Psychotherapy and Politics International
Psychother. Politics. Int. 9(2): 134–152 (2011)
Published online 27 April 2011 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) **DOI:** 10.1002/ppi.240

Islamism and Fanaticism: A Jungian Psychopolitical Analysis

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ABSTRACT *What turns a sixteen-year-old British Muslim into an Islamist, then turns him into a fanatic, and finally turns him into a spiritual Muslim? In this article I offer some answers to these questions first, from the perspective of Jungian psychology: complexes, inflation, compensation, dissociation, repression and projection, and secondly, from the perspective of political sociology (Paulo Freire, Albert Memmi): development of the political consciousness of the oppressed. I apply these perspectives to an analysis of the recent autobiography by Ed Husain, The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left. The article begins with a description of three stages of political consciousness: naive, fanaticized, and liberated. I posit two conditions for the transition between stages: ego strength, resulting from the successful resolution of a maturation crisis, and rootedness in the ancestral soul. Essential to the case study of The Islamist is my formulation of the psychodynamics of fanaticism, inspired by Jung's observation that "Fanaticism is always a sign of repressed doubt." The article ends on an optimistic note as to why Islamic fanaticism may reach an impasse and become moderated. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

Key words: Islamism, fanaticism, political consciousness, complexes, oppression

In Denmark in 2005 offended local Muslims took to the streets to protest against a newspaper cartoonist's depiction of the prophet Muhammad (Wikipedia, 2011). Soon after, angry Muslims demonstrated in many countries (Klausen, 2009). Since that time I have wondered about the linkage between Islamism and fanaticism. It is far too simple to assume that Islamism produces fanatics who become terrorists. To explain such a sudden reversal of attitudes among Muslims, from conformity to moral outrage, I studied fanaticism from a Jungian psychopolitical perspective (Alschuler, 2009a). That study provides the theoretical basis for the present paper, found in Part 1. A recently published autobiography by a radical Islamist offers a unique opportunity to conduct a case study on the linkage between Islamism and fanaticism, found in Part 2.

Fanaticism is not an isolated phenomenon. Rather, it is a stage in the development of political consciousness of the oppressed. The theoretical section of this paper begins with a description of three stages of political consciousness: naive, fanaticized, and liberated. I posit two key conditions for the transition between stages: ego strength, resulting from the successful resolution of a maturation crisis, and rootedness in the ancestral soul. Evidence for these causal relationships derives from previous case studies I conducted on the personal

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testimonies of four Native persons in Guatemala and British Columbia (Alschuler, 2007). The second part of this paper applies these ideas to the case of Ed Husain, based on his autobiography, *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left* (Husain, 2007). As this book title suggests, his political consciousness passed through a stage of fanaticized consciousness. Can my theoretical approach, originally applied to Native persons, explain the experience of a British Islamist?

I treat fanaticism as a set of beliefs with its own psychodynamics, however independent of any particular political or religious content (see my later section: the psychodynamics of fanaticism). Wikipedia implicitly agrees with this, as can be seen in its definition. 'Fanaticism is an *emotion* of being filled with excessive, uncritical *zeal*, particularly for an extreme *religious* or *political* cause, or with an *obsessive* enthusiasm for a past time or *hobby*' (Wikipedia, 2007). The content of the beliefs or ideology may vary widely, from liberalism to conservatism, from 'right to life' to 'women's right to choose' (abortion issue), or from Christian fundamentalism to Islamic fundamentalism, for example. I distinguish between the ideology of Islamism and the psychodynamics of fanaticism in order to examine why Islamism sometimes becomes fanatical. To be clear, Islamism is a term 'to distinguish it as a modern ideology from Islam as a faith' (Wikipedia, 2010). Wikipedia further defines Islamism as 'a set of ideologies holding that Islam is not only a religious but also a political system; that modern Muslims must return to their roots of their religion, and unite politically'. Aspects of Islamism include: enforcement of sharia law, pan-Islamic political unity, elimination of non-Muslim political, military, economic, social, or cultural influences on the Muslim world.

PART 1. UNDERSTANDING FANATICISM

Fanaticism as a stage in the development of political consciousness

Complexes have much to do with the stages of political consciousness (Alschuler, 2009b). Jungian psychology treats an unconscious complex as a cluster of images with a common emotional base (Samuels et al., 1986, 34). They are like partial personalities that act independently of the control of the ego. According to the Jungian analyst, John Perry, complexes are found in bipolar pairs, such as a man's authoritarian father complex and his rebellious son complex (Perry, 1970, 9). One member of the pair – the rebellious son complex, for example – is ego-aligned and the other – the authoritarian father complex – is ego-projected. The first contributes to the man's ego identity (self-image) while the second is split off, repressed into the unconscious, and may be experienced in a projection onto another person – a male authority figure, in this example. Perry's formulation has several advantages. First, it signals the one-sidedness of ego consciousness that results from splitting and repressing. Secondly, it explains the ego's emotional reaction, often negative, to those onto whom the ego-projected complex falls. Thirdly, it encompasses a realignment of the pair, a reversal of polarity, such that the ego-projected complex becomes ego-aligned and vice versa. And finally, Perry's formulation includes the possibility of overcoming the split and one-sidedness, namely by holding a tension of opposites – the two complexes in the bipolar pair.

In my study of the political consciousness of four *oppressed* Native persons in Canada and Guatemala, I describe their progression through three stages, relying on the notion of bipolar pairs of complexes. In effect, I 'translate' the stages of political consciousness, as defined by Paulo Freire (1972) and Albert Memmi (1967), into the Jungian language of complexes (Alschuler, 2007).

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I find that two specific bipolar pairs of complexes shape the political consciousness of the oppressed: superiority–inferiority and paternalism–dependence (Alschuler, 2007, 27–8).

At the stage of *naïve consciousness* the oppressed experience a particular form of one-sidedness. Here the oppressed's ego is aligned with an inferiority complex and a dependence complex, while projecting superiority and paternalism onto the oppressors. This ego alignment has implications for political behavior. The oppressed may resign themselves either to a life of oppression or may attempt to assimilate to the 'superior' culture of the oppressors.

At the stage of *fanaticized consciousness* the terms are reversed. Now the oppressed's ego aligns with the superiority and paternalism complexes while projecting inferiority and dependence onto the oppressors! Although the polarity of each pair of complexes is reversed, one-sidedness persists in a new form. The new ego alignment has implications for the political behavior of the oppressed. Feeling superior, the oppressed consider the oppressors as evil and may confront them through rebellion. In this regard, the protests of the Danish Muslim community, after the publication of the cartoons of Muhammad, most likely represent a sudden realignment of the ego with the very complexes just described: superiority and paternalism. In the context of colonialism, such a reversal occurs at the 'stage of revolt' against colonial authorities (Memmi, 1967, 127–32).

