

Lacan and Althusser on psychology: The political ethos of serving ideals and justifying ideology

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Abstract

The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan denounced psychology as a procedure of objectification that serves particular ideals in society and fulfils the social functions of ideologisation, adaptation and exploitation. Likewise, almost at the same time and also in France, the Marxist theoretician Louis Althusser stated his disapproval of psychological theories because they justified ideology either by assuming the existence of natural-individual tendencies as its foundation or by pathologising everything that contradicts it in the individual realm. After reviewing these critical approaches to psychology, this article will defend the idea that any theoretical or practical psychological work is not completely free to determine its guiding values, principles, rules and norms, as it must adhere to the predetermined functions that have been imposed on psychology and are clearly explained by Lacan and Althusser. The social-ideological functions of psychology logically restrict, orientate and underlie its ethos, which consequently includes the inescapable political imperatives that govern psychological theory and practice. For instance, the basic theoretical dualist operation that constitutes psychology—the one that distinguishes the psyche from the body and the world—is a political gesture that cannot be abstracted from class society, from its division of labour and its classist ideology, as was demonstrated by Marx and Engels.

KEYWORDS

critical psychology, ideology, Marxism, psychoanalysis, psychology

The French structuralist intellectual tradition, which has been developed since the 1950s and 1960s, has tended to be epistemologically incompatible with the kind of empiricism and positivism that underlie modern mainstream psychology (Lacan, 1969/2006a; Lévi-Strauss, 1976; Safouan, 1973). While psychological discourses were, and still are, supposed to deploy a specialised objective science with an empirical object separated from everything else, structuralism situates its analyses at the level of the theoretical distinction and elaboration of objective sciences, that is, at the level of the structural totality from which empirical objects are abstracted (see Althusser, 1965/2005; Balibar, 2005; Wahl, 1973).

The psyche, the object of psychology whatever it may be, cannot be accepted as an empirical object from the structuralist perspective. From this perspective, an object of that kind is a structural category whose experience derives from conceptual abstraction. The object is not positively given. It is not always already there and merely waiting to be discovered.

The empirical object, as explained in the “serious” discourse of structuralism, is an outcome of the “structure” and an effect of “knowledge” (Lacan, 1969/2006a, pp. 11–43). It is always the result of the theoretical work of distinction and elaboration carried out by objective sciences. These sciences and their objects are both produced at the structural level. At this level, everything evident in modern psychological science becomes problematical and questionable. The structuralist critique leads us to the roots of the very evidence for psychology. And, thus, we realise that nothing psychological is really evident by itself.

Psychology was explicitly criticised by two of the most important French structuralist theorists, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) and the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser (1918–1990). They are the subject of this article. My purpose here, of course, is neither to embrace the Althusserian and Lacanian theoretical systems in all their complexity nor to discuss their place in the history of psychoanalysis and twentieth-century philosophy. I do not intend either to thoroughly discuss all their critical remarks on psychology or to explain them by their intellectual filiations or influences. I will instead summarise these remarks, as briefly as possible, and focus on some ideas on which Lacan and Althusser converge and that may be used effectively to discuss the question of the ethos of psychology.

I understand here the ethos of psychology in its most general sense, as the values, principles, rules and norms that guide theoretical and practical psychological work. These patterns are both cultural or moral and logical-epistemological. However, as I will try to show in this article, they have an essentially political character from the Lacanian and Althusserian perspectives.

Ethos is not a key concept for Lacan and Althusser, but it allows us to designate a crucial point in which some of their respective observations on psychology converge. This converging point discloses an immanent (not transcendent), political (not logical-epistemological) and “dialectical” (not “idealistic”) side (Horkheimer, 1937/2008, p. 239) of the Lacanian and Althusserian critique, which, at least here, coincides with the critiques of psychology in the Marxism and Freudo-Marxism (see Pavón-Cuéllar, 2017) of the Frankfurt School (for example, Adorno, 1955/1986; Adorno & Horkheimer, 1947/1997) and in the Foucauldian tradition (Foucault, 1954, 1975; Rose, 1989, 1996), and clearly differs from those found in the German philosophical tradition that runs from Kant (1781/2004a, 1786/2004b) to Husserl (1936/1970) and his followers. Although the Husserlian legacy may help to explain some of Lacan's and Althusser's logical-epistemological reflections on psychological theories, it is of no use in understanding what is at stake in their political critiques, which, indirectly deriving from their rupture with phenomenology, are particularly fertile for the immanent kinds of critical psychology and critique of psychology that have been intensively carried out in the last half century.

