

# The Enemy: A Twenty-first Century Archetypal Study

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**ABSTRACT** *This paper delineates the biologically based archetype of the enemy, showing how it derives ideationally and affectively from the archetype of the stranger, the latter an evolutionary given within the lives of animate creatures. In doing so, it both extends Jung's classic exposition of archetypes and sustains their relationship to instincts. It shows how globalization magnifies the archetype of the enemy; how, in a living sense, stranger and archetype are taxonomically distinct; and how, just as the enemy is the cultural elaboration of the biologically based archetype of the stranger, so war is the cultural elaboration of male-male competition. In elucidating these aspects of the enemy, it makes explicit reference to Darwin's lengthy descriptive writings about male-male competition across invertebrate and vertebrate species. Key implications and ramifications are discussed on the basis of both Jung's and Darwin's insights into what is commonly known as 'the mind/body problem.'* Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

**Key words:** biologically-derived cultural archetypes, globalization, instincts and archetypes, Darwin's exposition of 'the law of battle'

## INTRODUCTION

In this strife-ridden, seemingly incurable fratricidal and fractionated twenty-first century human world, the recognition of basic and powerful psychic dispositional attitudes appears increasingly mandatory to the survival not only of humans, but of the diversity of animate life and of the planet earth itself. Basic and powerful psychic dispositional attitudes drive people to oppress, torture, and exterminate one another, often enough in ways deleterious to the world beyond the immediate human one. The attitudes are fueled by basic and powerful psychic ideational figures that motivate feelings and behaviors on par with biologically basic and powerful in-the-flesh alpha males. *The enemy* is just such a psychic ideational figure, an archetype in Jung's classic sense. In whatever guise and at whatever time *the enemy* comes culturally to the fore, threat and danger loom, and fear and loathing germinate in equal measure.

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The archetype indeed emerges across cultures and is of pan-cultural import. It represents a plurality of others who are not simply inimical to one's group's, tribe's, or nation's values and the meanings one's group, tribe, or nation holds dear. It is an ever-present potential source of the group's, tribe's or nation's consummate undoing, its total and absolute annihilation. That *the enemy* bestirs fear and loathing is hardly surprising.

The aim of this paper is to delineate the psychic nature of the enemy as a uniquely human archetypal figure that arises culturally on the basis of a phylogenetically based psychic archetype, the archetype of the stranger. In earlier writings, I identified and described in detail phylogenetically based *corporeal* archetypes. Some but not all of these archetypes are intercorporeal spatial ones in the service of power; for example, being larger or smaller than another, being above or below another, being in front of or behind another, and the like. Pilo-erection and whole body inflation, both of which increase one's apparent size, nonhuman primate presenting (its submissive context to be distinguished from its mating context), nonhuman primate mounting (its dominance context to be distinguished from its mating context), and the assumption of a bipedal stance in relation to another are further examples of phylogenetically based corporeal archetypes, specifically interanimate spatial ones carried out in the service of power (Sheets-Johnstone, 1994). The aim here is to enlarge this archetypal frame to include a phylogenetically based *psychic* archetype, and in a manner that, while extending Jung's classic conception of archetypes, at the same time sustains Jung's notion of archetypes as related to instincts. In the course of enlarging the frame, I will be crossing a hurdle, namely, demonstrating the reality of a biologically based and driven *psychic* archetype, a hurdle similar to that of demonstrating the reality of biologically-based and -driven *corporeal* archetypes. Crossing the hurdle essentially requires fleshing out in a psychic sense the evolutionary source of the cultural archetype, that is, laying out the phylogenetic ground of the archetype of *the enemy*. A sense of this biological rooting, in what Jung would term the human 'collective unconscious,' is given by psychology editor and religion scholar Sam Keen in a prose poem titled 'To Create an Enemy' (1991). Keen's book *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination* is rich in Jungian thought and insights. Keen in fact notes in the very beginning pages of the book that his 'initial quest is for what Jung would have called 'the archetype' of the enemy' (1986, 13). In its analytic of war, violence, and killing, it provides exceptionally timely reading for twenty-first century humans. I quote the following lines from his prose poem:

Start with an empty canvas  
 Sketch in broad outline the forms of  
 men, women, and children.  
 Dip into the unconscious well of your own  
 disowned darkness  
 with a wide brush and  
 stain the strangers with the sinister hue  
 of the shadow.  
 Trace onto the face of the enemy the greed,  
 hatred, carelessness you dare not claim as  
 your own.  
 ...  
 When your icon of the enemy is complete

you will be able to kill without guilt,  
slaughter without shame.

...

## STRANGER AND ENEMY: ARCHETYPAL FORMS IN PHYLOGENETIC PERSPECTIVE

The stranger is an evolutionary given within the animate world, a given from which virtually no animate form is sealed off. Strangers are in other words a fundamental biological fact of life and the typical affective reaction of animate creatures to strangers is equally a fundamental biological fact of life. Indeed, the typical wariness or outright fear reaction is an adaptive biological response in the classical sense. The stranger, after all, is an unpredictable quantity; his or her possible actions, motives, and intentions are unknown. Animate creatures are understandably wary of what is unfamiliar because what is unfamiliar may injure or inflict pain. In short, a stranger is the harbinger of possible harm and as such is the embodiment of a psychic archetype across the animal kingdom. The psychic archetype comes typically to the fore when any animate form unexpectedly comes upon a stranger, is accosted by a stranger, or otherwise encounters a stranger.

