Received: 18 March 2019 | Accepted: 23 May 2019

DOI: 10.1002/ppi.1510

ARTICLE

WILEY

A Jungian perspective on the unity of mind and body and its relevance to 21st-century politics

Maxine Sheets-Johnstone

University of Oregon, Eugene, OR

Correspondence
concerning this article should be addressed to Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Department of Philosophy, Susan Campbell Hall, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1295, USA.
Email: msj@uoregon.edu

Abstract

This article begins by putting basic themes in Jung's psychoanalytic in the context of present-day conceptual predilections that warrant questioning, specifically in relation to feeling and to being a body. The questioning leads to insights into the dynamic congruency of emotions and movement, to the political reality of demonstrations, protests, marches and so on, and from there to Jung's notion of a “psychic epidemic,” an epidemic that takes hold by way of a “totalitarian mass state.” At one point, Jung states that such epidemics can be mitigated only by “collective therapy.” Jung does not describe this form of therapy. On the way to specifying and describing just what practice might constitute “collective therapy,” the article focuses on what Jung specifies as the interconnected nature of the self, the living body, symbolic thought and the basic unity of psyche and body. The article's specification and description of “collective therapy” is anchored first in a real-life, real-time 20th-century description of the international power of kinetic silence. The article then documents the historical nature of that power by way of classicists' descriptions of real-life, real-time community circle dances that silently attest to the value of moving in concert.

KEYWORDS

circle dances, collective hysteria and collective therapy, emotions, feeling, living body and symbols of the self, our mother tongue, spirit and matter

 © 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

> *It accords better with experience to suppose that living matter has a psychic aspect, and the psyche a physical aspect . . . all reality would be grounded on an as yet unknown substrate possessing material and at the same time psychic qualities. In view of the trend of modern theoretical physics, this assumption should arouse fewer resistances than before (Jung, 1970a, p. 411).*

> *It would be an unpardonable sin of omission were one to overlook the* feeling-value *of the archetype. This is extremely important both theoretically and therapeutically (Jung, 1969, p. 119).*

> *The concept of the archetype has been misunderstood so often that one can hardly mention it without having to explain it anew each time. It is derived from the repeated observation that, for instance, the myths and fairytales of world literature contain definite motifs which crop up everywhere. We meet these same motifs in the fantasies, dreams, deliriums, and delusions of individuals living today. These typical images and associations are what I call archetypal ideas. The more vivid they are, the more they will be coloured by particularly strong feeling-tones. This accentuation gives them a special dynamism in our psychic life. They impress, influence, and fascinate us (Jung, 1970a, p. 449).*

> *For thousands of years the mind of man has worried about the sick soul, perhaps even earlier than it did about the sick body. The propitiation of gods, the perils of the soul and its salvation, these are not yesterday's problems. Religions are psychotherapeutic systems in the truest sense of the word, and on the grandest scale (Jung, 1970a, p. 172).*

> *I have called the mediating or 'uniting' symbol which necessarily proceeds from a sufficiently great tension of opposites the "self." I chose this term in order to make clear that I am concerned primarily with the formulation of empirical facts and not with dubious incursions into metaphysics. There I would trespass upon all manner of religious convictions. Living in the West, I would have to say Christ instead of "self," in the Near East it would be Khidr, in the Far East atman or Tao or the Buddha, in the Far West maybe a hare or Mondamin, and in cabalism it would be Tigereth. Our world has shrunk, and it is dawning on us that humanity is* one, *with one* psyche. *Humility is a not inconsiderable virtue which should prompt Christians, for the sake of charity—the greatest of all virtues—to set a good example and acknowledge that though there is only* one *truth it speaks in many tongues, and that if we still cannot see this it is simply due to a lack of understanding. No one is so godlike that he alone knows the true word (Jung, 1970a, p. 410).*

It is notable that virtually all highly esteemed aspects of being human are "embodied" by present-day researchers. We thus read of "embodied subjectivity" (Hanna & Thompson, 2003; Jensen & Moran, 2013; Zahavi, 2005), "embodied mind" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), "embodied language" (Gibbs, 2006), "embodied experience" (Gallagher, 2000), "embodied cognition" (Depraz, 2008; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991), "embodied self-awareness" (Zahavi, 2002), "embodied action" (Varela et al., 1991), "embodied simulations of actions, emotions, and sensations" (Freedberg & Gallese, 2007), and even of "embodied movement" (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; Gibbs, 2006; Varela & Depraz, 2005). It is an equally notable, if seemingly passed over, fact that *feelings* are not embodied. Why are *they* not embodied? Or is the more exacting question, why do feelings not need embodying? Supposing the answer is that feelings are already embodied, the subsequent question is, why are feelings not equally valued? That is, why are they not as highly prized and esteemed as "embodied mind" and "embodied cognition"? Moreover a further question might be asked, a complex question having expanding levels of inquiry: Why is being a body—not *having* a body, but *being* a body—foundational to all those aspects of human being that *are* embodied?—unless, of course, a body itself paradoxically first needs to be embodied, perhaps in a way akin

to the way in which *the brain* in present-day neuroscience actually needs to be embodied in order to account for the real-time, real-life experiences of individuals. The brain is, after all, part of a whole-body nervous system, not a brain-in-a-vat. To be so recognized would surely nullify the wayward practice of making experiential ascriptions to *the brain*.[1] Finally, too, it might be asked why being a body is not elementally valued in itself in the way in which mind is elementally valued in itself, especially in view of the body being the locus of real-time, real-life feelings?