The most advanced stage I call '*liberated consciousness*' (Alschuler, 2007, 80). The oppressed reach this stage when they are able to hold the tension of opposites, where the opposites are images of ethnic groups in conflict – their own and that of the oppressors. In other words, they overcome the one-sidedness of the previous stages. The bipolar pair of complexes, superiority–inferiority, for example, is no longer split. The oppressed differentiate between oppressors, rather than categorizing all of them as 'bad'. When the oppressed withdraw their projections from the oppressors, they find both good and bad in the oppressors, allowing for a balanced, realistic image of them. Having un-split pairs of complexes, the oppressed develop a self-image that is enriched by recognition of both sides of their personality: inferiority and superiority, paternalism and dependence. Thanks to the more moderate and realistic views of the oppressors and of the oppressed, it becomes possible for the oppressed to treat the oppressors simply as people. In a word, a human relationship between them becomes possible, even as the oppressed struggle to eliminate the objective conditions of oppression: exploitation, repression, denial of human rights, and discrimination. It remains to be seen whether the oppressors are able to treat the oppressed in the same manner.

In keeping with the foregoing analysis of political consciousness in terms of complexes, we can now understand the psychopolitical healing of fanatics. Leaving aside the paternalism and dependence complexes, I focus on the pair of complexes – superiority and inferiority – as polar opposites. Fanatics experience a split bipolarity, where their ego aligns with a superiority complex and their inferiority complex is projected onto the oppressors. This splitting can be considered as a 'psychic wound' due to oppression. By holding the tension of opposites in this bipolar pair of complexes, fanatics eliminate the splitting and attain liberated consciousness. In these circumstances it is appropriate to speak of healing the psychic wounds of oppression.

Causes of fanaticism

What enables or hinders the fanatic's holding the tension of opposites, the key to liberated consciousness? In my previous research on four Native people in Canada and Guatemala,

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based on their autobiographical narratives, I detected two explanatory conditions: ego strength and rootedness in the ancestral soul.

Ego strength often results from one's success in resolving a maturation crisis – a dilemma requiring choices between conflicting obligations or between personal aims and social responsibilities, for example. A strong ego experiences a sense of freedom to decide and to exercise will power despite opposition from others (Whitmont, 1978, 247–8).

Rootedness in the ancestral soul means that a person's ego–Self axis is connected. Proposed by Gambini, a Jungian analyst, this term refers to a person's two-way communication with a superior force in the psyche, sometimes understood as God. As an example, one's prayers may be answered in one's dreams. Rootedness fosters a positive identity as a member of an ethnic community. One feels pride in one's ethnic heritage: language, tradition, history, legends, literature, spirituality, and music. Rootedness contrasts with a 'loss of ancestral soul' that may result from a traumatic historical event such as military defeat or colonial conquest (Gambini, 1997, 145–7).

At the stage of *naïve consciousness* both conditions are absent. Lacking a strong ego and rootedness in the ancestral soul, the oppressed become vulnerable to humiliation by the oppressors. The one-sidedness of the oppressed here means that their ego will align itself with inferiority and dependence complexes, projecting their opposites onto the oppressors. The oppressed will want to lose their ethnic inferiority, most often by *assimilating* to the oppressors' 'superior' culture.

At the stage of *fanaticized consciousness* rootedness in the ancestral soul accompanies a weak ego. Now the oppressed experience another form of one-sidedness: a sense of ethnic superiority. Their ego is too weak to challenge an unrealistic identification with their own charismatic leaders and their spiritual or political truths. The oppressed's ego aligns with their superiority (and paternalism) complex. The condition of 'psychic inflation' underlies their fanaticized consciousness (Wirth, 2009, 216). When humiliated by the oppressors they will defend their 'superior' ethnic self-image and impose their 'truths' on the oppressors, sometimes by *rebelling*.

Liberated consciousness depends on both ego strength and rootedness in the ancestral soul. The strong ego of the oppressed resists any unrealistic identification with charismatic leaders and supposed political truths. At the same time the oppressed remain rooted in their ethnic heritage in a realistic way, seeing both its strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, the oppressed recognize both the advantages and disadvantages of the oppressors' culture. In a word, this is characteristic of holding the tension of opposites, where the opposites are images of ethnic groups in conflict. At the stage of liberated consciousness the oppressed struggle to eliminate the objective conditions of by *negotiating* with oppressors.

The psychodynamics of fanaticism

Having presented the concept and causes of fanaticized consciousness, I can now approach the psychodynamics of fanaticism. Extreme beliefs, of whatever source, when rigidly held and vehemently defended, characterize fanaticism. Erich Fromm states: 'In fact, it is easier to recognize the fanatic by some qualities in his personality rather than by the contents of his convictions' (Wirth 2009, 208). This agrees with my distinction between fanatical beliefs and the psychodynamics of the fanatic. The beliefs may vary from one ideology to another;

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for example, from Christian to Islamic fundamentalism, from ultra-liberalism to radical conservatism, or from pro-globalization to anti-globalization. In all this variation what remains constant is the *psychodynamics of fanaticism*. The resilience and intensification of fanaticism direct our attention to the psychological processes identified by C. G. Jung: psychic inflation, compensation, dissociation, repression, and projection. Elsewhere I have described in greater detail how these processes connect with fanaticism (Alschuler, 2009a, 60–3). These processes articulate the relationship between fanaticism and repressed doubt, as posited by Jung: 'Fanaticism is always a sign of repressed doubt' (Jung, 1970, 172). I have organized Jung's contribution in the form of a *vicious circle*.

- First, the fanatic holds resolutely to some political or religious 'truths' and develops an all-too-good self-image as an 'enlightened' believer. This brings about *psychic inflation* – a puffing up of the ego – and results in one-sidedness of the conscious personality.
- Second, through the process of *compensation* the unconscious attempts to reduce the ego's one-sidedness by confronting the fanatic's ego with doubts about its 'truths'.
- Third, doubts appearing on the distant horizon of awareness mobilize the fanatic's ego to defend its inflated self-image. The ego *dissociates* (splits off) *and represses these doubts*.
- Fourth, the fanatic's consciousness is only apparently cleansed of self-doubts, for the fanatic experiences these repressed doubts via *projection* as the doubts of non-believers. It is as if the unconscious insisted that the fanatic's ego confront its self-doubts in order to bring about psychic balance – that is, to reduce one-sidedness.
- Fifth, the fanatic feels compelled to eliminate or to convert the non-believers – those who embody the fanatic's own repressed self-doubts – into 'true believers' (Jung, 1972b, 142). Those converted further confirm the convictions of the fanatic. Wirth agrees from a psychoanalytic perspective: 'When the grandiose self in its megalomania and fanaticism is additionally protected and supported by the approval of the archaic almighty object, every self-doubt finally vanishes' (Wirth, 2009, 217).
- Finally, without the mitigating influence of conscious doubt, the extreme beliefs and self-images of the fanatic grow in strength and intensity.