Human history consistently validates the psychic archetype of the stranger in its typical ideational and affective guise. What is evolutionarily given, however, may be and commonly is culturally reworked, that is, shaped in different ways: it may be elaborated, suppressed, exaggerated, or neglected (Sheets-Johnstone, 1994). Hence, strangers may be welcomed and accepted rather than disdained and avoided. Herodotus, for example, points out that foreign customs are avoided by Egyptians and Scythians but that ‘There is no nation which so readily adopts foreign customs as the Persians’ (Herodotus, *The Persian Wars*, I.135). In addition to observing that the Persians ‘have taken the dress of the Medes, considering it superior to their own,’ and that ‘in war they wear the Egyptian breastplate,’ Herodotus notes too that ‘[a]s soon as they hear of any luxury, they instantly make it their own: and hence, among other novelties, they have learned pederasty from the Greeks’ (I.135). Insofar as strangers are differentially perceived according to cultural practices and beliefs – in a general sense, perceived as either contaminating or enriching – one is affectively moved to move differentially in relation to them. One may feel open toward them, enfolding them or their customs into one’s own community, or closed toward them, shunning them or their customs. It is notable that in both the Old and New Testament, the Bible specifies in exacting ways how strangers are to be recognized and treated (see Kidd, 1999 for a thoroughgoing account of strangers in the Old Testament; Luke 10:29–35, for example, in the New Testament). The specifications constitute an implicit recognition of the elemental biologically-driven inclination to be wary of strangers, to fear them as a source of possible harm. But the Bible also at times explicitly admonishes people to change their primary inclination, to turn toward strangers rather than away from them.

Archaeological evidence further validates the biologically driven inclination. Archaeologist Lawrence Keeley’s extensive and meticulous field studies of weaponry and human populations show conclusively that ‘a pacified human past’ is a myth (Keeley, 1996). In other words, human history is replete with instances in which one group of humans whose social organization as a whole – whose values, ways of living, and so on – is different from

that of another group of humans enters into a destructive combat with the alien group for the purpose of eradicating its values, ways of living, and so on, or of taking its land and resources for its own use, or for both purposes such that the alien group can, and in fact does, no longer survive. In sum, others who are unlike oneself and one's community are a persistent possible danger and may in addition hold in their possession assets one would like because they would enhance one's own community.

Tennyson's observation that Nature is red in tooth and claw – a stark contrast to God's love – is notably relevant in this context. Human history – biblical texts included – shows indisputably that what is red in tooth and claw are human groups, tribes, and nations. While their redness is obviously rooted in inter-species prey/predator relations for the purpose of procuring food, it is their redness rooted in intra-species relations that is of sizable moment. In a word, humans have *human* blood on their hands. That redness comes naturally too, but naturally in a way exponentially greater than other animate creatures who at times are brutally unwelcoming to intra-species strangers (see, for example, Wrangham and Peterson, 1996). The intra-species xenophobic proclivities and practices of humans are indeed unmatched in the animate world. They are unmatched because whatever the intra-species xenophobic proclivities in the nonhuman animate world and whatever the exterminative practices associated with them, they have no archetypal *cultural offspring en par with the enemy*. Human blood on human hands derives from what might thus be termed 'archetypal descent with modification'. In other words, while the phylogenetic archetype of the stranger and the cultural archetype of the enemy both contribute to humans being red in tooth and claw, they are quite distinct archetypal figures. Their common ground and difference warrant detailed specification.

The archetypal enemy is like the archetypal stranger: a psychic social entity or figure one does not in actuality know in any personal sense. One can of course have what one considers a personal enemy, a person whom one knows, a person who is working against one and is even out to destroy one, but such an enemy is precisely not a cultural elaboration of the stranger. The cultural archetype of the enemy is on the whole a faceless horde of others who have an overpowering socio-political-economic and/or religious significance. This culturally elaborated rather than individually defined enemy cannot just take things from you and deprive you of your livelihood – your job or your standing in a group of people, for example. This enemy can enslave you, rape you, torture you, behead you, depriving you not just of your livelihood but your life – precisely as might, conceivably, the archetypal stranger whose actions, motives, and intentions are totally unknown. The archetypal enemy, however, derives not just in a purely ideational sense but affectively from the archetype of the stranger. As so derived, the enemy is to begin with not a source of *possible* harm but of *unquestioned* harm. It is not just that the values one holds dear are antithetical to those of the enemy, but that the aim of the enemy is to wipe out those values along with those holding them. The enemy is hence a psychic figure evoking not just fear but hatred, and in turn, a figure from whom one does not in actuality just turn away or even run from as one might from a stranger, but a figure whom one wants in turn to kill and exterminate.

It bears notice that an archetype, whatever its form, may not only rise powerfully to the fore, but, as Jung indicates, be quiescent. An archetype is indeed a latent psychic form that arises circumstantially, situationally, according to conditions of life. It is thus not an abiding

presence, but what one might call an abiding absence that can be awakened into presence; it comes from within, but in conjunction with distinctive awarenesses of the world in which one lives. In effect, it can arise as a collective phenomenon. The enemy in present-day American-Western European life, for example, is a conscious manifestation consequent to the events of 11 September 2001. Prior to that date, and even with the threat of communism, the Korean and Vietnam wars, there was no immediate overarching *enemy*, and certainly no *global enemy*. The culture-spawned archetypal figure took root and grew palpably after 11 September. Its manifestation parallels in a striking if eerie way the rise of the archetypal figure of which Jung wrote in 1936. Prior to identifying the figure, Jung describes thoughts and feelings that were prevalent in Europe:

When we look back to the time before 1914, we find ourselves living [now] in a world of events which would have been inconceivable before the war. We were beginning to regard war between civilized nations as a fable, thinking that such an absurdity would become less and less possible in our rational, internationally organized world. (Jung, 1970, 179)

He then goes on to describe events in the 1930s in conjunction with the archetypal figure, ‘the long quiescent Wotan,’ who has awakened ‘like an extinct volcano, to new activity, in a civilized country that had long been supposed to have outgrown the Middle Ages’ (Jung, 1970, 180). He points out specifically, ‘We have seen him come to life in the German Youth Movement, and right at the beginning the blood of several sheep was shed in honour of his resurrection’ (Jung, 1970, 180). With respect to the seemingly irresistible power of an archetype, Jung suggests at a later point that outsiders can judge those irresistibly caught up in an archetype both inaccurately and too harshly, specifically when they accuse them of not being ‘responsible agents.’ He states, ‘perhaps it would be nearer the truth to regard them also as *victims*’ (Jung, 1970, 192). Whatever its nature – and outside judgments aside – when an archetype comes to the fore, its aura, tenor, and energy can clearly permeate an entire nation, mobilizing it in ways heretofore unimagined. In contrast, ‘When it is quiescent,’ Jung writes, ‘one is no more aware of the archetype . . . than of a latent epilepsy’ (Jung, 1970, 187).

Just so with the archetypal figure of the enemy at the beginning of the twenty-first century: prior to 11 September 2001, the archetype was a ‘latent epilepsy’ in America and Western Europe. Awakened into presence, *the enemy* rose to the fore ‘like an extinct volcano,’ and continues to erupt, perseverating feelings of fear and hatred, and motivating ongoing killings. In contrast to its ancestral form – the stranger who lurks about or appears out of the blue and is the perennial symbol of danger and possible harm in the animate world – the enemy is a decidedly augmented offspring in terms of power, unpredictability, and scope of potential destruction.

## THE PSYCHIC IMPORT OF GLOBALIZATION: A BEGINNING SKETCH

With the advent of globalization, the stakes increase, for with ease in monetary flow, air travel, and the like, the enemy can be anywhere and everywhere. Globalization in fact diminishes or at least attenuates the archetype of the stranger and correlatively augments the archetype of the enemy. It diminishes the former archetype for a fairly obvious reason: globalization shrinks the world, bringing all others into close and consistent if not

immediate contact with one's own kind. It augments the latter archetype for a variety of reasons: because covetousness and greed can readily accompany an otherwise humanistically oriented global economy, as can political territorial pursuits; because if, or as, human populations outgrow their resources, they can opportunistically seek the pastures of others through weaponry readily acquired from foreign industries, which thrive on such business; because the now proximate (rather than distant) existence of theological belief systems radically different from one's own can threaten the authenticity of one's own god or gods; and so on. It is hardly surprising then that, with globalization, the capacity to defend oneself from attack or encroachment by others is of considerable and consistent moment.

*The enemy* can rise to the fore at any time and at any place. Fear of the enemy in fact emerges within a larger affective field than fear of the stranger not only because his presence is totally unpredictable, but because he is the personification of death in the most radical and far-reaching sense: someone to be vanquished precisely because he is not simply out to kill you personally, but to extinguish the very cultural ground, meaning, and values that sustain your group, tribe, or nation.

In just this sense the archetypal enemy is known: he is the one who is out to destroy you and all that you stand for or symbolize. At the same time, however, he is essentially unknown in that, unlike the stranger, he is not commonly present in the flesh. When and if he *is* there in the flesh, he is a human being; he is not an alien figure, but just like you, not only with his two eyes, his nose, and his mouth, but with his blinkings, grimaces, gestures, feelings and thoughts. One reads stories of earlier wars when enemies met face to face, then mutually turned their backs on each other without either of them harming the other. In archetypal guise, however, the actual humanness of the enemy is subverted: he is regarded and treated as a nonhuman or subhuman object to be mutilated, tortured, or done away with, here and now, *in the flesh*. The treatment of *enemy combatants* at Guantánamo readily documents the subversion as do the suicide bombings in Mumbai.

It is furthermore not surprising then that, with globalization, the twenty-first century enemy emerges on a much broader affective field than mere wariness, i.e., the wariness of strangers. There is no attempt at understanding the motivations and actions of *the enemy*, for example, as there might be of a stranger. The enemy is simply branded, sometimes, as indicated above, in ways not totally unlike the way humans used to brand nonhuman animals – by putting hot irons onto their flesh. Because the archetypal enemy is depersonalized and dehumanized, he can be hated and killed in the flesh with impunity, indeed with sanction from confrères, applause from the home front, and honor from leaders – or gods – who rule with supreme authority. In effect, the archetypal enemy in a global world is an overriding blanketed human abstraction and affectively charged obsession; he is the psychic rendition of all those anonymous others who directly or indirectly threaten one and one's way of life, the psychic expression of all those anonymous others who are out to kill one and nullify the meaning and values that structure one's life.

