

# Narcissistic isomorphisms: The ego, the masses, the *Urvater*, and the alterity

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## Abstract

This work proposes an exercise of critical and deconstructive intertextuality regarding Freud's text on mass formation and the implications of the ego's different dimensions. The ego is comprised of a representational system that transforms the representations derived from the reality of a traumatic sexual event into an opposite and compact mass. The ego is social, even in its majesty and heroism; but it is asocial in its subordination to symptoms. Both narcissism—through its idealisations, and the ego—through its identifications, engender a path for a mass psychology that exalts the position of the *Urvater* of the horde (the primal father) as a self-sufficiency model for an anti-solidarity individualism. The narcissistic ego modulates and models a fascinating connection between the masses and the *Führer* (leader) in the possibility of occurrences of the law, doubt, and responsibility. In addition, it can be erected as an imposture and as a self-deception ideal.

## KEYWORDS

alterity, ego, ideal, identification, narcissism, *Urvater*

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

In Freud's (1921/1999) text on the imaginary composition of the masses, he proposed the ego as massified and magnified, consistent with Le Bon's characterisation. Attributes from metapsychology are attributed to the unconscious and manifest in the ego in the form of a lack of doubt and the admission of contradiction. Under these conditions, the mass is absolutely certain of what it does or is willing to do. It neither aims at truth nor appears to be concerned with it because it emerges as an incarnation or a supreme realisation of the truth. The mass only appears to require someone who directs it, someone with absolute credibility, and someone to submit to. Every leader requires a fold or a fence to

concentrate, dominate, and control their followers, who are conceived of as beasts. The leader is the master of these beasts. Derrida (2010) stated that the sovereign, the criminal, and the beast, encounter each other beyond the law: 'between the sovereign, the criminal, and the beast, there's a dark and fascinating complicity, even a disturbing mutual attraction, a disturbing familiarity' (p. 36; all citations from French and Spanish references have been translated to English by the authors).

A fascinating attraction can emerge between the mass and its conductor, similar to a herd that instinctually submits to the master's power (Freud, 1921/1999). This invokes and convokes the more fascinating aspects of the narcissistic ego. The master is personified in the primal father figure, installed and instated by the self-sufficiency ideal. He is also an ideal of infatuation and imposture because he sustains the absolute belief in the ability to perform any act, criminal or bestial, without sanctions. It is also the same posture that masses might assume.

## 2 | THE MAGNIFIED AND MASSIFIED EGO

Freud attributed the ego constitution to failed or broken alterity relationships, a historical flow of lost bonds; thus, a distinctive seal is embedded in the Oedipus complex. The ego is a social production insofar as it is derived from the relationships that it sustains, in which the other is considered a model, an object, a helper, and an adversary (Freud, 1921/1999). The ties of admiration, sexual and amorous appetite, support and assistance, as well as confrontation and opposition to the other, induce the formation of an individually social and socially individual ego. This ego, which Freud (1923/1999) presented as an altered fraction of the id, due to external influences, depicts the others' interference in its differentiated and corporal surface. Freud (1921/1999) positioned the ego in psychical conflict, whether it results in neurosis, an opposition between the id and the ego; or psychosis, an alteration between the relationships between the ego and the external world. In Freud's text on the masses, the ego is portrayed as fundamentally structured through an identificatory process in which it adopts the other as a model. In the case of neuroses, although the ego engages in the repressive process, it is subordinated to the external world's requirements and the superego's commandments.

The commandments, according to Freud (1923–24/1999), proceed from the external world in the form of imposed speeches that introduce limits to the ego. Subsequently, the ego must preserve its '*Einheitlichkeit*' (Freud, 1923–24/1999, p. 388), a sort of unity. It must avoid fragmentation while experiencing both the drive siege and the distorted representations of the commands that arise in the superego. In this sense, repression derives from the preservation of the unity and the homogeneity of the ego, and, as a narcissistic posture, prompts Freud (1914/1999) to state that it comes from the '*Selbstachtung des Ichs*' (p. 160), the respect of the ego for itself. The self inscribes in the 'ego's relationship with the other, the subject's relationship with that same other, with that semblable in relation to which it has constituted itself, in an essential structure of human relationship' (Lacan, 1953–54/1981, p. 88). By doing so, repression supposes the other that leads in reality or in the superego and that calls for respect, either for itself or its speeches. Freud (1914/1999) provided confirmation in this statement, while indicating that repression finally depends on the formation of the ideal, in which the others form the external world and the others' speech commandment takes part. The unicity, the homogeneity, and the uniformity, which ideally define the ego in its narcissistic structure and cause it to undergo repression as something that could define or situate the masses in its imaginary conjunction, appear to be essential elements to include in the analysis of Freud's text on the masses.