Jung mentions a way in which this vicious circle might be broken. As one clings one-sidedly to extreme beliefs, in the unconscious contrary beliefs build up as compensation. When the fanatical defenses of the extreme beliefs increase, so does the energy associated with the contrary beliefs until the latter break through the barrier of repression and reach ego consciousness (Jung, 1972a, 426). This breakthrough results in what Jung calls 'enantiodromia' – in this instance, a conversion of the fanatic into a believer in the opposite (Jung, 1969, 117, 129). In order to avoid a *new* one-sidedness, the former fanatic must remain conscious of both the opposing sets of beliefs at once and must hold the balance between them (Jung, 1969, 129). Then it becomes possible to mitigate the extreme beliefs and to break the vicious circle.

PART 2. ISLAMISM AND FANATICISM IN THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ED HUSAIN

In the final footnote to my article, 'Fanaticism: A Psychopolitical Analysis', I mentioned that the recent autobiography of Ed Husain would be fertile ground to examine my ideas on

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fanaticism (Alschuler, 2009a, 83). After all, Husain admits in his book title to joining radical Islam in Britain, then leaving the movement. It seemed that his political consciousness might have passed through a stage of fanaticized consciousness. This typically begins when a member of an oppressed ethnic group seeks assimilation, then abandons this aim to become fanatic in opposition to the oppressors, and finally leaves fanaticism behind to enter the stage of liberated consciousness. In sharp contrast to my earlier study of four oppressed Native people from Guatemala and Canada, Husain is a British Muslim, oppressed only indirectly by identifying with Muslims outside of Britain. In the concluding section of this paper I will report on the extent to which my theorizing fits the case of Ed Husain.

Biographical sketch

Ed Husain was born on 25 December 1974 in Mile End, UK, the eldest of four siblings. He was 'British by birth, Asian by descent, and Muslim by conviction'. His father was born in British India and migrated to England in 1961. His mother migrated from her birthplace in what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). His family was of modest income, the father working as a restaurateur. Ed's education began at William Burrough primary school in London's East End, with a reputation for social harmony in an ethnically mixed enrollment. From 1987 to 1990 he studied at Stepney Green School, attended mostly by immigrant boys from Bangladesh, with a reputation for Muslim gang rivalries. At age 14 Ed accompanied a Muslim spiritual guide, a friend of his family, on trips throughout England in the summers of 1989 and 1990. At age 16 Ed was introduced to moderate Islamist activities of the Jamet-e-Islami, centered at the East London mosque. In 1992 at age 17, he abandoned his parents' traditional Islam to dedicate himself to political Islam. While a student at Tower Hamlets College he became president of the Islamic Society. A year later he became disenchanted with moderate Islamism and joined the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir. Until 1995 he was an activist, recruiting new members and debating with moderate Islamist organizations. At the end of these 3 years, Ed became disillusioned with the extremist views of the Hizb and rejected the climate of violence engendered by the Hizb. Ed discontinued his Islamist activism. In 1996 he still identified with radical Islamism, though doubtful of its many political promises. In 1997 at twenty-four years of age, Ed found employment with the HSBC bank in London. By 2000, Ed was finally ready to abandon Islamism altogether and found support from his new bride, Faye, of a similar ethnic background. Together they made plans to study Arabic and seek a spiritual Islam. In 2002 they went to Damascus, Syria, for their studies and supported themselves by teaching English under the British Council. In 2005 they began a 7-month stay in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for further studies of Arabic and the Koran while teaching English under the British Council. These travel experiences enabled Ed to find the spiritual Islam he sought and to renew his identity as a proud British Muslim now living in Britain.

Overview: psychopolitical case analysis

The book is ordered chronologically with chapter titles that depict Husain's changing relationship to Islamism. I will respect this order while regrouping his chapters into sections that define his ideological development: (1) the traditional Muslim; (2) the moderate Islamist; (3) the fanatical Islamist; (5) again, the moderate Islamist; and (5) the spiritual Muslim. My analysis proceeds by searching Husain's narrative for the causal conditions posited by my

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psychopolitical theory of fanaticism. The chief conditions that explain the transition from fanaticized to liberated consciousness are rootedness in the ancestral soul and ego strength. The impact of these two causes is mediated by two further conditions: the repression of self-doubts and the differentiation of polarities.

1. The traditional Muslim (1987–90)

Identity: feeling different from the others, but not inferior

Ed's earliest cited reminiscences of William Burrough primary school in the 1980s conjure up an atmosphere of conviviality in an ethnically mixed environment. Two incidents in these years ended his being 'oblivious to the fact that large numbers of us were somehow different – we were 'Asian' (Husain, 2007, 2). Once in the company of school children and teachers, a group of National Front hoodlums jeered 'Pakis! Pakis! F--- off back home!' (Husain, 2007, 2). Another incident he never forgot took place when he was nine. A school employee noticed that Ed had not set the cutlery, as he was supposed to do, and remarked, 'Where is your Allah now then, eh? Where is he? Can't he help you?' (Husain, 2007, 4). At that time Ed hardly understood who Allah was. These two incidents made Ed feel different, but not inferior to his school chums. Despite these incidents, his primary school experience instilled in him 'an unspoken appreciation of its (Britain's) values of fairness and equality' (Husain, 2007, 5). At the *naïve stage of political consciousness* an oppressed person one-sidedly identifies with being inferior and seeks assimilation into the culture of the oppressors. In contrast, Ed accepts his Muslim identity and appears to *be assimilated* rather than seeking assimilation.

Rootedness in the ancestral soul

Ed traces his religious and spiritual roots to his father's side of the family. Referring to the spiritual master from India, Fultholy Saheb, Ed says, 'My father was a fervent disciple and had learned much from his spiritual guide' (Husain, 2007, 9). The family's closeness to this shaikh on his frequent visits to the UK led them to call him 'Grandpa', whom Ed liked very much. At age 14, Ed began to study the Koran with Grandpa and learned what Allah is, avowing that Allah is in his heart. After much study of the Koran Ed accompanied Grandpa in the summers of 1989–90 on his travels in the UK, during which Ed recited verses from the Koran in Arabic, a language he could read but not understand. Adding to the closeness of his relationship with Grandpa was a wealth of experiences: a sense of belonging in the congregation, singing in praise of the Prophet, smelling the fragrance of incense, enjoying the food offered to Grandpa, and the private lessons with Grandpa. These experiences consolidated Ed's *rootedness in the ancestral soul*: the traditional Muslim ethos belonging to the eastern tradition of guidance from a sage.

