

RE-VISITING FREUD, JEWISHNESS AND THE OTHER

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Hate and the 'Jewish Science' – Anti-Semitism, Nazism and Psychoanalysis. By Stephen Frosh. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 228pp, £25, pb/hb.

ABSTRACT *This paper is written in response to the book *Hate and the Jewish Science* by Stephen Frosh (2005). The central questions being explored are 'is psychoanalysis a Jewish science and what are the implications of the authors findings?' The response is written very much using the contextual material of Frosh's book and makes reference to many of the general themes outlined, such as the Jew as other, the Jewish relationship to Yahweh and the contrasting relationship with God in Christianity. The subject of Jungian psychology is also explored in terms of a religious dimension that is omitted in Freud's works. There is also some discussion about generalisation as an inevitable problematic when discussing race and culture. Matte Blanco's concepts of symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of being are summarised to help offer a formulaic view on the processes of using logic to make generalisations through relative simplification. Finally, there is an exploration of variable dynamic relationships to an internal other that illustrates the potential conflict through a sense of superiority between other-centricity and egocentricity. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

Key words: psychoanalysis, Jewish, Freud, other

INTRODUCTION

Other men, and myself, seen as empirical beings, are merely pieces of mechanism worked by springs, but the true subject is irrepeatable, for that consciousness which is hidden in so much flesh and blood is the least intelligible of occult qualities.
(Merleau-Ponty, 2005, 407)

In this paper I examine areas of the book *Hate and the Jewish Science* as a platform for thinking and exploration of sensitive and provocative issues related to Freud's Jewish identity and his role as the founder of psy-

choanalysis. The various speculations that psychoanalysis is Jewish in its making (Freud, 1978, 148; Klein, 1985, 93; Yerushalmi, 1991, 10) need to be explored in connection with the psychological makeup of Freud himself. It is then my aim to revisit Jung's situation during the Second World War as both anti-Semitic and a sympathiser with the Jews. I make an attempt to define how Jung's sense of self seemed under great pressure from the Nazi oppressive forces, whereas nonetheless he did provide a supportive role in relation to the Jews.

I also address Jung's attempt to bring religion back into psychoanalysis, as one of the counter-responses of Freud's claim that psychoanalysis had a superior knowledge base because it was 'scientific' in its methodology. This leads to an exploration of what I consider to be a central dynamic in Judaism with the relationship to God or Yahweh (the name). I suggest that the process of acknowledging Yahweh as an 'other' with a voice has radically different dynamics from that of Christianity and 'integrative' philosophies.

In relation to the problem of generalisation I look to Matte Blanco's formulations of the symmetrical and the asymmetrical modes of being that contribute to understanding processes involved in defining 'race' and 'culture'. In the final part of the paper, I focus on how an internal other can be identified that allows for a greater variability of content, expanding upon Frosh's reference to the Jew as the kernel of otherness, that which is always found everywhere, yet is never to be allowed in (Frosh, 2005, 215).

SO, IN ESSENCE, IS PSYCHOANALYSIS JEWISH?

Frosh's reasoning for exploring aspects of psychoanalysis as a 'Jewish science' is based on the Jewish identity of Freud. This is in terms of Freud's links with other Jews, providing an arena within which he could explore some of his central ideas between 1897 and 1912. As is well known, Freud was not sympathetic to religious ideas and preferred to consider them as the result of childhood conflict producing such neuroses as are exhibited by way of worship and irrational belief systems. It seems that the practising Jewish community accepted him, even if he was not a self-proclaimed follower himself (Frosh, 2005, 23).

In the light of Freud's relationship to Judaism, it is possible to explore in Frosh's

writings and from Freud himself, the likelihood that Freud's relationship to 'traditional' Judaism was not the primary motivating principle in the formation of psychoanalysis. However, it seemed that Freud's relationship to a group of 'Jewish' people who could identify with some type of collective history of location and family was fundamental to the acceptance of his ideas. In 1926 Freud wrote to the Jewish organization, Bnai Brith, '... for I was always an unbeliever, was brought up without religion though not without respect for the demands, called "ethical", of human culture' (Gay, 1988, 601). Here he states his position clearly as concerned with an area overlapping between Jewish interests and his own. He did consider himself to be a Jew, for example: '... I have always been faithful to our people, and never pretended to be anything but what I am: a Jew from Moravia whose parents come from Austrian Galicia.' This affirms his sense of belonging in a society that is close to his personal history, but that suggests that he is neither 'religious' nor aligned with the Jewish faith but that he is deeply involved with the personhood of his ancestors and community.