This deconstruction of the concepts that result in ensemble, namely the ego and the masses, were present in Freud's thinking in 1893 (Freud, 1893–95/1999). In his works on the formation of neurotic symptoms, he discussed an ego that did not admit representations that had the potential to be intolerant or irreconcilable. This prompts the following question: In regard to what? Clearly, in Freud's perspective of the traumatic interference in the neuro-psychoses of defense, those representations were derived from the sexual event, the sexual submission of a young person to an adult. He proposed a social–sexual genesis of neurotic suffering, mediated by a series of unbearable

representations that must be excluded from the ego. The motive of exclusion and repression was in the production of a non-pleasurable sensation that emanated from the 'Unverträglichkeit' (Freud, 1893–95/1999, p. 174). This refers to the incompatibility between the repressed ideas, with 'der herrschenden Vorstellungsmasse des Ich,' the group, or 'mass,' of representations that dominates the ego. The ego, coated in a mass of representations, undertook a defensive task in the face of those untreatable representations with which it cannot socialise or conciliate. With its mass of dominant ideas, the ego pretended to dominate the sexual experience representations—with no success. The symptoms were the proof of its failure.

Before the ego is embedded in the masses, thereby cancelling its individuality, its moral conscience, and its identity in the fury of collective action, Freud (1923–24/1999) demonstrated how the ego is dominated by a mass of representations that cause it to reject other representations. These representations, remitting to an act of sexual submission hardly possible to verbalise and, therefore, hardly representable, could make the subject succumb to a state of psychotic confusion, as in this ego; and, as a last instance, discards any of these representations. This representation, being so integrated into a fragment of reality, causes the ego to detach from reality, as a result of the ego's separation from that same representation. The ego is dominated by an ideational mass within the social reality insofar as it cannot impose its dominion on the unbearable representation.

It is notable that Freud designates this defensive posture of the ego, in order to understand the representational conflict that becomes overwhelming, in which the ego has the position of 'Nichtwissen' (Freud, 1893–95/1999, p. 269)—not knowing, and 'bewusstes-Nichtwissenwollen' (p. 269)—not wanting to know. In other words, the ego's mass representations inspire ignorance and aspire to ignorance. Freud (1921/1999) highlighted that, for Le Bon, the masses came to ignore every ethical and moral limitation and immerse themselves in an omnipotent position. The masses equally neglect every sense of responsibility even when they are willing to perform any type of sacrifice, and the representations conforming these masses cause the ego to break with many things that it defends in other moments.

The ego conforms to the mass that does not create an associative bond with the sexual representations. These could be attached to the ego that only wants to know what the mass conductor wants. It is the ego insofar as it inscribes itself as a support for a mass of ideas, wherein the detention of the subject's history is organized. With the ego, through its defensive form, and the intolerant desire to repudiate the memories related to the traumatic sexual encounter, it is about not wanting to know anything about the history. Both the representational masses that dominate the ego and the ideas, beliefs, and certainties of the masses that diluted the subject's ego do not want to know anything about the history: they resist knowing their history to historicise themselves. Ignorance is their vote and passion. They ignore their ignorance, owing to their cover-up conducted by judging undoubtable, unquestionable knowledge.