Low ego strength and the need for self-esteem

In 1987 Ed began at Stepney Green School in London's East End, contrasting in most ways with his primary school. 'Here everyone was Bangladeshi, Muslim, and male' (Husain, 2007, 6). Ed admits being a loner who did not fit in, who wished he were back at Sir William's primary school. 'I could not relate to the boys and they knew I did not fit in' (Husain, 2007, 7). The repeated mention of his non-conformity points to *low self-esteem*, a trait of a narcissistic problem. Wirth

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links narcissism with fanaticism: 'The fanatic develops a narcissistically overblown self-image as if he wanted to say, "I am something very special … I do not want people to love me but rather, to admire me …"' (Wirth, 2009, 216). Low self-esteem is associated with a *weak ego*, as the following incident suggests. At the start of school Ed discovered that he needed to wear glasses and has some made. When the students jeered, 'glass man' at him, he stopped wearing them.

It is possible to boost one's self-esteem artificially by joining a prestigious organization that treats one with admiration and respect. This is Ed's experience at the East London mosque. Ed asserted a new identity: 'young, Muslim, studious, and London born' (Husain, 2007, 23). This identity made him a '*misfit*' in the Stepney Green School among non-practicing Muslim boys, organized into gangs, immigrants from Bangladesh, not interested in their studies. When Ed was introduced to Jamat-e-Islami activists at the East London mosque his new identity made him *fit in* with the UK-born, educated, English-speaking Muslims, dedicated to their faith. He was 'given VIP treatment'. 'The people here were interested in *me*. To an isolated schoolboy, that mattered' (Husain, 2007, 27–8).

A weak ego and rootedness in the ancestral soul, we may recall, are conditions that promote fanaticized consciousness. His early studies and travels with Grandpa created in Ed a rootedness in traditional Islam. When combined with a *weak ego* and narcissistic needs for self-esteem, Ed became vulnerable to the appeal of an Islamist organization at the East London mosque.

2. The moderate Islamist (1991–92)

At age 16 in 1991, Ed already had knowledge of Koranic Arabic (he could read and pronounce the words without knowing their meaning), Muslim history, and the basics of Islam. His religious education at school and extracurricular tutoring introduced Ed to readings on 'Islamic politics', the 'Political System of Islam', and the creation of 'truly Islamic states' (Husain, 2007, 20–1). He wondered why his parents practiced spiritual Islam and never spoke of political Islam. Ed recalls that Grandpa spoke disparagingly of such movements as Jamet-e-Islami, started by Abdul Ala Mawdudi to promote political Islam.

Maturation crisis: part one

It is often by resolving a maturation crisis, by making difficult choices when confronted by moral conflicts, that one develops *ego strength*. Ed faced such a moral conflict as he deepened his commitment to political Islam at the East London mosque. On the one hand, he tried to be a 'good son' by studying the Koran, and on the other he became involved in the Young Muslims Organization (YMO), an Islamist street gang at the mosque, yet 'without drugs, drinking, womanizing' (Husain, 2007, 32).

As a young 'rebel', Ed prayed in the mosque without wearing a skullcap, against his father's traditional Islam. When his after-school tutoring ended, he continued to attend the East London mosque once per week, without informing his parents. Opposing images express this conflict: the image of his father, on the one hand, and on the other his new Islamist friend in the mosque, who is like an older brother to Ed. The dilemma makes him 'deeply troubled' as he leads a 'double life' and is 'betraying' his parents (Husain, 2007, 31).

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> 'The mosque' was, of course, the ill-reputed East London. *What would my father say*? Even to set foot inside the East London mosque, which was regarded by my family as a center of political activity for Jamat-e-Islami rather than a place of worship for ordinary Muslims, seemed practically sacrilegious. Then again, I did not want to alienate the first genuine friend I had had in many years'. (Husain, 2007, 26)

How does he manage this conflict? Ed lied to his parents while secretly conducting his political activities in the mosque. The maturation crisis was *unsuccessfully* resolved, namely through deceit, avoiding an honest confrontation with his parents. He did, much to his credit, confront the YMO with a series of written questions on their political positions – those criticized by traditional Muslims. Given this unsuccessful outcome, Ed failed to strengthen his ego, yet remained rooted in the ancestral soul.

Superiority of Islam over the West, of Islamists over ordinary Muslims: polarity begins

Ed confirms his commitment to political Islam when he states that the YMO 'has a place in my heart' (Husain, 2007, 32). This commitment endorses the YMO's proclamation of 'Islam's superiority over the West' (Husain, 2007, 34). He also agrees with the YMO's position on Mawdudi, who argues for attacking 'disbelieving rulers', traditional Muslim rulers, and promoting his own 'believers' (Husain, 2007, 34). Ed avidly read books by Islamist ideologues and concludes: 'Now I was not a mere *Muslim*, like all the others I knew; I was better, superior' (Husain, 2007, 36). His reading allowed him to distinguish between categories of Muslims: 'true Muslims', whose ideologies are all shaped by Islam, and 'partial Muslims,' who confine their religion to prayer and piety (Husain, 2007, 37). 'I was considered part of the Islamic movement,' an active member of the YMO (Husain, 2007, 37). 'For deep down I had committed myself, my life, to the Islamist movement and, like my brothers at the mosque, I would let nothing stand in the way of following Islam as a complete life code' (Husain, 2007, 42).

Maturation crisis: part two

Ed's serious involvement in political Islam precipitated a maturation crisis in 1992, at age 17. Ed says, 'My parents were becoming seriously concerned about my sudden outburst of religious fervour' (Husain, 2007, 39). 'I had to be a "true Muslim", completely enmeshed in Islam, not a "partial Muslim" like my parents' (Husain, 2007, 39). Then, his father discovered that Ed was an Islamist, practicing at the East London mosque. This brings about the crisis: the need to make a moral choice with competing pressures on Ed.

First pressure: the YMO says, 'This is the way God tests his servants … Your parents will be an obstacle to your commitment to God's work, the Islamist movement … Partial Muslims like our parents will never understand what we are trying to do. Be patient, brother. You are from among the true Muslims' (Husain, 2007, 41). *The choice*: 'You must choose between family and God's work. The Islamic movement is more important to us than our families' (Husain, 2007, 44).