## LIVINGLY PRESENT TAXONOMIC CONTRASTS

Stranger and enemy are clearly related but differentially configured psychic archetypes. Moreover, as intimated, they are taxonomically distinct in a living sense as well. Essential among these distinctions are the following markers:

- (1) The one is a possible or potential threat to one's existence; the other, a certain and absolute threat.
- (2) The one is encountered bodily, face to face even if not eye to eye, and even if commonly ignored as when one walks down the street, boards an airplane, or shops in a supermarket; the other is commonly unencountered bodily, though certainly at checkpoints in Israel, for example, and in hostage-takings and beheadings, face to face encounters take place.
- (3) The humanness of the one is subliminally recognized – a common humanity obtains; the humanness of the other is denied or conjured as monstrous, and in either instance is bent on destroying what is truly human.
- (4) The one is marginalized; the other is tortured, maimed, or straightforwardly exterminated.
- (5) A latent question of power obtains with respect to the stranger; a definitive ever-present question of power obtains with respect to the enemy.
- (6) Fear of strangers is adaptive in an evolutionary sense; there is nothing analogously adaptive in an evolutionary sense about either fear or hatred of the enemy, for neither the fear nor the hatred is rooted in the unfamiliarity of the other, that is, in the possibility of harm from someone unknown. Moreover while fear is indeed the pivotal emotion with respect to both stranger and enemy, fear of the enemy is not uncommonly veiled by unabated hatred.

The above livingly present taxonomic distinctions are notable and certainly worthy of further analysis. There is, however, a further taxonomic distinction, one definitive of the enemy in a classic evolutionary sense quite apart from the stranger and thus of such significance that it should not only *not* be overlooked but be of prime concern.

The culturally spawned psychic archetype of the enemy gives rise to certain kind of actions, actions that are combative in nature, that are rooted in the biological matrix of male-male competition and in the ascension to and maintenance of power in conjunction with that competition, and that are instantiated in the human practice of war. Indeed, the archetype of the enemy is a cultural elaboration of the biologically based archetype of the stranger in a manner parallel to the way in which war is the cultural elaboration of the biological matrix of male-male competition (Sheets-Johnstone, 2008). The enemy is thus in the most fundamental sense male through and through: he is *archetypally* male. Women and children – civilians, i.e., those who do not fight – are classically outside the archetypal denomination '*enemy*'.

It warrants emphasis and in fact sizable underscoring that Darwin devoted 12 chapters to male-male competition in *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*. In particular, he devoted upward of 460 pages to intra-species male morphological and behavioral differences, starting with mollusks and crustaceans and beetles and working his way through fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds (four chapters), mammals (two chapters), then finally and specifically human mammals (two chapters). In these pages, he consistently describes male-male competition as 'the law of battle.' The 'law' is certainly *not* sanctioned or obeyed by every human male, but given human history, it is an undeniable law all the same. Male-male competition should thus surely be examined, at minimum cease being ignored in the way it is presently ignored, and in biology itself. Buried under the sobriquet

of *sperm competition*, it never surfaces. Though sperm competition, an area of study for many years now (e.g., Birkhead and Moller, 1998; Parker, 1998; Birkhead, 2000; Simmons, 2001) keeps the phenomenon of male-male competition indirectly tethered to its original evolutionary context, i.e., competition for females, it puts *real-life* male-male competition as it is culturally elaborated by humans in the practice of war under wraps and out of sight. Sperm competition may be a more compelling and engaging academic area of study precisely for that reason. But it is not the only way of putting *real* human male-male competition under wraps. *Real* human male-male competition is regularly buried as well under the aegis of aggression, a culturally safe, and, in a sense, refined way of investigating what is at base a biological reality. Aggression, specifically male aggression, is viewed, in other words, as a purely cultural product, not a biologically based or driven phenomenon.

A further incisive light may be cast on *real* human male-male competition by recalling an observation of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker, whose book, *The Denial of Death*, won a Pulitzer Prize in 1973. Becker's observation elaborates psychiatrist Otto Rank's seminal insights concerning immortality ideologies, their anchorage in forms of soul-belief, and their development into the enduring scientific pursuit of truth-seeking. In particular, Rank showed how soul-belief lives on in the guise of truth-seeking not only in psychology and psychoanalysis, but in all fields of scientific inquiry (Rank, 1998). Becker takes up this broader theme in a striking way. He states that if anyone doubts Rank's conception of truth-seeking as an immortality ideology,

let him try to explain in any other way the life-and-death viciousness of all ideological disputes. Each person nourishes his immortality in the ideology of self-perpetuation to which he gives his allegiance; this gives his life the only abiding significance it can have. No wonder men go into a rage over the fine points of belief: if your adversary wins the argument about truth, *you die*. Your immortality system has been shown to be fallible, your life becomes fallible. History, then, can be understood as the succession of ideologies that console for death. (Becker, 1975, 64)

The law of battle is indeed culturally elaborated at an individual ideological level as well as at national, ethnic, and tribal socio-political levels in the form of war. As Becker comments, 'If we had to offer the briefest explanation of all the evil that men have wreaked upon themselves and upon their world since the beginnings of time right up until tomorrow, ... it would be simply in *the toll that his pretense of sanity takes*, as he tries to deny his true condition,' i.e., that he is an abysmal worm, an insignificant nothing, and that his fear of death is *dreadful*, too dreadful to be faced (Becker, 1973, 29–30). Thus, where man turns against man in harmful and murderous ways, he turns in defiance of his own death: 'If we don't have the omnipotence of gods,' Becker writes, 'we at least can destroy like gods' (Becker, 1973, 85).