That recent critical approaches to psychology have found inspiration in Lacan and Althusser may be taken as read. While the French and Latin-American Althusserian tradition offered some of the most important and influential critiques of psychology in the 1960s and 1970s (see, for example, Braunstein, Pasternac, Benedito, & Saal, 1975; Deleule, 1969; Herbert, 1966; Sastre, 1974), Lacanian theory has been utilised constantly by critical psychologists from all over the world in the last two decades (Hook, 2008, 2017; Malone, 2000; Malone & Friedman, 2015; Parker, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2015; Pavón-Cuéllar, 2013). Not all of these works are reviewed here, but I do address an aspect

of their common origin when examining Lacan's and Althusser's ideas on the ethos of psychology, trying in this way to take a first step towards correcting an inexplicable blind spot in the common vision of the history of the critique of psychology in the English-speaking world, which is usually limited to the British, American and German traditions (Teo, 2005).

I will begin with Lacan's description of psychology as an objectification that serves particular ideals in society and enables the ideologisation, adaptation and exploitation of people. Then I will recall Althusser's condemnation of psychological theories for fulfilling the function of justifying ideology either by providing an individual-natural foundation for it or by pathologising everything subjective that contradicts it. Finally, I will defend the idea that no theoretical or practical psychological work is completely free to determine its own ethos, as it must adhere to the aforementioned functions that have been imposed on psychology and clearly denounced by Lacan and Althusser.

As we will see, both Lacan and Althusser assume a fundamental contradiction between psychology, on the one hand, and Marxism and psychoanalysis, on the other. It is precisely on the basis of this contradiction that their Marxist and psychoanalytical perspectives can function as an effective critical approach to psychological discourses. Critique appears here as the only congruent attitude regarding psychology.

1 | LACAN: PSYCHOLOGY AS OBJECTIFICATION THAT SERVES IDEALS

Psychoanalysis has always oscillated between reabsorption into and opposition to psychology. Perhaps the most representative and influential of anti-psychological psychoanalytical approaches has been the one developed by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who insistently opposed psychology, as well as the psychologisation of psychoanalysis as expressed, for instance, in American ego psychology. The radical break with the psychological field was the foundational gesture of Lacan's return to Freud.

To be authentically Freudian meant, for Lacan, to reject any kind of psychology. This is not to say, however, that such a rejection was only an unreflective premise or a dogmatic act of psychoanalytical faith. Lacan had very good reasons for rejecting everything psychological. Let us address some of these reasons.

According to Lacan, psychology has nothing to do with science. It is not a "scientific" approach to the real but rather a "scientistic" ideological doctrine (Lacan, 1936/1999a, pp. 73–78) that "mutilates the real" (p. 79) and develops itself in the "domain of the imaginary" (p. 80). This domain only allows psychologists to reflect themselves as in a mirror, to illu-sively realise their desires, to be confused with their objects, to project themselves in what they pretend to know.

In psychology "nobody knows much" [*personne ne sait grand-chose*] about anything (Lacan, 1954/1998, p. 423). But this does not matter since psychologists believe strongly in what they believe. It is a question of faith. Psychology in fact consists of a "religious" construction that mixes "obscurantism" and "illumination" (1953/2001a, p. 143; 1954/1998, pp. 394–395). It obscures the real and illuminates the objectifying images of the subject in the mirror. It adheres to them, to its imaginary vision of the inner world, to an "illusion" (1966/1999b, p. 340). This is its only foundation. Psychology is thus "poorly founded upon its logic" (1953/1999c, p. 257). It rests on an "error of perspective" (1954/1998, p. 423).

Psychology, for Lacan, is untrue. Or rather, its truth lies not in its tenets, but in its social function. Psychology obeys society, at least in three senses. First, it is composed of social banalities and helps to ideologise, reproduce and spread the dominant ideologies in society, as it follows common sense or the "discourse of opinion" (Lacan, 1955/1999d, p. 416). Second, psychology presupposes and preserves the unity of society since it has an adaptive fundamental orientation in which "all things must fit together" [*tout doit coller*] (1956/1981, p. 95). Third, psychology depends on the relations of power in society, and is crafted in such a way that it can be used for "social exploitation" (1960/1999e, p. 278).