Questioning the emptiness within Le Bon's ideational system was fundamental for Freud. Why did he not question himself regarding the mass conductor, if the history of humanity is marked by the presence and the name of those who directed collectives of Iliads and Odysseys, exoduses, and travels to conquer communities and geographical discoveries? Where is the ideational factor, namely, the sustaining agent of judgment that foresees and advances the mass actions? Freud (1921/1999), instigated by the research challenge, repeats what he did in his exhaustive inquiry regarding psychical dream work. He expands the knowledge on the state of the subject he is inquiring into, not without questioning it, and finding its sector for prejudices, namely, its aprioristic masses. He concluded that the experts in the field of dreams and social masses do not know enough about those matters, which have not become central issues. Freud reassessed Le Bon's and other authors' statements, and revamped his ego theory. He revalued the formation of an ego from the psychic complexities of the masses and from his correlate of social presence and representation, designated as an identity, which is only stated, according to González (1991), 'in relation to an alterity that allows to set up the difference' (p. 25). However, to the extent that this otherness is also a discourse, the other's discourse, identity is not a compact, homogenous subjective–social formation. It involves different experience registers. In other words, it involves not only relations of imaginary identifications but also alienating conditions of the symbolic order and the elements of the real that have not been integrated into the subjective memory.

Freud undertakes, to a certain extent, a deconstructive effort in relation to Le Bon's discourse of the dominant concepts in his presuppositions about mass behaviour (Derrida, 2010). Freud posits a fundamental question as a researcher of the social–affective bond. This question also supports the clinic of subjectivity in social discomfort: What are masses made of? To the extent that there is no difference between what is individual and what is social, the question implies what leads to the constitution of the subject. It would be important to say, regarding Freud's (1921/1999) work on the masses, that it is pertinent to question how the ego comes into being. One must ask how this ego that in hysteria appears to be comprised of ideational masses and that in these masses seems to become lost in an omnipotence, anonymity, and irresponsibility *jouissance* comes to being. One must account for the fact that, as Pommier (1987) stated, 'the powers signs are, in first place, signs of *jouissance*' (p. 31). It may find solace or expand in the exercise of a power directed toward something unlimited, or that power, in its expansion, may supply enjoyment that seems endless.

### 3 | THE EGO'S NARCISSIST FEUD

Freud was concerned with demonstrating diverse ego positions in his conceptualisations. In 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,' Freud (1905/2006) observed, in a footnote published in 1910, a statement regarding the narcissistic circuit that accounts for the genesis of masculine homosexuality. Freud again mentions the circuit in his text on the masses to illustrate the mutation of an investment or libidinal otherness in identification. The ego, unconsciously assuming in its subjective condition the dominant presence of the maternal figure, searches for objects in its environment that allow a reencounter with its infantile or juvenile image, interested in her. The ego is narcissistic in this love object election. However, as written in 'On Narcissism: An Introduction' (Freud, 1914/1999), that ego is also seeking under the anaclitic modality, objects that nurture and protect it. If these satisfy narcissism, love is, in its complete form, fully and ostentatiously narcissistic. Nonetheless, the paradigmatic other, in this case, of homosexuality, is the maternal figure that, 'being someone who is more advanced in existence than the child' (Lacan, 1957–58/1999, p. 2005), inserts the subject in the dimension of desire, in her desire regime. The maternal figure exhibits an intense libidinal alterity modality because she inadvertently fixates or seals a mode of incorporating or seeking her love in others, through the election of the object.

Freud (1910/1999a) resorted to this process of transmutation of the libidinal investment, directed to the mother figure in identification, to elucidate Leonardo da Vinci's probable homosexuality. Repression mediates this passage from object election to identification. In that context, a translation of figures of alterity is observed. The mother transitions from an object for possession, although sealed by and closed by the social commandment that prohibits incest, to a model, after whose resemblance the ego must be configured. In this case, the subject's ego was an alter for the mother because it was considered an intensely loved object. The individuals who are subsequently elected as beloved objects are replacements and renewals, or restitutions of themselves. Namely, the others are extensions and restorations of an ego that creates social bonds through this method, homogenising or unifying its alterity. The otherness constitutes a resumption of kind narcissism, in a specular space, made possible by an excessive tenderness of the mother.

