

# Globalization and The Other: Lifeworld(s) on the Brink

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**ABSTRACT** *This article specifies how globalization is not only an economic reality, but is also a socio-political–psychological and ecological one. It demonstrates how globalization, as an institution created by humans, not only fosters fear and greed among humans, but also decimates non-human animal lifeworlds, and, in doing so, threatens planet Earth itself. The article explores the relationship of globalization to Otherness in the form of the “enemy”, whether religious, national, ethnic, political, or ecological, the latter specifically in the form of coral reefs. The exploration highlights the fact that if there are endangered species, it is because a dangerous species exists. Globalization foments an “us against them” mentality; heightens human competition between groups; and, not surprisingly, draws on what Darwin described as “the law of battle”, namely, male–male competition. What in a phylogenetic sense originated in the service of mating now functions in the service of power and war. Recognition of this socio-political–psychological–ecological reality leads to an inquiry into the enemy that is not only outside but also within. Notable descriptions of the “Other within” are found in Socrates’ and Plato’s commentaries on the nature of humans, in Jung’s concept of the Shadow, and, strikingly, in the observations of David Shulman and Mahmoud Darwish on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and impasse. This investigation of the relationship between globalization and the Other leads ultimately to the realization that, if socio-political–psychological – and ecological – ills are to be treated and cured, then we need to examine the Other within. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

**Key words:** the enemy; greed; coral reefs; the Other; male–male competition; self-deception; Israeli–Palestinian conflict; war

## INTRODUCTION

Shortly after George Bush disavowed the United Nations’ search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, declared a war on terror, and invaded the country, a global proclamation appeared in a cartoon. It pictured the global earthworld, duly labeling Bush’s own country “US” and all other countries “THEM” (see The Student Room, 2011).

Though having its origin as an economic strategy, globalization is not simply an economic phenomenon; it is a socio-political–psychological phenomenon that brings with it a decided augmentation of “the Other”. Prior to the formal institution of a global economy, “others” were

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what one might call distant relatives: real-life, individual humans whom one would not see, visit, hear about, or even be interested in hearing about in one's lifetime. Now, with the advent of instant communication and news, they are worldwide virtual kinfolk. If one does not see them or visit them, one hears or reads about them every day, not just in terms of failing national economies as in Greece and Portugal; of the billions of dollars being spent on military operations or wars; and of natural and man-made disasters; but simply and starkly in terms of individuals killing and being killed by others for religious, political, territorial, or national reasons. Religious beliefs, political ideologies, territorial claims, and ever-ready "national interests" run rife in our newly acclaimed globalized world, driving us to obliterate our virtual kinfolk as Other and them to obliterate us as Other. A polarized "Us against Them" mentality holds sway: in a speech in 2011 on the fight against terror, George Bush said famously: "You're either with us or against us." Thus a combative course of action is ever-present, a motivation to exterminate those who pose a threat or stand in the way, whether obstacles, competitors, or infidels. Of course, by virtue of their political and/or corporate positions and ties, our virtual kinfolk also make lucrative killings: they gouge others for money, destroy jobs, ruin individual means of livelihood in the process, and bring on real-life, real-time national and global as well as individual economic catastrophes. Indeed, their financial killings pointedly belie the positive economic values promoted by global free market enthusiasts.

In short, globalization brings to the fore and from virtually every corner of the Earth others whose proclivities and outright acts may be rapacious and violent as well as thoroughly self-serving. In effect, there are fewer and fewer strangers and more and more enemies or potential enemies. The move to globalization has thus meant living in a world too close for comfort. Though putatively secured by economic agreements, in the full scope of its socio-political-psychological dimension, the global world is in fact riddled with fear.

Surveillance is indeed mandatory: security forces, security codes, security checks, security fences, and so on, become a way of life. In a socio-political-psychological sense, globalization ironically shrinks the world of each human individual. Certainly one can still travel and explore distant lands. The global horizons of one's surrounding world are still open and beckoning, but *the singular and common lifeworld* of humans has changed. There is a pervasive undercurrent of fear generated by those no longer distant relatives whose paths may cross your own at any moment and place and whose motives and intentions may spell your doom. The word "lifeworld", we might note, is a direct translation of the German *lebenswelt*, a word Edmund Husserl (1931/1973), the founder of phenomenology, used to describe the immediate surrounding world in which we live our everyday lives, a directly experienced world distinct from the world of science that investigates humans, other forms of life, and the world "objectively". As Husserl (1935/1970) wrote, we are "here and there", "in the plain certainty of experience, before anything that is established scientifically, whether in physiology, psychology, or sociology." Moreover "we are subjects for this world . . . experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing it, relating to it purposefully" (pp. 104–105).