By enabling exploitation, adaptation and ideologisation, psychology cannot be considered a neutral scientific enterprise aimed solely at the knowledge of that object called "psyche." In fact, psychology, as conceived by Lacan, does not even have a definite pre-existing object. It is not a science, a science in the proper sense of the term, with an

object that precedes it. The psyche does not precede psychological discourse. This discourse comes first and creates its object, the psyche, by mistakenly “objectifying” and thus “alienating” someone, “the subject,” who, in Lacan's view, resists objectification essentially by definition (Lacan, 1951/1999f, pp. 212–214), as in the classical philosophical critiques of the supposed psychological objective knowledge of the “transcendental subject” (Kant, 1781/2004a, pp. 278–320).

By objectifying the subject, psychology justifies its own existence, insofar as it obtains an object of study. But it does this at the expense of the subject. The subject, whoever it is, cannot be objectively approached. His or her objectivation amounts to alienation, disappearance and loss. This is how the need for a science of the subject arises. The emergence of psychoanalysis is correlative to the emergence of modern objective psychology.

While psychoanalysis is, or at least pretends to be, a science of the subject, psychology is an objective pseudo-science of an object put in the place of the subject. This subject disappears in psychology. However, he or she is the only reason why psychological knowledge exists.

There is something like psychology because there is the subject omitted by psychology. Psychological pseudo-science is, therefore, a way of undermining its own subjective foundation, which is its prerequisite, its deepest sense and its constant reference. Psychology involves the annihilation of each subject and the objectification of something individual that may only be supported and performed by one subject.

The transformation of individual subjective facts into generalised objective entities is perhaps the most fundamental process achieved by modern psychological discourses. Lacan (1951/1999f) accordingly defined psychology as “the objectification of certain of the individual's properties” (p. 213). Now, if this objectification is a process inherent in psychology, then it must be governed by what Lacan supposes governs psychology, namely the aforementioned logics of exploitation, adaptation and ideologisation.

The psyche, the object created by psychology, must be exploitable, adaptable and permeable to certain ideas and ideals. These ideas and ideals, together with the psyche and psychology and many other material and immaterial things, are the interrelated entities that form the cultural and social-economic unified whole which the structuralists called “the structure” and which I will simply call “the system” from now on. The system, with its specific needs for exploitation, adaptation and ideologisation, decides the kind of object that has to be created by psychology. Psychological objectification follows the paths of political projects, economic interests and cultural values. All kinds of ideologies are always determining psychology and its object.

As Lacan (1950/2001b) argued, “any so-called psychological science must be affected by the ideals of the society in which it occurs” (p. 130). These ideals, also according to Lacan (1964/2006b) are “transmitted” by psychology, are actually the masters of psychology, but, at the same time, “society's slaves,” as may be illustrated, for example, when “psychology not only furnishes the means, but even defers to the wishes of market research” (pp. 311–312). The market appears here as the master whose will rules psychological theories and practices. For Lacan, in this case as in many others, psychology obeys a “blatant ideology” and is indistinguishable from it, thus betraying the “ethics” of science, of reason and knowledge (pp. 312–313).

As conceived by Lacan, the scientific ethos can be respected and followed by the psychoanalytical science of the subject, but it necessarily excludes psychological scientism and its compliant obedience to ideology. More precisely, the scientific ethos forbids the ideological techniques of persuasion, manipulation and subordination to the system that are constantly used in psychology. There is, therefore, an opposition between the ideology of psychology, on the one hand, and the ethics of science, which can also be the ethics of psychoanalysis, on the other.

2 | ALTHUSSER: PSYCHOLOGY AS A JUSTIFICATION OF IDEOLOGIES BY A MIRRORING FOUNDATION AND A NORMATIVE PATHOLOGY

Lacan established the opposition between the scientific ethos of psychoanalysis and the ideological techniques of psychology in 1964, while he was conducting his seminar at the *École Normale Supérieure* (ENS), thanks to an

invitation by the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. Under Lacan's influence, but while also exerting a reciprocal influence on him, Althusser identified a similar contradiction between the ideological perspective of psychology and the scientific theory of psychoanalysis.