Feelings are natural, spontaneous dimensions of being a body. As both affectively and kinesthetically experienced, they are clearly dynamic. Sadness, disgust and disappointment move through us and move us to move in highly distinctive ways, ways that are different from joy, anger and curiosity, for example. Indeed, affective feelings *move us to move in ways that are dynamically distinct* (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999; see also Sheets-Johnstone, 2019). Oddly enough, the foundational dynamic congruency of emotions to movement goes largely unrecognized, so much so that the relationship remains unacknowledged as a basic fact of animate life. The oversight is surprising given that Darwin's writings on the emotions of “man and animals” offer ample testimony to the basic fact (Darwin, 1965 [1872]). The basic fact is, furthermore, clearly apparent in everyday human life from human infancy onward to anyone who would observe and reflect. The oversight and veritable deficiency in acknowledging the relationship may, in fact, explain why, though people speak of political movements that foster protests, marches, demonstrations, walk-outs and so on, they fail to connect those movements to their generative source in feelings—or, if they do, they fail to see the foundational significance of that relationship and its motivational genesis in bodily felt dynamics, precisely in real-life, real-time feelings, whether of anger, dissatisfaction, resentment, offense or outrage. Clearly, the foundational relationship between emotions and movement warrants acknowledgement as the existential truth it is.

Jung detailed basic insights into the existential truth and its political extension. His rendition of feeling within the context of these insights warrants specification, particularly in terms of the questions posed above and the above-mentioned facts about feelings and their integral dynamics with respect to emotions and movement. Jung quite pointedly does not align feelings with emotions and thus specifically distinguishes between feeling and emotion. In his analysis of psychological types—thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition—-he states, “When I use the word ‘feeling’ in contrast to ‘thinking’, I refer to a judgment of value—for instance, agreeable or disagreeable, good or bad, and so on.” He clarifies the judgmental nature of feeling in relation to the other “psychological types,” stating that “*Feeling* as I mean it is (like thinking) a *rational* (i.e., ordering) function.” He succinctly sums up his specification of four “psychological types,” each of which describes a particular aspect of a subject–world relationship: “*Sensation* (i.e., sense perception) tells you that something exists; *thinking* tells you what it is; *feeling* tells you whether it is agreeable or not; and *intuition* tells you whence it comes and where it is going” (Jung, 1968, p. 49; see also Jung, 1976). He explicitly states, “Feeling according to this definition is not an emotion (which, as the word conveys, is involuntary)” (Jung, 1968, p. 49).

Jung's specification of feeling is akin to the specification of feeling in Buddhist psychology. As Buddhist monk and clinical psychologist Jack Kornfield points out, “primary feelings” are different from emotion (Kornfield, 2009, p. 129). Primary feelings are pleasurable, neutral or unpleasurable, thus akin to what Jung describes as “agreeable or disagreeable, good or bad, and so on” (Jung, 1968, p. 49). Such feelings can give rise to emotions proper, to grasping or jealousy, for example, or to joy and affection, thus to what Kornfield describes as positive or negative, healthy or unhealthy emotions. It should perhaps be noted that, though Jung was not a Buddhist, his study of Buddhist thought and practice sizably influenced his writings on the psyche and psychoanalysis. He, in fact, comments at one point that Buddhism, in its “extremely radical reformation of Hinduism,” was not an entirely new form of spirituality, but that, unlike “the Hindu pantheon swarming with millions of gods,” Buddhism “boldly introduced Man, who before that had not been represented at all” ‘(1970b, p. 370). References to Buddhism are indeed found in many of his books (e.g., Jung, 1968, 1970a, 1976, 1980).

Jung specifies *emotion* in fine-grained ways equal to his specification of feeling. Most significantly he states what appears a largely unrecognized fact of corporeal life, namely, that emotion “is not an activity of the individual but something that happens to him” (Jung, 1976, pp. 8–9). In short, emotion is indeed “involuntary”: though we are free

to choose what we do in light of our emotions, we are not free to choose the emotions themselves. Elsewhere, in his delineation of the unconscious and, specifically, in the context of his discussion of "autonomy" as a "general peculiarity of the unconscious," Jung gives a finer description of emotions. He first states that the "autonomy of the unconscious . . . begins where emotions are generated," and then goes on to specify their nature with a definitively negative twist: "Emotions are instinctive, involuntary reactions which upset the rational order of consciousness by their elemental outbursts." Here too, however, he again states the basic fact of life, namely that "Affects are not 'made' or willfully produced; they simply happen" (Jung, 1980, pp. 278–279).

However valid or questionable one finds his linking of emotions to the unconscious, and however valid or questionable one finds his description of them as "elemental outbursts" intruding on "the rational order of consciousness," his comments on the autonomy of the unconscious and its integral relationship to emotions are of decided import. They are, in fact, pointedly relevant to understandings of both national politics and human individuals, whether the latter are normal or pathologically disturbed. Consider the following exposition:

> *[N]othing produced by the human mind lies absolutely outside the psychic realm. Even the craziest idea must correspond to something in the psyche. We cannot suppose that certain minds contain elements that do not exist at all in other minds. Nor can we assume that the unconscious is capable of becoming autonomous only in certain people, namely in those predisposed to insanity. It is very much more likely that the tendency to autonomy is a more or less general peculiarity of the unconscious . . . . This tendency shows itself above all in affective states, including those of normal people. When in a state of violent affect[,] one says or does things which exceed the ordinary. Not much is needed: love and hate, joy and grief, are often enough to make the ego and the unconscious change places. Very strange ideas indeed can take possession of otherwise healthy people on such occasions. Groups, communities, and even whole nations can be seized in this way by psychic epidemics" (Jung, 1980, p. 278).*