In our economic practice of globalization, we humans have changed not only our own singular common lifeworld, but the lifeworlds of other living creatures. Non-human and human animals alike have been and are being affected, decimated, and, in many instances, made extinct. Humans have long killed other species not simply for food, but for land, for resources, for money, for putative medicinal benefit, and so on. The present rapacity of human beings in this age of economic globalization, however, knows few if any bounds.

In this context, it is of interest to recall the two standard and pre-eminent values given for human bipedality: a consistent upright stance allows humans to see to greater distances and to plan ahead. “Ah!” one might exclaim, “What unparalleled stature in the world – a definitive space–time amplification over and above non-human animal talents.” In particular, given their unique bipedality, humans can see a wider world beyond their immediate spatial frame of reference and look temporally to the future, taking it into consideration in terms of the present. These unique talents and awarenesses, these possibilities for thoughtful enterprise, are encapsulated in the doubly vaunted rationality of *Homo sapiens sapiens*: we modern humans, a subspecies of the genus *Homo*, the genus of bipedal primates, are doubly named for our peerless and unsurpassable wisdom.

But is human bipedality really doing its job, so to speak? Are the purportedly positive values of our upright stance in the world duly vindicated? Are they vindicated, for example, by what “shock and awe” brought about in Iraq? Does the global outsourcing of jobs by companies, the worldwide overfishing in our oceans, or the lack of global action on climate change attest to our human space–time talents and wisdom? In the sense of greed, the answer is “Yes.” In each instance, seeing to greater distances means to exploit more resources, to make more money, and to plan ahead to exploit and to make even more. With apologies to Shakespeare, one might say that “gluttony by any other name would smell as sour”. In a tangential but equally pre-eminent sense, the answer is again “yes” – that sense being ideological self-righteousness. Making the world conform to one’s religious or political beliefs may readily be seen as a form of greed: raking in the believers at the existential expense of the “non” believers, thus satisfying the craving for the supremacy of one’s own religion or one’s own political program. Again, one might exclaim “Ah!”, in this instance, in light of the self-righteous power and glory that come with religious or political dominance, not to mention the afterlife – a concept which speaks of the insatiable greed for more.

What has so far been said of globalization and the other, and of fear and greed, may sound to some like soapbox oratory, which is why I want now to document what has been said more closely. I begin with non-human animal life, perhaps a surprising place to begin but, in fact, the essential place to begin, for non-human animal lifeworlds are fundamental to full understandings of the relationship between globalization and the Other.

## THE OTHERNESS OF NON-HUMAN ANIMAL LIFEWORLDS

I focus on coral reefs as an example of the Otherness of non-human animal lifeworlds for several significant reasons:

- (1) because coral reefs are global;
- (2) because they are presently endangered, indeed under radical threat of extinction;
- (3) because they house such small forms of life – corals are the calcareous skeletons of marine polyps, minute sedentary creatures;
- (4) because most of us have never seen coral reefs and are not likely to experience them directly; and
- (5) because, as we shall see, they were the first natural phenomenon about which Darwin wrote lucidly and in enlightening detail with respect to evolution.

Coral reefs are, of course, not the sole non-human animal lifeworld at risk of being decimated or going extinct at the hands of humans; so are gorillas, polar bears, and multiple species of frogs, to list only a few examples. All are endangered species, but, as I have written elsewhere (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008b), if endangered species exist, *it is because a dangerous species exists*. Just as this existential relationship is commonly overlooked, so also is a seminal conceptual relationship having to do with biodiversity:

Present-day concerns with endangered species focus attention on a vast range of imperiled creatures in the animal kingdom and on the concomitant ecological hazards of a diminished biological diversity. The diminished biological diversity may be described in twentieth–twenty-first-century terms as a lack of biological pluralism. Just as a belief in and valuing of pluralistic societies demands respect for others, so also does a belief in and valuing of biological diversity. From a moral standpoint, biodiversity and sociological pluralism are indeed sister concepts. In each instance, the “Other” is commonly recognized as morphologically different in some way from oneself, but not so different as to be ranked inferior, deemed expendable, and so on. Indeed, in a Darwinian sense, i.e., in the sense of a conjoint human/non-human evolutionary history within the Kingdom Animalia, morphological difference is a matter of degree, not of kind. Conceptions and valuations of others thus logically reflect natural gradient differences rather than egoistically inflected “Us against Them” categorical differences. The former kinds of differences propel us toward thoughtful, equitably negotiated decisions concerning Nature and other living beings, the latter toward peremptory and myopic acts that sever relational bonds. (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008b, pp. 343–444)

We might well add to Darwin’s fundamental truth of differences in degree and not in kind, and emphasize that, were we indeed to recognize a singular and common lifeworld with, as Husserl (1931/1973) put it: one “common time-form” (p. 128), and one “[o]penly endless Nature . . . that includes an open plurality of men (conceived more generally: [an open plurality of] animalia)” (p. 130), we might have far more ecologically enlightened citizens, along with a far more informed and respectful sense of evolution and of our own human evolutionary history within the evolution of the Kingdom Animalia.