For Althusser, as for Lacan, science may perhaps be found in the Freudian tradition, but not in the psychological domain. Psychology cannot offer even a theory in the strict sense of the word, but only a "technical practice" that is "a prisoner of its purpose" and a "supposedly theoretical reflection about this purpose," an ideological "by-product" of a "technocratic" process (Althusser, 1965/2005, p. 172). Psychological theories are nothing but ideological "theorisations of techniques," while psychological practices are just techniques, "responses" to "demands" and "interests," such as those of conditioning, preventing conflicts or adapting or readapting to existing conditions (1998, pp. 51–55).

Political, social or economic demands and interests are theorised, justified, explained, rationalised, idealised and thus *ideologised* by the supposed psychological theories. The result is psychology and its content composed of "the worst ideological confusions and perversions" (Althusser, 1966/1993a, p. 58). It is in this "ideological field" in which psychoanalysis can only "arise" by reacting against and constantly resisting psychology (1964/1996, pp. 80–81).

Psychoanalytic thought could only realise its potential as a science, according to Althusser (1964/1996), through an "epistemological cut" or "break" with psychological ideology (pp. 78–80). By using the notion of an "epistemological break," introduced years before by Bachelard (1938), Althusser made it clear that psychology is not scientific but an obstacle to science, an epistemological obstacle that must be ruptured, broken away from and set aside to make way for science. This break with psychology was, again, the precondition for psychoanalysis to attain a scientific existence. Psychoanalytical science could even be conceived, in a sense, as a kind of critique of psychological ideology, just as Marxist science appeared as a critique of the bourgeois ideology underlying classic philosophy, utopian socialism and liberal political economy.

The philosophic-economic discourse criticised by Marx was, in fact, inseparable from the psychological discourse questioned by Freud. Both ideological discourses actually converge by putting the "ego" in the "centre" of everything (Althusser, 1964/1993b, pp. 45–46). Both are expressions of "bourgeois ideology" and assume its idea of "the subject whose unity is assured and crowned by consciousness" (1978/1993c, pp. 237–238). This subject has two faces, that of *homo economicus* and that of *homo psychologicus*, which were respectively "rejected" by Marx and Freud and whose rejection is at the "foundation" of Marxism and psychoanalysis (1966/1998, p. 53).

The critique of the liberal economic individual is as fundamental for Marxism as the critique of the psychological individual is for psychoanalysis. The Freudian and the Marxist sciences appear to Althusser (1978/1993c) as critiques, as critical sciences, as "conflictual sciences" (p. 230). Here "conflictuality" constitutes "scientificity" (p. 232). Science is a "permanent purification" of itself, an "incessant struggle" against polluting ideologies such as "psychology," which needs psychoanalysis to criticise it since it does not know how to criticise itself and thus remains "uncriticised, unknown" (1965/2005, pp. 171–172).

For Althusser, in reality, psychology is not just ideology. It is ideological, of course. It consists of ideology, but it is clearly distinguished from ideologies in the strictest sense of the word. Proper, moral, political and philosophical ideologies are complex sets of ideas that can find justification in psychological theories. Psychology can justify ideological constructions either by assuming natural individual tendencies as their underpinning, or by pathologising everything that opposes or challenges them in the individual realm. In the first case, psychology functions as a "mirror foundation" (*fondement en miroir*), as a supposedly internal justification of an ideological order; in the second case, psychology offers a "normative pathology", an indirect demonstration of the supposed truth of ideology by refuting that which contradicts it on the subjective level (Althusser, 1964/1996, pp. 108–115).

For instance, in the individualist, possessive and commercial ideological perspective of the capitalist system, there is a pathologisation of different kinds of spontaneity, impulsiveness, bountifulness, unselfishness and community-

centredness, as well as a naturalisation of self-centredness and strategic thought. The selfish, calculating and ambitious individual, who is just a mirror of capital, becomes the psychological model of the human being and may be used as a justification and foundation for capitalist society. Capitalism seems to obey the selfishness of human nature, but, in fact, it is this selfishness which obeys capitalism.