Although his personal history does clearly pervade his work, his reflections on Jews for example play a small part in the formation of his central ideas about the unconscious. He uses anti-Semitic jokes (Freud, 1976), for example, which give an insight into the dynamics of humour, but where any other joke could have done the job equally well. It appears to me that his essential conceptual framework, which he defines and models, is perhaps something less personal in its origins and content.

It can be very easy to see Freud in his own works, apparently forging such determined truths in a tone of conviction, but Freud had a tendency to overauthorize his findings, so that where there may be uncertainty he

claims the opposite. For example, Freud describes speaking to a colleague who had analysed his own son (little Hans) to discover that the child was aware, through observation, that women actually became pregnant and gave birth to babies, contrary to the story of the stork bringing the baby to the family home. This, claims Freud, is 'irrefutable proof' (Freud, 1977, 192) that psychic conflict can be encouraged through the misinformation given by adults to their children. The evidence cited is, of course, questionable even if the theory is sound. It is unclear what kind of dynamics may have been at work between father and son – the information given to Freud is secondary evidence and the case in question may have already been influenced by ideas suggested by Freud about the unconscious. Given that Freud had ideas that required evidence rather than everything being solidly based on observed clinical material, it might be possible to consider that his 'ideas' often begin with a life of their own, almost independently of the 'author'.

In this sense it can be considered that Freud's 'voice', personal history and cultural identifications are less important than the essence of the work in itself and essentially the work does not have a primary location as being 'a part of' Freud and therefore remains a distinct enterprise, coloured and channelled through personal experience. It is interesting to note that in Valentine (1954, 11) biography of Albert Einstein, she states 'Man moves the centre of gravity of his personal sentimental life and looks for the calm and balance that he cannot find in the too narrow circle of his personal life.' So, along those lines, perhaps Freud could be considered to have engaged in something far wider than the 'too narrow circle of his personal life'. Developing the idea that impersonal processes, many of which were unconscious, may in fact have led him, it may be possible to deduce that

there is a difference in this context between the 'author' and the 'essence' of the work in itself.

Roland Barthes (1967) wrote his seminal paper 'Death of the author', which may help to elucidate the problem of assigning Freud the sole accountability of producing the work. From this perspective it could be considered that his work came *via* Freud rather than originating *in* 'him'. To quote Barthes (1967):

We know that a text does not consist of a line of words, releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Author-God), but is a space of many dimensions, in which are wedded and contested various kinds of writing, no one of which is original: the text is a tissue of citations, resulting from the thousand sources of culture.

Barthes describes the text in terms of the hidden meanings, the multiple influences and the subtle complexity, which I feel is particularly relevant to Freud because he drew upon so many sources. Whether Freud's works belong on the shelves of Jewish studies, or under the psychology section a question with which Frosh opens his book *Hate and the Jewish Science*, can, in my opinion, be resolved. Freud's biographies and material relating directly to his personal history would not be misplaced if found in the Jewish studies section. The psychological studies, however, are another type of material, 'a tissue of citations' (Barthes, 1967), which have a place in the psychological category as being a contribution to society quite separate from any personal, cultural affiliation.

This was confirmed in Freud's history, where he wishes to treat the work as an ethical human endeavour. This conflicted with his Jewish allegiances during the 1920s and 1930s because he was keen to promote psychoanalysis as having its own place separate from any Jewish history (Gay, 1988, 597). Perhaps we can consider the

Janus-type nature of the internal world that Freud makes reference to when writing about jokes (Freud, 1905, 215) as being evident in these reactions. The face that looks inwards towards the evolution of a curious 'other' knowledge of the unconscious and the face that looks outwards towards the social world and how this knowledge finds a place.

THE JEWISH IDENTITY

Frosh explores Freud's understanding and complex questioning in terms of his Jewish heritage. The remarkable insight and capacity for abstract reasoning that is rare in human culture is, he feels, particularly abundant in the Jewish culture. He is not the only one who has argued this and the facts are very compelling. (For example, that 17.8% of Nobel prizes given out between 1901 and 1995 were given to Jews and the population of Jews in the West is approximately 1.2%, Rubinstein et al., 2002, 429.)

This argument has been comprehensively explicated by Frosh. For example, quoting Abraham (1965), Frosh (2005, 26) uses this material to suggest that 'This "racial kinship" determines a way of thinking and reasoning and non-Jews struggle to keep up with it.' His support for the cultural strengths of Jews being the foundation for psychoanalysis is prominent in the book. For example, 'It can be argued that psychoanalysis is heavily indebted to, and informed by, "Jewish" perspectives, attitudes, ethics and methodological approaches' (Frosh, 2005, 1).

