

ARTICLE

Pharisees, Freudians and the fetishism of the text: Catholic triumphalism in Jacques Lacan

Daniel Burston

Department of Psychology, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

Correspondence

Daniel Burston, Department of Psychology, 214 Rockwell Hall, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA 15282, USA.
Email: burston@duq.edu

Abstract

This paper argues that Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) was possibly the most famous Catholic psychoanalyst who was not known for being Catholic. Confusion on this score is understandable, however. He declared himself an atheist at age 16 but in later life, boasted of his Jesuit education, frequently quoted St. Paul, Augustine, and St. Aquinas, and, at the age of 73, pronounced Catholicism to be “the one true religion”. Lacan possessed an almost religious veneration for Sigmund Freud, but rejected Freud's theory of psychosexual development and criticised psychoanalysts who invoked Freud's characterology and theories of object relations as “Pharisees”. I argue that his bizarre polemics with the International Psychoanalytic Association are the result of habits of thought and feeling he acquired as a child, and then “transferred” from Jesus onto Freud in later life.

KEYWORDS

anti-Semitism, Catholicism, crypto-revisionism, International Psychoanalytic Association, Judaism

Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) was one of the most celebrated and influential psychoanalysts of the 20th century. He was also a Catholic intellectual who was not widely known for being a Catholic intellectual. After all, even Lacan's most ardent admirers are seldom conversant with or even interested in his views on religion. Indeed, for most Lacanians, Lacan's Catholic background is incidental or even irrelevant to his approach to psychoanalysis. Confusion on this score is understandable, however. Although he formally renounced Catholicism at 16, opting for atheism (or so he said) (Roudinesco, 1999), 15 years later, in 1932, Lacan dedicated his doctoral dissertation to his younger brother, a Benedictine monk, in the following words: “Au R. P. Marc-François Lacan, bénédictin de la Congrégation de France, mon frère en religion”, i.e., to “my brother in religion”, not just to “my brother” (as cited in Earle, 1997, p. 224). Moreover, Lacan's writings are filled with references to St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St. Aquinas, among others, and Lacan saw to it that all of his children were baptized (Roudinesco, 1999). In 1954, when the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) revoked his status as a training analyst, Lacan complained bitterly that he had been “excommunicated”, and quoted the New Testament and celebrated Catholic authors like Pascal and Renan in his

ongoing polemics with the Freudian faithful. And in 1964, when he formed his own school, *L'École Freudienne de Paris*, Lacan joined forces with three Jesuit Fathers, namely, Louis Beirnaert, Michel de Certeau, and Francois Roustang. Other key figures in the school, though not priests, were also devout Catholics.

Ten years later, in *The Triumph of Religion*, Lacan declared that Catholicism is the “one true religion” (Lacan, 1974/2013, p. 66) – implying that others were false, or at least defective by comparison. He even argued that Catholicism would triumph over psychoanalysis and science because it supplied an abundance of meaning. Having disparaged or dismissed questions of meaning (from a structuralist and/or poststructuralist perspective) for most of his career, what Lacan actually meant by “meaning” in this cryptic remark remains quite obscure, and a matter for considerable conjecture (Dunlap, 2014).

Finally, note that on November 16, 2011, three decades after his passing, Lacan's daughter, Judith Miller, sued historian Elizabeth Roudinesco who recalled that Lacan had asked for a proper Catholic burial, despite his atheist convictions (Westali, 2013). According to Miller, Roudinesco's remark implied that Lacan's family had disrespected his last wishes, and she therefore sought to suppress or delete this passage from Roudinesco's book, *Lacan: In Spite of Everything* (Roudinesco, 2014). The court first ruled in Miller's favour but their verdict was overturned on appeal, because the higher court discerned that this was not really a conflict between Roudinesco and Miller, but “between Lacan and himself” (Westali, 2013).