Notably, Freud appears to insufficiently deepen an element that correlates with his unmeasured tenderness from the mother's part, which seems destined to weaken a hostile passion and that refers to a father's recoil attitude. It is unknown whether this recoil, dimension, or relegation is executed by the father who excludes himself or moves away from the mother–son relationship, or if it is something that the mother effectuates. This is stipulated by Lacan (1957–58/1999), who discussed a mother that dictates the law to the father. Freud (1910/1999a) noted that Sadger proposed that the mother energetic character of the 'Mannweiber' (p. 169), a king of manly woman, such that it expels the father from the place that is meant for him, as part of the function that interdicts the incestuous relationship, which allows differentiation from the maternal desire. In other words, there is also a renewal of an expelling of the difference, whose structural plot belongs to the symbolic register. A mother who cancels the sexual difference and

renews or re-edits herself in a child who expels the sexual difference selects men who must resemble the mother's immeasurably beloved child.

Nevertheless, Lacan (1957–58/1999) contended that this evicted father, expelled from the place that is meant for him in the dialectics of desire and law in the Oedipal adventure, finds a type of restitution. In the homosexual position, phantasmic and oneiric scenes depict a type of warlike bet, in which the partner constitutes a virtual replacement of the father. Similarly, the imaginary montages situate, before the anguish of penetrating the woman's vagina, the spectrum of the 'hostile phallus, the paternal phallus, the phallus both phantasmic and absorbed by the mother, whose only power resides in the female organ' (Lacan, 1957–58/1999, p. 217). There, where Freud presents a dynamic of male homosexuality as predominantly reduced to the child and the maternal figure, nearly replicating his theory concerning the disdain for the father, Lacan insists on repositioning the father's structural place, not only beside his hostile phallus but also unfavoured by the maternal figure.

#### 4 | THE HEROIC EGO

Before the narcissistic position of the ego is described, Freud (1907–08/1999) ascribed to it a heroic role in the literary speech and scene. This central role, as ascribed by the poet or in phantasy as imaginary wish fulfilment, is performed to acquire the other's comprehension and empathy, to obtain that response from a society that expects achievement and to be rescued. Within this ego resides a narcissistic, invulnerable presence that anticipates stigma.

As an example of the heroic position of the ego, in his novel *The Magic Mountain*, Mann (1972) confessed that Hans Cartop is 'our hero' (p. 163). Nonetheless, he neither saves nor rescues anyone. He did not save Joachim, his cousin, from a terrible illness and did not win over the woman he loved. He arrives in perfect health at a place where the daily register and balance of body temperature is part of the collective speech and becomes ill afterward. However, he manages to overcome the disease by the end of the story. Perhaps therein lies his heroism if we consider the following statement made by Naphta, a character who exudes ethical and philosophical reflections throughout the story: 'Illness is perfectly human... as being human means being sick' (Mann, 1972, p. 148). Overcoming an illness that has annihilated many men could be considered a superhuman, heroic accomplishment.

Caillois' (1987) conception of a hero was an individual capable of finding a blissful or unfortunate exit to a conflictive, dangerous situation that others have failed to overcome. Mann (1972) referred to him as 'life's spoiled son' (p. 439), dedicating the final chant to him as a celebration of his 'beating [the disease] with his spirit' (p. 429). However, he warns him that he will not be able to 'survive (the deadly war celebration) with his body' (Mann, 1972, p. 439). Perhaps this heroism could be destined, in present times, for individuals who have survived a COVID-19 infection, which can be fatal. The images of individuals who have been ill being released from the hospitalisation required to treat COVID-19 appear to note and to celebrate this heroism.

Freud (1921/1999) returns to the hero, stating that the poet uses this figure to present his narcissistic aspirations while subduing the tyrannical, hoard-dominating father. A father creates and recreates his jouissance in the possession of women and injection of fear into his children. To annihilate the father, exempt of every genealogy and history, the heroic ego subtracts itself from the fraternal collective, which subsists in submission and persecutory anguish in the face of this supreme master. The father can be its ideal model of invulnerability, which feeds its yearning to substitute him. The first ideal is that which can simultaneously be feared and revered. Namely, it is the ideal of a tense and intense respect for his complete and all-powerful image. Again, the respect ideal that encourages repression is observed.