In the example of Plato's *Republic* provided by Althusser, the tripartite dissection of each individual justifies the tripartite division of classes. If there is a social separation between philosophers, warriors and merchants in the Greek ideal polis, it is supposedly because different people develop their three psychic faculties of reason, will and appetites differently. The psychological theory of these three faculties is, in turn, illustrated by the sociological theory of the three classes: philosophers reveal the development of intelligence, while warriors are a living example of determination and courage, and merchants exemplify the power of desire and appetites. The three human faculties are thus demonstrated by the three social classes. In this way, to understand man Plato "refers us to the structure of society, and when he studies the structure of society he refers us to man, that is, he refers to a human subject in which the structure of society is to be founded" (Althusser, 1964/1996, p. 109). The subject "conceived as constituted by a tripartite structure is in fact the by-product of the political problems that Plato is trying to resolve" and "is simultaneously the reflection of these political problems in the individual and the expression of these political problems presented as its solution and its foundation" (pp. 109–110).

3 | PRE-SET ETHOS AND THE SOCIAL-IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Plato's representation of the tripartite subjective structure validates his ideal of the tripartite objective structure of the polis. Even if his ideal of society is supposed to be ethically grounded in the general psychological nature of the human being, it is indeed politically based on a specific social reality and its ideological rationalisation. This supposedly rational justification is the only ethos of Plato's ideas on society and the subject.

Plato's psychology and sociology conform to the ethos of ideology. Likewise, at the present time, the individualist, possessive and commercial ideological perspective of the capitalist system governs the ethos of most mainstream psychology. It is not surprising, therefore, that psychological theories and practices tend to focus on individuals and can only develop their strategic selfish behaviour (Parker, 2007).

The ethics of individualism, possessiveness and commercial economic rationality are the only ethics acceptable and available for the work of average psychologists. Perhaps the professionals of psychology disagree with this ethical perspective, but their profession has to respect it and follow it by virtue of its own intrinsic form and constitutive structure. Althusser would find here the ethos of capitalism that is transmitted to psychological techniques and theorisations of techniques through the demands and interests to which psychology responds. Lacan would point out that this ethos cannot simply be a scientific ethos, an imperative of reason and knowledge, as it must correspond to the predetermined social-ideological functions fulfilled by psychology in the capitalist system. And Althusser would agree with Lacan because the demands and interests of the system cannot create a science, but only a technique and the ideological rationalisation of this technique, a rationalisation in which the logic of the system adopts a rational ethical form.

The system determines the ethos of psychology. Here is the main point at which Althusser meets Lacan. Both recognise that psychologists are not completely free to determine the ethos of their theories and practices, as they must obey the ideals of society and the functions that the system has imposed on psychology, such as *ideologisation*, *adaptation* and *exploitation* for Lacan, as well as *legitimation* or *justification*, *the mirror foundation* and *normative pathologisation* for Althusser. These social-ideological functions of psychology logically restrict, orientate and underlie its theoretical and practical ethos, which is thus a political ethos, as it includes the inescapable political imperatives that guide and govern psychological theory and practice.

4 | DUALISM AND CLASS SOCIETY

Psychology cannot entirely free itself from its pre-set political ethos. This ethos determines a large part of what psychological discourse can be and do. We have already seen, for example, how Lacan explained the psychological objectivation and resulting alienation of the subject that is required for his/her ideologisation, adaptation and exploitation. Similarly, for Althusser, the political imperatives of justifying the system, preventing conflicts and adapting or readapting subjects are what, once theorised, produce the ideological perversions and confusions of psychology. In fact, as I will try to show now, the basic theoretical dualist operation that constitutes psychology, the one that distinguishes the psyche from the body and the world, is a political gesture that cannot be abstracted from class society, from its division of labour and its classist ideology. This has been convincingly elucidated by Marx and Engels.

As was pointed out by Marx (1845/1981), “the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis” (p. 8). The social contradictions and class struggles thus explain the division between our world and heaven, between the material and the ideal, between body and mind, between the soma and the psyche.

The object of psychology can only be separated from the material world because of the separation that is intrinsic in class society. Class division turns into a division of labour, a division between manual and intellectual work, which in turn creates the dualist division between mind and body, that is, the division constitutive of psychology. As Engels showed, if today people tend to explain their acts psychologically by their thoughts, it is because earlier some men ensured that the work “planned by their heads” would be “performed by hands not their own” (Engels, 1876/1986, p. 418).