The state of coral reefs today is the result of precisely those kinds of human acts that sever relational bonds. The report issued by the World Resources Institute (Burke, Reyntar, Spalding, & Perry, 2011) says as much. Seventy-five percent of coral reefs around the world are at a three-fold risk: from overfishing, from industrial pollution which causes ocean acidification, and from climate change. Overfishing constitutes the most immediate threat, and has affected approximately half the world’s reefs. Overfishing in the Indian and Pacific oceans poses the biggest threat because dynamite and other explosives are used to blast fish out of the water. Moreover, in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, 275 million people live within less than 15 miles of the reefs, and rely on them for food as well as for tourism. As for climate change, global warming warms water which, in turn, bleaches the normal color of coral reefs by killing the marine polyps that live on the reef and give the reef its color. By their inaction on global warming, humans are wantonly destroying the lives and lifeworld of these tiny creatures, and with their destruction the lives and lifeworlds of other forms of marine life and the source of food and economic stability for millions of humans, not to mention the natural beauties of the Earth.

Darwin’s first published writing in 1842, the *Sketch* (see Darwin, 1909), was devoted to coral reefs, and pre-dated publication of *The Origin of Species* by 17 years. Gordon Chancellor’s (2008) excellent summary of Darwin’s *Sketch* in *The Works of Darwin Online* aptly highlighted the integral conceptual relationship of this earlier work to *The Origin of Species*, namely, in the fact that coral reefs evolve, their evolutionary sequencing running from

fringing reef to barrier reef to atoll, a sequencing that hinges on the relationship between coastline level and water level. Chancellor described this evolutionary sequencing as follows:

[I]n clean, agitated, tropical seas corals will form fringing reefs just below low tide level. If the coastline is being elevated (as for example may happen if the island is an active volcano) this type of reef should persist but as soon as the living coral is raised above the surf it will die and become a strip of white limestone. If the coastline is stable, the coral will gradually grow out from the shore to become a barrier reef. If the coast is sinking, as Darwin thought was happening to hundreds of islands in the south Pacific, the coral might keep pace by growing upwards but as the land sinks beneath the waves all that would remain would be a more or less circular atoll. Eventually the rate of subsidence might prove too fast, or (perhaps as in our own times of global warming) sea level will rise too fast and the atoll will die.

As is evident from Chancellor's summary, Darwin thought globally in an ecologically interconnected and temporal sense. He could, indeed, see to greater distances because he had actually traveled great distances, and explored and described them in fine detail. He could also see to greater distances in a temporal sense, deriving present conditions from past conditions as well as possible future conditions from present ones, precisely as in his recognition of the evolutionary sequencing of coral reefs. Clearly, in today's world of global warming, he would be eminently capable of planning ahead precisely because he had a historical sense of nature and of the natural world.

Corals are *others* that barely if ever enter directly into our 21st-century human concerns with, or sense of, the natural living world. Moreover, though we humans are in fact consummately *others-dependent*, those others – both animate and inanimate – who sustain our immediate world barely, if ever, enter into our immediate concerns: we do not grow our own vegetables, cultivate our own fruit trees, raise our own chickens or livestock, make our own clothes, build our own houses, manufacture our own cars or computers, and so on. In great measure, the problem is that we fail to recognize the fact that we are *others-dependent in the positive communal interconnected sense it warrants*. On the contrary, that positive interconnected and communal sense has long been and remains for the most part reversed. Though not naming it as such, economists Paul Krugman and Robin Wells (2011) have justly pinpointed and analyzed that reversed sense in their recent article: "Why greed gets worse". With the institution of Reagonomics in the USA and with economist Milton Friedman's free-market solutions for every problem, a reigning doctrine prevails that Krugman and Wells (2011) term "a creed of *greedism*", namely, the idea that "unchecked self-interest furthers the common good." (p. 28). In this form of globalization, greed is the driving force, propelling humans to be exploitative, bilking (cheating), rapacious "others": others who overfish, pollute, and care nothing of global warming; others who, in making killings, in grabbing resources and land, and so on, are concerned with amassing more and more, satisfying their own self-interests at the expense of those they disdain to recognize as kinfolk, whether real or virtual. In effect, the plurality of lifeworlds that is part of what Husserl (1931/1973) described as "openly endless Nature" (p. 130) is endlessly exploitable – that is, until the moment that overkill exhausts or exterminates these worlds completely.