Second pressure: 'I knew my father's hurt was deep' (Husain, 2007, 41). Ed and his father had many hours of 'heated debate' over Islamism and traditional Islam. His father explained that 'Islam is spiritual, internal, and about drawing closer to God and not about radical politics, assassinating politicians and trying to set up an imaginary Islamic state' (Husain, 2007, 42). *The choice*: 'Enough of pretending to study, then lying to us, deceiving us …' His father gives Ed an ultimatum: 'leave Mawdudi's Islamism or leave my house' (Husain, 2007, 44).

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The *choice is made*: after writing a farewell note to his parents, Ed left home. Once at the mosque Ed realized the pain he was causing his parents. 'Deep down I wanted to go home. But that would be seen as backing down in the face of parental pressure. I had to win. The Islamic movement must prevail' (Husain, 2007, 46).

Is this a successful resolution of his maturation crisis? It might be, except for his parents' next move. The leadership of the YMO brought Ed home after three nights away. His father forgave Ed and his mother said that Ed was free to do as he pleased. Ed remarked that, 'With my parents defeated, there was no stopping me' (Husain, 2007, 47). This meant that the pressure on Ed from his parents ceased while the YMO pressure continued. The crisis ended without requiring Ed to decide and to face the consequences of a very difficult choice. Once more, I conclude that this second part of his maturation crisis found a resolution, but not one that strengthened Ed's ego.

Rootedness in the ancestral soul accompanied by a weak ego promotes fanaticized consciousness. The ancestral soul represents a person's deepest connections with a directive force within the psyche, called the Self, in Jungian terms. A weak ego is easily overwhelmed by its connection with the Self, often to the point of blurring the boundary of the ego. As a result, the ego succumbs to psychic inflation: identification with a superior 'truth', sometimes embodied in a charismatic leader. Ed's remark suggests this turn of events: 'With parental obstacles out of the way, my zeal and commitment to Islamism were unconfined' (Husain, 2007, 47).

3. The fanatical Islamist (1993–95): polarity deepens

The fanatic adheres absolutely to extreme beliefs. In fanaticized consciousness the world is divided into good versus evil – 'we' versus 'they'. As elected President of the Islamic Society at Tower Hamlets College, a front organization for political Islamism, Ed espoused the following 'truths': good is equated with Islam and its 'true Muslims', and evil with the West and 'partial Muslims – 'those who serve as agents of Western imperialism' (Husain, 2007, 48, 49, 51). 'Islam was *the* solution for all the world's ills' (Husain, 2007, 54).

Ed's radicalism deepened as he identified with Muslims experiencing oppression in Bosnia. The Bosnian war and slaughter of Muslims created an urgent need for action.

Finding that the YMO failed to provide answers to the bigger questions and policies for immediate action, Ed became a 'disillusioned teenage Islamist'. At age 18, in 1993, Ed deepened his commitment and became receptive to the appeal of Omar Bakri, a Syrian-born Muslim cleric, and the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which sponsor the restoration of the caliphate, an Islamic state. This charismatic leader embodies all the answers and represents a 'true Muslim'.

The psychodynamics of fanaticism: a vicious circle

Shifting the focus from the fanatic to the fanatic's ideology is revealing. The psychodynamics of this ideology operate regardless of any specific content: political, religious, or other. What is more, the fanatical ideology tends to be self-sustaining. The psychodynamics of fanaticism follow four steps, as illustrated below in the case of Ed's Islamism.

First: absolute truths lead to a one-sidedness of consciousness. When a 'true believer' holds extreme beliefs absolutely, not allowing for moderation or compromise, he or she

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becomes one-sided. As the local leader of the Hizb, Ed believed in these absolute truths: 'The Muslim nation was a global nation, and we had a religious obligation to establish a global state that would rival the United States and Europe' (Husain, 2007, 88). The Prophet had 'bequeathed a political system for us to implement, a total ideology for global domination: Islam' (Husain, 2007, 93).

Second: one-sidedness leads to the introduction of self-doubts. The unconscious, as an autonomous and self-regulating force in the psyche, attempts to redress this one-sidedness by introducing self-doubts. In Jungian theory this is called the compensatory function of the unconscious. While Ed's beliefs became even more extreme, he made no mention of second thoughts or self-doubts at this time. It can be assumed that those self-doubts were repressed.

Third: repression of self-doubts leads to a need to convert non-believers. Self-doubts, however, present threats to one's self-image of goodness and will be repressed into the unconscious where they do *not* lie dormant. Rather, these doubts are found in projection onto non-believers. The psychic energy required to repress self-doubts equals the zeal applied to convert non-believers. By converting non-believers the fanatic attempts, unconsciously, to silence his own voices of self-doubt.

The intra-Islamic struggles in London at this time are marked by efforts at conversion, especially of more moderate Islamists. Under Ed's presidency, da'wah, meaning evangelism and conversion, becomes a main effort of the Islamic Society. The Society pursues its evangelism through debates with their teachers, journalists, and intellectuals.

> The only achievement we wanted was a radical shift in perception, to politicize Muslim public opinion, to connect it as an *unmah*, as One Nation. Then we could destroy the existing political order in Muslim countries and engage in the conversion or coercion of the rest. (Husain, 2007, 112)

Ed sums it up: 'My daily life was dedicated to activism: recruiting new activists, organizing events, distributing leaflets, arguing and debating with those who opposed us' (Husain, 2007, 129).

Fourth: successful conversion leads to a confirmation of the fanatic's extreme beliefs. The accumulation of converted believers silences those voices of 'self-doubt' in the fanatic. These new converts lend support to the fanatic and serve to confirm his extreme beliefs, which grow even stronger as a consequence. For Ed, the conversion efforts reaffirm his fanatical beliefs, yet fail to quell his self-doubts.

Jung considers the repression of secret doubts about one's 'truths' to be the main condition explaining fanaticism. The doubts remain unconscious, only to be projected onto non-believers. When doubts become conscious, according to Jung, they moderate one's beliefs, reducing one-sidedness, causing the fanaticism to wane. Since Jung did not develop a full study of fanaticism, it is understandable that certain circumstances surrounding fanaticism escaped his notice. One such circumstance is found in the case of Ed Husain. He confronts a growing number of self-doubts without, however, diminishing his fanaticism. His conscious doubts seem, on the contrary, to make him an even more fanatical Islamist. His success in converting seems insufficient to silence the voices of self-doubt projected onto non-believers. Ed clings to even more extreme beliefs in the superiority of his Islamism over rival Islamist groups. Only when his doubts lead to insights as to the 'impure' nature of some Islamists does Ed's fanaticism

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begin to weaken. He then is able to perceive differences among Islamists, among Muslims, among non-Muslims, and yet other religious groups. The following discussion, accompanied by quotes from Ed's experiences, supports the trends just mentioned. First are the doubts, then the more extreme beliefs.