1 | THE BODY AND THE UNITY OF BODY AND MIND IN JUNG'S PSYCHOANALYTIC

In his comments on a picture drawn by a patient, Jung comments, "The tree symbolizes earthbound corporeality, the snake emotionality and the possession of a soul. Without the soul, the body is dead, and without the body the soul is unreal. The union of the two, which is plainly imminent in this picture, would mean the animation of the body and the materialization of the soul" (Jung, 1983, p. 257). Elsewhere, in the course of comparing archetype to physiological instinct and noting that 'In archetypal conceptions and instinctual perceptions, spirit and matter confront one another on the psychic plane,' Jung concludes, "Matter and spirit both appear in the psychic realm as distinctive qualities of conscious contents' (Jung, 1969, p. 126). In his consideration of cultural and everyday conceptions of spirit, Jung again confronts the relationship of spirit to matter. For example, in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, specifically in the context of exploring "The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales," he notes, "In view of the intimate connection that exists between certain psychic processes and their physical parallels we cannot very well accept the total immateriality of the psyche" (Jung, 1980, p. 212). Several observations that follow his affirmation of a discernible if limited materiality of the psyche illuminate different aspects of "the intimate connection." To begin with, Jung calls attention to the fact that "Although the idea of immateriality does not in itself exclude that of reality, popular opinion invariably associates reality with materiality." He goes on to counter "popular opinion," noting that "Spirit and matter may well be forms of one and the same transcendental being. For instance, the Tantrists, with as much right, say that matter is nothing other than the concreteness of God's thoughts" (Jung, 1980, p. 212). Moreover—and most significantly—before proceeding to a consideration of the origin of spirit, he points out three essentially distinguishing features of spirit, the first of which is notable in terms of a foundational *kinetic disposition*: "The

hallmarks of spirit are, firstly, the principle of spontaneous movement and activity; secondly, the spontaneous capacity to produce images independently of sense perception; and thirdly, the autonomous and sovereign manipulation of these images" (Jung, 1980, p. 212). Interestingly enough too in this same context, in urging recognition of "the origin and original character of the spirit," he presages precisely the way in which the individual may foment a national disaster—i.e., may foment *a psychic epidemic*, though he does not use the term here. He writes that man "did not create the spirit, rather the spirit makes *him* creative, always spurring him on, giving him lucky ideas, staying power, 'enthusiasm' and 'inspiration'" (Jung, 1980, p. 213). He states that when an internalization of spirit takes over, man is in the "gravest danger of thinking that he actually created the spirit and that he 'has' it." Characterizing such a man as "naïve," Jung in fact observes, "Spirit threatens the naïve-minded man with inflation, of which our own times have given us the most horribly instructive examples." The result indeed is that an "unbridled materialism results, coupled with maniacal arrogance . . . which is in any case the ideal of the totalitarian mass state" (Jung, 1980, p. 213).

One of the most revealing, and perhaps most thought-provoking, expositions of spirit–matter unity occurs in the context of Jung's earlier consideration of symbols—specifically, symbols of the self—and matter. Jung writes, "'Fantasies' are the natural expressions of the life of the unconscious. But since the unconscious is the psyche of all the body's autonomous functional complexes, its 'fantasies' have an aetiological significance that is not to be despised . . . . In the last analysis the human body, too, is built of the stuff of the world, the very stuff wherein fantasies become visible; indeed, without it they could not be experienced at all" (Jung, 1980, p. 172). He goes on to affirm that:

> *the symbols of the self arise in the depths of the body and they express its materiality every bit as much as the structure of the perceiving consciousness. The symbol is thus a living body,* corpus et anima . . . . *The deeper "layers" of the psyche lose their individual uniqueness as they retreat farther and farther into darkness. "Lower down," that is to say as they approach the autonomous functional systems, they become increasingly collective until they are universalized and extinguished in the body's materiality, i.e., in chemical substances. The body's carbon is simply carbon. Hence "at bottom" the psyche is simply "world." In this sense I hold Kerényi to be absolutely right when he says that in the symbol the* world itself *is speaking. The more archaic and "deeper," that is the more* physiological, *the symbol is, the more collective and universal, the more "material" it is. The more abstract, differentiated, and specific it is, and the more its nature approximates to conscious uniqueness and individuality, the more it sloughs off its universal character" (Jung, 1980, p. 173).*

One could conceivably bolster the credibility, if not the veracity, of Jung's individual–universal analytic by adding an evolutionary perspective, notably by considering the writings of Darwin and of anthropological linguist Mary LeCron Foster. Foster's research shows that the symbolic structure of primordial language was rooted in the body, the meaning of the original sound elements of language being the analogue of their articulatory gestures (Foster, 1978, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996). She shows that all reconstructed root forms of the sound *m*, for example, refer to bilateral relationships that are spatio-kinetically analogous to the act of bringing the lips together: "the fingers or hands in taking or grasping," for instance, or "two opposed surfaces in tapering, pressing together, holding together, crushing, or resting against" (Foster, 1978, p. 110). In effect, in primordial languages, the sound *m* referred to what Foster terms a particular "motional-relational complex" (Foster, 1978, p. 110)—resting against nest materials as in sleeping or against the earth as in standing, pressing together as in copulating, crushing as in chewing food, the pounding of one thing with another. In effect, what the linguistic reconstruction of the symbolic structure of primordial languages shows is that articulatory gestures were of primary semantic significance, which is to say that the tactile-kinesthetic body and its qualitative dynamics, the felt moving body, was the focal point of symbolization, its "spontaneous movement" being indeed a "hallmark" of spirit.