Is it surprising, then, that greed-driven others easily slip into being regarded not a distant relative but a close-up threat to one's existence, and indeed, an enemy of the common good? To examine this question concretely and to answer it effectively, understandings of our other-dependency in a positive, communally interconnected sense are mandatory. The conceptual

relationship pointed out earlier between biological diversity and social pluralism suggests as much. By considering the relationship of non-human animals to human ones in finer terms, we will in fact bring to the fore Darwin's positive communally interconnected sense of the global world, a sense that duly and in detail recognizes competition as part of the natural order, and just as duly and in detail recognizes the natural foundational interdependence of living beings. As we shall see, lifeworlds are the existential terrain of the foundational interdependence of living beings and of competition between and among them.

## NON-HUMAN AND HUMAN ANIMAL LIFEWORLDS

As should be apparent from what was said about coral reefs, non-human animals have distinctive lifeworlds of their own. Differential lifeworlds exist because each species of animal has its own niche, its own particular surrounding world with its own particular "functional tones", as biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1957) so aptly described species-specific subject-world relationships. The lifeworld of humans is indeed but one form of lifeworld. When humans invade the lifeworlds of other animate organisms, they necessarily disturb those worlds, often enough bringing them to the point of extinction. A seminally important irony is thus evident – an irony that is notable precisely because the Earth is a singular planet, which is to say that, however differential the lifeworlds of animals, both human and nonhuman, they are inescapably interconnected, not just geographically but existentially. Darwin (1968/1859) observed this fact in *The Origin of Species*. He described at length the checks and relations between and among organic beings, giving detailed examples of the interconnectedness of life, even to the point of showing how the introduction of a single species of tree – a Scotch fir – can affect not only other trees but also insect and bird populations, and even cattle. As he succinctly stated: "*plants and animals, most remote in the scale of nature, are bound together by a web of complex relations*" (Darwin, 1968/1859, pp. 124–125, my emphasis). On the basis of his extensive observations, he furthermore noted that competition is "most severe between allied forms, which fill nearly the same place in the economy of nature", but that "in no one case could we precisely say why one species has been victorious over another in the great battle of life" (p. 127). He added that "[a] corollary of the highest importance may be deduced" from competition,

namely, that the structure of every organic being is related, in the most essential yet often hidden manner, to that of all other organic beings, with which it comes into competition for food or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it preys. (p. 127)

In light of Darwin's empirically detailed studies of plant and animal life, the very idea of globalization might have given us an appreciation not just of economic competition in "the great battle of life", but of the positive communal interconnectedness of life on this singular planet; that is, it might have given us an appreciation of how, as Darwin wrote: "*plants and animals, most remote in the scale of nature, are bound together by a web of complex relations*" (pp. 124–125, my emphasis) Notwithstanding the dedicated work of organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund ([www.wdf.org](http://www.wdf.org)), Earthjustice ([www.earthjustice.org](http://www.earthjustice.org)), Natural Resource Defense Council ([www.nrdc.org](http://www.nrdc.org)), National Wildlife Federation ([www.nwf.org](http://www.nwf.org)), and many others, what globalization has done is quite

the opposite. With its internationally sanctioned economic platform, globalization has heightened competition. It has done so because, as pre-eminently an economic strategy, globalization is a financially driven and financially focused program whose reigning motto is “More!” – a motto that as shown elsewhere (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008b) is utterly devoid of any moral weightings.

Clearly, self-interest, devoid of moral weighting, justifies literal and metaphorical killings. The enemy of the common good is, in effect, hard to miss. The example of coral reefs demonstrates unequivocally how non-human species are at risk because humans put them at risk, and have the unquestioned capacity to put them at risk. Hence, if endangered species exist, it is indeed because humans exist. Human beings have become the most dangerous species ever spawned by Nature, and not only with respect to the Other, but also with respect to their own kind: “Their intra-species danger is in fact unique: no non-human animal species decimates its own kind as humans do and have done for millennia. And no nonhuman animal species decimates its environmental resources, fouls its own air and water, or puts the global planet itself at risk as humans do and have done over the last century in particular” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008b, p. 345). In short, as the American cartoon character Pogo long ago observed and declared: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” To gain insights into this enemy that is us involves searching within for the destructive penchant of humans, to inquire into their self-deceptive side as Socrates described it, their “conceit” side as Plato described it, their shadow side as Jung described it, a side that is set forth in close-up, present-day terms and eloquently described in different but complementary ways by David Shulman, an Israeli professor of Humanistic Studies and activist in the Arab–Jewish Partnership (Ta’ayush), and by Mahmoud Darwish, a Palestinian poet. In short, insights into the enemy within demands recognition of another Other, that is, an Other who, through ignorance or fabrication, impacts on the socio-political–psychological realities of globalization.