The poetized hero's deeds also require the participation of the mother's desire. The mother prefers this son, and it appears that she prefers him over the father. This preference does not necessarily entail an abundant tenderness, as noted in the discussion of the process behind the psychic genesis of homosexuality. However, the mother purports to keep the son apart from the despotic father's jealous hostility and encourages the son to commit parricide. Thus, this act as an end to the father's powerful fickleness, the father being someone who does not allow desire in alterity, or

alterity in desire, is in actuality manufactured or provided by the mother. The hero occupies the place of the invulnerable, non-castrated father, just as the son yearned to do at the beginning of the Oedipal history. He owes his mother a debt, who is now accessible as a motive of suspicion. Who can guarantee that there will not always be some other who will be preferred? The hero thus will have been the poet's alibi to individualise the phantasy of murdering the father. No hero does not confront himself with the family will of '*Aufzehrung von Interessen*' (Freud, 1905/1999), an interest absorption, which has an incestuous approach.

Each of the children would be a heroic ego attending to the cultural demand of the incest barrier, for which it is necessary to deflect the parents' absorbing bonds to constitute higher social unities (Freud, 1905/1999). In this sense, these unities adhere to the drive of Eros characterised by Freud (1920/1990) as always reuniting larger unities in everything organic. The unity expansion and the introduction of new vital differences is a binding task belonging to a social, symbolic Eros. This Eros, which generates new social vitality bonds and guarantees the incest barrier, initially opposes the father figure in the primitive horde. This is why he must be annihilated.

In this respect, notably, the symbolic aspect of the Eros, which integrates unities that make a difference, can be paradoxically tied to the repetition compulsion inscribed in the death drive's path. Lacan (1954–55/1984) believed that, by operating the symbolic regime beyond the pleasure principle, it eclipses the narcissistic power of the ego. Guillerault (2020) reaffirmed this: 'There where Freud will be compromised to a biological research, Lacan will extract from there the tracks to articulate the symbolic potency, a spring able to signify repetition' (p. 109).

## 5 | THE SYMPTOM AS AN ALTERITY TRAIT

There is nothing heroic about the suffering, insufficient ego of the neurotic symptom. It refers, rather, to a narcissistic collapse. Freud (1910/1999b) occupied himself with the hysterical blindness that signals the path in which the ego resorts to the loss of control over an organ, such as the eye, and a function, such as vision, because they are implied in the satisfaction of repressed sexual drives. Organ and function answer to erotic aspirations, willing to reach toward and apprehend the sexual object. The subject is pleased and with that which he pleases himself with, a type of punitive reckoning is applied. This refers to Saint Matthew's evangelic sentence, which dictates that if a part of the body leads to sin, it must be eliminated (Sagrada Biblia, 2003, Mateo 5:29). The ego prepares itself for punishment, just as it has lent itself to *voyeuristic jouissance*. However, more than a punishment disposition, there is a punishment that imposes itself and demands the ego through a punitive voice (Freud, 1910/1999b).

The superego voice reassures the subject as deserving of the punishment inasmuch as he intended to abuse and misuse sensual pleasure through the eye and the view (Freud, 1910/1999b). That voice emanates from a superego that purports to possess extensive knowledge of the evil pretensions that the subject's ego appears or prefers to ignore. It detects evil in that ego, which transcends using the vision to obtain pleasure and detects the evil in that pleasure and the eagerness to abusively and treacherously use it. The symptom sets aside the subject of the social bond and entrenches him in the martyrdom *jouissance*, in the fulfilment of a wish for punishment. Therefore, Freud (1921/1999) noted that even if neurosis and mass formation are opposites, the religious illusion makes martyrdom and punitive sacrifice, outside of the symptom, a cult motivation, part of the community culture and mystic and religious communication.

Nonetheless, the symptom represents a form of solidarity with the other and indicates a solid relationship with the other. In this sense, the symptom is highlighted as the residue of a fragmentary identification with one other, with its punitive component, interpreting it as a loan as '*einen einzigen Zug*' (Freud, 1921/1999, p. 117), a single trait of the other with whom an affective bond has been established. It copies him in a manner that expands singularity, which constitutes its suffering condition. In Dora's case, an alterity scenario, belonging to the Oedipal constellation, is depicted, and this trait is mimicked as a symptom. A punitive voice denounces the fact that Dora yearned to occupy the place of the mother who possesses the father; thus, she must now assume the symptom of coughing. The symptom declares her love for the father as martyrdom.