From this statement Frosh categorizes some human characteristics, but the reader is required to make the link between them and how they are embodied in a unique way by the Jew. If we follow the paths of the Jewish cultures and ideas about faith, there is currently such divergence that it is difficult to find the Jewish identity that would hold a cohesive set of perspectives. It has

even been described as 'chaos and confusion across the religious spectrum' (Cohn-Sherbok, 2006, 119).

Along with the cultural complexity, to reason that Jewish individuals are making major contributions because they are Jewish does not give justice to the work itself. It is difficult to argue that this is pure chance too. The dilemma arises about whether a culture can be defined by its advancements and contributions or whether achievements can be defined by the culture? In other words, are these contributions examples of Jewishness? It is unlikely that any generalizations can be formed about Jewish culture as a whole without losing something of the individuals involved and the mastery of creative processes that evolve beyond those particular cultural limitations.

Frosh sees the world of psychoanalysis through a 'traditional Jewish' lens (rather than a 'modern' Jewish one), which is perhaps why he states 'that there is some truth to my idea that I really only think reproductively' (Frosh, 2005, 19), that is, through the well trodden paths of conceptual and historical Jewish perspectives on psychoanalysis. Assuming a cohesive and traditional narrative, his view culminates in a final conclusion that rather than being simply reproductive, is outstanding and original:

It is not, then, that the Jew is just a convenient scapegoat upon whom these inner urges can be projected; it is rather that just as psychoanalysis is 'Jewish' in important ways, so is the unconscious that it has discovered and invented. All otherness in the West is Jewish, including that inner otherness that is unconscious desire. (Frosh, 2005, 215)

This statement is original because it steps into a new territory; that the entire West contains a greater influence than ourselves that is essentially Jewish. The internal otherness that fuels our fears is made conscious

through the tools Freud offered us and should I or others come to terms with this otherness there would be a realization of Jewishness as 'other' inside. My concern is that the West is multicultural, multifaceted and full of complex 'othernesses' that are illuminated in many powerful forms. I wonder if the profound simplification that 'all otherness in the West is Jewish' is an attempt to regain a lost sense of Jewishness. Perhaps there still is a sense of opposition to anti-Semitism that reactivates a sense of hostility that inadvertently keeps a sense of Jewish identity alive. The academic Rabbi Cohn-Sherbok (2006, xiv) states that 'The paradox of Jewish life is that hatred and Jewish survival have been interrelated for thousands of years, and without anti-Semitism, we may be doomed to extinction.' The Holocaust was clearly a major and destructive genocide that has become part of a general knowledge of the Jewish struggle, and perhaps not only does anti-Semitism solidify a sense of Jewish identity that perhaps compromises on complexity but it also encourages a collective counter 'assertion'.

If this is the case, I think that it is at the cost of a fuller and multifaceted picture. Consequently, it is difficult to define and locate exactly what the cultural Jew is, especially in modern times, and in what ways this is similar to or different to the traditional religious Jew. At times Frosh touches on this, but I feel the question of Jewishness is kept at a safe distance. For example Frosh (2005, 28) quotes Freud – 'He could not express that [Jewish] essence in words, but some day, no doubt, it will become accessible to the scientific mind' – and Braun who states that Jewishness is a '... vision of nature and humanity' or Yerulshami on the shift from the secular to the modern Jewish identity, 'Floating in their undefined yet somehow real Jewishness, they will doubly resent and fiercely resist any attempt on the

part of society to define them against their own wishes.'

But, if there were to be the desired, explicit definition of a Jew, this may create as many problems as it solves, such as problems of nationalism and cultural hierarchies. To consider Samuel's critique of Jung's political typology, he states that there has been an over-emphasis on 'what a Jew is, rather than on what being a Jew is like' (Samuels, 1993, 315). So, although there remains an elusive definition of a cultural Jew in *Hate and the Jewish Science*, perhaps such divisions are only signifiers for the purposes of communicating generalizations that should be acknowledged as such.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AS SCIENCE

The *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* (1964, 1806) defines science as 'The state or fact of knowing; knowledge or cognizance of something specified or implied . . .', which seems to be applicable to dynamics that can be repeated and systematized in some definite order. Freud acknowledged that his defining models of the mind were redefining science (Freud, 1964, 181–2) but his enthusiasm for the growth of psychoanalysis seemed to drive his ambition for psychoanalysis to be clearly demarcated from irrational, superstitious and superfluous studies about the psyche (Freud, 1964, 54).