Killing their own kind in acts of war is never mentioned as a behavior that makes humans unique in the animal world. One might question whether the omission is due wholly to the fact that killing one's own kind is considered a purely cultural phenomenon or whether it is due also to the fact that killing one's own kind is a singularly *unlaudable* practice, far from the honorific practice of language, for instance, and of all those other fine practices offered in distinctive praise of humans and of human civilization. In other words, since war is a *bestly* practice, it can hardly differentiate 'man' from 'the beasts,' and differentiating man from the beasts is not only easily and readily done by way of culture, but is vital to

the self-esteem of *Homo sapiens sapiens*. That male-male competition can be disregarded in this context is both startling and inexplicable. With quite minor as well as altogether rare exceptions in the long course of human history, it is males who plan wars, who initiate wars, who fight wars, and who win and lose wars. Indeed, the omission of male-male competition is odd in the extreme, but then few humans seem prepared either to examine close-up the biological roots of war *or* to acknowledge something ‘beastly’ as that which in fact readily distinguishes human animals from their nonhuman counterparts.

*Real* male-male competition clearly both supports and escalates the phylogenetically based cultural psychic archetype of the enemy. Indeed, it perpetuates, enshrines, and even vindicates the very archetype itself. Were the real-life biological phenomenon to be recognized and examined, the cultural archetype of the enemy might in time and in turn come to be quiescent and perhaps even remain quiescent, receding from its present-day prominence and perhaps even diminishing in power in the event of future awakenings. In this context, however, we should note that the enemy naturally needs a counterpart and that counterpart is obviously the cultural archetype of the warrior, he who fights the enemy. The cultural archetype of the warrior is concomitant with the cultural honing of heroes. Archetype and honing both warrant deep and serious study. They are relevant correlatives of the cultural archetype of the enemy and its biological relationship to male-male competition. Jung’s remarks on the hero are notably relevant in this context. They implicitly highlight the archetypal reality of the enemy, a relationship that will be briefly but pointedly exemplified in the concluding section of this paper.

## THE FECUNDITY AND IMPORT OF JUNG’S CLASSIC NOTION OF ARCHETYPES

Archetypes arise from the transcendent ground of the psyche and remain an embedded ‘psychoid factor’ (Jung, 1969, 123). They are thus not immanent in experience but a psychic motif within it, a motif that ‘is a piece of life, an image connected with the living individual by the bridge of the emotions’ (Jung, 1968, 87). An archetype is similar to an instinct in this respect. It too is not controllable but arises *causa sui* in conjunction with a felt inclination or affinity, a felt reluctance or aversion to something in the world. As Jung astutely observes, ‘A man likes to believe that he is the master of his soul. But as long as he is unable to control his moods and emotions, or to be conscious of the myriad secret ways in which unconscious factors insinuate themselves into his arrangements and decisions, he is certainly not his own master’ (Jung, 1968, 72). Jung is in fact at pains to show that humans are ‘possessed by ‘powers’ that are beyond [their] control’ (Jung, 1968, 71). Emphasizing many times over that ‘we are moved by forces from within as well as by stimuli from without’ and that we tend not to recognize our dependency on these forces, he specifically notes, ‘The one thing we refuse to admit is that we are dependent upon ‘powers’ that are beyond our control’ (Jung, 1968, 71). Thus, just as present-day humans separate themselves from ‘basic instincts,’ aligning the latter with ‘animals’ (Jung, 1968, 72, 64, respectively), so they separate themselves from archetypal forms of thought. Instinct and archetype are indeed intimately related powers and their coincidence is highlighted by Jung: ‘instinctive trends’ are represented by corresponding thought forms – that is, by the archetypes’ (Jung, 1968, 67). Moreover, ‘[I]ike the instincts, the collective thought patterns of the human mind

are innate and inherited. They function, when the occasion arises, in more or less the same way in all of us' (Jung, 1968, 64).

The notion of instincts and of 'collective thought patterns' – of a human collective unconscious – is patently distant from present-day cognitive, neuroscience, and related fields of inquiry. So long as humans remain blind to psychic powers beyond their control, however, they are pawns of those powers, precisely as with their collective response to *the enemy*. They remain in the grip of a powerful, emotionally laden archetype that drives them and that can insinuate itself into virtually all aspects of their lives. They are, in a word, driven by fear, threatened by death, in constant battle with others to sustain their way of life, its values and meanings. The substantive emotional value of the archetype is the source of its power; it readily awakens humans. It moves them to move, both to protect themselves and to kill those who threaten them. Moreover the emotional charge of *the enemy* is rife with meanings that the realities of globalization augment, as noted earlier, meanings that a government can in fact ratchet up such that fear is indelibly branded onto the collective psyche. It is hardly surprising then that the emotional charge of *the enemy* is not simply fear but fury and vengeance, driving people to kill as well as to protect. It moves them to think and weigh their doings, to be concerned about risking their resources or themselves.

It is important to note in this context that the word *enemy* – and/or words associated with it – do not create the archetype or the emotions that fuel and engender it – any more than we ourselves create the archetype or emotions that fuel it. On the contrary, archetype and emotions create us in the sense that, as indicated, they move us to move in certain ways and correlatively to think and decide in certain ways. As Jung notes, the word *emotion* itself conveys the fact that emotions are 'involuntary' (Jung 1968, 49): they 'move out feelings,' bodily felt feelings, and thereby 'set in motion' (OED). With respect to the actual linkage of emotion and archetype, Jung explains, 'That is why it is impossible to give an arbitrary (or universal) interpretation of any archetype. It must be explained in the manner indicated by the whole life-situation of the particular individual to whom it relates' (Jung, 1968, 87). Jung's point is exemplified by his own descriptive account of the reawakening of Wotan in Germany in the 1930s. Wotan, he writes, 'is the god of storm and frenzy, the unleasher of passions and the lust of battle' (Jung, 1970, 182). He states,

to avoid prejudice, we could of course dispense with the name 'Wotan' and speak instead of the *furor teutonicus*. But we should only be saying the same thing and not as well, for the *furor* in this case is a mere psychologizing of Wotan and tells us no more than that the Germans are in a state of 'fury'. We thus lose sight of the most peculiar feature of this whole phenomenon, namely, the dramatic aspect of the *Ergreifer* and the *Ergriffener* [the one who is taken, moved, or touched, and the one who is taker, mover, or toucher]. (Jung, 1970, 185)

