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ANIMA(L)S: WOMEN, NATURE AND JUNG

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ABSTRACT *In this paper I attempt to find ways in which Jungian theory can support ecofeminism in its attempt to bring about a new, non-dualistic consciousness in order to balance up the current masculine economy. I begin with an exploration of Luce Irigaray's reading of Jacques Lacan's symbolic order, which Irigaray claims has denied women subjectivity within Western culture. Her solution, shared by Hélène Cixous and contemporary ecofeminists, is for women to resubmit themselves to the symbolic via maternal geneaology and nature, with nature offering the most effective means of critiquing and subverting the masculine economy. This suggestion has engendered accusations of essentialism, which I also explore and deconstruct using the theories of ecofeminist Susan Griffin and feminist writer Diana Fuss, as well as CG Jung's theory of archetypes. I then move on to consider Jung's notion of the anima, attempting to show how this controversial concept, together with certain types of ecofeminist theory, can open up possibilities for a new symbolic order for both men and women via a more embodied, embedded connection with nature.*

Key words: ecofeminism, Jung, anima, essentialism

INTRODUCTION

Despite some 40 years of second-wave feminism, contemporary Western culture is still governed by a masculine economy. During the 1990s, Susan Faludi's predicted backlash (1991) erupted within popular culture, a turn from the so-called politically correct climate of the previous decade to an overstated laddish culture and a heavy emphasis on the glibly-termed post-feminism, leaving the vision of 1970s feminism and the more politically aware 1980s to die a cruel death at the hands of a generation demanding hedonistic self-indulgence in place of social progression (Faludi, 1991).

Feminism no longer captures the culture's imagination, while post-feminism has resulted in a confused jumble of images of supposedly sexually and financially independent women all desperately competing for Mr Right. A radical rethink is needed to kickstart women out of this self-defeating muddle and into a place where real possibilities begin to open up for them, where they no longer need to defer to men or motherhood in order to feel validated.

So, where to search? Jungian theory hardly seems an obvious place to start, with its dubious ideas of gender and opposites, so I begin elsewhere, with a look at French feminists Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous, and

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their elegant, trickster-like suggestions for smuggling women back into Western culture's symbolic order, which, as I explain, has traditionally left the female without subjectivity. Irigaray spies entry zones via maternal genealogy, which I briefly explore, and nature (meaning that which is non-human, and considered to be apart from culture), bringing her in touch with ecofeminism and its demands for a re-evaluation of the woman-nature connection. I go on to investigate both Irigaray's method of tactical mimesis, in which she actively deploys essentialism, and ecofeminism's handling of woman and nature as the other, which also takes risks with essentialism; before examining the stigma of essentialism itself in the light of social constructionism, applying the erudite reasoning of ecofeminist Susan Griffin and feminist Diana Fuss, and then turning my attention to Jung and the question of the anima.

As I have already stated, Jungian theory is not an obvious choice for feminists. Widely known to be essentialist, reactionary and, when it comes to gender, far too entrenched in the mindset of a late nineteenth-century Swiss middle class patriarch, Jung appears to be incapable of offering, or at the very least unwilling to offer, women anything but a condemnation of their intellectual aspirations and a confinement to the role of 'empty vessel'.

However, while the more publicized interpretations of Jung's controversial attitudes toward gender are far from inaccurate, they don't tell the full story. Closer readings of Jung's archetypal theory, his structuring principle of the psyche, contextualize anima and animus, showing them to be full of far more potential than Jung's rigidly gendered images imply. I suggest that his contradictory confusion of gender with archetype arises from his 'number one personality', while the deeper wisdom of the archetypes is perceived and communicated by his 'number two' (Jung, 1995). This might explain the evident dichotomy in his views that has caused such controversy among post-Jungians.

Jung's fundamentally problematic treatment of gender has given rise to a proliferation of post-Jungian texts attempting to deal with the issue, but relatively few have actually moved beyond the troubling dualistic paradigms within which Jung saw fit to trap himself. Mostly female writers and analysts struggle to re-evaluate Jung's feminine principle, but as my example of Ann Shearer (below) illustrates, until they decide to break out of the familiar masculine/feminine divide their arguments take them in ever decreasing circles, serving only to further marginalize Jungian theory from the broader, more forward-thinking field of academic feminism where such outmoded methodology was made redundant decades ago. Because of this, I have chosen to focus on the work of post-Jungians who are making relevant contributions to the current field of sexual politics, namely Susan Rowland, Andrew Samuels, Jules Cashford and James Hillman, all of whom demonstrate considerable awareness of cultural horizons beyond the enclave of analytical psychology, enabling them to develop Jung's theories in a truly progressive manner. Hillman in particular connects with ecofeminism and Irigaray's demands for a redeployment of symbolism with regard to sexual difference, and shares Cixous's consideration of a bi-sexual consciousness – and here I should mention that I haven't included Freud's theory of bisexuality, as I have chosen to focus solely on analytical psychology for my argument.

Together with ecofeminism and Irigaray's suggestions for the symbolic order, a progressive development of Jung's archetypal theory, with emphasis on the anima image,

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offers women possibilities for a valid subjectivity so far denied them by the masculine economy of Western culture. In the following pages I show how, and I explain why, in the hope of finding new potential for a particularly controversial aspect of Jung's theory.

BODIES: CORPOREAL, SYMBOLIC, AND NON-HUMAN

No entry?

The symbolic order, postulated by French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (Lacan, 1977), is that which enables a human being, via the rupture of the symbiotic bond with the mother (the activation of the Oedipus complex), to enter into society via discourse and meaning. This order is always already inscribed, preceding and exceeding human subjectivity, acting, as Andrew Samuels notes, like Jung's collective unconscious, where archetypal structures render individuals liable for certain types of experience. The symbolic offers a way out of the imaginary, the pre-Oedipal, dyadic relationship with the mother, the phantasy life, which Samuels equates with Jung's personal unconscious, while acting as mutual support for it (Samuels, 1985). However, it also locks the feminine out of meaning.