Doubts about the political program of Islamism

In 1993, when the YMO tried to oust Ed from the presidency, mostly because of his Hizb ideas, he had some *second thoughts* about his mission because he had encouraged divisions, not unity, among Muslims. Ed resigned from the YMO. An acquaintance from the previous year at the YMO, Zachariah, also an Islamist, forcibly evicted Ed and his Hizb colleagues from the East London mosque. A Hizb colleague, Farid, had only an 'impersonal, indifferent response' to the eviction. Ed wonders:

> What sort of human beings was the Hizb creating? This experience sowed the very first seed of doubt. If Zachariah, a fellow Islamist, was prepared to fight us in a mosque, what were Islamists capable of doing when in power? (Husain, 2007, 128)

When Ed begins his studies of government and politics at Newham College in 1994, the truths of Islamism begin to be less than absolute. He admits to having doubts about his Islamist ideals. Ed studied the draft constitution of the Islamic state, written by Nabhani, a Hizb scholar. 'It was during the study of the constitution that doubts started to creep into my mind as to where we were headed' (Husain, 2007, 132). Chief among the articles that Ed found 'problematic' concerned the segregation of women. Their meeting with women in various public places in a non-segregated manner 'smacked of hypocrisy to me' (Husain, 2007, 132).

Extreme beliefs about the superiority of the Muslim identity

According to my theory, his many conscious doubts should initiate a transition to liberated consciousness. As more of his doubts become conscious, fewer repressed beliefs would be projected onto moderate Islamists. As a consequence, his beliefs about moderate Islamists would become more realistic and less one-sided. However, Ed's fanaticism intensifies. It seems that Ed's ego struggles to preserve his positive self-image as a 'true' Islamist. To do so the unconscious applies even greater energy to the repression of self-doubts that, once repressed, find themselves in projection onto moderate Islamists. Von Franz, a Jungian analyst, comments on just this situation.

> The need for the withdrawal of a projection is always constellated at that moment when conscious or semi-unconscious doubts about the rightness of one's own way of looking at things arise and when on the conscious level this view is fanatically defended. Doubt and fanaticism are therefore symptoms that indicate that the time is ripe for the withdrawal of some projection. (von Franz, 1975, 78)

In 1995 Ed extended his fanatical beliefs even further to include non-Muslims as well as 'partial' Muslims. 'As an Islamist, I saw everyone along religious lines, and all non-Muslims as inferior to us' (Husain, 2007, 130). It is typical of the fanatic to divide the world into two compartments: we and they – friends and enemies. His ego aligns with the superior 'true' Muslim, splits off any 'impurity' from his self-image, and projects this onto 'partial Muslims' or non-Muslims. Back at college in Newham, Ed had classmates of different ethnicities and

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nationalities: non-Muslim British, Africans, Asians, Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and ordinary Muslims. For Ed, these students were divided into two groups: Muslims and the rest. 'We were Muslims, superior and different from others' (Husain, 2007, 142). Ed sought to convince Muslims of different nationalities that religion was the only defining identity.

Doubts about the religiosity of Islamism

After insisting that religion for Muslims was the only defining identity, he questioned his own religiosity. Ed was troubled that he was 'no longer an observant Muslim' (Husain, 2007, 146). His activism had displaced his piety. This is the first time he mentions a *new polarity*: political versus spiritual Islam. He faults his Islamist colleagues, the Hizb people, who know little about the Koran. 'The Hizb seemed suddenly like pretentious, counterfeit intellectualism' (Husain, 2007, 146). That the Hizb should not concern itself with Islamic spirituality, but only Islamist politics, 'annoyed me'. He blamed the Hizb because 'there was a vacuum in my soul where God should be … I had started out on this journey 'wanting more Islam' and ended up losing its essence' (Husain, 2007, 147–8).

At this time Ed met Faye, a British Muslim, also with family origins in Bangladesh. Their friendship deepened to love and they made plans to marry.

Doubts about the politics of Islamism

Ed's commitment to Islamism reached a turning point in 1995 due to an act of violence. Near the East London mosque, when a black Christian from Africa was rowdy a Hizb militant fought and killed him. 'I felt unremitting guilt.' The Hizb condemned the act; however, not taking any responsibility (Husain, 2007, 151–2). Ed considered the Hizb to be responsible for creating an atmosphere in which violence was probable because it encouraged rivalry between ethnic groups and promoted a Muslim sense of superiority. He also believed that there was no role for gang or individual violence in the jihad strategy: in an Islamic-caliphate state national armies would engage other national armies. 'That murder, the direct result of Hizb ut-Tahir's ideas, served as a wake-up call for me' (Husain, 2007, 153). 'Now I began to wonder whether Islam had anything at all to offer. I had completely confused Islamism with Islam: to me they were the same.' 'I had serious doubts' (Husain, 2007, 154). He wonders how fundamentalism can fail to take into account 1200 years of scholarly Muslim interpretation of the scriptures. Ed refuses violence as a means to end the oppression of Muslims. He sees how Islamism has ruined his friendships and his relationship to his parents.

Despite these revelations, Ed admits: 'The indoctrination of the Hizb was powerful and it was many years before I was completely free of it' (Husain, 2007, 156). In an effort to distance himself from contact with the Hizb and to open up his worldview, Ed and Faye, his future wife, agreed to leave the area to study at the University of North London.

4. Back to the moderate Islamist (1995–99)

Distinguishing between Islamists

The accumulation of doubts about the political program, the religiosity, and the politics of Islamism led to a decline in Ed's fanatical one-sidedness, as suggested by his chapter title,

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'Farewell Fanaticism'. As Jung asserts, the introduction of conscious doubts serves to mitigate extreme beliefs. The first victim of this reduction in fanaticism is the Manichean division of the world into friends and enemies – Islamists and others, in the ideology of Ed Husain. When friends are not always 'good' and enemies not always 'evil', fanaticized consciousness may develop into liberated consciousness, as we will soon determine.

At age 20 in 1995, a white, non-Muslim, British historian at the university is 'a major influence' on Ed's thinking about Islam. Given that Islamism would label this non-Muslim scholar as an enemy, Ed finds 'goodness' in an enemy (Husain, 2007, 157). It is then that Ed re-examined the work of the Islamist scholar, Nabhani, who claims that his thought is based purely on Islam, free of Western philosophical influences. Ed finds that Nabhani's Islamic ideals are none other than Western political discourse, especially influenced by Hegel, Rousseau, and Gramsci. As a result, Ed discovers that some Islamists are not so 'pure'. The differentiation of Islamists, Ed's own 'we' identity, into 'pure' and 'impure' signals a decline in his fanaticism. Holding to his new awareness of the limits to political Islam, Ed concludes: 'Islamism became an empty, bankrupt ideology. However, its cultural attitudes to the world still resided deep within me' (Husain, 2007, 164).