A few pages later, he explains further: 'Because the behaviour of a race takes on a specific character from its underlying images we can speak of an archetype "Wotan". As an autonomous psychic factor, Wotan produces effects in the collective life of a people and thereby reveals his own nature' (Jung, 1970, 187). Noting that Wotan 'simply disappeared when the times turned against him, and remained invisible for more than a thousand years, working anonymously and indirectly,' Jung remarks more generally that 'Archetypes are like riverbeds which dry up when the water deserts them, but which [they] can find again at any time.' Elaborating on the analogy, he states,

An archetype is like an old watercourse along which the water of life has flowed for centuries, digging deep channel for itself. The longer it has flowed in this channel the more likely it is that sooner or later the water will return to its old bed. The life of the individual as a member of society and particularly as part of the State may be regulated like a canal, but the life of nations is a great rushing river which is utterly beyond human control, in the hands of One, who has always been stronger than men. . . . Thus the life of nations rolls on unchecked, without guidance, unconscious of where it is going, like a rock crashing down the side of a hill, until it is stopped by an obstacle stronger than itself. Political events move from one impasse to the next, like a torrent caught in gullies, creeks, and marches. All human control comes to an end when the individual is caught in a mass movement. Then the archetypes begin to function. (Jung, 1970, 189)

Archetypes are a central and perdurable theme not only throughout Jung's writings, but pivotal in what might be called his natural-history-based socio-political psychoanalytic. His descriptive accounts specify not only the collective power of archetypes and their affective and temporal nature, they also delineate the grounding of archetypes in biological ways strongly suggestive of an evolutionary history:

[Archetypes are] the hidden foundations of the conscious mind, or, to use another comparison, the roots which the psyche has sunk not only in the earth in the narrower sense but in the world in general. Archetypes are systems of readiness for action, and at the same time images and emotions. They are inherited with the brain structure – indeed, they are its psychic aspects. They represent, on the one hand, a very strong instinctive conservatism, while on the other hand they are the most effective means conceivable of instinctive adaptation. They are thus, essentially . . . that [aspect] of the psyche [that] is attached to nature, or in which its link with the earth and the world appears at its most tangible. (Jung, 1970, 31)

Given their biological grounding if not natural history, archetypes are clearly not a theoretical construct on the order of 'feature analyzers' (e.g., Bernstein et al., 1994, 196–8), 'cognitive maps' (e.g., O'Keefe and Nadel, 1979; Golledge, 1999), 'eye-direction detectors' (Baron-Cohen, 1995), or other such hypothetical entities present-day psychologists, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and others have conjured to exist in *the brain* to explain phenomena discovered in a laboratory or in experimental studies. Archetypes are an affectively-rich ideational or imagistic reality of life itself. They stem from Nature, an endowment on par with instincts. Indeed, Jung remarks that 'To the extent that the archetypes intervene in the shaping of conscious contents by regulating, modifying, and motivating them, they act like the instincts' (Jung, 1969, 115). In effect, archetypes influence us in ways no less primordial than instincts, precisely as detailed in the cultural archetype of *the enemy*. The cultural archetype of the enemy is indeed properly conceived as Jung conceives an archetype: 'instinct raised to a higher frequency' (Jung, 1969, 122). What exists at the frequency of instinct is xenophobia, the biologically based fear of strangers. The cultural archetype of the enemy elevates the intensity, scope, and import of this basic biological fear. Humans are thus clearly *by nature* attuned in both an instinctual and archetypal sense to *the enemy*, attuned in Jung's sense of both 'spirit' and 'matter': 'In archetypal conceptions and instinctual perceptions, spirit and matter confront one another on the psychic plane,' which is to say that '[m]atter and spirit both appear in the psychic realm as distinctive qualities of conscious contents' (Jung, 1969, 126).

While Jung emphasizes that the archetype is a 'psychoid factor', i.e., a transcendent form we experience only as a psychic motif and of which we are not and cannot be directly

conscious, the cultural archetype of the enemy can nonetheless be specified as both a *psychic species*, one that may manifest in various forms, and an attendant *psychic reflex* in terms of the actions one is inclined to take. Jung intimates as much when he states, ‘Like the instincts, the collective thought patterns of the human mind are innate and inherited. They function, when the occasion arises, in more or less the same way in all of us’ (Jung, 1968, 64). Hence, though archetype and instinct are ontologically distinct and may be differentially manifest according to variations among individuals and to *circumstances* – to draw on a rich and useful concept from Lamarck – they are an abiding human inheritance. Indeed, archetypes are dynamic: they ‘manifest themselves in impulses, just as spontaneously as the instincts’ (Jung, 1968, 64–5). In short, they coexist within an evolutionary framework.