His claim, however, that his own methodology was 'to avoid individual factors and affective influences' (Freud, 1964, 170) was perhaps overly ambitious in his treatment of the human psychological subject, and inevitably he drew from a multiplicity of cultural sources around him as well as individual affective expressions from himself and the patient, which became integral to the work.

The effect of treating psychoanalysis as a science could have had wider implications; it could be argued that in this search for a scientific reality he was in fact denying the

voice of the practising Jew. The researcher Dan Stone explains a perspective that looks at the underlying dominant causative factor for 'redemptive anti-Semitism' as the attempt to put science at the top of the cultural hierarchy for the sake of the survival of a nation:

Thus, 'redemptive anti-Semitism', for example, is not simply a continuation of 'traditional' Christian anti-Judaism, rather it is also an adaptation of Jew Hatred under modern conditions of the emancipation of the Jews . . . most significantly, the rise to prominence of ways of thinking that stress the eradication of superstition and the superiority of science. (Stone, 2006, 230)

It is well known that Freud's concern was not about the promotion of Jewish values, ethics or systems of belief. His enquiry was about, as he put it, the 'ethical' nature of 'human culture' (Gay, 1988, 601), a deeper content and symbolization particular to the individual and society. This, in my view, takes the work of psychoanalysis beyond many cultural limitations in the West including a Jewish perspective, which was an accumulation of Jewish and non-Jewish ideas and texts.

Therefore, Dan Stone's consideration of the elevation of science, replacing 'superstition' was not just a fascist endeavour. It was also Freud's. It could therefore be argued that Freud's intentions created an oppositional division in the cultural psyche between the 'irrefutable' ideas, based on a biological, internally dynamic psychic composition and the profound embodiment of symbolization and otherness held in superstition and religious practice.

C. G. JUNG

Frosh devotes a section to Jung's misgivings under the title 'A non-Jewish psychoanalysis'. In the first paragraph Jung is described as the 'Nazi spokesman' for 'The General

Medical Society' (GMS). This sets the tone with some exceptions on pp. 92–3. A part from some passages on pp 92–3, Frosh spends some considerable time (Frosh, 2005, 94–111) outlining the various fascist views that Jung held.

Frosh states that the GMS had a different type of member to the 'German Psychoanalytic Society' (GPS); they were not Jews and were described as 'revisionists'. The GMS and the GPS, he explains, moved steadily apart. He states that Jung, 'seems to have been caught up, albeit ambivalently, in admiration of Nazi philosophy, mystical celebration of the cult of Wotan, anti-Semitic innuendo, and self-aggrandisement at the expense of Freudian psychoanalysis' (Frosh, 2005, 94).

Frosh takes quotes from radio programmes and interviews with Jung that illustrate Jung's idealisation of Hitler. Frosh is keen to get this point across but also shows us his findings in Bair's biography of Jung that contrast with 'Jung as the Nazi spokesperson'. He summarizes Jung's concern about the fascist oppression and touches upon Jung's protection of some Jews and notes Allers, in particular, who was an eminent psychoanalyst at that time.

There is convincing evidence that Jung lived beneath a dark internal shadow of anti-Semitism, but, it is also possible to see that Jung deserves a little more credit for his support of the Jewish society. For example Bair also states that 'Jung guaranteed that if for any reason these persons, [many of whom were Jews] were unable to support themselves, he would assume all financial responsibility' and 'Jung treated many Jewish patients without charge . . . among them Aniele Jaffe, who later became his secretary and collaborator on his auto-biography' (Bair, 2003, 459).

According to Bair, Jung asked many friends to support particular Jews abroad

and in response to Neuman's feeling that Jung was considerably detached from the situation in 1938, Jung responds 'I have a lot to do with Jewish refugees and am permanently occupied with finding a place for all my Jewish acquaintances in England and in America. In this way I am in continuous connection with the events of our time', and in terms of the GMS Bair (2003, 459) states that, 'Jung's main reason for convening delegates away from Germany was that, after six years of trying to effect change, he was tired and wanted to quit. As his successor was unlikely to come from a neutral nation, he hoped to install a non-German.' This sense of a humane Jung looking out for Jews and attempting to establish a non-Nazi leader is some evidence that contrasts significantly with his more fascist remarks covered by Frosh. It seems that the two are difficult to hold in mind as being part of a conflicting inner world that makes up Jung's psychology.

Frosh looks at the problems of Jung's ideas on race and how Jung contributed to a politically oppressive force. This is a curious focus for Frosh, who appears to be promoting racial characteristics as forming the foundation of psychoanalysis. There are greater accusations that he makes, which seem to undermine all of the Jungian interests of that time, when he states that Nazi ideas about 'the use of myth, its engrossment with spectacle and its rhetoric of striving and national fulfilment were all congruent with Jungian perspectives and made Germany an ideal testing ground . . .' (Frosh, 2005, 99).