Even assuming the court ruled correctly, on the whole, Lacan's attitude toward Catholicism need not be framed in terms of an “internal conflict”, conscious or otherwise. Judging from the available evidence, it seems just as likely that Lacan was not the least bit conflicted but simply wanted to have it both ways – to be, and to be perceived as a loyal Catholic, and to be an atheist, simultaneously. (What else are we to make of this bizarre history?).

In any case, as Ian Parker observed “The Lacanian break with the IPA was to some extent a break that gave voice to a Catholic current inside French psychoanalysis” (Parker, 2011, p. 156). And yet, as John Forrester pointed out, Lacan approached Freud's text with an attitude that seemed to border on religious veneration (Forrester, 1997), adding only that Lacan honoured what he claimed was the spirit, not the letter of Freud's texts, which he seldom cited at length. Moreover, as Roudinesco pointed out, Lacan embellished pretty freely at times, attributing many ideas and intentions to Freud that Freud had never actually embraced or espoused (Roudinesco, 1999). Worse still, as Stuart Schneiderman pointed out long ago, Lacan actually *banned* certain texts of Freud's, especially his later works, prohibiting his own students from reading them lest they be led astray (Schneiderman, 1983). So if Lacan venerated Freud, it was an odd kind of veneration, which promoted numerous flights of fancy, resembling a fetishism of the text (and its author), by adopting all kinds of irrational beliefs about them.

In addition to banning specific books of Freud's, Lacan argued that Freud's whole theory of character and object relations was misbegotten – a moralistic intrusion on the real business of psychoanalysis. In *Discourse to Catholics*, for example, he deplored

the famous Freudian definition of sexuality, from which people wanted to deduce a supposed “object relation” said to be oral, anal or genital. This notion of object relations harbours within itself a profound ambiguity, if not a pure and simple confusion; for it gives a natural correlate a characteristic of value that is camouflaged behind reference to a developmental norm.

It is with such confusions that (Christ's) malediction regarding those who “bind heavy burdens, hard to bear, and lay them on men's shoulders (Matthew 23: 4) will strike those who authorize in man the presupposition of some personal shortcoming at the core of dissatisfaction. (Lacan, 1974/2013, p. 42)

Lacan did not stop there: he sometimes reproached Freud with complicity in the gospel of normalization that his followers presumably built out of bits and pieces of his work. For example, in *Discourse to Catholics* (1920/1961), Lacan speculated that “whereas a woman may be secretly content deep down with the person who satisfies both her need and her lack, a man, seeking his want to be beyond his need, which is nevertheless so much better assured than a woman's ... is inclined to inconstancy” (Lacan, 1974/2013, p. 46).

Or, as the well-known rhyme has it: “Hogmus higgamus, men are polygamous; higgamus hoggamus, women monogamous”. Judged by this standard, Lacan said, Freud’s character

was more feminine than anything else. I see a trace of this in the extraordinary monogamistic requirement that led him so far as to submit to a kind of dependency (on Martha Freud) that one of his disciples, the author of his biography (Ernest Jones), calls “uxorious”. (Lacan, 1974/2013, pp. 22–23)

In retrospect, of course, Ernest Jones’ characterization of Freud as an uxorious husband is open to doubt. After all, Jones was a notorious liar and philander, so his appraisal doesn’t carry much weight. While there is now considerable evidence that Freud may have had an affair with his sister-in-law Minna Bernays (Burston, 2008), whether Freud had an extramarital affair or not is actually quite beside the point. Judging from this passage, it is evident that Lacan construed traits like dependence and submission to be “feminine”. And although an explicit moral or theological justification for this assertion is lacking, Lacan clearly construed the requirement of monogamy within marriage as “extraordinary”. This inference tallies with Roudinesco’s observation that both before and during his marriages, Lacan kept numerous mistresses (Roudinesco, 1999).

So, to summarize, Lacan pronounced certain texts of Freud’s “off limits” to students, and invented freely when attributing specific ideas or utterances to him. He also characterized Freud’s character as feminine or submissive. On the face of it, perhaps, this weird combination of deliberate censorship, free-wheeling fantasy, and some powerful projections hardly seems consistent with an attitude of veneration. And yet, odd as it was, the quasi-religious intensity of his veneration for Freud does register *indirectly* in Lacan’s frequent admonitions to his followers, and obliquely in his frequent use of scriptural references and theological analogies to chastise other analysts as I explore further below.