Frau K, as Lacan (1956–57/1994) proposed, represents for her father a figure who transcends the love that could be destined to come to Dora. She does not know what that is because it is commonly asked, 'What is that he sees in her that I lack?' If Dora cannot take phallic properties from her father, perhaps her cough will be that trait that situates her father as one who suffers because of her desire. The cough is a comprehension trait that signals the daughter's imaginary identification with the father. The symptom is a copy of something from the other that forges singular bonds, such as the bond that may result from knowing that the partner one shares a household with replied with a hysterical reaction to a letter from a secret lover. That symptom could be copied in virtue of what would be properly called a desire of identification. It is not an unfolded identification but an '*in dieselbe Lage Versetzenkönnen oder Versetzenwollens*' (Freud 1921/1999, p. 118), which could be translated as being able or wanting to put oneself in the same situation. Because of this, Freud (1921/1999) mentions a sentimental disposition, in which the subject arranges to move to the place occupied by the person he has identified with, knowing that his symptomatic trait responds to a hidden passion.

## 6 | HATRED ON THE THRESHOLD OF OTHERNESS AND THE EXQUISITELY MONUMENTAL FATHER

In the beginning, the ego, in its narcissistic condition, does not require the other (Freud, 1915/1999). It finds in itself complacency modes and autoerotic satisfaction. Nonetheless, it cannot be self-reliant. It requires others to survive. Hate appears before love insofar as this ego manifests an original repudiation of the external world, of the other in reality. This exhibits its lack, which demonstrates how incapable it is of subsisting on its own. This is why the first idealisation of this ego is self-reliant and capable of presenting in its primary love bonds with the object the incorporation or devouring of it, to not be exposed to frustration any longer. Hatred reflects the struggle of the ego for the sake of its sustenance and affirmation (Freud, 1915/1999). The ego maintains and reassures itself by fighting with others who confront it with its lack of plenitude and self-sufficiency. The ego of the sons of the father of the primitive horde finds itself in such a situation. They represent, for the father, a constant threat, namely the risk of losing his omnipotent position. The father is, to the sons, the ideal grandiose, dominant, and phallic image that every son yearns toward, but they are constantly exposed to impugnation. This leads Freud to identify the father as a first affective bond, the first model of identification without battle or conflict. It is the narcissistic ideal of the power of self-sufficiency. This father neither depends on nor requires anyone, supposedly. He is the incarnation of God, the portrayal of an image of totality and unity. Therefore, he is available to exercise power and the rejection of otherness.

The father of the horde appears to undoubtedly be paranoid to the same extent that he possesses the certainty of wanting to be stripped of his powerfully narcissistic attributes and attributions. He trusts no one. He can only require and spy on the fear of the other as a measure of protection. We could take a risk and state that there is no tyrannical power, such as that sustained by this 'Urvater,' to which it does not correspond to a position of unbending paranoid suspicion. This version of the first father contrasts with that of the ideal father of phallic enormity, with that of the father whose grandiosity the child would like to emulate by being the same as him and '*in allen Stücken an seine Stelle treten*' (Freud 1921/1999, p. 115), to occupy its place in all respects. The son wants and is required to be akin to the father, who is exquisite because he is everything for him. The first impulse is toward identification with an immense father, with a father who is 'all love' (Lacan, 1969–70/1999, p. 105) and without ambivalence. This father happens to be the first entity to love and imitate. For that reason, anguish and panic appear when the ego is forced to break the amorous and idealised bond with the '*Führer*' (Freud, 1921/1999, p. 106). The subject is lost because he has lost the two bonds that sustain him in the group: that which links him to the exquisite figure of the leader and that which links him to a group. The subject regards himself as reduced to the maximum of vulnerability and helplessness because, in relation to the '*Führer*, '*das Irrewerden an ihm*' (Freud, 1921/1999, p. 106), what can be expected from him is unknown. All trust is shattered.