Having left the Hizb, Ed flirts with a moderate Islamist organization of British Muslims, the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), opposed to the Hizb. There, Ed witnessed anti-semitism and anti-Israeli sentiment. From his university education, he knew that the history of the Jews did not warrant this. He also knew that not all Islamists were anti-semitic, further distinguishing between Islamists.

By 1996 Ed was leading a 'double life', as a moderate Islamist and as a free thinker (Husain, 2007, 171, 175–6). US lecturer Imam Shaik Hanson preaches Islamic spiritualism in a convincing way. Hanson's criticism of political Islam 'reinforced my doubts about the wisdom of seeking power to "establish Islam"' (Husain, 2007, 175). Ed admits to confusion – a healthy alternative to being an indoctrinated believer in a future Islamic world state. Nonetheless, only political Islam held meaning for Ed, though he was no longer an activist. The spiritual Islam of Grandpa and Imam Hanson remained unacceptable.

Courting the business world

In 1997 Ed found employment with the HSBC bank because he wanted to learn about the business world. This double life took the form of entering the business world of London and becoming a 'high flyer' (Husain, 2007, 182). He admits that his Islamist energy had been redirected. At age 24 in 1999, Ed was promoted to a higher post in the HSBC. Ed planned to marry Faye, who also worked at the HSBC, in 2000. In spite of all his efforts to free himself from political Islam, the Islamist personality survived in Ed: 'I was a sleeper Islamist' (Husain, 2007, 183). After two successful years at the bank, he found the HSBC 'hypocritical and not entirely ethical' (Husain, 2007, 184). This disenchantment made Ed more introspective.

5. The spiritual (traditional) Muslim (2000–06)

Loss of the ancestral soul

Ed recognized that 10 years as an Islamist, 1991–2000, had led to a loss of his ancestral soul, a 'spiritual void', as he calls it (Husain, 2007, 185). 'Since leaving Islamism, I could no longer

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believe in a God who wanted us to govern in his name … Tired of materialism, disillusioned with fanaticism, I had lost my anchor in life … I was in search of spiritual solace, meaning for my life, and whoever offered it would win my commitment' (Husain, 2007, 186–7). At age 25, Ed realized that his study of the Koran ended 10 years earlier when he traveled with Grandpa.

> I understood Imam Hanson's words completely: my lethargy towards worship, my distance from God, resulted partly because true faith had not touched my heart in a decade. I wore it on my sleeve, abused it for political ends, but I had lost the essence of Islam: spiritual surrender to serenity. (Husain, 2007, 189)

Recovery of the ancestral soul

Ed left the HSBC. In August 2000, Ed married Faye.

Thanks to the influence of Imam Hanson and others, 'Sufi-oriented scholars helped me anchor my soul after five years of political Islamism …' (Husain, 2007, 190). Ed practically says, 'rootedness in the ancestral soul' and mentions finding 'nourishment for the soul'. At a place near Istanbul, while on his wedding trip, the Turkish Sufis and their attachment to the Prophet 'all brought back buried memories of my own childhood with Grandpa' (Husain, 2007, 196). Under the influence of Sufism, Ed found Muslim spirituality. His father's 'long lost son had, at last, truly *come home* again … I was at peace with myself and the world around me' (Husain, 2007, 198). By 2001, Ed affirmed his commitment to spiritual Islam. He wanted to study Arabic in order to learn the Koran in the original language.

The new (reversed) polarity: spiritual versus political Islam

According to my theory, Ed has found again a rootedness in the ancestral soul – one of the two main conditions for the transition from fanaticized to liberated consciousness. His ego strength – the other condition – still seems to be lacking. He struggles to free himself from the doctrines of Islamism and his identity as an Islamist. While retaining great sympathy for oppressed Muslims everywhere, he rejects violence as the means to their liberation. Experience with Islamists, traditional Muslims, and non-Muslims, teaches Ed that the world is not so easily divided into 'we' and 'they' or into 'good' and 'bad'. He recognizes the 'impurity' of some Islamists as well as the laudable qualities of other groups. Ed appreciates that American Muslims have taught him the best of Sufi Islam. No longer are they 'partial Muslims' of no value. Ed now appears to be *holding the tension of opposites*, where the opposites are images of sectarian groups in conflict: Islamists and traditional Muslims. 'The spiritual void I experienced while in Islamism had been filled. I no longer categorized people as Muslims and non-Muslims, as I had done as an Islamist, but simply as people' (Husain, 2007, 198). To transcend the opposites in this way is to achieve liberated consciousness.

However, Ed's rejection of the Islamists, especially the Hizb, is total. 'I saw the Hizb for what they were: misguided, deluded, and dated … As far as I was concerned, Islamism had now been *completely* flushed out of me' (Husain, 2007, 199–200). He summarizes his absolute rejection of the Hizb as follows:

> I was almost gleeful at having been able not only to leave the Hizb, but to discover authentic religion and to reject the politicization of it. I no long shared the Hizb's vision of a cataclysmic Islamic state which would right all the wrongs of the Muslim world. (Husain, 2007, 201)

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Can there be a 'tension of opposites' when one pole is negated completely? By returning to the Jungian concept of a bipolar pair of complexes, we can appreciate the new polarity in Ed's psyche. Until now, there has been an ego-aligned 'political Muslim' complex and an ego-projected 'traditional Muslim' complex. Revaluing or devaluing groups at each pole and recovering his ancestral soul produce a dramatic change in Ed's complexes. The two complexes have traded places! Before, Islamists ('true' Muslims) were good; 'partial' Muslims (traditional) were bad; Americans were bad. Now, Islamists ('true' Muslims) are bad; some (traditional) 'partial' Muslims are good; some Americans are good. Ed remains one-sided, but in a new way. Though an improvement over fanaticized (Islamist) consciousness, this is not yet liberated consciousness. His ego is not strong enough to hold the tension of opposites, where good and bad reside in each pole.

Recent developments in Ed Husain's political consciousness (2001–06)

In fairness to Ed Husain, I must consider trends in his post-fanatic period that suggest progress toward liberated consciousness. Between 2001 and 2006, when he turned 31, significant experiences in his life challenged his new one-sidedness as a spiritual (traditional) Muslim. In 2002 Ed and his wife, Faye, left Britain for a 2-year stay in Damascus, Syria, with the main purpose of studying Arabic, the language of the Koran. In 2005 they resided for 7 months in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in order to continue their study of Arabic while supporting themselves by teaching English as a foreign language under the auspices of the British Council, as they did in Syria.