Even so, on first acquaintance, Lacan’s peculiar brand of Freud piety seems utterly bizarre until we recognize that Lacan was what I have elsewhere called a “crypto-revisionist” (Burston, 1991, 2007). In the history (and historiography) of psychoanalysis, crypto-revisionists are theorists like Klein, Marcuse, Lacan, and to a lesser extent, Erik Erikson, who repeatedly insist on their unwavering fidelity to Freud even as they chart new and increasingly original or deviant directions in their theories of human development. In so doing, they practice a kind of plagiarism in reverse by attributing their own creative ideas and intentions to an earlier, more authoritative source. This strategy of obfuscation, which is designed – consciously or otherwise – to legitimize new ideas may create new opportunities for interpretation in the communal discourse, but also generate confusion and schisms of one sort or another. Either way, in staking their personal and professional identities on their (alleged) fidelity to Freud, crypto-revisionists resemble religious reformers who develop a new interpretation of a canonical text or, indeed, an entirely new theological perspective, while attributing it to an earlier figure – often the founder or his immediate successor – in the tradition. Such rhetorical manoeuvres inevitably entail a measure of self-deception, and sometimes, one suspects, of deliberate dishonesty. But by the same token, this rhetorical sleight of hand may be absolutely necessary to achieve a significant change in perspective in conservative religious communities that are extremely resistant to change, or a measure of legitimacy for a minority intent on repudiating an earlier interpretation of a sacred text – a strategy that I believe Lacan intuitively understood.

So, for example, in his seminar of December 1, 1954, Lacan delivered a blistering broadside against orthodox Freudians, “Even when one does show willingness to follow Freud, mouthing *the death instinct*, one doesn’t understand it any more than the Dominicans, so prettily ridiculed by Pascal in *Les Provinciales*, had a clue about the principle of sufficient grace” (p. 162).

To put these remarks in context, Lacan was suggesting here that Freud wrote *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920/1961) – admittedly, a confused and confusing text – to recapture his original ground, and to disabuse readers of ideas like character structure and object relations which Freud saw as red herrings and not really relevant to what he was trying to do. Is that actually the case? No, of course not. But let us bracket that issue, which is also tangential to our inquiry. Instead, let us attend carefully to the tacit implication of Lacan’s anathema, which is that *psychoanalytic theory is analogous to religious doctrine* and that the leaders of the IPA merely delude themselves in thinking that they follow Freud, because they do not grasp his deeper meaning.

This accusation of Lacan's tallies with his use of the myth of Acteon at the end of "La chose freudienne". On the one hand, notes Jeffrey Mehlmann:

the myth is a parable of psychoanalysis properly construed: The analyst, upon confronting the truth of castration (Diana in her nudity) is called upon to play Acteon, bearing witness to to the violation of the integrity of his ego by his "own" unconscious drives (allegorically, the hounds). On the other hand, the myth is a somewhat paranoid allegory of the historical tragedy of psychoanalysis - the work of Freud-Acteon, having encountered truth, is torn to shreds by his inferior followers. Now those followers are referred to as a "diaspora" of "emigrants". Lacan's villains, in this case, are less Americans than Jews. Freud-Acteon, on the other hand, is said to be inspired by a "properly Christian concern for the soul's movements". In ... this reading of the myth, moreover, the role of Diana in her bath falls to none other than the Statue of Liberty. All of which - the castigation of ego-psychology as a Jewish cultural formation, the outlandish identification of Freud with Christianity - join to revive a Christian typological reading of the myth - Acteon/Freud, the hounds/the Jews. (Mehlmann, in Roudinesco, 1999, p. xiv)