An example of this is contained in Fernando Benítez's (2014) tale, '*El Rey Viejo*', which narrates President Venustiano Carranza's effort to take his cabinet to Veracruz (Mexico) in 1920. The War Secretary employs the word 'panic'

to describe the state of the troops while they are besieged by shots from adversaries to the 'Tren Dorado.' This phrase is shouted at the president. Carranza asks the man to calm down, affirming that it would be possible to recover via a rearrangement of the forces. But the secretary tells him, 'Nobody, sir, will be able to rearrange anything' (Benítez, 2014, p. 78). In other words, not even him, as president, will be able to rearrange anything. It is not simple; that is, that the president is as lost as the troops and that it is impossible to rely on him and his power. Thus, as stated in the novel, the investment of this type of leader represents the following, in a vast mode:

*a power that both brings and takes life away, that forgives and condemns, that can do good and result in misfortune, with the gesture, with the word of a God, stripped off of its justice and love, as how it gives us grace, whether we deserve it or not, because of its absolute omnipotence and because everything he gives, he gives it freely.*

(Benítez, 2014, p. 51)

This president-God, ruling with absolute omnipotence, refers to the figure of the fascinating father in his grandiosity, the father of the primordial love identification. If this figure of immense and constant gifts cannot maintain its position of providing full protection, everything is lost. The flight of the Carranza troops corresponds to this panic, to the extent that his military body lost its head leader and that he lost his mind as he continues to be deceived, believing that the situation remains manageable.

Freud (1914/1999) was already announcing his psychology of the masses by warning that the ideal was not reduced to the narcissistic ego. The ideal trespasses the ego and takes it to the otherness that appears, from time to time, disavowed from the ecstatic position of narcissism: Aside from its individual participation, the ideal has a social element and is also the collective ideal of a family, a social class, and a nation (Freud, 1914/1999). Since the text on the masses (Freud, 1921/1999) supports an epistemological approach of the individual being social as well, collective ideals are also transferred toward the individual by means of a reconfiguration, and narcissism characterises a collective, family, and country. The ideals that bond a community are motives of narcissistic pride and enjoyment. That is, narcissism concerns the leader who does not need to love anyone, who is allowed to be dominant in nature, and who is absolutely narcissist, though self-confident, and independent (Freud, 1921/1999). Invested in the narcissism of the absolute, the garment of the absolutist power, the *Führer*, allegedly a master by nature, is utterly confident in himself, but not in the others, and the others will never be confident in him, as De la Boetie (2008) proposed:

*The tyrant's favorites can never be sure of being so, because they themselves have shown him that he can do anything and that no right or duty compels him to do anything, so that the tyrant begins to believe that his whims are his only reason, that none of his favorites, therefore, can be his friend and that he has no choice but to become the master of all. (p. 72)*

The *Führer*, as a master, appears not to need to love anyone but himself. He is highly confident in himself, anchored in an absolute narcissistic pleasing of himself (Freud, 1921/1999), the self-sufficiency narcissism. As a result, he cannot let himself be questioned by anyone and is convinced that his ideals must mirror those of his followers and the collectives. Similarly, his certainty of the obedience of his followers as fulfillers of his ideals as if they were their own is, for the *Führer*, the supreme jouissance. The ideal is governed by the illusion of obedience.

Disobedience generates intense ego guilt because it positions itself in the place of submission in the face of the Other as disobeying the ideal and, simultaneously, defying it. The ideal, at the same time, disposes of a regulatory–evaluative power, a vigilant power that demands that its commandments be fulfilled. It possesses a moral conscience that is, relentlessly unfair. Those ideals take the place of an ego that is, purported and proposed to be self-sufficient and narcissistic; thus, satisfying them provides a narcissistic jouissance. Nonetheless, there is a trap in this imaginary imposture. Pommier (1987) stated the following:



*The problem with enjoying that Other and making him enjoy can be easily solved; it is enough to serve him, to be his guarantor. In order to do this, it is convenient to be what this Other is lacking. But what it is lacking is emptiness, and nothing can ever fill it. (p. 102)*

In other words, the *Führer* exposes his own lack, his castration, to the extent that he requires his followers for his jouissance, by fulfilling its narcissistic ideals. What enlarges him also belittles him. He is not as self-reliant or self-confident as he believes himself to be, to the extent that he requires the others as providers and guarantors of his jouissance. Moreover, as Freud (1913/1999) observed, no one wants to take the place of the *Urvater*. Nobody from the phratry wants to be the master because they know that it attracts a murdering disposition and that it is doomed to be annihilated.