But it can also be argued that Jung was attempting to bring back into depth psychology what Freud was casting into 'the superiority of science' (Brown, 2006, 203). Jung was, broadly speaking, reincorporating into depth psychology the spiritual dimension of human life that is beyond scientific classifi-

cation, parallel to the 'Judaism' of Jewishness that had otherwise been lost in Freud's ambitions. In the late 1940s Jung wrote, 'what are religions? Religions are psychotherapeutic systems', which he felt that one aspired to in maturity (Jung, 1977, para. 370). This contrasts with Freud's basic foundation that 'The scientific spirit brings about a particular attitude . . . the greater the number of men to whom the treasures of knowledge become accessible, the more wide spread is the falling-away from religious belief' (Freud, 1961) and later 'Religion restricts this play of choice and adaptation . . .' (Freud, 1961, 84). This further puts into question both the view of Jung as anti-Semitic and that of Freud as the introspective embodiment of Jewishness. It seems that Jung contributed to and was swept along by an oppressive collective 'other' during the 1930s, but that apart from his 'glib typology' to quote Samuels (1993, 315), he was reviving a depth of interest in symbolization of an 'other' distinct from the ego.

YAHWEH AND GOD

Is there a fundamental difference between 'God' and 'Yahweh'? Frosh (2005, 163–4) describes the roots of Christianity as being an attempt to 'derive their affective charge from primary narcissism, and represent a challenge to reality and to the order of the father'. One result of which, he suggests, is the dislocation of the persecutory super-ego into the Jew, who reminds Christians of their betrayal of God. Does this mean that the muted facet of the judgmental Christian God is perceived instead in the name of Yahweh? This is possible when the history is examined and the identifications with Jesus are explored. However, the dynamics of Yahweh, its relationship to Jews and its 'nature' remain uncharted in this book, but perhaps would have helped to offer an insight into a

more general dynamic stemming from studies of Judaism. In *The Fundamentals of Jewish Mysticism and Kabbalah*, the scholar Feldman writes: 'Non-Jewish biblical interpreters sometimes pronounce YHVH-The Name as Jehovah or Yahweh, but to the Jewish mind – and considerable scholarship – these are misreadings, for the YHVH-The Name is unpronounceable' (Feldman, 1999, 68).

As suggested by Feldman, the sacred concept, being, word and omnipresence of Yahweh remains unspoken of directly. That is, his name cannot be spoken and his omniscience cannot be comprehended straightforwardly. This immediately creates a problem in attempts to research what Yahweh is. 'I am left outside of something 'other', only to come to terms with a strange paradox of a sense of knowing through experiencing the 'other's' namelessness. In this sense, it is quite feasible that what has been integrated in Christian culture in terms of a knowledge of God has resulted in a tendency to undifferentiate God in terms of a parallel coexistence of an internal 'other'. I am making a link between the hated 'Jewish' 'other' that Frosh describes and a depreciation of a more universal God or other. I think that a comparison of religious and cultural ideologies of God may bear some fruit in terms of what the internal other represents and how this other functions in everyday life.

The function of God as 'other' and as omniscient could be considered to reveal a fundamental being that is common to all. So that when Frosh (2005, 193) argues that the Nazi pathology was 'of returning to a world without organisation, to primeval chaos, to a universe marked by homogeneity and the continuum present before birth', perhaps there is also a sense that he is talking of an experience of God or Yahweh, not just a regressive retreat to avoid the conflict potential in difference. So, if there are these types

of 'system' present in life that can be in both malign and benign form, perhaps the issue of anti-Semitism is also about a reaction to the Jewish relationship to this 'other' or Yahweh, rather than the 'other' being identified with the Jew.

To explore this idea further, the Jewish relationship to Yahweh remains sacred in the sense that there are purposeful taboos established that inhibit the identification and illusion of being one with the Yahweh/God as other and unconscious, and instead create a greater sense of differentiation between ego and this 'other'.

The extremes of an integrative relationship to God had a history in Germany, which Jung describes in his book *On the Nature of the Psyche*, originally written in 1946:

In Schopenhauer we find the unconscious Will as the new definition of God, in Carus the unconscious, and in Hegel identification and inflation, the practical equation of philosophical reason with Spirit . . . They induced that hubris of reason which led to Nietzsche's superman and hence to the catastrophe that bears the name of Germany. (Jung, 1977, para. 359)

(It is important to take note of the type of generalization that Jung has made of Germany, in the oversimplification of culture, just as he applied the same analysis of other cultures, including the Jews. See Samuels, 1993, 287–339.)