Mehlmann's gloss on Lacan's reworking of the myth of Acteon rings true. But, oddly enough, it is followed by an emphatic disclaimer to the effect that Lacan was not anti-Semitic (Mehlmann, in Roudinesco, 1999). Yes and no. In fairness to Mehlmann, Lacan was never a racist anti-Semite in the Nazi mould. But that hardly settles the matter. Anyone who delves deeply into his quarrels with the IPA cannot completely dispel the suspicion that Lacan's grandiose imagination was deeply infused with the imagery and attitudes of the older, clerical/Catholic anti-Semitism that enveloped France during the Dreyfus era (Brown, 2010). So, for example, in his essay *Kant with Sade*, he quotes the Catholic historian Ernest Renan (1823–1892) as follows:

Let us be thankful that Jesus encountered no law against insulting a whole class of citizens. For the Pharisees would have been inviolable. His exquisite mockery and magic provocations always hit home. The Nessus tunic of ridicule that the Jew, the son of the Pharisees, had been dragging in tatters behind him for eighteen centuries was woven by Jesus with divine skill. A masterpiece of high-level mockery, his scathing remarks have become burned into the flesh of the hypocrite and of the falsely devout. Incomparable remarks, worthy of a Son of God! (Renan as cited in Lacan, 1953/2006, pp. 665–666)

This passage warrants very careful scrutiny. Renan began by describing the Pharisees as "a ... class of citizens", suggesting that they were merely a portion of the Jewish population in Jesus' lifetime. But then he shifts his ground, noting that *all* modern Jews are descended from Pharisees, and therefore implying that *all* Jews are hypocritical and "falsely devout". This rhetorical device, of seeming balanced or judicious at first, then escalating rapidly into full blown calumny, is extremely common in anti-Semitic literature. And, along the same lines, Renan said that Jesus deliberately "wove" the tattered "Nessus tunic of ridicule" that Jews have born for 18 centuries, implying that Jesus himself was the source of contemporary Christian anti-Semitism. This is a rhetorical trope favoured by most Christian anti-Semites, and as any competent biblical scholar knows, is complete and utter nonsense.

One might excuse Lacan's use of Renan in this context by arguing that, according to Lacan, scathing ridicule is an art form associated with moral, intellectual or spiritual superiority; hence his remarks about Pascal and the Dominicans, for example. That may be true up to a point, though the claim that a knack for biting ridicule is a product of moral superiority is a dubious one at best. However, if one chooses to read Lacan in this way, one could argue that he simply did not notice Renan's anti-Semitism, or felt it was beside the point. If this was an isolated instance, this argument might even be plausible but historical experience and Lacan's own writings demonstrate that this seemingly common-sense explanation is lame (Burston, 2014). After all, it begs the question – *why didn't* Lacan notice Renan's anti-Semitism? And *why* would he imagine it was somehow beside the point? If you approach matters psychoanalytically, you have to wonder whether he simply did not *want* to notice. Perhaps he did not care. Or more to the point, perhaps he sympathized with Renan's anti-Semitism.

Why? In light of Mehlmann's reflections on "La chose freudienne", it seems reasonably certain that Lacan thought of the guardians of Freudian orthodoxy, who had "excommunicated" him, as "Pharisees", and imagined himself as a true (if somewhat belated) apostle of Freud's; a kind of secular version of St. Paul, who understood the teaching of Freud/Jesus, ostensibly unlike his Jewish followers, who supposedly "tore him to shreds" (see also Hackett, 1982). As noted previously, Lacan's suggestion that Jesus possessed a "properly Christian concern for the soul's movements" (Mehlmann, in Roudinesco, 1999, p. xiv) struck Mehlmann as "outlandish". Yes, indeed, but it was more than merely outlandish. After all, in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939/1964), Freud elaborated on a claim he first made in *Totem and Taboo* (1913/1955), namely, that Christianity gained converts and surpassed Judaism in antiquity because its doctrines and rituals made deep concessions to paganism and to mother-worship, reflecting a cultural and historical regression to a lower developmental level than Judaism (Burston, 2014).