In Lacan's revision of Freudian theory, the penis becomes the symbolic phallus, but, even though symbol has replaced actual body part, the masculine phallus remains the determining signifier around which masculine and feminine identities are constructed, leaving nothing much changed since Plato declared that 'women and other animals would be generated from men' (Taylor, 1944, 203). Jacqueline Rose (cited in Fuss, 1989) has tried to defend Lacan's phallus, on the basis that it is not a literal penis but, as Diane Fuss (1989) puts it, the proximity and nearness of the two terms cannot be denied.

For post-Lacanian French feminists Luce Irigarary and Hélène Cixous, this symbolic phallic governance is hugely problematic. It leaves woman without subjectivity, figuring as no more than maternal object, an empty space, like one version of Jung's anima, awaiting masculine projections, while 'Woman, for her part, remains in unrealized potentiality – unrealized, at least, for/by herself' (Irigaray, 1985a, 165). Where woman should be, there is an absence, says Cixous, and this is what sustains masculine desire. Woman is in the shadows that man casts over her, she is 'Night to his day . . . Black to his white. Shut out of his system's space, she is the repressed that ensures the system's functioning' (Cixous, 1986, 67). She has been denied her own body, taught to view her own physicality as fearful and alien, she has been made to see herself in his terms, i.e. as not-there, as projection, and she has been instructed to become her own enemy. She has been banished from herself. But Cixous, like Irigaray, has ideas about how she may return.

With trickster-like grace, agility and cunning, both women make controversial moves back into the symbolic. Uninterested in what Australian ecofeminist Val Plumwood terms 'uncritical reversal', neither looks to invert Western culture's masculine/feminine hierarchy (Plumwood, 1993). Understanding the full inherited weight and cultural force of this dualistic system, they abandon the idea of a coup, and instead ride straight into the eye of the oppressor's storm, hurling the weight of patriarchy back on itself like a boomerang, or a martial arts manoeuvre, using attack as their means of escape.

As ecofeminist Susan Griffin says, we cannot afford to lose the word 'woman' just yet, despite its confining, silencing, restric-

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tive connotations. If we lose 'woman', and then 'man' and then 'human' even, what do we have left? Griffin's solution is to burrow beneath language, to look at it from a different angle in order to view other aspects of the construct, while Cixous suggests using writing, what she calls *écriture feminine,* to reverse the mind/body hierarchy, and to rediscover the body through an exploration of the so-called dark continent of female pleasure. Similarly, Irigaray suggests woman resubmit herself to the discourse through strategic mimicry of the masculine symbolic in an attempt to locate the exploitation of the feminine by discourse, without reducing the feminine to it. All three steer a risky but unavoidable route back through the essentialist territory of masculine and feminine, but Irigaray's path in particular illustrates the effectiveness of such an admittedly controversial tactic. Directly addressing the empty spaces left by the non-representation of the feminine, *consciously* assuming the feminine role, Irigaray attempts to 'convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus begin(s) to thwart it' (Irigaray quoted in Whitford, 1991, 71). In her efforts to balance the current economy, Irigaray suggests bringing the feminine into the frame via two routes – the first being maternal genealogy.

Once a maternal genealogy enters the symbolic order, both masculine and feminine will figure as parents and the mother-daughter relationship takes on a new significance, where women relate to each other and themselves as subjects not objects. Jung seems to intuit the potential of this relationship when he writes of the Demeter-Kore myth, declaring it to be 'far too feminine to have been merely the result of an anima projection' and therefore 'alien to man' (Jung, 1959a, par. 383). He acknowledges that this ancient myth addresses an aspect of the feminine that exists within its own right, not as a projection or as an opposite, but independently of man, and in doing so is almost pre-empting an aspect of Irigaray's proposed female symbolic. Indeed, as early as the 1930s, Jung declared that individuals use their experiences of the symbolic to reinscribe themselves back into a world from which they no longer feel estranged (Jung, 1959b).

Like Irigaray, archetypal psychologist James Hillman requests a redeployment of symbolism with regard to sexual difference, claiming that the material part of humanity has always been associated with the feminine, and that 'the transformation of our world-view necessitates the transformation of the view of the feminine' (Hillman, 1992, 216). He uses the Biblical myth of Adam and Eve to illustrate the point he shares with Irigaray and Cixous that 'the male is the precondition of the female and the ground of its possibility' (Hillman, 1992, 218), and calls for woman's resubmission to the symbolic through a reinvestiture in feminine attributes that have been identified as female. This, he believes, would break the tradition of Western metaphysics inherited by psychoanalysis, transforming what have till now been perceived as 'inferior' female bodily traits into a psychology shared by both sexes. Woman would thus be reinscribed into the symbolic order as an equal, not an inferior, being.

Hillman also draws attention to Jung's understanding of the problems of a masculine anti-materialist economy via the latter's comments on the Assumption of Maria. In a revised version of his paper on the Mother archetype written in 1954, inspired by the papal encyclical delivered by Pope Pius XII four years earlier, Jung clearly sees potential problems with Catholicism's literal image of the sanitized Immaculate Virgin, absolved of all stains of original sin, being taken up body and soul to heaven, perceiving this as

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the very opposite of materialism. But on a symbolic level, he reads the image as containing a much more positive acceptance of matter, which holds healing potential for the split between man's pneumatic tendencies and the equation of woman with flesh, earth and instinct (Jung, 1959b). Despite the sharp animus/anima divisions he had drawn earlier in his career, between the intellectual, spiritual and masculine spheres and the more feeling, sensuous, receiving realm of the feminine, Jung now appears to recognize Cixous's sick shadow as man's denial and casting out of his own mortality, and advocates a union of the spiritual masculine and the earthly feminine, basing his theory on the complementary yin and yang of Taoist philosophy. As the opposites of yin and yang depend upon and contain the seeds of each other, so too do matter and spirit, claims Jung, noting also the symbolic function of the alchemical *hieros gamos*, the sacred *coniunctio*, the marriage of the spiritual and the bodily, in uniting the opposites.