Identification with God and the consequential inflation can be explained in Hegel's main criticism of Judaism, that Judaism divorced God from the world while idolater religions integrated God. From a Jungian perspective, God as a close definition of the core of the unconscious is not necessarily a defence against the unknown, but is a reality in its own right. Jung, in the above paragraph goes on to identify the extremes of the denial of such an unconscious presence, when he describes Nietzsche's superman and the effects of this on Germany.

With regards to a concept of Yahweh, there are two compatible views that are held within the Jewish community. The first is that there is an emphasis on what is said by Yahweh to the Jew, usually based on a motivating principle to question the purpose and reality of the recipient. The second, based on an argument by Maimonides, is that Yahweh is understood by that which Yahweh is not, that is, he is not what I can see, do and so on (Kessler, 2006, 42–8). Therefore in both versions a distinct image and definition of Yahweh remains elusive but paradoxically acknowledged, the presence of which is experienced by his voice, but not concretely ‘known’ through it.

I suspect that the problem with this explicit acknowledgement of an ‘other’ in Judaism is that it can create in other individuals and groups an unnerving feeling of potential breakdown and loss of selfhood. To quote Frosh:

Selfhood is based on psychic integrity, but how can this be sustained when people have the feeling, always and everywhere, that something else is speaking within them – something over which they have no control (the defining feature of the unconscious), and the voice of which they cannot even properly hear? (Frosh, 2005, 209)

The imposition of this indistinct ‘other’ seems to provoke such volatile reactions – an attempt to counter-usurp the voice within – that we could even consider this to be the basis of the Holocaust. Sinason has written on the subject of an internal other as another voice that can become apparent in the consulting room offering advice and views that commonly distract the patient from their wishes to form more constructive relationships and instead throw them into a reactive state. The shift in acknowledgement of an internal other is lucidly described in his paper ‘Who is the mad voice inside?’

With patience and hard work a genuine interest in the otherness of this being can be fostered in

the patient to replace the attitudes of confrontation, condemnation and impugning of character and integrity with which he starts and which so exacerbate and inflame the problem. (Sinason, 1993, 221)

So, in other words, it appears that there are two distinct modes of existence, which are distinguishable by the ways in which they function rather than the contents. For example an emotional bearing may not result in a better understanding of *what* is happening only that it *is*. It seems plausible that every Jewish individual connects through this sense of ‘otherness’ in Judaism. More importantly, the central relationship between the manifold aspects of God as ‘other’ and unconscious, contrasts with the ego-personality. This makes up the complex dynamics on individual and group levels. For example, in relation to Yahweh, there can be an attempt to acknowledge an internal other – a voice within, in Christianity an attempt to integrate God and in the anti-Semitic, an attempt to denigrate the other.

MATTE BLANCO ON GENERALIZATION

One of the greatest challenges of embarking on a task describing groupings, such as Frosh has undertaken, is that there are inevitably some simplifications of the grouping for the purposes of defining and using language to make a proposition. It is easy to criticize the oversimplification of any group on the grounds that there is a loss of detail and that something still remains indefinite, that is, a subcategory of that group that will contrast with the larger grouping in some way. This comes about because the individuals are not the group and the group is more than the sum of its parts. But where are the boundaries of the ‘group’, a concept or an idea?

Ignacio Matte Blanco, an eminent post-Freudian, concerned himself with such

issues. By using formulae to symbolize concepts, he denoted values that were perceptible in behaviour and language and that formed the basis of our conscious reality. I cannot describe his entire theorem here, but to take an aspect that seems very relevant to the problems of language when defining cultures, I will focus on his ideas about generalization.

That is, how does one hold in mind the complexity of parts when describing the whole? The Jewish culture for example can become an amorphous mass, a generalized quality, or a merged condition if it is not seen in its many colours and subgroups. Matte Blanco (1967, 2) re-examines Freud's works and when talking of the primary and secondary processes (unconscious and conscious respectively) describes the unconscious as treating 'any relation as identical with another relation. In other words it treats relations as if they were symmetrical.' In contrast, he describes 'conscious' processes as treating 'an individual thing (person, object, concept) as if it were a member or element of a class which contains other members; it treats this class as a sub-class of a more general class, and this more general class as a subclass of a still more general class and so on'.

These are in principle the logic(s) behind generalizations and particular group identifications as defined by Matte Blanco. He looks at the potential for these two types of logic to work in the service of the actual intentions of the group, for example the 'Jewish' group. He describes the relationship between these types of logic, namely that which:

- Symmetricises – treats objects as the same form based on a similarity of some characteristics
- Asymmetricises – attempts to differentiate objects and aspects of a class.