Of course, Freud's statements along these lines are probably as odious and exaggerated to many Christian readers as Lacan's anti-Semitic rhetoric is to most Jewish ones. But that is just the point, isn't it? From early childhood onwards, Freud was enveloped in a predominantly Catholic culture awash in anti-Semitic attitudes and stereotypes. Among other things perhaps, Freud's appraisal of Christianity as a massive cultural regression – first in *Totem and Taboo* (1913/1955), and later in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939/1964) – was a sophisticated (if long-winded) polemical retort to just the sort of mythological nonsense Lacan was peddling in his polemics against Freud's orthodox followers (Burston, 2014). Once this fact registers fully, it suddenly dawns on you that Lacan completely *failed* to grasp the cultural-historical context in which Freud lived and worked, and to reflect critically on his own cultural biases; and that this sad state of affairs is reflected obliquely in his weird (ahistorical) flights of fancy.

So, on reflection, had Freud lived long enough to become acquainted with Lacan's comparisons between him and Jesus, and between Lacan and St. Paul, he would have repudiated them vehemently. And this is true despite Lacan's meditations on Freud and the Talmud (Dunlap, 2014; Roudinesco, 1999). Why? Because the Talmud is a direct outgrowth of the Pharisaic movement that Renan reviled so forcefully, and that Lacan himself obviously despised. So on reflection, Lacan's occasional depictions of Freud as a kind of latter day Talmud scholar are completely disjunctive with his depiction of Freud as a Christ-like figure who does not share the faith and the failings of his Jewish followers. At this point even the most generous reader, if she or he has not succumbed to the Lacanian mystique, will be struck by a sense of looming incoherence that runs through Lacan's polemics with the IPA. Indeed, the reader may be thinking: "For God's sake, Jacques, make up your mind! Was Freud Christ-like, or a latter day Talmudist? And while we're at it, was Jesus a Jew, or an anti-Semite?"

In light of the preceding, then, one can only applaud Ian Parker, who noted that despite the generous defences of Lacan against the charge of anti-Semitism, for example, the argument that he was nasty about everyone and did not single out the Jews in particular for contempt, some unpleasant eruptions of spite against the IPA have been condensed into complaints about Judaism. Lacan's "Proposition of 9 October, 1967", for example, includes the appalling factually incorrect claim that "the IPA of Mittel Europa has demonstrated its preadaptation ... in not losing a single member in the said [concentration camps]" (as cited in Parker, 2011, p. 165).

In truth of course, at least nine members of the IPA perished in the camps. And so indeed did Freud's four sisters. As Paul Roazen pointed out long ago, Freud, Martha, and their children only escaped Vienna by the skin of their teeth after an international outcry and generous bribes to Nazi officials (Roazen, 1971). Insisting that no one lost their lives because of some cosy arrangement with the Nazis was wildly inaccurate, and had a disturbingly tendentious quality, if not a whiff of slander.

Commenting on the "Proposition of 9 October, 1967", Parker noted that one long time analysand of Lacan's confessed that "Lacan's argument in the first version of the 1967 proposition – that 'the religion of the Jews must be questioned in our hearts' – was a call for searching inquiry 'came to be understood as an unbearable hostility toward Judaism'" (Parker, 2011, p. 165).

In Lacan's defence, some may argue that his rupture with the IPA provoked all these bad-tempered tirades and innuendo. After all, Lacan seldom invoked the New Testament or well-known Christian authors unless he wanted to rebuke the Freudian faithful for their intellectual poverty, or for betraying their master's legacy. But if he had

not already harboured “an unbearable hostility toward Judaism” (Parker, 2011, p. 1965) – a product, perhaps, of his Jesuit education – it seems certain that his vehemence would have found other targets and other forms of expression.