Darwin's global studies of animate life bring a Jungian individual–universal analytic to light in meticulously studied ways that elucidate both themes and variations, themes in the form of morphological, intellectual, and emotional archetypes together with their variations (Darwin, 1968 [1859]; Darwin, 1981 [1871]; Darwin, 1965 [1872],

respectively; see also Darwin, 1976 [1881]. Later studies by Iraneus Eibl-Eibesfeldt and J. A. R. A. M. van Hooff elucidate these archetypal themes along further lines, Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979) in his research on basic human facial expressions across cultures, van Hooff (1969) in his studies of specific facial expressions in monkeys and their relationship to human laughter and smiling. From an evolutionary perspective, we might further note that the idea that Nature is the "rock-bottom" of our being and the thesis that as we descend into the deeper layers of our psychical being we move away from our unique individuality are neither outlandish claims nor outright crazy notions. The morphological archetypes that define us as human—for example, upright posture, structural relationship of thumb and forefinger (for fine grasping)—are complemented by kinetic archetypes that are themselves complemented by semantic archetypes. In finer terms and terms, which at the same time take nonhuman as well as human animate forms of life into account, it is evident that morphological archetypes describe distinct bodily forms that engender archetypal affective dispositions and dynamically congruent archetypal movement dispositions and possibilities that, whether instinctively or voluntarily carried out, move through bodies and move them to move in ways that are meaningful.[2]

> *Thus, from a Jungian perspective, Everything of the nature of the self starts in earnest with the living body, including symbolic thought. Where symbols of the self are otherwise generated, they float off, as Jung says, into the abstract and are anchored in an* individuality*. They are, in other words, products of a unique consciousness; they are not universal; they come not from the depths but from the shallows. When in contrast we descend into the deeper layers of the self, we move away from our unique individuality, our individual consciousness, and descend into the collective aspects of our being. Ultimately, we reach that microscopic materiality of which we are all composed" (Sheets-Johnstone, 1994a, p. 271)*

In "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man" (Jung, 1970a), one finds perhaps the most striking authentication of the body's significance and of psyche–body unity. Writing of the cultural and national "spirit of the times" and of collateral "symptoms of our time," the latter evident, for example, in allowing us to experience danger without involvement, as in sports and cinema, Jung (1970a, p. 93) observes, "The fascination of the psyche brings about a new self-appraisal, a reassessment of our fundamental human nature. We can hardly be surprised if this leads to a rediscovery of the body after its long subjection to the spirit—we are even tempted to say that the flesh is getting its own back." His comment on this state of affairs is exceptional:

> *The body lays claim to equal recognition; it exerts the same fascination as the psyche. If we are still caught in the old idea of an antithesis between mind and matter, this state of affairs must seem like an unbearable contradiction. But if we can reconcile ourselves to the mysterious truth that the spirit is the life of the body seen from within, and the body the outward manifestation of the life of the spirit—the two being really one—then we can understand why the striving to transcend the present level of consciousness through acceptance of the unconscious must give the body its due, and why recognition of the body cannot tolerate a philosophy that denies it in the name of the spirit" (Jung, 1970a, pp. 93–94).[3]*

What is furthermore exceptional—and in fact constitutes an incredibly keen observation with respect to today's religious strife—is Jung's deep insight into the relationship between Christian and Muslim worshippers. Jung writes, "Today [in 1931] the God of the West is still a living person for vast numbers of people, just as Allah is beyond the Mediterranean, and the one believer holds the other an inferior heretic, to be pitied and tolerated failing all else." He adds, "To make matters worse, the enlightened European is of the opinion that religion and such things are good enough for the masses and for women, but of little consequence compared with immediate economic and political questions" (1970a, pp. 92–93). Jung actually holds himself accountable for his words immediately thereafter, saying that he is "like a man who predicts a thunderstorm when there is not a cloud in the sky," but adds too that "psychic

life always lies below the horizon of consciousness, and when we speak of the spiritual problem of modern man we are speaking of things that are barely visible . . . . In daylight everything is clear and tangible, but the night lasts as long as the day, and we live in the night-time also" (1970a, p. 93).

Suppose that the cure for twenty-first century socio-political ills is "collective therapy," as Jung at one point suggests when he writes,

> *Naturally the present tendency to destroy all tradition or render it unconscious could interrupt the normal process of development for several hundred years and substitute an interlude of barbarism. . . . [A] predominantly scientific and technological education, such as is the usual thing nowadays, can also bring about a spiritual regression and considerable increase of psychic dissociation. With hygiene and prosperity alone a man is still far from health, otherwise the most enlightened and most comfortably off among us would be the healthiest. But in regard to neuroses that is not the case at all, quite the contrary. Loss of roots and lack of tradition neuroticize the masses and prepare them for collective hysteria. Collective hysteria calls for collective therapy[4] (Jung, 1976, p. 181).*

The question is in just what would collective therapy consist and how would it be orchestrated? Jung does not elaborate. At most, he elsewhere implicitly indicates that collective therapy is a matter of individuals (see endnote 4). What follows is a possible model of collective therapy that accords with what Jung identifies as a basic symbol. The model might be judged idealistic, naïve, sentimental, even Pollyannaish, but its basic premise is that language may actually be the wrong place to anchor collective therapy. As earlier references to our common infancy show, movement is our mother tongue. Movement indeed forms the I that moves before the I that moves forms movement, much less utters its first words. Just such recognition of our mother tongue underlies the innovative political strategy carried out by a political historian to open an international conference on nuclear weapons.

2 | THE POWER OF KINETIC SILENCE

William Polk was founding Director of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs and later its president. He organized the 20th Pugwash conference titled "Peace and International Cooperation: A Programme for the Seventies" held at the University of Chicago, such conferences being dedicated to the eradication of nuclear weapons. Recognition of the social power of movement and recognition of our native faculty to think in movement were implicit in Polk's decision to begin the conference with sign language performances of short dramatic works by Anton Chekov and Dylan Thomas. In a later piece of writing in which he recalls the conference (Polk, 2013, p. 74), he states that sign language can be "both beautiful and remarkably evocative," specifically commenting:

> *I witnessed a stunning example of this when my then organization, the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, sponsored the twentieth Pugwash Conference on nuclear arms. We assembled 109 representatives of most of the Academies of Science from around the world, including a number of Nobel laureates. The exchanges were predictably difficult—the cold war was then in full blast—so in an attempt to relieve the tensions and to urge understanding, I arranged for the National Theater of the Deaf to put on two short skits: Anton Chekhov's spoof "On the Harmfulness of Tobacco" in Russian and sign language and Dylan Thomas's "Songs from Milkwood" in English and sign language.*

Polk describes the effect of the sign language performances on conference attendees, stating that he introduced the evening "by saying that I hoped that in our troubled times the direct visual language of the deaf can perhaps

communicate more effectively across the world boundaries'" He remarks, "What I really meant, of course, is that if the deaf can manage to 'hear' one another across the barrier of enforced silence, there is no excuse for the rest of us not to communicate. The plays changed the mood of the gathering and, many participants subsequently told me, their own approach to international understanding" (Polk, 2013, p. 74).