## KEY IMPLICATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS

If ‘the hero figure is an archetype, which has existed since time immemorial,’ as Jung claims, so also is the enemy. Moreover the same may be said of their respective origins. Jung writes with respect to the hero:

When and where such a motif originated nobody knows. We do not even know how to go about investigating the problem. The one apparent certainty is that every generation seems to have known it as a tradition handed down from some preceding time. Thus we can safely assume that it “originated” at a period when man did not yet know that he possessed a hero myth; in an age, that is to say, when he did not yet consciously reflect on what he was saying. (Jung, 1968, 61)

The enemy, like the hero, originated ideationally on its own, unquestionably on the basis of a natural history of animate life, i.e., in the phenomenon of the stranger, and of a natural history of human experience, in the cultural elaboration of the stranger. The enemy was and is, in other words, not an *invented* idea. That the cultural archetype of the enemy has erupted and grown in this twenty-first century world can hardly be denied. Its overarching and relentless presence derives from the biologically-rooted archetype of the stranger and follows from the twenty-first century globalization of virtually all individual human lives. As indicated earlier, strangers can indeed be a matter of life and death. They raise questions of survival not in so many words, of course, but in the immediate nonlinguistic kinetic appearances and interactions of animate life. The idea that twenty-first century adult humans live in some form of radical psychic captivity deriving from globalization strongly suggests that Herbert Spencer’s nineteenth-century ethics of amity and enmity was on the right track. In effect, ethical implications follow from globalization and warrant brief but pointed specification.

To begin with, the larger the global world, the more worries, the more threats, the more competition – in the end, the more *danger*. With an ever-more expanded world, with its ever-more extended conflicts, ever-more extended possibilities for territorial takeovers, ever-more extended resources to appropriate, and so on – much of it the result of more and more information about the world – people’s focus of attention changes; their attitudes change; their feelings change. At the everyday level of everyday people, i.e., nonpoliticians and nonleaders, there is more and more – ostensibly – to be concerned about, while at the

everyday level of many a politician and leader, there is more and more to be *actively pursued*.

Territory is an integral part of this picture because it is an integral part of the national history of a people. It is thus not surprising that, in a pancultural sense, danger, and specifically the danger of war, shapes and patterns human life. But territory has a much longer and more complex history, being an integral part not only of the national history of a people but of the natural history of humans. Its national history is in fact the cultural elaboration of its natural history, that is, an elaboration of what is evolutionarily given, as evidenced in the territorial behaviors of nonhuman animals, especially the behaviors of other primates, and equally, in light of the human archaeological record, the behavior of humans for untold centuries and more.

We glimpse these evolutionary relationships in a preliminary way in Robert Ardrey's 1966 book *The Territorial Imperative*, in which Ardrey fittingly identifies human nations as biological entities, showing how they are an extension of the territorial claims of nonhuman animals, a domain of research he documents extensively. In addition to dwelling pointedly on the concept of a biological nation, he dwells at length on Spencer's concept of amity and enmity that identifies the dual moral codes informing human action, emending the concept along the lines of evolutionary thought. Indeed, Ardrey remarks on the fact that, despite Spencer's knowledge of their obvious ties to evolutionary thought, the dual codes remain devoid of evolutionary reference: 'Oddly enough,' Ardrey writes, 'it is Spencer, the evolutionist, who seems by some quirk to have clung to a belief in man's original good nature. He saw the code of enmity as something laid onto man, something that history must one day wash away' (Ardrey, 1966, 286). He points out too that anthropologist Sir Arthur Keith was actually the first to take up Spencer's dual codes in a true biological sense, giving them a firm footing in territorial behavior, and quotes Keith's basic claim:

Human nature has a dual constitution; to hate as well as to love are parts of it; and conscience may enforce hate as a duty just as it enforces the duty of love. Conscience has a two-fold role in the soldier: it is his duty to save and protect his own people and equally his duty to destroy their enemies. ... Thus conscience serves both codes of group behavior; it gives sanction to practices of the code of enmity as well as the code of amity. (Ardrey, 1966, 287–8)

What Keith was at pains to show was how tribes occupying specific territories were the original human 'evolutionary unit' (Keith, 1946, 142), how nations are 'the lineal successors of tribes' (Keith, 1946, 146), and how amity binds the tribe or nation together in 'group affection' and enmity separates the tribe or nation from other tribes or nations in 'group aversion' (Keith 1968, 14). Of particular note is his emphasis on fear as the basis of the 'enmity complex': 'Fear is the tribal sentinel,' he states. 'Even at peace, fear is not asleep,' but is present in suspicions, dislikes, contempt, and so on' (Keith, 1946, 143–4). When roused by a perceived threat, fear sets off a 'state of warlike exaltation [in which] there is pressed into action a passion to destroy, to kill, to exterminate the enemy, to terrify him by acts of cruelty and of inhumanity' (Keith, 1946, 144). In short, Keith's insights into human nature and its capacity for enmity toward outsiders run deep, including not only understandings of the power of fear but the power of ambition to precipitate war. At the base of man's 'competitive complex,' he states, is 'man's desire for place and power–ambition' (Keith, 1968, 58), a desire he elsewhere speaks of as 'the most compelling of

human passions' and specifies as one of the two causes of war (Keith, 1946, 145, 141, respectively).

It should be noted that both Keith's and Ardrey's conceptions of the dual codes are firmly grounded in the world-wide field research of renown primate psychologist C. R. Carpenter, whose penetrating and insightful studies of the behavior of nonhuman social primates is seminal to their theses (see, for example, Carpenter, 1963).