## THE OTHER WITHIN

In an earlier article (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008a), I pointed out that Socrates’ dictum “Know thyself” was one whose import was apparent in many of Plato’s dialogues. In the *Phaedrus*, for example, Socrates states, “I must first know myself, as the Delphian inscription says; to be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of my own self, would be ridiculous” (Plato, 1937b, pp. 235–236). In the *Philebus*, he observes that self-ignorance is evident in three domains: wealth, beauty, and wisdom, and specifies each domain as follows:

the ignorant [person] may fancy himself richer than he is . . . [a]nd still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really has not . . . [a]nd yet surely by far the greatest number [of people] err about the goods of the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are. (Plato, 1937c, p. 384)

Consulting Plato directly, I noted further striking resemblances between ancient Greek thought and Jung’s pivotal psychic figure: the Shadow. In the *Laws*, Plato writes that to imagine oneself a better human being than one actually is, is to take on what the Athenian

Stranger (Plato himself) describes as the “conceit of wisdom” (Plato, 1937a, p. 608). The Athenian Stranger, who ironically is Plato himself in the face of foreign Others (Clinias, the Cretan, and Megillus, the Spartan), declares that to take on the conceit of wisdom is to fall short of the highest virtue: one does not accurately assess one’s own knowledge but professes to know what one does not know. Stating specifically that this form of ignorance can have dire socio-political consequences, the Athenian Stranger affirms that when conceit of wisdom is “possessed of power and strength, [it] will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes” (ibid., pp. 608–609). In finer terms, when ignorance is not merely simple, resulting in only “lighter offences”, but is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom, ignorance doubles, and when “doubled ignorance” combines with power and strength, criminal action results (ibid., p. 609). Present-day testimony to the trenchancy of this observation is readily available. We have only to open our eyes to “the great and monstrous crimes” that are committed by certain leaders, among whom was President George W. Bush, in whom the embodiment of the conceit of wisdom combined with unparalleled “power and [military] strength.”

Jung’s (1937/1970a) emphasis on “know[ing] ourselves as we really are” (p. 170; see also Jung, 1955/1970b) is present in multiple perspectives across his writings. He points out, for example, that a patient’s illness “is not a gratuitous and therefore meaningless burden; it is *his own self*, the “other” whom, from childish laziness or fear, or for some other reason, he was always seeking to exclude from his life” (Jung, 1937/1970a, pp. 169–170). As to that “Other” and to the challenge of confronting our own psychic shadow, Jung (1967/1983) succinctly observes: “One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light but by making the darkness conscious”, adding, wryly, “The procedure, however, is disagreeable and therefore not popular” (Jung, 1967/1983, pp. 265–266).

Succinct though it be, his observation is telling and leads us to consider how, by keeping ourselves in the dark with respect to our own self-deceptions and conceits, we fail to illuminate the darker corners of our humanity and fail to see their ever more disastrous socio-political consequences in today’s globalized world. Indeed, Jung’s observation leads us to a central and critical question posed in an earlier article:

What is the nature of a being who cannot live in peace with others of its own kind, who is obsessed with power and who has the power in equal measure to create and to destroy, and to destroy not simply his own kind but other kinds as well and indeed the whole earth? More finely, what is the nature of a being who cannot live without killing, not in order that he may eat but in order that others, whether termed the enemy or the devil, the intruder or the insurgent . . . are obliterated? (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008a, pp. 22–23)

Before proposing a beginning answer to that question, let us consider Jung’s insights into the Shadow in broader contexts.

Jung spelled out the socio-political consequences of self-ignorance in *Civilization in Transition* (Jung, 1937/1970a), the tenth volume of his collected works. The temporal span of the book runs from the close of World War I to World War II and more than a decade beyond. A fitting epigraph of the book with respect to his essays on both wars might well read – in his own words – that “for man to regard himself “harmless” is to add “stupidity to iniquity”” (Jung, 1937/1970a, p. 296). The opacity of humans to their shadow side might be tied to the vapidness of Heidegger’s “they”, the “everybodies” who fail to live authentically, who are cowards to confront their own fears, in particular, the fear of their own death, and are instead consumed in “idle talk” (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 211–214, my emphasis). It might also