In conclusion, Lacan proclaimed that he was spearheading “a return to Freud” (as cited in Schneiderman, 1983) but, although he talked about Freud’s texts with an attitude bordering on religious fervour, or said he did, at any rate, he seldom invoked the New Testament or well-known Christian authors unless he wanted to rebuke Freud’s (mostly Jewish) followers for their intellectual poverty or for betraying their master’s legacy. Nevertheless, in light of the preceding, it is apparent that Lacan’s ostensible “return to Freud” was really nothing of the kind. The Freud that Lacan conjured with in his seminars and publications was a radically de-contextualized, de-historicized, and frequently idealized figure, not a real, flesh and blood human being. Here I am reminded of another Catholic psychiatrist’s reflections on the roots of Christian anti-Semitism. In an essay entitled “Some Religious Aspects of Anti-Semitism”, Karl Stern observed:

The psychology of the “cradle Christian” is such that the Christ of the icon is not a truly incarnated being. Now, Christian faith is full only if there exists a living awareness of the historical Jesus, of that almost anonymous “heretical” rabbi – obscure and utterly peripheral in the secular history of the Roman Empire of his time. This latter image comes “naturally” to every Jew, and I could quote innumerable examples. But for the Christian, in order to “see” this fully, something like a conversion is necessary. (Stern, 1970, p. 260)

Why is “something like a conversion” necessary to enable the “cradle Christian” to grasp the full blooded humanity of Jesus (Stern, 1970, p. 260)? Perhaps it is because an etherealized, disembodied notion of Jesus as pure “spirit” is quite comforting. It renders the horrors of his crucifixion much easier to contemplate. But Stern provided another reason:

The Christian child who, in the course of his religious education, is early imbued with a love for Jesus, frequently hears the very word “Jews” for the first time in the context of the crucifixion. The fact that the mother of Jesus was a Jewess, that all his friends and followers were Jews, that he himself in the flesh was a Jew, is kept from the child’s consciousness with what at times seems like a bad intention. (Stern, 1970, p. 259)

I suspect that this was precisely the kind of religious education that Jacques Lacan received as a boy, and that Lacan transferred the same kind of etherealizing tendencies he was taught to bestow on Jesus, an idealized figure, onto Freud, as an adult. The process I am describing is not transference in the standard psychoanalytic sense, of course, but refers to the transfer of certain habits of thought and feeling acquired from trusted teachers from one domain (religion) into another (psychoanalysis), and using them as a template or a platform for later intellectual endeavours, but the resulting attitude is quite similar.

Either way, if truth be told, Lacan was not really acquainted or even interested in Freud or his enveloping social context and the way it shaped his ideas. Instead, he viewed Freud through a kind of distorting prism that was largely of his own making. This kind of idealizing “transference”, if I may call it that, was a necessary prelude to the emergence of his narcissistic fantasy of himself as a latter day St. Paul, bent on spreading the true Gospel. And this fantasy, in turn, gave him permission to invent and embellish freely, and to dismiss some texts altogether, taking psychoanalysis in a completely different direction from the one Freud intended, while accusing others – who were mostly Jewish, including some of his former teachers– of doing precisely the same thing.

Finally, Lacan was notoriously elusive and ambiguous on political issues, but Lacanians on the left – who seem to be the majority nowadays – sometimes congratulate themselves (and one another) by claiming that they are the only school within contemporary psychoanalysis that is genuinely opposed to capitalism, presumably because they have distilled and consolidated the latent radicalism of Lacan’s thought (Dunlap, 2014; Parker, 2011; Stavrakakis, 2007). But is that claim really tenable? Granted, the Freudian left has dwindled to a fraction of its former size and influence

(Stavrakakis, 2007) but there are still plenty of non-Lacanian psychoanalysts who are fiercely critical of capitalism (for example, see Durkin, 2014; Kovel, 2002). Moreover, and more to the point, when Lacan lashed out at the Freudian faithful, the anti-Semitic sensibility he channelled was more akin to the monarchist Catholicism of 19th century and Vichy France than it was to the Catholicism of contemporaries like Dorothy Day or Montreal psychiatrist Karl Stern, and it is even more remote from Vatican II theology. Indeed, surveying the work of Lacan's more theologically minded critics and expositors (for example, Hackett, 1982; Kotsko, 2008; Pound, 2007; Reinhard & Lupton, 2003) one wonders if the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), when the Church dramatically changed its historic stance toward Judaism, ever touched Lacan and his circle in a meaningful way, and if so, where – if anywhere – this registers in their texts. Perhaps future research will clarify that question.