In sum, globalization brings nations, tribes, clans, and ethnic groups into closer and closer commercial and socio-political proximity to one another. The psychic archetype of the stranger runs along a continuum in these more closely lived circumstances. At one extreme, the archetype is prominenced, especially in one's actual and initial face-to-face encounter with a strange other; at the other extreme, the archetype recedes, especially as one's acquaintance with the stranger tempers and even nullifies his or her strangeness. The fear that Keith highlights is essentially an archetypal fear that runs along this same continuum. Fear waxes and wanes in accordance with the waxing and waning of strangeness because it foundationally defines the affective nature of the archetype. Accordingly, when one solidifies one's identity with one's own kind in amity, or 'group affection,' as Keith describes it, fear is defused precisely by group solidarity; when one turns against others in enmity, or 'group aversion,' fear may be similarly muted, but muted in this instance by hatred and contempt. On the one hand, globalization can turn the stranger into a known quantity; on the other hand, it can turn the stranger into *the enemy*. In the latter instance, more and more alien others who remain alien stream into one's life. More and more of these others disrupt one's familiar patterns of living. More and more of these others weigh in on the political moves of one's government. More and more of these others are out to destroy the meaning and values of one's life and one's life itself. These others are no longer strangers; they are precisely *enemies*. Clearly, what can follow and has in fact followed from globalization warrants painstaking study.

A key ramification of the cultural archetype of the enemy similarly warrants painstaking study. It has to do with what is generally referred to as the mind/body problem, but takes its bearings not from theoretical formulations but from biological facts of life.

To begin with, the idea that mind and morphology evolved together surely makes evolutionary sense. What Darwin observed in his travels and in his home studies, especially in his extended study of worms in his last years (Darwin, 1976 [1881]), was movement – the habits and practices of living creatures. He observed that what they did and how they did it made sense in terms of survival. It is thus hardly surprising or odd that Darwin should write in one of his Notebooks, 'Experience shows the problem of the mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself – the mind is function of body – we must bring some *stable* foundation to argue from' (Darwin, 1987 [1838], 564). What Darwin meant by saying 'experience shows' may be interpreted in two ways. He may have been referring to philosophers who attempt to show the nature of mind by attacking the citadel itself. But he may also very well have meant that his own experience – his own first-person experiences of animate life – showed him that the mind was not something distinct from the body but precisely, as he states, a function of body. In effect, animate bodies are mindful bodies. Jung's description of archetypes as systems of readiness for action that are infused with images and emotions and that are inherited with brain structure, constituting psychic aspects thereof, ties in readily with Darwin's observation that mind is a function of body.

The psyche is indeed rooted in nature – it is ‘part of nature,’ as Jung (1968, 6) avers. Moreover the neglect of the body was apparent and of moment to Jung. Writing in 1928 of ‘the spiritual problem of modern man,’ of modern man’s ‘fascination’ with the psyche in terms of the unconscious, i.e., what lies below the surface of consciousness and the possibility of this fascination bringing about ‘a new self-appraisal, a reassessment of our fundamental human nature,’ Jung presciently remarks

We can hardly be surprised if this leads to a rediscovery of the body after its long subjection to the spirit – we are even tempted to say that the flesh is getting its own back. ... the body lays claim to equal recognition; it exerts the same fascination as the psyche. If we are still caught in the old idea of an antithesis between mind and matter, this state of affairs must seem like an unbearable contradiction. But if we can reconcile ourselves to the mysterious truth that the spirit is the life of the body seen from within, and the body the outward manifestation of the life of the spirit – the two being really one – then we can understand why the striving to transcend the present level of consciousness through acceptance of the unconscious must give the body its due, and why recognition of the body cannot tolerate a philosophy that denies it in the name of the spirit. (Jung, 1970, 93–4)

Still another way of emphasizing the fact that mind and morphology evolve together and of understanding their relationship is to recall an observation by evolutionary anthropologist, William Howells, who rightly, if wryly, noted that ‘hands and a big brain would not have made a fish human; they would only have made a fish impossible’ (Howells, 1959, 341). Moreover the idea that the psyche is rooted in nature, that its roots are sunk deep into the earth in the narrower sense and in the world in general is methodologically significant. Darwin’s ending line intimates as much: i.e., ‘we must bring some *stable* foundation to argue from’ is quintessentially a question of methodology. Surely we can take a cue from evolutionary biology itself, that is, a cue from Darwin’s formulation of the origin of species, selection in relation to sex, and the expression of the emotions in man and animals (Darwin, 1968 [1859], 1981 [1871], 1965 [1872], respectively). We can, in other words, take a cue from his basic writings about the animate world. They all have a *stable* foundation. They are based on observations of animate creatures making their way in the world. They are based on the observable forms and dynamics of life itself. But that is not all. Darwin meticulously transcribed the observable forms and dynamics into language that both captured and preserved their uniqueness. The stable foundation from which he argued was thus not immediately explanatory or theoretical in nature but *descriptive*. His consequent thesis concerning evolution and explanations of the interconnectedness of animate life rest on *descriptive foundations*. We might note that, in a related way, phenomenology rests on descriptive foundations as do literary, environmental, and ecological writings (see Sheets-Johnstone, 2002).

What is the import of descriptive foundations? They are obviously the empirical foundation for verification by others who can corroborate or question the authenticity and aptness of a description. In addition, however, they are the basis of taxonomic analyses, which analyses, of fundamental import in themselves, in turn open the possibility of comparative studies that set forth relationships among the things described. With respect to archetypes, such studies would be of considerable value precisely for this reason. An archetypal taxonomy would delineate the nature of psychic forms and in turn open the possibility of showing relationships and lineages among them.

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