However, so long as the view of female inferiority persists, says Hillman, the *coniunctio* will remain unbalanced. What is needed now is a new consciousness, one that resembles that of the alchemists who, unlike modern-day scientists, worked on the premise that body and spirit were always already united. Science has widened the split between the two, which had already been introduced psychologically through religion and philosophy with the aforementioned Adam and Eve myth in which man always comes first, and the prioritization of the Apollonian, sky-directed principle, which can be read as Lacan's woman-sterilizing symbolic. Hillman demands a shift away from this immaterial principle, favouring a Dionysian approach, a bisexual symbolic where male and female are primordially conjoined in an androgynous consciousness. He wants to move beyond Jung's notion of contrasexuality, where masculinity and femininity reportedly exist in both men and women, because he feels that this supposedly innate, archetypal structure is culturally influenced, operating in favour of Apollo, in favour of the male, and therefore the masculine. But, if this is the case, how can a truly Dionysian, bisexual consciousness be viable?

Aware of the complexities of reaching for the bisexual within a masculine economy, French feminist Catherine Clément warns that Dionysus possesses a phallus, reminding us that even with this alleged symbol of bisexuality 'it all goes back to man who goes through woman to reach immortality' (Clément and Cixous, 1986, 56). Cixous, on the other hand, draws a careful distinction between bisexuality as unity, which she perceives more as the asexual hermaphrodite, and the multiplicities implied for desire and bodies within a bisexual that bears close resemblance to Jung's theory of contrasexuality; although like Hillman, she too is fully aware of the cultural impact on its development. Cixous believes that women find bisexuality (psychologically, if not physically) far easier to access than men, who are still too repressed, too terrified of homosexuality and the feminine, to move beyond their familiar solid masculine ground. 'It is much harder for man to let the other come through him' she says (Clément and Cixous, 1986, 85). Emma Jung also emphasizes this, in the context of man coming into relationship with his anima. Used to perceiving the female, and therefore the feminine, as inferior, she realizes he must step down from a height and overcome his resisting pride if he wants to access his inner femininity (Jung, 1957).

Clearly there is potential for a bisexual consciousness, but Cixous and Emma Jung, although writing several decades apart, are both still right. Within the confines of a mas-

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culine economy, the majority of men are hugely reluctant to embrace femininity, to acknowledge or nurture it within themselves, and this is where the idea of a bisexual symbolic serving to resubmit woman begins to look less hopeful. As Irigaray says, so long as the destinies of each sex remain different, bisexuality will continue to be a delusion (Irigaray, 1985b). And so the wheel keeps turning – a masculine economy ensures that men and women's destinies remain different, the possibility of a balanced bisexual consciousness remains blocked, and this particular attempt of women to re-enter the symbolic is continually thwarted. Maybe it's time to change tactics, which leads us neatly to Irigaray's second re-entry zone for women, one that Cixous wholeheartedly supports – nature.

Both Irigarary and Cixous are furiously aware of Western culture's damning alignment of the pre-cultural with the feminine. This equation can be traced as far back as Plato, whose relegation of irrational female matter to the realm of chaos in the *Timaeus* (Taylor, 1944) has been taken by feminists including Irigaray (1985a) and Plumwood (1993) as a clear indication of the philosopher's devaluation of the earth, the female and the feminine. So whereas feminists such as Shulamith Firestone believe women are imprisoned by their reproductive biology (Firestone, 1970), Irigaray and Cixous, together with contemporary ecofeminists, urge women to rescue their bodies from enculturating definitions by men. Irigaray insists that there will always be a part of woman that eludes masculine imprinting and socialization, and Cixous, joyfully unafraid of woman's chthonic aspect, claims that woman has her ground of 'childhood flesh, shining blood', that she exudes a diffuse, white depth, and that 'nothing can put it out' (Clément and Cixous, 1986, 88). Having been replaced by the sick stranger that is man's projection, women have everything to discover about their bodies. 'Your body must make itself heard', she roars, advocating stealing into discourse, into the symbolic, in order to fly with it, 'Then the huge resources of the unconscious will burst out' (Cixous 1986, 97).

Such impassioned pleas in the name of the flesh have earned both women accusations of essentialism, which I shall explore later; but this seems to be the price of boomerang tactics, and they are worth the cost, for such an attitude is likely to promote a better relationship with nature as a whole, and once women begin to experience themselves as positively embodied they are more likely to perceive themselves as embedded within a wider system. This affirmation of women's connection with nature operates from within the symbolic, serving to turn it on its head, helping to balance and iron out the mind/body, culture/nature, masculine/feminine arrangement. And as Plumwood notes, affirmation is vital in countering the logic of the master subject that has inferiorized women (Plumwood, 1993).

So while man needs to climb down from the transcendent realms and step back into his body, woman needs to inscribe herself in her own symbolic order, away from that paradox which has excluded her down the centuries on the basis of her anatomy, effectively leaving her without her a valid body, a valid identity. A more equal 'symbolic distribution of roles' says Irigaray, will help both sexes to be 'fertile according to the spirit' (quoted in Whitford, 1991, 156). Ultimately, both men and women must be resymbolized, and man needs to fundamentally adjust his position in order to accommodate her.

Perhaps then, Hillman would have been better suggesting that a transformation of the feminine necessitates a transformation of our worldview, and perhaps women should

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try a less anthropocentric approach to the symbolic. By turning away from the specifically human issues of relations with men and towards their relationship with nature – a suggestion made by contemporary ecofeminists as well as Cixous and Irigaray – women can get back into the eye of that storm. The hierarchical binary opposition of culture/nature operates on the same premise as that of man/woman, because of the link traditionally made between women and nature, both of which are considered inferior. But, as Irigaray says, man hasn't thought through his exploitation of nature, and therein risks his own death. He has determined his relation to nature by means of appropriation, and symbolically stopped the earth turning, having immobilized it within theory. Much as he has rendered woman infertile by immobilizing her and preventing her from being fully woman with his symbolic order, so too has he frozen nature, splitting it off from culture, from thought and spirit (Whitford, 1991). If women are to reinscribe themselves, they need to end the complicity with men against nature, and rediscover themselves through an embedded, embodied connection with the non-human, opening up a symbolic to include all sentient beings, and not just those classified as *homo sapiens*.