Polk's innovative approach to political strife is a moving testimony to the power of kinetic silence. It is clearly also a testimony to both the social power of movement and our native faculty to think in movement. As noted elsewhere (Sheets-Johnstone, 2017; see also Sheets-Johnstone, 2016), moving in harmony with others is a social phenomenon—a silent social phenomenon—that has, or can have, sizeable political implications. That it has or can have such implications is surely of special moment in this strife-ridden 21st-century world. In particular, *to move in concert* is an elemental and reciprocal being-with-others that opens all participants to the possibility of being not just intellectually attuned to a common good, *but kinetically tuning to* a common good. One might describe this kinetic coming together toward a common good in Sartrean terms (Sartre, 1956) as one's being *kinetically* for others as one's being *kinesthetically* for oneself. Balancing and choosing in this way are not abstract reflective manoeuvres but actively lived-through structures of thinking in movement, actively lived-through discriminations and judgments that, in the very moment and process of moving, resonate harmoniously both for oneself and for others. We recognize such discriminations and judgments in the kinetic harmony of infant and parent interchanges that infant psychiatrist and clinical psychologist Daniel Stern (1985) describes as "affect attunement"; we see them in the kinetic harmony of team players moving cooperatively toward a goal in soccer, hockey and football; we see them in the kinetic harmony of two female tigers in their tracking and pursuit of a prey animal and in the concerted labors of beavers building a dam; and we, of course, see them most surely in the kinetic harmony of dancers in learning a dance and in dancing the dance, whether choreographed or improvised. In short, being equally for oneself and for others in kinetically harmonious ways draws on our natural capacity to move in concert and on our native faculty to think in movement.

Two historical insights implicitly document this inborn capacity and faculty. Their political implications are intriguing and potentially sizeable. To begin with, Aristotle's identification of movement as a *sensus communis* (Aristotle, 418a18, 425b9, 458b5) is analytically and descriptively relevant not just to sensory modalities but *to a common creaturehood and common humanity*. Movement is, in other words, not only integral to touch, vision, hearing, taste, and smell, but an essential sensory modality in its own right, a modality of all animate forms of life that, in the beginning, specified deformations and decompressions by way of *proprioception* (Laverack, 1976; Lissman, 1950), that is, by way of outer sensory organs dedicated essentially to surface recognition sensitivity, and that later evolved into *kinesthesia*, into internal organs dedicated to the spatio-temporal-energic dynamics that constitute self-movement, organs that, we might note, are neurologically the first to develop in utero along with tactility. It should indeed not be surprising that movement is our mother tongue.

To move harmoniously with others puts us precisely in touch with our mother tongue and its inherent qualitative dynamics. In doing so, it allows us to experience ourselves and others in the deepest possible way that borders on the density of their being as well as our own, for to move harmoniously with others requires not just an awareness and knowledge of the body one is, *but an awareness and knowledge of the body one is not*. Moving harmoniously with others indeed has the possibility of ever heightening awarenesses and knowledge of bodies one is not, of hearing others in a different, namely, silent, medium. Hearing ourselves kinesthetically and hearing others kinetically puts us in touch essentially with our common aliveness. However that common aliveness might be culturally inflected in ways both subtle and complex, our mother tongue nonetheless binds us in a common humanity and common creaturehood. By speaking it more often with others and listening to it more often with others, we might recognize that common humanity to begin with and move beyond a blinkered, small-minded notion of those who are other. This existential awareness and knowledge are as pertinent, or at least as potentially pertinent, to international bodies—international organizations and institutes—as they are to animate bodies in their customary movement lives in offices, stores, playgrounds, streets and sidewalks, family kitchens and dining rooms, and so on. The difference between meeting in words and meeting in movement is a critical difference in thinking, a difference that warrants

recognition precisely because that recognition leads to the possibility of enhanced corporeally awakened and corporeally inflected social sensibilities and relationships.[5]

The second historical insight derives from ancient Greek dance. As multiple articles by classicists document, these dances were group dances in which dancers joined themselves together by forming a circle and holding another's hand or wrist. Armand D'Angour (1997) documents the historical derivation of these group dances, tracing out in meticulous detail the establishment of the dithyramb in fifth century B.C. as a circular chorus. J. F. Davidson (1986) begins with the reasonable assumption "that all choral songs were accompanied by dance" (p. 39) and specifies how the chorus's circular form enhanced the drama being performed. Writing more generally of the circular form of dances in the near East but at the same time specifying the significance of the circular form, Yosef Garfinkel (2003) comments:

> *In the circle of dancers, all holding hands, the individual disappears and the circle, in which everyone is identical in body movement, rhythm of movement, dress and accessories, is created. The immense energy required here is directed not to the productive work of hunting or food production, but rather to unity and formulating a sense of identity. (p. 85)*