During these years Ed shows increasing openness toward his former 'enemies' and empathy for the suffering of humanity, regardless of religious affiliation. This *first trend* reflects his ability to overcome one-sidedness and to hold the tension of opposites, a key condition for liberated consciousness. I will cite examples of this trend below.

Ed befriended a non-Muslim American woman in his Arabic class in Damascus, showing that he could make distinctions between Americans and reduce his one-sidedness. This goes against his Islamist teachings of hatred for Americans, considered as a force behind 'partial' Muslims and their secular states. Tolerance for many religions also grows. 'Two years in Syria, away from Islamism in Britain and in the company of amiable believers of many religions in Damascus, had, I knew, decontaminated my mind' (Husain, 2007, 232). Also note: 'As an Islamist, it was only the suffering of Muslims that had moved me, provoked a reaction. Now, *human* suffering mattered to me, regardless of religion' (Husain, 2007, 256–7).

After his stays in Syria and Saudi Arabia, Ed returned home to Britain. The reconciliation of the 'two sides' of his personality reflects a tension of opposites, a trait of liberated consciousness. 'Just as my Britishness had come to the fore while living in the Muslim world, my Muslimness now seeks expression. I feel as though I belong to both the East and the West, and sometimes find it difficult to reconcile the two sides of my personality' (Husain, 2007, 269).

During these same years a *second trend* accompanies the first. While reaffirming his commitment to spiritual Islam, Ed repeatedly rejects political Islam (Islamism) absolutely. Considering these as polar opposites in Ed's psyche, this trend represents *a continuing one-sidedness*, uncharacteristic of liberated consciousness. Examples below mark this trend.

The horrific event of 9-11-2001 stirs up the new polarity in Ed. His 'Sufi spirituality' confronts his 'arrogant sleeper Islamist still residing within' (Husain, 2007, 202). Ed struggles against his 'sleeper Islamist' to the point of 'confronting fellow Muslims in support

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of non-Muslims' when it comes to condemning Islamic terrorism. 'For me, Islam was about truth, humanity, and compassion. It was not about supporting Muslims regardless of whether they were right or wrong' (Husain, 2007, 206). This even-handed view, however, evolves into an absolute rejection of Islamists. In Syria, Ed rekindles his faith in harmony with the traditional Muslim faith of his parents. As his appreciation of other faiths increases, however, so does his intolerance of Islamists.

In Saudi Arabia, Ed recognizes the inhumanity of fanatic Islamist movements that have slaughtered 'impure' Muslims. In this regard, Ed singles out the Wahhabis, 'a literalist sect' committed to 'an Islamic political state' (Husain, 2007, 235). He links this sect to Islamism in general: 'My own experience of life inside Islamist organizations was that they were *all* at one with the Wahhabis in creed' (Husain, 2007, 234). After observing the poverty of marginalized immigrants and the discrimination against black and female Muslims in Saudi Arabia, he condemns Islamist Muslims as racist and misogynist. He sums up his rejection of political Islam:

> The perfect Islamic state is a cherished myth, sold to naïve Muslims by conniving Islamists. In reality, no government would be 'Islamic' to a degree sufficient to satisfy every Islamist group. In the name of religion, these groups seek political power for their own organizational and ideological purposes. (Husain, 2007, 255)

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Is my explanation of fanaticism confirmed?

This case analysis of Ed Husain began as an extension of my three case studies of oppressed Native people in Guatemala and British Columbia, who passed through a stage of fanaticized consciousness. I identified two key conditions, drawn from Jungian psychology, to explain the transition to liberated consciousness: ego strength and rootedness in the ancestral soul. When the former condition is absent, an oppressed person may become fanatic. By examining a case in a very different context, not a Native person, not in North or Central America, I wanted to know whether my theory would still find support in the new evidence. I can now conclude that the case of Ed Husain supports the theory.

In some important ways Ed Husain's experience differs from the three cases of Native persons. First, unlike the three cases, he never enters fully the stage of liberated consciousness. Secondly, unlike the other cases, he experiences a *new form of one-sidedness* after leaving the stage of fanaticized consciousness. This, in fact, is the chief obstacle to attaining liberated consciousness, as did the three Native persons. The nature of this obstacle, therefore, warrants some further attention here.

Let me pause to remind the reader about the politics of complexes. As a cluster of images with a common emotional tone, complexes structure much of the unconscious. They are like partial personalities with a will of their own, acting independently of the ego's control. It would even be appropriate to view the relationship between the ego and the complexes as a power struggle. Complexes with contrary qualities are found in pairs, one more conscious than the other, contributing usually to one's positive self-image. The unconscious complex, usually consisting of one's repressed negative qualities, is experienced in projections that sustain an attitude of intolerance toward one's adversaries. In this way, one lives one-sidedly, oblivious of how the detested others merely carry the projections of one's own devalued characteristics.

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I attribute to Husain's weak ego this new form of one-sidedness, an ego alignment with a *spiritual (traditional) Muslim complex* accompanied by an ego projection of a *political Muslim complex*. If we return to what Husain repeatedly considers to be the turning point that leads to his rejection of Islamism, we find the event in 1995 when a member of the Hizb outside the East London mosque kills a black Christian youth from Africa (Husain, 2007, 153, 264, 270). Ed's reaction to this event is emotional and does *not* seem to derive from newly found ego strength. In fact, I have been unable to find any 'maturation crisis' after the one unsuccessfully resolved in 1992 that could support the conclusion that Ed later developed ego strength. It would be consistent with my psychopolitical approach that Ed's weak ego prevented him from completely freeing his mind from Islamist indoctrination between 1995, when he left the Hizb, and 2001. Despite years of experiencing doubts about Islamism, Ed admits to having pro-Islamist thoughts that linger on from 1995 to 2001 (Husain, 2007, 164, 178, 183, 199, 202).

Are there hopeful signs for the reduction of fanaticism?

According to my case evidence of Native people and Ed Husain, the transformation of the fanatic occurs in two ways. In the first way the fanatic develops ego strength to accompany a rootedness in the ancestral soul and attains liberated consciousness. The absence of any instance of Ed's successful resolution of a maturation crisis supports the conclusion that Ed's weak ego prevents him from completing this transformation. The second way concerns the psychodynamics of fanaticism. Viewed as a vicious circle, fanaticism tends to intensify, though not indefinitely. Fanatical beliefs may reach such an extreme that they are transformed into their opposite by a process called, 'enantiodromia'. In Ed's case, this does happen rather gradually over several years, leading him into a new one-sidedness. This contrasts with what appears to be an enantiodromia *to* fanaticism, when the assimilated Danish Muslims reacted rapidly to the cartoons depicting Muhammad. Only time will tell whether their fanaticism will be temporary or enduring.

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