De-othering nature

A positive re-evaluation of women's relationship with nature is, needless to say, problematic, particularly for feminists. Taken at face value, it presents a threat to those who have fought tooth and nail to refute Freud's claim that anatomy is destiny, and to some feels like a regressive step in women's evolution, back towards being barefoot and pregnant. Lynda Birke, however, resents feminism's denial of biology, arguing that an escape from nature represents little more than an affirmation of patriarchy (Birke, 1994). What is wrong with admitting to our connection with the non-human, she asks, and moreover, why has social constructionism with its open-ended possibilities been set against rudimentary, unchanging biological facts to which the non-human continues to be subjected? As long as animals are perceived to be products of a fixed nature, and as long as deterministic assumptions about the non-human remain unchallenged, claims Birke, biological determinism will flourish with regard to humans as well; which, given the traditional alignment of the female with nature, can only be bad news for women. Birke wants to transcend the dualistic divisions of social constructionism versus biological determinism, calling for an acknowledgment of both, for if humanity is to connect with nature, biology cannot be denied.

Many ecofeminists agree with Birke's position, but in doing so they risk being misinterpreted or just plain dismissed. Arch critic of ecofeminism Janet Biehl falls into the former category. Deeply suspicious of what she refers to as psycho-biological ecofeminists, such as Andrée Collard and Charlene Spretnak, who, she claims, believe that women possess innately caring, nurturing natures because of their ability to give birth, Biehl regards this type of attitude as an unwelcome return to the stereotypical gender images that have only recently been demolished, and decries ecofeminism's assumption that women are ecological beings as nothing but a perpetuation of women's subordination (Biehl, 1991).

As with most epistemologies, ecofeminism is undeniably flawed, and psychobiological or affinity ecofeminism, to borrow Mary Mellor's term, certainly features among its more questionable avenues (Mellor, 1997). For example, Collard believes women's greatest strength lies in her potential to give life, and espouses a highly questionable gynocentric view of prehistory,

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while Spretnak, with her talk of 'Earth-bodies' and 'body parables' depends on the assumption that women are drawn to ecology by virtue of being female (Spretnak cited in Biehl, 1991, and Mellor, 1997). But, as Mellor notes, these particular perspectives serve to highlight the deep-seated reluctance many feminists have expressed to explore the association between nature and women.

The sensitive and complex area of women's relationship with nature for both ecofeminists and their critics is illustrated by Mellor's reading of Simone de Beauvoir's seminal feminist polemic, *The Second Sex* (Beauvoir, 1960). Originally published in French in 1949, Beauvoir's tract rails against society's preordained feminine roles, from girlhood through to and including motherhood, claiming that women are imprisoned by their biology; thereby earning the philosopher an accusation, from Mellor at least, of being against embodiment. Biehl too seems to have adopted this interpretation of Beauvoir's work, although of course this works in her favour. Quoting from Beauvoir's conversations with Alice Schwarzer – 'Equating ecology with feminism is something that irritates me' – Biehl deems the philosopher to be flatly against the idea of a woman-nature connection (Biehl, 1991, 16). Admittedly, Beauvoir perceives biological processes such as menstruation and pregnancy as having their own momentum, leaving women with bodies they cannot control, but on a closer reading it becomes clear that *The Second Sex* is more critical of culture than biology. 'One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman' says Beauvoir, stressing that biological difference only becomes a problem when culturally defined value systems deem it be so (Beauvoir, 1960, 8). According to Beauvoir, away from cultural notions of femininity, inherited from mothers via tradition and law, adolescent girls find freedom in nature – 'among animals and plants she is a human being' and 'to have a body no longer seems a blemish to be ashamed of' (Beauvoir, 1960, 93). Citing Emily Brontë, Rosa Luxemburg, and Joan of Arc, and quoting from Colette and Mary Webb, de Beauvoir makes her position apparent – females feel free, and wholly themselves, in nature, away from the restrictive rigours of culture's gender roles. Like Irigary and Cixous she believes it is society, the masculine economy, the male symbolic, not nature, that transforms female biology into a prison, robbing girls and women of their bodies.

The ecofeminist controversy sparked by Beauvoir's work does not end there. Mellor and Biehl both go on to quote the same passage from the 1968 Random House edition of *The Second Sex*, concerning man's view of woman and nature as other (Beauvoir, 1968, 144). Biehl uses this passage to try and discredit ecofeminists, who, she asserts, have failed to grasp the significance that an alignment with nature is nothing but a demeaning patriarchal conspiracy to oppress women. But Mellor neatly refutes Biehl's ill-considered claim of ecofeminist ignorance by showing that this patriarchal perspective is precisely what ecofeminists are addressing. By perceiving their connection with nature as positive, ecofeminists are *refusing* to comply in women's oppression. Women will only be oppressed by a link with nature if they experience it as oppressive; and quite clearly ecofeminists, having reassessed and repossessed it, don't. Ecofeminism is a multiple discourse, comprising many different voices, but with one thing in common – a positive perception of the relationship between woman and nature, in full awareness, and therefore defiance, of having been 'othered'. Ecofeminists believe that a denial of this reality is unhelpful to women and, like Irigaray, choose to take risks with essentialism in order to reach a more radical critique

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of patriarchy, despite the contention involved.

However, arguing for a privileged epistemological position with regard to nature solely on the premise of being female is, as Mellor says, to assume an unacceptably essentialist view of women, and ecofeminists need to qualify their positions more carefully and convincingly, even if their multiplicity gives rise to confusion. Many have, and among them, Mellor cites Ynestra King who sees the shared socially constructed identities of women and nature as possessing the potential for sculpting a different cultural and political system, Vandana Shiva who stresses women's inherited experiential and intellectual knowledge of nature in terms of economic survival, and Maria Mies who emphasizes the role of political struggle in obtaining a knowledge of nature. So, rather than women's bodies being the instrumental factor in the woman-nature relationship, for many ecofeminists it is more a matter of how women have been situated within the sex/gender division of labour. Women have been built into a position of disadvantage, through being 'othered' alongside nature by the masculine economy, but this is precisely where many ecofeminists, through a canny exposure and subversion of what Karen J Warren calls the 'logic of domination' (Gruen, 1997, 365), find empowerment.

Subversion is just one of ecofeminism's strategies. Writers like Val Plumwood and Charlene Spretnak prefer to renegotiate the boundaries of duality altogether, questioning and transforming the very system responsible for their so-called otherness.