## 7 | CLOSING THOUGHTS

In the text on the masses (Freud, 1921/1999), narcissism prompts community establishment, which is full of shared ideals. These ideas could be the *Führer's*, but they could also be ideas of hate and intolerance. The ideal, when converging as a creed in the collective sphere, creates a double bind: on one side, narcissistic love for those who share the ideals and, conversely, a hostility toward those who do not. As highlighted by Freud (1921/1999), a love religion is equated with hate toward those who believe in something else. Belonging to the same region is asserted and strengthened by manifesting a repulsion that is, difficult to overcome, repulsion towards geographic neighbours. As a result, it is possible to discern narcissism in hate and intolerance toward what is different. In hate, the ground of every affective bond presents as one of its faces. Lauru (2015) described this as the possibility of 'differentiating and affirming myself in my singularity' (p. 12). Freud (1921/1999) emphasised this as a manifestation inherent to 'love toward oneself' (p. 112) that leads to an intolerance of what is different, as it is experienced as an attack on the ego's narcissistic affirmation and conservation. In fully devastating the other, even beyond his dead, this hatred finds narcissistic enjoyment. That event is what Zoja (2015) described as occurring when subversive mobilization imposes intolerance toward people, or a world, that is unacceptable and repulsive. An exercise of excessive cruelty is observed:

*A destructive excess (even when it is frequently found in creative people) reveals a narcissistic pathology that floats in the environment: a need that, even when it refers to society, is still personal. The defiant challenge comes from loving competition, fighting, conflict, perceived as vital and sense carrying by themselves. (Zoja, 2015, p. 122)*

The need to provoke the other, defy him, and compete against him is vital even when it is lethal, implying jouissance insofar as it entails 'the evilness of the neighbor' (Lacan, 1959-60/1990, p. 223). That need is narcissistic, and it is animated by a narcissism that can only preserve or confirm itself in that recalcitrant manner. The ego of the excess, of the surplus of enjoyment in the other's destructive incitation, appears to have been extremely individualised without being heroic. It also seems to be alien to anything collective, unless this sphere mirrors its narcissistic omnipotence and perfection ideals, becoming closer to the primitive horde father image, who had the need to be feared by his children to bolster his absolute dominion and control pretension. This image was configured in an arbitrary exercise of power, of totalitarian State power that, as posited by Bauman (2015), was applied in a fickle manner while exempting itself from logic and law. Totalitarian State power reproduces itself in every ego of the highly socialised competitiveness, in every society comprising individuals who did not find, in collectivity, an opportunity for compromise and solidarity.

The model of the total dominion of the *Urvater* is also that of sophisticated but systematic self-deception. It is the exaltedness of individuals who have the certainty of governing without ever being questioned or questioning themselves. This is the model of someone such as Thomas W. Wilson who, in his most portentous self-confidence, regarded himself as God or as delegated by God in the world: 'In January of 1918, Wilson was sure of being able to upgrade the war into a crusade, by the principles of the Sermon of the Mount, through the power of his words. His identification

with Christ guided his speeches' (Freud & Bullit, 1997, p. 226). He trusted his grandiloquent power to be sufficient to warrant and achieve 'the perfect peace he had promised' (Freud & Bullit, 1997, p. 231), to solve World War I. The *Urvater's* narcissistic ideal of conceit, related to that of self-sufficiency, grandeur, and perfection, fortunately does not invariably ascribe to the leader of a collectivity experience.

Oskar Schindler rescued thousands of Jews who worked in his factory in World War II. Steven Spielberg's film *Schindler's List* (1993) exposed, in the end, the leader of a group being dissatisfied with his work of salvation. Schindler is far from considering himself a hero, insofar as he intensely regrets not having done enough. Contrary to the narcissistic figure of the heroic ego who saves everyone, Schindler laments that he could have saved more lives if he had sacrificed his car or some other valuable item to 'buy' more Jewish lives. He is capable of questioning his act and questioning himself in his act. For this leader, having stewarded one of the most persecuted and massacred groups in the history of humanity, the recognition of the fault could reveal the inherent incompleteness of the symbolic order. There is no complete Schindler's list, and there cannot be a full Schindler's list. Schindler cannot save everyone. This ethical stance creates an opening in the imaginary, revealing the falsity of its imposture and introducing it to the symbolic field and the dimension of lack.

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
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