These two functions can potentially work together to form a structurally complex perception of the world that acknowledges increasing scales of difference, that Matte Blanco calls 'subsets' within 'subsets'. He considers an initial application of 'symmetrization' to be helpful in forming a perception of likeness of properties or qualities that can then be differentiated from other groups by the asymmetrical function. For example, Jews are different from non-Jews because they have a particular cultural heritage. However, if instead of making an asymmetrical assertion another symmetrical assertion is applied immediately to a Jewish quality as a category, they can become a 'mass', where other characteristics amount to the same thing. To further symmetricise would be to suggest that they are all essentially the same, based on this quality, regardless of age, background, gender or sexual orientation, and so forth.

If you apply a stage of asymmetricisation, looking at the differences of the cultural group before applying a symmetrical relation, the consequence will be to divide the group into subcategories to a more detailed definition of the parts of the group. For example, if I ask the question 'what is a Jew?' I could say that 'people born from Jewish parents are Jewish.' This is a symmetry that can be contested by an asymmetrical enquiry, for example, 'What are the differences between the parents and the child?' The difference forms subcategories, within which similarities are formed and within which further subcategories can be found and so on.

If we consider how these two functions operate in the book *Hate and the Jewish Science*, it is possible to see that there are complex multidimensional formulations that would take considerable time to unpack. However, if we examine the final statement that Frosh makes – 'All otherness in the

West is Jewish, including that inner otherness that is unconscious desire' – it is possible to see that we have jumped to a place where Westerners all have the same unconscious, before the differences in unconscious desire have been defined through a process of asymmetricization. A second process of symmetricization is applied to make 'unconscious desire' equal 'Jewish'. Other cultural forms in Western contexts have been removed from the formula without acknowledgement. In other words, variation is dismantled in the service of sameness through the intolerance of difference.

Matte Blanco's concepts of the conscious and unconscious functions seem a valuable analytic tool for understanding the fundamental formulae in the book and provide some explanation for the sense of disorientation in the reader in response to some forms of generalization – that is, the reader can be drawn into a non-differentiated place that in itself has a potential to attack thinking processes. Thinking in this sense being the capacity to make links between things, objects, ideas and so forth without making them the same. On the other hand, it is evident, especially in Frosh's undertaking of describing historical events during the reign of Hitler, that there were very well differentiated narratives involving detailed complex relationships.

But through the processes of generalization of character subcategories, there can be an argument that Frosh begins to articulate that suggests that we all have Jewish traits as well as anti-Semitic traits. However, the groupings of Jewish and anti-Semitic in this context acquire a psychological meaning related to particular dynamics of inclusion and identity that may be better replaced with psychoanalytic *concepts*, such as that of the 'ego relationship' to the 'other'.

This brings us back to the psychology of the individual, or the exploration of univer-

sal dynamics that do not attempt to define cultures accordingly. Samuels (1993, 315) pointed out this error in Jung's psychology: whereas he had very valid arguments for individual psychology, he stretched his expertise by assuming a biological and sociological psychology 'that went so far in this direction that his ideas about national psychology degenerate into nothing more than a glib typology.' As described with the functions of the unconscious symmetricization, where the subtleties of cultural difference are overlooked, generalizations can easily slip into grand oversimplifications.

THE OTHER

To put it another way, the functioning of the unconscious as an 'internal other', an 'it' speaking from within the personality, radically disturbs the rather homely sense that each of us is 'master' of him or herself, and in so doing it opens the way to a collapse of confidence in the self, to a sense that however robust it might seem, it has already been infiltrated by something subjectively inexplicable, something that the 'self' is not.

(Frosh, 2005, 207)

This statement is a powerful articulation of a defining otherness within the individual. According to Frosh, 'otherness', or 'the other', is formulated in terms of a perceived culture or person, and is the source of all subjectivity. This seems in line with Freud's view of the unconscious and ego as the horse and rider, 'The ego must on the whole carry out the id's intentions . . .' (Freud, 1964, 77) in that the horse or id, both can potentially influence or determine the contents with which the ego is left to grapple with but that help to create a broader vision of nature or the complexity of 'being'. There are numerous cases where the answer to an artistic or scientific problem has come in a dream or moment of unexpected illumination. This

could be said to operate in a much more subtle way in language or gesture where something other is present and enables a connectedness or symmetricization in social discourse but that in itself requires further interpretation or work to understand what is being connected with (asymmetricization). But the important point that Frosh has discovered in his research, and to which Freud refers, is that there is a considerably different view or internal character from that of the perceived self that we identify with 'I'. Freud named this place the 'unconscious', that which has its own life beyond the scope of our conscious intention.