According to Renos Papadopoulos, Jung understands the other in terms of symbol, complex and archetype, with the latter offering 'a structuring principle . . . connected with broader cultural and societal perspectives' (Papadopoulos 2002, 170). For Jung, psychic energy depends on the tension of the opposites, and the concept of the other is fundamental in this. Where there is union, or no other, he says, there is unconsciousness, as consciousness presupposes a differentiated subject and object (Jung, 1968). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak takes issue with this position, suggesting instead an ideology of radical non-duality as an alternative to the dominant binary oppositional structure. Criticizing deconstructive postmodernism for its insistence on 'nothing but difference', she claims that true subjectivity is evoked through a multiple web of 'cosmological, ecological, biological and historically generated social relationships', and that a consideration of unitive dimensions of being, together with an appreciation of pluralism, is needed for any real social transformation (Spretnak, 1997, 434).

Spretnak's call for plurality is more than legitimate, but her search for radical unity is highly problematic, especially when juxtaposed with Jung's archetypal other. Polly Young-Eisendrath (1998) aligns Jung's other with the Lacanian concept of alterity, describing it as that irreducible otherness which exists beyond the subject, and which is not based on projection or identification. This otherness is what makes the subject aware of his or her own individuality, and without it, one doesn't connect, one merges. With this in mind, Spretnak's theory begins to look undesirable, if not implausible.

Like Spretnak, Plumwood is wary of dualism, but she believes in diversity and difference within human cultures as well as between human and non-human cultures. Her exhaustive investigation into and deconstruction of the 'master identity' leads her to call for a more sensitive reconceptualization of reason, an end to colonizing relationships, and a 'mutual, ethical basis for enriching coexistence with earth others' (Plumwood, 1993, 196). With faith in the values of

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kinship, she also supports the otherness of others, perceiving diversity to be a strengthening factor among earth-dwelling beings and not something that should be destroyed. She is more interested in moving towards what Donna Haraway describes as an embodied objectivity, that which consists of partial perspectives and situated knowledge, rather than transcendence and splitting of subject and object (Haraway, 1991). Plumwood values the other, and warns against the continuation of colonization for fear of the other being completely devoured, either through elimination or incorporation, both of which constitute moves towards the loss of consciousness Jung speaks of, when there is no other.

If difference, otherness, can be celebrated beyond the colonizing confines of duality, a new kind of consciousness can develop – one in which the emphasis has changed from antagonistic, to complementary. Differences will never disappear, and why indeed should we want them to? But does difference necessarily entail oppositionality? While Jung says the tension of the opposites keeps life alive, and that it prevents humanity from slipping into blind instinctuality, ecofeminism's critique of dualism highlights the problems evoked by a system predicated on inherent hierarchy, particularly with regard to women and the non-human world. Sustaining the other is better supported by the metaphor of a web, wherein tension is a vital part of the structure, but where multiplicity replaces duality, opposites disappear, and instinct is reappraised. Nature and culture are more clearly perceived in mutually sustaining terms (as Birke says, many animals are more in culture than in nature), and men, women and the non-human have an equal role in holding the web together. The other remains distinct, but has simultaneously been incorporated into a wholeness, and the dividing line is better described as a connective strand, or a joining seam. As Donna Haraway says, the knowing self is constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and this is what enables it to join with another, without claiming to be another – to connect without merging (Haraway, 1991).

Celebrating difference, sustaining the other, represents another controversial move for ecofeminism. Difference has traditionally been used to repress women, and emancipation has been sought through other means such as equality, or post-modernist attempts to move beyond sexual difference. Equality doesn't mean similarity, though, and post-modern constructionism is a construct itself – who knows what lies beyond it? According to Susan Griffin one cannot reveal the social construction of gender without revealing the social construction of nature, because this social construction of nature has been used to justify ideas about gender and sex (Griffin, 1997). But, she asks, is there a nature beyond social constructionism?

Controversially, provocatively, Jung with his archetypal structure and Irigaray with her suggestions for a new symbolic order both reply, yes.

ESSENTIALISM AND THE ANIMA: PSYCHE AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE

And nothing but the truth

In these post-modern times, any claims beyond the bounds of social constructionism are shot down dead, for fear of what has become the new enemy – essentialism; and with so much of this discussion revolving around gender and sex, feminists are particularly vulnerable targets. Ecofeminist Susan Griffin objects to these accusations, pointing out firstly that essentialism is a mere projection, carrying the fears of the accuser, and secondly, that early feminist

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thought was responsible for revealing gender as a social construct in the first place, so to castigate these feminists for being essentialist is 'oddly ahistorical' (Griffin, 1997, 214). Clearly, the accusers do not appreciate the complexity of ideas concerning the feminist approaches they see fit to attack, condemning any notion of sexual difference, together with mention of woman and the feminine.

Griffin, like Plumwood, Irigaray and Cixous, celebrates sexual difference, while recognizing that it is largely created through the interaction of bodies with culture, resulting in different treatment by society, and different experiences of that society, of men and women. She does not appear to follow Birke's useful reasoning, that biology needs to be reconsidered, but she does believe that even affinity feminists such as Collard are operating within an understanding of a socially constructed, derogatory category of woman, just as non-affinity ecofeminists understand woman's relationship with nature to be a product of gender construction and the division of labour. Keen to point out the similarities between post-modernism and ecofeminism, Griffin stresses that both factions argue for the interdependence of the words 'woman' and 'nature'; but where the former focuses on the system of language, the latter pinpoints the ecosystem as a site of knowledge, bringing a new sense of meaning, a new possible symbolic, into the picture. Griffin reads Derrida's theory of deconstruction, where words depend on each other for meaning, as an ecosystem, but makes the important point that an ecosystem cannot be separated from meaning, because it *is* meaning. Without actually referring to him, she also weaves Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological view of language and the body into her argument, when she states that language is shaped by the body, and that this connects language to nature, and therefore, ecosystems to language.