He later virtually restates the communal nature of the dance: "The absolute similarity between all the dancers in dress and body movement stresses the unity and equality of all members of the community" (Garfinkel, 2003, p. 94). Senta German points out a critical aspect of "the unity and equality of all members of the community" when in writing on Greek dance in the Bronze Age, she quotes the description of Achilles's shield in Homer's *Iliad* (*Iliad* 18.590–605) that specifically mentions "maidens . . . holding their hands upon the wrists of one another" (German, 2007, p. 23). Guy Hedreen (2011, p. 500) quotes the same lines from Homer's text in his elucidation of the scene on the François vase that depicts Theseus leading a dance upon his arrival on Crete, and in fact earlier states, "It is not an exaggeration to say that, visually, the central and most extensive part of the representation of the Cretan adventure on the François vase is the chain of boys and girls holding hands in dance." Deborah Steiner (2011, p. 304) points out that "[i]f Armand D'Angour has correctly re-constructed the history of the dithyrambic chorus' shape, then this distinction would have been a late-sixth-century innovation, part of the restructuring of events at the City Dionysia, where dithyrambic choruses would now for the first time be included in the sequence of competitions and would have exchanged their chiefly processional and linear formation for the circle with which they came to be associated." She points out too (2011, pp. 313–314), "In D'Angour's account, the piper's new prominence is integral to the change from line to circle; so as to improve group coordination and vocal clarity, the *aulêtês* would have been moved to the center of the dancers arranged in a circle around him; this novel structure would enhance the musician's visibility and audibility to dancers and audience alike." Gonda van Steen (2002, p. 376), documenting the innovative choreographic reconstruction of ancient Greek dance writes that the choreographer "left us with important cues pointing to the centrality of the form of the circle to her philosophical and practical approach to the Greek theater. She then quotes the choreographer Emma Palmer-Sikelianou (1967, p. 298): "The Greek Theatre is primarily a circle . . . . The attention of actors, chorus and audience was centered on a point, the orchestra, and formed circling waves of power which increased in intensity as the drama unfolded ". Finally, Peter Warren (1984, p. 323) gives a detailed account of excavated circular platforms at Knossos, closing his account with "[an] interpretation of the large circular building as a dancing platform, . . . or as platforms for musicians" and with reference to Achilles's shield as described by Homer.

What is the significance of joining together in such a way as to move in concert with others, namely, joining in a circle? A circle is a symbol that Jung likens to the child motif and to the self. It is a symbol that *unites opposites*: it is "a mediator, bringer of healing . . . one who makes whole . . . I have called this wholeness that transcends consciousness the 'self'" (Jung, 1980, p. 164; see also Jung, 1970b, p. 207). He furthermore calls attention to the circular form that constitutes the mandala, a drawing that "we find so often in the drawings of our patients [that] corresponds to the vessel of transformation [i.e., to the Hermetic vessel]" (Jung, 1970b, pp. 15–16). "*Mandala*," Jung writes, "means 'circle', more especially a magic circle" (Jung, 1983, p. 22). He furthermore calls attention to the "'solar' nature" of the

eye that makes the eye "a symbol of consciousness" (Jung, 1970b, p. 207).[6] The union of opposites or wholeness, Jung states, "is not a rational thing, nor is it a matter of will; it is a process of psychic development that expresses itself in symbols" (Jung, 1983, p. 21). Clearly, as the mandala and eyes indicate, symbols are not necessarily linguistic. They can, in fact, be kinetic. Jung gives a striking example. He writes:

> *Among my patients I have come across cases of women who did not draw mandalas but danced them instead. In India there is a special name for this: mandala nrithya, the mandala dance. The dance figures express the same meanings as the drawings. My patients can say very little about the meaning of the symbols but are fascinated by them and find that they somehow express and have an effect on their subjective psychic state" (1983, p. 23).*

To move from individual circle drawing to the forming of a communal circle is to expand the sense of self, that is, to expand the unity of opposites that Jung invokes with respect to the conscious and unconscious dimensions of self. The communal circle unifies self and other than self; it unifies opposites, not just in a spatial sense but in an existential one. Greek psychotherapist Sofia Petridou specifies this existential sense precisely in terms of the forming of a communal circle. She writes, "Unlike the spiral dance of the Sufi, who attempts to spin the world of matter into divine glory, the Greek dancing circle is anthropocentric. It is in fact an attempt to reach ecstasy through an harmonic connection among the community members" (Petridou, personal communication).

What would happen if international political bodies began their meetings by forming a circle, joining hands or hand-to-wrist, and moving together. Would some males—professionals or executives, for example—find it difficult to hold hands with other males, that is, with subalterns, factory representatives, or even other professionals or executives? A handshake is one thing. Hand-holding or wrist-holding is another. Yet not just nations and institutions, but real-time, real-life individuals make up the body politic and move the body politic to move. These individuals are of political import. The last epigraph from Jung's writings at the opening of this article issues a warning pertinent to their import: "[T]hough there is only *one* truth it speaks in many tongues, and. .. if we still cannot see this it is simply due to lack of understanding. No one is so godlike that he alone knows the true word." The true word does indeed elude us, but in a way that our mother tongue does not, for it is a tongue common to all. Being common to all, it can indeed resonate politically and express a singular truth. Polk's innovative inclusion of sign language performances of plays by Chekhov and Thomas attests to both the commonality of our mother tongue and the power of kinetic silence. Classicists and Petridou implicitly document the same when they attest to the sense of community and meaningfulness that is awakened in circular dance. When a *communal* kinetic dynamic—a communally created "kinetic melody" to use neuropsychologist Aleksandr Luria's descriptive term—is being created, it is kinesthetically felt by each individual in the circle. It is thus initiated and moved through by many individuals, none of whom has the singular power and eloquence of the whole, but all of whom are together creating the power and eloquence of the whole. It is possible, of course, that an individual is simply going through the motions. In other words, it is possible that an individual is dissembling, feigning a felt sense of togetherness or actively restraining contrary movement urges. In short, our mother tongue does not guarantee a "harmonic connection" in moving together in a circular form. It does, however, anchor us in a common humanity, and in doing so, opens us to the possibility of hearing each other in a modality that transcends words and thus requires no translator. It, furthermore, opens us to the possibility of transcending our individuality and, in doing so, to experiencing the qualitative kinetic dynamics of the whole being created. In contrast to a psychic epidemic sustained by a mass movement, such anchorage and openings can create a psychic harmony sustained kinesthetically and affectively by individuals moving in a real-life, real-time communal kinetic dynamic. Indeed, through such anchorage and openings, moving together in a circular form has the possibility of being a collective therapy in and of itself. On this basis, it has the possibility of generating innovative and ongoing collective movement psychotherapies for the common good. In effect, it is not a cure-all but an opening on the common ground of movement: our mother tongue.