According to Engels, the social separation between the master's head and the slave's hands was at the origin of the division between mind and body, psyche and soma, psychology and physiology. Dualism arose from classism and from its political ethos of domination. The dominant class had to dominate in order to obtain a psyche different from the body and the world. The psychological sphere, therefore, is a social privilege and presupposes the social domination of one class by another (Pavón-Cuéllar, 2017, 2018).

The politics of domination and privilege underlies the very existence of the object of psychology, of any kind of psychology, even the most radical, egalitarian or liberationist psychological perspectives, since their problem lies, as we have seen, in the fact of being psychological. The problem is the psyche, which is not only always political, but is always political in a precise sense. In other words, there is a defined political choice in the very gesture that makes the object of psychology exist. Of course, this choice may differ from that of the psychologist, but this does not prevent it being operative and effective.

Psychology remains what it is in the hands of those who struggle against privilege and domination. No matter how good their intentions, the effects of what they do, the consequences of their deeds, do not depend on them, but on what they do. To recognise something as simple as this is one of the main lessons we receive from structuralism.

Thanks to structuralist thinkers like Lacan and Althusser, we understand better why psychology is what it is regardless of who uses it. This is so because, as Althusser (1965/2005) warned us, one cannot “use” an ideological device without “submitting” to it (p. 242). In Lacan's (1970/1991) terms, one cannot “employ” a discourse without becoming an “employee” of it (pp. 74–75).

Psychologists are the employees of psychological discourse. And this discourse is the complex elaboration of a class privilege and of an effect of domination. It is perhaps for this reason that it was so successful among the bourgeois in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Plekhanov, 1907/1974). It is perhaps for the same reason that psychological discourse remains so popular in the dominant and privileged classes and countries of the world.

Psychology unceasingly performs the dualist dissection that reproduces class society and division of labour on a national and international level. Psychology also fulfils such important functions as fragmenting communities by individualising subjects, by enclosing them within themselves and by micropolitically constituting and reconstituting liberal individualistic capitalist society composed of isolated, highly vulnerable citizens, workers, consumers and voters. Moreover, as Lacan pointed out, psychology destroys the subject by making him/her the opposite of what

he/she is, precisely what he/she is not, an object—that is, the object of psychology that can then become the object of the capitalist system. Faced with this objectification, structuralism may paradoxically be a refuge for the subject threatened by empirical and objective sciences or pseudo-sciences such as psychology (Balibar, 2005).

5 | CONCLUSION

Politics should not be abstracted from psychology. The psychological domain is also political and its ethos can only be a political ethos. This ethos may partly depend on a deliberate political positioning. However, as Marx and Engels have demonstrated, the political ethos of psychology also always involves a forced choice for the politics of dualism, that is, the politics of domination and class society, which is also the politics of ideological justification for Althusser and of ideologisation, adaptation and exploitation for Lacan. Today, as in the times of Lacan and Althusser, this politics is that of capitalism conceived as a cultural and socioeconomic system that dominates our lives through diverse and complex devices, including psychological ones.

Choosing psychology always involves choosing the system. This inherent truth does not in any way exclude the choice of psychology being an ethical choice and, as such, a free choice, as we can reject psychology, of course. However, once we choose psychology, we are also making a political choice in favour of the system, a choice in favour of the reproduction of the system, a choice of serving its ideals and justifying its ideologies. This reproductive choice is the inescapable political ethos of psychology.

If we concede that psychology unavoidably involves a reproductive political ethos, then we should conclude that any pretension to non-reproductive or apolitical work would be deceptive in the psychological domain. Such deception seems to be the most elementary and generalised form of unethical behaviour characteristic of psychologists. Any ethical accomplishment by psychology would then demand the initial reflexive acknowledgment that psychology essentially excludes any kind of subversion of the system or neutrality regarding it. Perhaps this acknowledgment allows us, paradoxically, to find a way to make a different use of psychology.

Perhaps psychology's self-awareness of its functions may help it to liberate itself from these functions and thus become something better. This liberation by self-awareness is an ethical principle promoted by both Marxism and psychoanalysis. It is something that psychology still has to learn from its Marxist and Freudian critiques.

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