Griffin elegantly dispels the illusion that nature can be separated from language and culture, and she is unafraid of grounding her theories in the body of nature, which although it is in constant motion, is nevertheless a body, and therefore open to charges of essentialism. Here is the ground of ecofeminism, says Griffin: here, in the ground of natural existence, and here, in this breeding ground for fictions – of woman, nature, gender – lies the key to woman's unjust treatment in the West. Of course women are not biologically closer to nature than men, but the socially constructed gender division of labour has situated women's work in closer relationship to nature, enabling men to deny their connectedness with and interdependence on nature. But, says Griffin, there is meaning in interdependence, and moreover, the web of meaning itself is interdependent. Western philosophy has been obsessed with finding a fixed point of meaning, a secure site, but as Derrida, and now ecofeminism, show, it cannot be done. The living, shifting, fluid ecosystem of meaning cannot be caught. Essentialism is an illusion.

Social constructionism has set up essentialism as singular and irreducible, as the enemy of difference. It has *constructed* essentialism as necessary for its own identity, thereby revealing its own essentialism while falling back into dualism, the structure that perpetuates essentialist thinking. As Diana Fuss argues, the mapping of an anti-essentialist position simply reinscribes an unavoidable essentialist logic (Fuss, 1989).

Fuss uses this perspective to critique Lacan's attempt to de-essentialize woman, before elucidating Irigaray's relationship with essentialism. Lacan, says Fuss, defines the essence of woman as an absence of essence but, in doing so, sets up another universal – that of woman as a repository for

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essence. This brings to mind Jung's 'nothing but' woman, an 'empty vessel' who he describes as over-identified with her mother and whose only chance of not remaining 'a hopeless nonentity forever' lies in becoming filled with a man's anima projection. This kind of woman, claims Jung, possesses an emptiness that 'constitutes the whole '"Mystery" of woman', and which offers man 'his only chance of making a man of himself' (Jung, 1959b, para 183). Moreover, when Jung (1954) declares that the anima, as the feminine in man, is man's soul, he leaves the question of woman's soul unresolved; for if the feminine *is* soul, how can woman *have* a soul? Jung's theory no doubt owes a great deal to Plato and his original idea of woman as the receiving principle, who is prohibited from having a form in order to differentiate her from man (Taylor, 1944). As Irigaray says, without form and without soul, woman is without subjectivity, and written out of a valid existence; and as we've already seen, Irigaray's response to this exclusion is tactical mimesis, for which she has been accused of essentialism. But as Fuss points out, there's a big difference between falling into essentialism and actively deploying it.

Irigaray, unlike her critics, is unafraid of essentialism because she knows how to use it. She knowingly combines the post-structuralist method of displacing identity, with the feminist method of reclaiming identity in a move that involves and rejects essentialism at once. In order to construct, one must deconstruct, but if one is to deconstruct, one must also *re*construct. So if, as Plato, Aristotle and Jung decree, woman *has* no soul, no subjectivity, and no essence, because she *is* the ground of soul, subjectivity, and essence in man, then to give woman essence is to give her subjectivity, a place in the symbolic order. As Fuss says, this offers a new context to the essentializing of woman. Instead of a reductive trap, essence for Irigaray is a strategic means of displacement. She is not postulating a definition or a theory of woman, nor does she set terms or limits that might preclude the possibility of multiple essences. As Fuss observes, Irigaray is merely trying to reserve a legitimate place for woman within the symbolic order, within sexual difference. Read in this light, the essence of woman takes on a whole new aspect.

Of course there are still problems with postulating any theory about women, as Elizabeth Spelman's (1988) thorough critique of feminism's exclusive tendencies makes extremely clear. Primarily a discourse of the educated white middle classes, feminism presumes and assumes too much with its careless talk of 'women', as if to imply that there is some homogenous experience shared by all females, regardless of class, culture, race, age, or any other number of differentiating factors that comprise an individual. But while Spelman's arguments cannot be denied for much of feminist discourse, there is an equally strong argument for all women of all backgrounds, races, classes and cultures to be afforded a subjectivity of their own, along with the non-human, whose presence within the symbolic serves to bring further mutual support to the all-inclusive web of meaning and interconnectedness expounded by Griffin. And to re-emphasize, the potential for multiple possibilities within Irigaray's reconceptualization of the (female) subject is limitless.

Despite his essentialist tendencies, Jung's archetypal structure of the psyche holds as much potential for multiple possibilities as Irigaray's new symbolic order, but like Irigaray he doesn't ascribe solely to social constructionism. Writing in 1934 (revised in 1954 (Jung, 1959c)) he makes this clear when he refers to the 'archetypes of trans-

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formation', which he says come into play when the psyche begins to experience archetypes such as the shadow, the wise old man and the anima in personified form, through dreams and fantasies:

> The ground principles of the unconscious are indescribable because of their wealth of reference, although in themselves recognizable. The discriminating intellect naturally keeps on trying to establish their singleness of meaning and thus misses the essential point; for what we can above all establish as the one thing consistent with their nature is their *manifold meaning*, their almost limitless wealth of reference, which makes any unilateral formulation impossible. Besides this, they are in principle paradoxical . . . (Jung, 1959c, para. 80)

Jung also believes in the mutually affecting relationship between psyche, nature and culture, and while it would be stretching the point to credit him with ecofeminist leanings, his ideas more than support Griffin's interconnective web with its multiple implications for meaning. As early as 1917, Jung writes of the influence of culture on the psyche when he describes initiation rites among young men in indigenous cultures. These ancient practices 'have become almost instinctive mechanisms' he says, 'They are engraved on the unconscious as a primordial image' (Jung, 1966, para. 172). Thirty years later, he writes of the psychoid, that aspect of the archetype which lies 'beyond the psychic sphere', which 'forms the bridge to matter', showing that he understands the psyche as being interdependent with the world, as belonging within an ecosystem (Jung, 1966, para. 420). 'The psyche is the world's pivot', he adds, this time emphasizing the dependence of culture on psyche 'It is also an intervention in the existing natural order' (Jung, 1966, para. 423).

These insightful perceptions of Jung's hold promising potential for the development of a consciousness similar to those suggested by Irigaray and the ecofeminists, but unfortunately Jung's sexual politics are far more reactionary. Perhaps these deeper perceptions arise from what Jung refers to in his co-authored 'autobiography' as his 'number two self', that which appears to see beyond the immediate fabric of everyday life and into more semi-conscious territory, and perhaps his more reductive views belong to 'number one', his daily self, which contains more than a few elements of the upstanding, narrow minded Swiss bourgeoisie (Jung, 1995). Judging by Renos Papadopoulos' erudite elaboration of this split within Jung, this seems a highly plausible explanation of the discrepancy between Jung's archetypal view of psychic structure, with its multiplicity of perspectives and ways of being, which links comfortably with Irigaray and ecofeminism, and some of his more reactionary personal views, particularly those concerning gender (Papadopoulos, 1984).