be tied, however, to the self-opacity of those who literally thrive on manly competition, who take pleasure in the pursuit of power and war, and in the excitement and bravado of killing others. Darwin (1871/1981) rightly identified male–male competition as “the law of battle” (p. 182), an evolutionary fact of male life in the service of reproduction. He described the living realities of the law in 12 chapters (over 460 pages in *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*), detailing the competitive behavior of males in species across the animal kingdom, aquatic and terrestrial, beginning with the secondary sexual characters of mollusks, annelids, and crustaceans; moving from there to spiders, beetles, and other insects; from there to butterflies and moths; from there to fish, amphibians, and reptiles; and finally, to birds (four chapters); mammals (two chapters); and man (two chapters). In the first of the last two chapters, Darwin pointedly comments, “Man is the rival of other men; he delights in competition, and this leads to ambition which passes too easily into selfishness. These latter qualities seem to be his natural and unfortunate birthright” (p. 326). His second sentence notwithstanding, however natural the birthright, there is variation among characters or traits common to a species, including sexual characters or traits. In other words, all males are not equally competitive. On the contrary, it is essential to recognize *variation*, Darwin’s first central observation of differences among individuals of the same species. Thus, *all* human males are not given to violence, all do not revel in the excitement and bravado of battle, all are not so-called “killers at heart”, and so on. What hardly needs saying, however, is that “the law of battle” has been culturally elaborated in infinitely barbarous and violent ways by male humans. What in a phylogenetic sense began as male–male competition in the service of mating has mushroomed into an ever larger cloud that threatens to erase not only humanity, but also the 99 million other species that inhabit this planet, and the planet itself.

Male–male competition is in fact an overlooked if not deliberately ignored topic of study. Its neglect in terms of human history and our barbarously violent 21st-century world is astounding: *real* male–male competition is nowhere on the academic map, let alone on laymen’s or politician’s lips, even though its real-life presence is all about us, as in the 2010 Football World Cup competition, for example, where winning at all costs meant injuring, cheating, and lying (Parks, 2010). It will not do to distract ourselves with discourses on aggression. Aggression is a cultural euphemism for the essentially biological phenomenon of male–male competition (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008b), something akin to *les préciosités* in earlier French literature where authors, rather than speaking of teeth, for example, spoke of “the furniture of the mouth”. Neither will it do to distract our attention with studies of sperm competition (see, for example, Parker, 1998; Birkhead, 2000; Simmons, 2001). Sperm, after all, are rightly doing their job in a quite laudable biological sense – a sense totally unlike the savagery to which real male–male competition is devoted nationally and honed culturally. Those whose motivation lies in the pleasure of killing others, in the sheer excitement and bravado of war are, to reverse Jung’s words, adding iniquity to stupidity. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that were the present scientific surge toward reductionism a truly credible pursuit, then surely the most significant study a geneticist could pursue would be a search for the gene that drives male–male competition and expresses itself in the pursuit of power and war. The idea is patently ludicrous, yet the following report concerning the cardinal role of a singular hormone in the service of cooperation and trust supports it.

Science writer, Sharon Begley (2007) states that “Being hunted brought evolutionary pressure on our ancestors to cooperate and live in cohesive groups” and that such cooperation and

cohesion, more than aggression and warfare, “is our evolutionary legacy” (p. 56). Subsequent to this bald statement, she states:

Both genetics and paleoneurology back [up] that [evolutionary] legacy. A hormone called oxytocin, best-known for inducing labour and lactation in women, also operates in the brain (of both sexes). There, it promotes trust during interactions with other people, and thus the cooperative behaviour that lets groups of people live together for the common good. (pp. 56–57)

If such a series of claims were true – including the claim that “cooperation and cohesion, more than aggression and warfare, is our evolutionary legacy”, a claim that ignores Darwin’s detailed studies of “the law of battle” – why would oxytocin not be made clinically available and administered worldwide? To affirm that a hormone “promotes trust during interactions with other people” is an outlandish and irresponsible claim: it not only overlooks the evolutionary reality of male-male competition, but overlooks the experiential source of our social proclivities and feelings and indeed their developmental progression in the course of ontogeny. We are not born with trust; trust is learned (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008b). Indeed, were such a reductionist claim plausible, it would follow that if oxytocin promotes cooperation and trust in the brains of both sexes, and thus “lets” people live together for the common good, then surely a certain other hormone operates in the brain and promotes male-male competition in the service of “aggression and warfare” – the other half of our “evolutionary legacy” – and thus “lets” people live together for the common bad. Were this conditional statement true, then hormonal treatment of males competing for power and “delighting” in the rivalry of war should receive immediate medical and worldwide public attention.