Frosh builds on Laplanche (1999), describing an area of experience or being that can be clearly demarcated from the functions and relatedness of the 'possessed' (Frosh, 2005, 2006). There are points where Frosh alludes to the perception and interrelation of the otherness within every individual – that is, the social pervasiveness of otherness. This is of interest in terms of what it is about the Jew that attracts the racist simplifications of this 'other'. It could be argued that the 'other' takes on a unique but immediately transferable form in every individual, which would require us to look into the psyche of the individual 'Jew' with some scrutiny, as much as any other ethnic grouping. Frosh is arguing that there are separate structures, which build themselves beneath the surface of a collective consciousness. He suggests that unconscious feeling states, misconstrued ideologies and familial delusions passed through the adult-child relationship are central to society. People choose to ignore them, and instead locate the Jew as the container for all of this destructiveness. Inadvertently, there is an interesting argument that these structures are the source of all subjectivity, that individuals, the groups and I organize themselves in relation to a sense of otherness.

The immense hostility that is provoked through the lack of internal differentiation of these two worlds and resulting misperceptions of the other in the Jewish culture goes a long way towards an explanation of anti-Semitism. The high levels of destruction and unilateral simplifications of cultural dynamics in anti-Semitism are reminiscent of many descriptions of psychotic attacks on thinking and perception that psychoanalysts such as Bion (1984) and Segal (1981) have written about. Which brings about the possibility that repetitious symmetricization that Matte Blanco defined could in many cases be called psychotic. For example, psychotic dynamics that can be seen to operate in parallel with more connected and constructive views in the individual and in society result in breaks in continuity through profound distortions of reality, or the overlapping of events in such a way that people are denied their right to exist. Richards (1993) has written on the subject of such parallel viewpoints within each individual, which are due to the concretization of the subject. Perhaps, in this sense, the processes of differentiation that evolve in family ties and structures such as the close-knit Jewish community may antagonize the impoverished, grandiose 'other' that Frosh refers to. Or perhaps there is a discreet 'ambivalent' other in the Jewish community that becomes evident in the historical racism of the Jew. It would seem that in the interface of the analytic differentiation of worlds a potential freedom occurs for creativity and therefore a sense of individual subjectivity on both parts.

If I return to the idea that Freud's works are not entirely authored by 'him', it could be considered that he was very much moved by his unconscious, which he codified in a psychoanalytic language. However, this is far from a static process or fixed dynamic and hence Laplanche argues that Freud repeatedly retreated from his findings to

safer egocentric territory. The dilemma of making an accurate codification becomes: if the other is not 'I' and is not integrated into 'I' how does 'I' relate to the internal other on the other's terms without simply defining the other as a set of observable behaviours? In other words, how do we know the anti-Semitic 'being', intention, content of mind, and essentially 'otherness' without identification and loss of some personal ego parameters? Due to this dynamic internal relationship, the creative interface between self and other can easily slip to an anti-Semitic position through being ego-centric or other-centric, or both.

CONCLUSION

I am indebted to Frosh for the source of inspiration for this paper. His book: *Hate and the Jewish Science* (Frosh, 2005) is a complex, demanding and original piece of work that I turned to as a text to stimulate further thought on the subject of 'how do I connect psychoanalytic and social theory?' In many ways I have reverted to a safe premise of psychoanalytic formulation on smaller scales, that is, the individuals relationship to the internal 'other'.

I have looked to explore the central themes to the question of whether psychoanalysis is a 'Jewish science' or not and have felt that it would be erroneous to make the assumption that it outrightly is. This does not contradict with Freud's involvement with Jewish society or his sense of being Jewish, but that there can be a constructive role of the 'other' may help to elucidate on a motivation that perhaps even Freud overlooked at times. I suggest that Jung attempted to bring back the importance of the internal 'other' in the shape of religion and reflections on spirituality, but that this was inevitably opposing Freud's aim to establish psychoanalysis as a 'science'.

This led me to explore the importance of Yahweh in Judaism and the uncommon relationship to a differentiated internal 'other' as unconscious and as God. The importance of this is revealed in terms of one dimension of an account for the holocaust and perhaps other social catastrophes. There are inevitable problems with forming generalisations about any culture, because the symmetrical and asymmetrical use of words underlies the basic modes of communication, fluctuating between categorisation and de-categorisation. On these grounds, this paper can serve as refining some details of a larger social process described by Frosh (2005) with attention to the oscillating demands of both modes of experience.

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