James Hillman (1992) says that an adequate psychology needs to be able to reflect the depth and breadth of Jung's archetypal theory. Yet when it comes to gender, Jung's own psychology settles deep into the conservative quagmire of its day, refusing the risky challenge of the archetypes in favour of more familiar ground.

Anima-tion

Stripped of reactionary gender politics, Jung's archetypal theory offers women an effective means of re-entering the symbolic. Irigaray's tactical mimesis combined with a revisioning of the anima opens up possibilities for a new consciousness concerning women and the feminine, which, together with previously mentioned ecofeminist perspectives, has radical implications for a new social order. But before we find out where the anima can lead us, we need to look at where it came from.

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Animus and anima rank among Jung's more controversial theories because this is precisely where he tangles gender with archetype, contradicting the idea that archetypes as irreducible, indefinite forms arising from the unconscious cannot be fixed to an image, gendered or otherwise. According to Jung, animus personifies the masculine principle, Logos, which connotes reason, logic, intellect and objectivity as it appears in the unconscious of a woman, while anima corresponds to the feminine principle, Eros, which connotes love and relatedness as found in the unconscious of a man (Jung, 1968). This idea of contrasexuality arises partly from biology and genetics, and partly from Jung's theory of the other. 'What is not-I, not masculine, is most probably feminine,' he says of the anima, clarifying his point, 'and because the not-I is felt as not belonging to me and therefore as outside me, the anima-image is usually projected upon women' (Jung, 1959c, para. 58).

At first glance, this idea of an inherent femininity within man and an innate masculinity within woman appears to be quite forward-thinking, but as Andrew Samuels (1989) points out, contrasexuality is not the liberating factor many post Jungians believe it to be. By nailing certain characteristics and aspects of a person to a particular gender, even if it is the opposite gender, contrasexual theory reinforces polarized thinking concerning masculinity and femininity, with the archetypal dimension supporting the idea that these are inborn. Samuels suggests deconstructing contrasexuality by disconnecting fixed, gendered images from anima and animus, leaving human characteristics free of gender categorization, while Jules Cashford queries the value of opposing and gendering Logos and Eros in the first place, pointing out that the former is a concept while the latter is a deity as well as an idea, and that both are male terms acting as replacements for female terms – respectively Sophia (wisdom), and Aphrodite (Cashford, 1998). Cashford interprets the Eros/Logos opposition as a recent incarnation of the culturally determined woman/nature, man/spirit debate, noting how culture affects the archetypal structure, which in turn mirrors its projections back onto culture. As we have seen, Jung is aware of this interdependent relationship between psyche, archetypes and culture; but while his traditionalist attitude prevents his insights from being deployed towards gender, several post-Jungians have revised this unfortunate situation, as James Hillman's earlier request for a redeployment of symbolism with regard to sexual difference illustrates. However Cashford doesn't believe that such a re-evaluation of the female through feminine imagery is enough to transform our worldview. Like Samuels, Cashford wants to unhook anima and animus images from gender altogether, in order to free up that which we call male and female to be available for all human beings. Anima and animus would then operate together, with male and female images residing in the conscious and unconscious of both men and women, and their relative strengths would depend on the style of gender an individual had chosen for him or herself.

While it seems senseless to speak of inner masculinity and femininity given that whatever an individual feels, thinks or experiences pertains to them rather than to some predetermined gendered category (such as the traditional masculine association with intellect, or the feminine association with submissiveness), anima and animus are nevertheless bridges to the unconscious, calling into question the role of the other. Without gender-specific archetypal images, what becomes of this archetypal otherness? What happens to alterity? To conceptualizations of sexual difference? How are they defined and manifested? Difference, as we

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have seen, is required for consciousness, for subjectivity, so how exactly would de-gendered anima and animus images support a new consciousness wherein sexual difference is consciously re-envisioned?

If we reconsider Jung's words regarding the anima quoted earlier, we can see that he is clearly stating that this archetype manifests as a projection onto women because it is bound up with otherness, and the most obvious 'other' to an individual is that of the opposite sex. If this is the case, it is hard to see how gender will ever be fully dissociated from these archetypes, because no matter how hard discourses and theories try, sexual difference will always come down to the fact that men and women are different by virtue of their bodies, and that this means they have different experiences of the world, which after all, accounts for sexual attraction, whether homosexual or heterosexual – heterosexuals being attracted to the sexual other, while homosexuals are attracted to those who are, like themselves, different from the sexual other. Of course, differences need not be sexual, which potentially opens up the idea of the other to mean anything which is not-I, regardless of sex and gender; but even if masculinity and femininity are completely reconceptualized, and even if we refuse to assume, as Samuels suggests, that psychological functioning is different in men and women, men and women will always experience differences in and from each other, using them to some extent to define themselves and each other, sexual or otherwise (Samuels, 1989). But can we really persist with gendered anima and animus images without remaining stuck in Jung's conservative quagmire?

Ann Shearer agrees with Hillman that anima and animus are at work in everyone, but suggests retaining difference and the notion of the other with gendered archetypal images. 'Athene is not Apollo', she states (Shearer, 2002, 299), adding that while she is interested in traditionally masculine qualities being experienced as part of an inherent feminine self, she is also keen to preserve the distinction between feminine and masculine consciousness, Eros and Logos, keeping open the question as to whether women are Erosoriented by nature or whether this simply resides in the culture (Shearer, 2002). Ultimately, Shearer believes in the syzygy, the union of anima and animus, where masculinity and femininity exist in the interdependent dynamic of yin and yang; but as Hillman has noted, this is hardly a balanced situation in the current cultural climate.

In danger of bringing the argument back to a typically Jungian beginning, where men are men and women are mere shadows with her unresolved ideas about women's so-called nature, Shearer's only hope lies in borrowing Hillman's re-evaluation of the feminine, although as Cashford wonders, is this enough? Shearer's circular orientation doesn't leave enough room for escape routes back into the symbolic, although her arguments for retaining difference are worth considering.