In sum, nothing can compete with self-knowledge. This socio-political–psychological truth is eloquently stated by David Shulman (2011) when, writing of the retraction of UN Commissioner Richard Goldstone of part of his Commission’s report on the behavior of Israelis in the 2009 Gaza war, he discussed what remained true in Goldstone’s report, for example, that

Israel unleashed firepower of an unprecedented intensity in Gaza, despite its dense civilian population . . . [and that] though efforts were made to warn civilians to leave the combat zone – the combat zone was by no means emptied of ordinary people. (Shulman, 2011, p. 28)

As Shulman states, “[a] great many were killed – primarily because as a high-ranking Israeli officer told *The Independent* [newspaper], “We rewrote the rules of war for Gaza” (p. 28). Shulman, who served in the Israeli army in the 1982 (Lebanon) war and whose three sons also served in the Israeli army, goes on to note that: “Soldiers interviewed by the Israeli veterans group Breaking the Silence . . . report being told literally to shoot first and put troubling doubts aside for later” (p. 28). He notes too, for example, that the Gaza war

began with an attack on newly trained Gaza policemen at their induction ceremony; some eighty-nine police officers were killed, along with members of their families who had come to attend the celebration. The majority were *not* known Hamas fighters but simply police cadets, some of them apparently trained as traffic cops or for other minor, clearly noncombatant jobs (including five who were musicians in the police orchestra (p. 29).

Shulman’s critical analysis of the factual truths in Goldstone’s report bears precisely on a full understanding of “the Other”. Although Shulman himself does not recognize the two distinct forms of the Other, that is, the Other without and the Other within, his two closing observations give voice to each of them. After observing first that the colonial enterprise that

defines the ongoing Israeli occupation is of a piece with the Gaza war in terms of “the willingness to sacrifice innocents on an ever wider scale” (p. 29), thus recognizing violence to *the Other without*, he goes on to make an observation that strikes resonant chords with self-ignorance, self-deception, and the conceit of wisdom as described by Socrates, Plato and Jung. Following his surmise that “Israel may well repeat its earlier mistake in Gaza and eventually make some sort of niggardly, unilateral withdrawal from, say, Area B in the West Bank – anything except cutting a meaningful deal with the Palestinians, anything except making peace”, Shulman then, with great acuteness, points out: “There is nothing more precious than an enemy, especially one whom you have largely created by your own acts and who plays some necessary role in the inner drama of your soul” (p. 29).

Mahmoud Darwish’s (2008) poem “A Ready Scenario” reads like a validation of that created enemy in its descriptive enactment of the “necessary role” the “precious enemy” plays in “the inner drama of your soul.” The poem centers on two men and begins as follows:

Let us now suppose that we fell,  
I and the enemy,  
Fell from the sky  
In a hole . . .  
So, what will happen?

What will happen, as Darwish’s poem shows, will be conditioned precisely by what “I and the enemy” think of each other, that is, what each of us has largely created by our own acts on behalf of the inner drama of our respective souls. The accordance of this notion of a self-conditioned future with the Buddhist concept of *karma* is notable; in both instances, it is a recognition of the fact that “what we do and how we act create our future experiences” (Goldstein & Kornfield, 1987, p. 4). Furthermore, the “precious enemy” that we largely create by our own acts, our self-created “Other”, is nowhere to be found in contemporary phenomenological discourses on “The Other”. Indeed, while “The Other” has risen to great prominence in phenomenology, that Other remains a wholly *outside* Other, a non-self-contaminated Other. In a recent article by Françoise Dastur (2011), for example, we find Sartre’s (1956) confrontational or “hemorrhaging of the world” conception of the Other, Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) “anonymous intercorporeity” conception of the Other, and Levinas’s (1969) “hostage-holding facial” conception of the Other. The *Other* that emerges from the shadow side of our own individual psyche is not recognized. Yet, clearly, that concealed Other is a powerful Other in the global realities of life, one substantively permeating the affective character of our relations with other world-living beings. In short, the affective character of our relations with other humans across the globe is incontrovertibly conditioned by our own acts and the “inner drama” of our own soul that motivates those acts. Darwish’s poem gives substantive evidence of the reality of this psychic Other.