ENDNOTES

[1] "If you see the back of a person's head, the brain infers that there is a face on the front of it" (Crick & Koch, 1992, p. 153); "An object's image varies with distance, yet the brain can ascertain its true size" (Zeki, 1992, p. 69); "Nonhuman primates have brains capable of cooperative hunting" (Harding, 1975, p. 255); "In my view, emotional feelings represent only one category of affects that brains experience" (Panksepp, 2005, p. 162).

[2] Reflexes as well as instincts and affects engage and move the body to move, as in the pan-animate startle reflex, a reflex that may well be thought an archetypal bodily response, precisely as Landis and Hunt's classic research documents (Landis & Hunt, 1968).

[3] Interestingly enough, "Giving the Body Its Due" was the title of a national interdisciplinary conference at the University of Oregon in November 1989. The title was subsequently the title of an edited book (Sheets-Johnstone, 1992), the outgrowth of the earlier conference gathering.

[4] The complete sentence reads: "Collective hysteria calls for collective therapy, which consists in abolition of liberty and terrorization." The complete sentence is puzzling and Jung provides no clarification. The word 'abolition' can be read as pertaining to *both* liberty and terrorization, or as pertaining only to liberty and, with the abolition of liberty, to a resultant terrorization. Neither interpretation makes any sense in terms of *therapy*—whether collective or individual. It is notable that in his "Epilogue to 'Essays on Contemporary Events', Jung states, "Without freedom there can be no morality" (Jung, 1970a [1946], p. 229).

[5] "Movement meetings" are a 'before work' practice in many companies and even government offices in Japan. The benefit is not simply a matter of health but of community. Moreover movement breaks during the day are noted as being of benefit to the community: "Companies who allow their workers to take periodic exercise breaks have noticed that in addition to the health benefits mentioned before, employee morale and their sense of camaraderie has increased, and that their employees feel as if they are more a part of a community than a corporation" (The Gibson Center, 2017). Radio Taiso is a national entity dedicated to both health and a sense of community. Its programs run in schools as well as in companies.

[6] See also Sheets-Johnstone, 1994b, p. 97: "The eye of the other is a circle," the *first* circle we visually experience and that we endow with a tactile-kinesthetic reality. . . . The eye indeed is a "mystic circle."

ORCID

Maxine Sheets-Johnstone https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1494-4806

REFERENCES

Aristotle. On the Soul, J. A. Smith (Trans.). *The complete works of Aristotle.* In J. Barnes (Ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bollingen Series LXXI.2.

Aristotle. On Dreams, J. I. Beare (Trans.). *The complete works of Aristotle*. In J. Barnes (Ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bollingen Series LXXI.2.

Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1992). The problem of consciousness. *Scientific American*, *267*(3), 153–159.

D'Angour, A. (1997). How the dithyramb got its shape. *The Classical Quarterly*, *47*(2), 331–351.

Darwin, C. (1965 [1872]). *The expression of the emotions in man and animals*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Darwin, C. (1968 [1859]). In J. W. Burrow (Ed.), *The origin of species*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Darwin, C. (1976) [1881]. *Darwin on earthworms: The formation of vegetable mould through the action of worms with observations on their habits*. Ontario, CA: Bookworm Publishing Company.

Darwin, C. (1981 [1871]). *The descent of man and selection in relation to sex*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Davidson, J. F. (1986). The circle and the tragic chorus. *Greece & Rome*, *33*(1), 38–46.

Depraz, N. (2008). The rainbow of emotions: at the crossroads of neurobiology and phenomenology. *Continental Philosophy Review*, *41*, 237–259. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-008-9080-y

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1979). Universals in human expressive behavior. In A. Wolfgang (Ed.), *Nonverbal behavior* (pp. 17–30). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Foster, M. L. C. (1978). The symbolic structure of primordial language. In S. L. Washburn, & E. R. McCown (Eds.), *Human evolution: Biosocial perspectives* (pp. 77–121). Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings.