The question of gender, difference, anima and animus is not so much an either/or situation as a both/and, with the only restriction being the dualistic notion of opposites. A successful reconceptualization of masculinity and femininity, of anima and animus images is not about doing away with difference, but about forsaking opposites, so they remain as effective others but their functions are no longer confined to and therefore confining of specific gender. Returning to the metaphor of the web structure, which draws its support from tension without the need for opposites, one can employ difference as a realistic starting point for a potentially healthy re-visioning of the anima and animus. Like the risky position taken by

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Irigaray, Cixous, and the ecofeminists who work with rather than against difference, this is a controversial premise, particularly in the light of social constructionist arguments. But if, to borrow Irigaray's method, so-called essentials of sexual difference can be worked with consciously, in full awareness of the role played by social constructionism, then the anima and animus images as we know them can be displaced, and therefore ultimately replaced, by images which retain their difference but not in the familiar, restrictive, reductive, oppositional ways.

James Hillman manages this fairly well with the anima at least, an archetype worth examining more closely because of its implications for woman's entry into the symbolic (Hillman, 1985). Situating the gendered anima image within the cultural habit of duality, he explains that as an archetypal form the anima pre-exists, and continues to exist independently of, such a psychological framework. He disengages the anima from Eros, from femininity, and from the mother, bringing to attention some of Jung's less-publicized views including his somewhat surprising doubts about the anima's link with the feminine, and stipulates that women should not be denied the anima, likening analytical psychology's absence of anima in women to the psychoanalytic theory of penis deprivation, and by default Lacan's symbolic order with its phallic governance. He perceives anima and animus less in terms of contrasexuality, and more in terms of intrapersonal relations, where both function as projections between different parts of the psyche as well as between men and women and the external world.

Hardcore Jungian traditionalist Cecile C Tougas takes issue with Hillman for daring to expand the notion of the anima, claiming that this archetype is strictly the feminine counterpart in a man and that anyone who dares to suggest otherwise is simply indulging in a 'wrong way of describing women' (Tougas, 2000, 54). Tougas grants nothing to cultural constructionism or conditioning, fails to realize the connection between the idea of an inherent femininity within men and patriarchy's view of real women, and sticks closely to a singularly essentialist reading of Jung epitomizing the stalest end of post-Jungian thinking.

At the other end of the spectrum Susan Rowland believes in the feminist possibilities for Hillman's anima, but she too has her criticisms (Rowland, 2002). While appreciating the potential of Hillman's 'mind polytheism', where psychic images hold more significance than the ego, she is concerned that a downplayed ego entails a renouncement of rationality. Like Damaris Wehr (1988), Rowland insists that women need the ego with its demarcated reasoning powers because for so long women have been denied entry here. Secondly, she argues that Hillman's prioritization of a neutered anima image over the ego devalues cultural location, denying women the opportunity to shape the image with their own physical and social subjectivity. In a move reminiscent of Janet Biehl, who argues against ecofeminism for being too irrational, Rowland is reluctant to embrace Hillman's new consciousness for fear of los*s* of what was valuable about the old consciousness (Biehl, 1991). But ego-based reasoning is not the only kind of reasoning there is, as eastern religious and mystical systems such as Buddhism, I Ching, and the Jewish Kabbalah illustrate, and Rowland's concern about Hillman's apparent reticence to engage with materiality apparently leads her to miss his emphasis on Jung's concepts of the *anima mundi* and the psychoid, both key links between the psyche and the material world, inclusive of the human as well as the non-human.

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For Hillman, who bases his interpretation on a seemingly much closer reading of Jung's theory than Tougas, the anima is the archetype of life, the structuring principle of consciousness that connects with the unconscious, a relating function that forges bonds beyond the human realm, a multiple, unfathomable aspect of the psyche that refuses category, restriction, definition of any kind. Archetypes, as Jung illustrates with his notion of the psychoid and talk of 'organ consciousness' (quoted in Hillman, 1985, 151) extend beyond the psyche, into the physical dimension. As we have seen, they are plural, boundless and irreducible, and the anima, in its numinous singularity, personifies this plurality.

Such a re-envisioned anima, free from gendered anchorage and patriarchal privilege, holds potential for women to gain entry into the symbolic, while the psychoid, with its connective function, offers a means for the non-human realm to find validity, subjectivity, and a new place in the order of things. Jung's archetypal structure positions the psyche between nature and culture, in a place where the social construct of essentialism and the essence of social constructionism do not so much collide as collaborate to create a tightly woven web of possibilities for men, women and the non-human alike, supporting ecofeminist theory and Irigaray and Cixous in their attempts to balance up the current masculine economy with a new, non-dualistic consciousness. Hillman, like Irigaray and the ecofeminists who gamble on essentialism with their risky mimesis, builds on and away from a masculinist premise, tunnelling out from established paradigms, expanding and evolving inherited psychological and cultural history to forge a reconceptualized environment where the notion of opposites gives way to a continuum. Tension is maintained through differences rather than polarities, enabling subjectivity to develop without being hampered by prescribed hypotheses of androcentric or anthropocentric persuasion, and a new sense of an embodied embedded ecosystem to which we all belong is encouraged to grow.

CONCLUSION

Ecofeminism, in chorus with Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous, says that all women have the right to experience themselves in this way, as legitimate subjects who have as much currency as men in the world, and the way to find it, to recover it, is through nature, through an embodied, embedded connection with the non-human realm. Jung's structuring principle of archetypes with its connecting function and manifold images supports this perspective, offering limitless potential for its expression once the locks of duality are prised open.

By taking risks with essentialism, by daring to celebrate difference, by learning to converse with nature instead of seeking to discover it, we can replace opposing polarities with mutually supportive webs; we can integrate women and nature as other without feeling oppressed by the confines of a hierarchical binary system, and we can re-conceptualize gender in the service of individuality rather than in terms of prescribed roles and ill-fitting categories. An idealistic vision perhaps, but surely one worth striving for. After all, if we perceive this as idealistic, what does that say about our acceptance of the situation for women and the non-human within the current symbolic?

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