## EXPOSITIONS AND RUMINATIONS ON DARWISH’S POEM

In her meticulous analysis of Darwish’s poem, Honaida Ghanim, General Director of the Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies and former postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies and the Department of Sociology at Harvard University, states that what Darwish is doing is exploring possibilities that the *I/enemy* relationship – or, as she herself calls it, “this partnership” – generates, both “in the metaphorical hole itself, and more broadly

in the predicament of hostility in which it figures” (Ghanim, 2011, p. 1). Quoting the continuing lines of the poem, she points out that “[q]uickly, a conflict arises over whose right it is to exit first” (p. 1):

At the beginning, we wait for luck . . .  
 Rescuers may find us here  
 And extend the rope of survival to us  
 He says: I first  
 And I say: I first  
 He curses me then I him  
 In vain,  
 The rope has not arrived yet . . .

Most importantly, Ghanim goes on to point out that “*salvation* from outside the hole never arrives, and no one extends the rope of survival. Time passes and enmity remains within their *common* hole, and so they share the same fate against their will. Extending enmity, each one is occupied with his own willingness to get out alone from their common entrapment, without regard for what the enemy–partner says or does.” (Ghanim, 2011, pp. 1–2)

The backdrop of the poem is obviously the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict over land, resources, livelihood, and life itself. In a general sense, that backdrop is a common human one: the oppression of one group of humans by another. What the poem so eloquently captures is the futility of life in the hole and what Ghanim so accurately describes is the hole’s “temporary permanence” (pp. 10–11), that is, the putative temporariness of the occupation until a peaceful solution is reached, and the actual permanence of the putative temporariness in the ongoing construction of “settlements”. Validation of this temporary permanence is apparent in Israel’s final approval of a plan to build 1600 settlement homes in east Jerusalem (Heller, 2011). As Ghanim observes, until the conditions that define the hole and the kind of “enemy” relationship that exists within it change, “attempts to triumph over the enemy inside the hole” not only will continue to fail but will broaden “the divisions between the two sides and [deepen] the hole” (Ghanim, 2011, p. 14). With what might be called “the audacity of hope”, Ghanim concludes that the solution lies in the possibility that “the “hole residents” . . . turn their gaze to the opening of the trap” (p. 15), seeing a future in which there is no longer an “enemy–partner” but a future modeled on a past that echoes actual cultural history – a history in which, in part quoting Darwish’s words, Ghanim writes:

“Jews would not be ashamed to find the Arabic element in [themselves], and the Arab would not be ashamed to say that he [is] composed of Jewish elements,” and this because people realize that they are “a product of all the cultures that [have passed] in this place – Greek, Roman, Persian, Jewish, Ottoman,” and that “[e]very developed culture left something” (p. 15)

This notion – that multicultural threads run through our human lifeworld, that humans of any particular time and place are the lineal descendants of mixed racial, ethnic, religious, and/or social pasts – can hardly be denied. Civilizations have come and gone; empires have been built and destroyed; people have migrated from one place to another; racial, ethnic, tribal, and religious intermarriages have taken place; and so on. In this historical sense, we can only be our own enemy; we are in truth temporally and globally interconnected in the here and now. Moreover, from an evolutionary perspective, we undeniably share a common

humanity and a singular common lifeworld to begin with. The multicultural threads that run through that lifeworld are historically akin to the foundational taxonomic threads of our evolutionary heritage: all present-day humans are a species of the genus *Homo*, of the Family Hominids, of the Order Primates, of the Class Mammals, of the Subphylum Vertebrates, of the Phylum Chordata, of the Kingdom Animalia. What warrants our attention is thus paradoxical: namely, the communally concealed negative Other of our positive phylogenetically and culturally interconnected otherness. However paradoxical, what in finer terms clearly warrants our attention is “the precious enemy” that constitutes our iniquity and stupidity, and that sanctions us to commit foul deeds. Indeed, our communal human psychic divide warrants our undivided attention. Until we give it such attention, our own Other will continue to loom destructively within our being. Our neglect of it can only spell a self-inflicted doom, the doom of the lifeworlds of other forms of animate life, and the doom of the planet on which all these lifeworlds were spawned in the first place. If the socio-political–psychological – and ecological – ills of globalization are to be treated and even cured, then our us-against-them mentality, our greed, our iniquities and stupidities, male–male competition and its co-option from its origins in sexual selection to its transfiguration into warriorhood and the honing of heroes to fight our precious enemy – whoever it may be – all need to be recognized in terms of the full scope of Otherness: the Other within and the Other without.

From the perspective of these socio-political–psychological–ecological ills, the moral equivalent of war is not sports and other kinds of sanctioned public displays of competition, vigor, power, manliness, and so on. The moral equivalent of war is making the darkness conscious: assuming responsibility for one’s own self-lucidity, for one’s own Other, for living up to one’s own doubly vaunted sapiential wisdom; in effect, recognizing that our positive communal interconnectedness and singular common lifeworld can come to light only in the light of the inner drama of our own soul and of the enemy that is us.

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