REFERENCES

- Brown, B. (2010). *For the soul of France: Culture wars in the age of Dreyfus*. New York, NY: Knopf.
- Burston, D. (1991). *The legacy of Erich Fromm*. Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press.
- Burston, D. (2007). *Erik Erikson and the American psyche; ego, ethics and evolution*. New Jersey, NJ: Jason Aronson.
- Burston, D. (2008). A very Freudian affair: Erich Fromm, Peter Swales and the future of psychoanalytic historiography. *Psychoanalysis and History*, 10(1), 115–130.
- Burston, D. (2014). Anti-semitism. In T. Teo (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of critical psychology* (pp. 115–120). New York, NY: Springer Publishers.
- Dunlap, A. (2014). *Lacan and religion*. Bristol, CT: Acumen Publishers.
- Durkin, K. (2014). *The radical humanism of Erich Fromm*. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Forrester, J. (1997). Lacan's debt to Freud: How the Ratman paid off his debt. In T. Dufresne (Ed.), *Returns of the "French Freud": Freud, Lacan and beyond*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Freud, S. (1955). Totem and taboo. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 13). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1913)
- Freud, S. (1961). Beyond the pleasure principle. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 18). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1920)
- Freud, S. (1964). Moses and monotheism. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 23). London, UK: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1939)
- Hackett, C. D. (1982). Psychoanalysis and theology: Jacques Lacan and Paul. *Journal of Religion and Health*, 21(3), 184–192. doi:10.1007/BF02274178
- Kotsko, A. (2008). *Zizek and theology*. London, UK: Continuum.
- Kovel, J. (2002). *The enemy of nature: The end of capitalism or the end of the world?* London, UK: Zed Books.
- Lacan, J. (2006). *Kant with Sade. Écrits* (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton. (Original work published 1953)
- Lacan, J. (2013). *The triumph of religion preceded by discourse to Catholics* (B. Fink, Trans.). Malden, MA: Polity Press. (Original work published 1974)
- Parker, I. (2011). *Lacanian psychoanalysis: Revolutions in subjectivity*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Pound, M. (2007). *Theology, psychoanalysis and trauma*. London, UK: SCM.
- Reinhard, K., & Lupton, J. R. (2003). The subject of religion: Lacan and the ten commandments. *Diacritics*, 33(2), 71–79.
- Roazen, P. (1971). *Freud and his followers*. New York, NY: Alfred Knopf.
- Roudinesco, E. (1999). *Jacques Lacan & Co.: A history of psychoanalysis in France, 1925–1985*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Roudinesco, E. (2014). *Lacan: In spite of everything*. London, UK: Verso.
- Schneiderman, S. (1983). *Jacques Lacan: The death of an intellectual hero*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stavrakakis, Y. (2007). *The Lacanian left*. Albany, GA: SUNY Press.
- Stern, K. (1970). Some religious aspects of anti-Semitism. In *Love and success, and other essays* (pp. 258–261). New York, NY: Farrar Straus and Giroux.
- Westali, H. (2013). *The Lacanian trials*. Retrieved 6 May, 2013, from criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/06/the-lacanian-trials/

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY



Daniel Burston is an Associate Professor of Psychology and former Chair of the Psychology Department at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh. He authored numerous books and articles on the history of the behavioral sciences. His latest book, *A Forgotten Freudian: The Passion of Karl Stern*, was published by Karnac last year.

How to cite this article: Burston D. Pharisees, Freudians and the fetishism of the text: Catholic triumphalism in Jacques Lacan. *Psychother Politics Int.* 2017;15:e1400. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ppi.1400>