Foster, M. L. C. (1990). Symbolic origins and transitions in the palaeolithic. In P. Mellars (Ed.), *The emergence of modern humans: An archaeological perspective* (pp. 517–539). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Foster, M. L. C. (1992). Body process in the evolution of language. In M. Sheets-Johnstone (Ed.), *Giving the body its due* (pp. 208–230). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Foster, M. L. C. (1994). Symbolism: The foundation of culture. In T. Ingold (Ed.), *The companion encyclopedia of anthropology* (pp. 366–395). New York, NY: Routledge.
Foster, M. L. C. (1996). Reconstruction of the evolution of human spoken language. In A. Lock, & C. Peters (Eds.), *Handbook of symbolic evolution* (pp. 747–772). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Freedberg, D., & Gallese, V. (2007). Motion, emotion and empathy in aesthetic experience. *Trends in Cognitive Science*, *11*(5), 197–203. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.02.003
Gallagher, S. (2000). *Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experience*. Paper presented at Atelier phénomenologie et cognition, Phénomenologie et Cognition Research Group, CREA, Paris.
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). *The phenomenological mind* (2nd ed.). London and New York: Routledge.
Garfinkel, Y. (2003). The earliest dancing scenes in the Near East. *Near Eastern Archaeology*, *66*(3), 84–95. https://doi.org/10.2307/3210910
German, S. (2007). Dance in Bronze Age Greece. *Dance Research Journal*, *39*(2), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0149767700000206
Gibbs, R. W. Jr. (2006). *Embodiment and cognitive science*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hanna, R., & Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology and the spontaneity of consciousness. In E. Thompson (Ed.), *The problem of consciousness: New essays in phenomenological philosophy of mind* (pp. 133–161). Calgary, Canada: University of Calgary Press.
Harding, R. S. O. (1975). Meat-eating and hunting in baboons. In R. H. Tuttle (Ed.), *Socioecology and Psychology of Primates* (pp. 245–257). The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
Hedreen, G. (2011). Bild, mythos, and ritual: Choral dance in Theseus's Cretan adventure on the François vase. *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens*, *80*(3), 491–510. https://doi.org/10.2972/hesperia.80.3.0491
Jensen, R. T., & Moran, D. (2013). The phenomenology of embodied subjectivity. In *Contributions to phenomenology* (Vol. 71). New York: Springer Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01616-0
Jung, C. G. (1968). *Man and his symbols*. New York, NY: Dell Publishing.
Jung, C. G. (1969). *On the nature of the psyche* (Trans. R. F. C. Hull). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/Bollingen Series.
Jung, C. G. (1970a). *Civilization in transition* (2nd ed., trans. R. F. C. Hull). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/Bollingen Series.
Jung, C. G. (1970b). *Mysterium coniunctionis* (2nd ed., trans. R. F. C. Hull)). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/Bollingen Series XX.
Jung, C. G. (1976). *Psychological types*, (Trans. H. G. Baynes, revised by R. F. C. Hull). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/Bollingen Series XX.
Jung, C. G. (1980). *Archetypes and the collective unconscious* (2nd ed., trans. R. F. C. Hull). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/Bollingen Series XX.
Jung, C. G. (1983). *Alchemical studies* trans. R. F. C. Hull. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/Bollingen Series XX.
Kornfield, J. (2009). *The wise heart: A guide to the universal teachings of Buddhist psychology*. New York, NY: Bantam Books.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought*. New York: Basic Books.
Landis, C., & Hunt, W. A. (1968). *The startle pattern*. New York: Johnson Reprint.
Laverack, M. S. (1976). External proprioceptors. In P. J. Mill (Ed.), *Structure and function of proprioceptors in the invertebrates* (pp. 1–63). London: Chapman & Hall.
Lissman, H. W. (1950). Proprioceptors. In *Physiological mechanisms in animal behavior (symposia of the Society for Experimental Biology)* (Vol. 4) (pp. 34–59). New York: Academic Press.
Palmer-Sikelianou, E.(1967). What is great theatre? *Eos 103–107*, 298–303.
Panksepp, J. (2005). On the embodied neural nature of core emotional affects. In G. Colombetti & E. Thompson (Eds.), *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 12 (8-10) (pp. 158–184). special issue on *Emotion Experience*.
Polk, W. (2013, April). “What It Means to Be Deaf.” *New York Review of Books*, *60*(6), 74.
Sartre, J.-P. (1956). *Being and nothingness* (Trans. Hazel E. Barnes). New York, NY: Philosophical Library.
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1992). *Giving the Body Its Due*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1994a). *The Roots of Power: Animate Form and Gendered Bodies*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing.
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1994b). The body as cultural object/The body as pan-cultural universal. In M. Daniel, & L. Embree (Eds.), *The phenomenology of the cultural disciplines* (pp. 85–114). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1999). Emotions and movement: A beginning empirical-phenomenological analysis of their relationship. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, *6*(11–12), 259–277.

Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2016). Foundational dynamics of animate nature. In U. Eberlein (Ed.), *Zwischenleiblichkeit und bewegtes Verstehen* (Intercorporeity, Movement and Tacit Knowledge) (pp. 51–67). Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.

Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2017). Moving in concert. *Choros International Dance Journal*, *6*, 1–19.

Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2019). The essentials of being a body. In H. Payne, S. Koch, & J. Tantia (Eds.), *The Routledge International Handbook of Embodied Perspectives in Psychotherapy* (pp. 19–27). London: Routledge.

Steiner, D. (2011). Dancing with the stars: Choreia in the third stasimon of Euripides' *Helen*. *Classical Philology*, *106*(4), 299–323. https://doi.org/10.1086/662037

Stern, D. N. (1985). *The interpersonal world of the infant: A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

The Gibson Center. (2017). *Exercise in the workplace: What Japanese companies can teach us.* Retrieved from https://thegibsoncenter.com/blog/exercise/exercise-in-the-workplace-what-japanese-companies-can-teach-us/

Thompson, E. (2007). *Mind and life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press.

Van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. (1969). The facial displays of the catarrhine monkeys and apes. In D. Morris (Ed.), *Primate ethology* (pp. 9–88). Doubleday Anchor: Garden City, NY.

van Steen, G. (2002). "The world's a circular stage": Aeschylean tragedy through the eyes of Eva Palmer-Sikelianou. *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, *8*(3), 375–393. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12138-002-0003-8

Varela, F. J., & Depraz, N. (2005). At the source of time: valence and the constitutional dynamics of affect. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, *12*(8–10), 61–81.

Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). *The embodied mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001

Warren, P. (1984). Circular platforms at Minoan Knossos. *The Annual of the British School at Athens*, *79*, 307–323. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0068245400019997

Zahavi, D. (2002). First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, *1*, 7–26. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015568518276

Zahavi, D. (2005). *Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/6541.001.0001

Zeki, S. (1992). The visual image in mind and brain. *Scientific American*, *267*(3), 69–76.

How to cite this article: Sheets-Johnstone M. A Jungian perspective on the unity of mind and body and its relevance to 21st-century politics. *Psychother Politics Int*. 2019;17:e1510. https://doi.org/10.1002/ppi.1510