# LIVING WITH AN INTERNAL OTHER: AN EXTENDED REVIEW OF *PSYCHOANALYSIS, IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY*

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ABSTRACT *An extended review of* Psychoanalysis, Identity, and Ideology: Critical Essays on the Israel/Palestine Case *(Bunzl and Beit-Hallahmi, 2002), focusing in particular on Brunner's chapter, which brings 'home' enemy images of the Other, and using psychoanalytic concepts (specifically 'internal cohabitation') which call for the recognition of an Other within.*

**Key words:** Israel, Palestine, psychoanalysis, the Other, internal cohabitation

## INTRODUCTION

In 1999, a conference was convened at the Freud Museum in Vienna entitled 'Identity and Trauma'. Organized by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, it involved a group of psychoanalytically informed academics and clinicians from Israel whose aim was to connect psychoanalytic theory to Jewish history over the past 100 years, specifically in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Papers from this conference would be published subsequently in a book entitled *Psychoanalysis, Identity, and Ideology: Critical Essays on the Israel/Palestine Case*. It is this book that will be the subject of my extended review.

I will start by offering a brief overview and synthesis of the book. This will be followed by a more in-depth illustration of one of the chapters which itself centres on the internal Israeli debate over Israel's creation (Brunner, 2002). I have chosen this paper

as an example because it brings 'home' enemy images of the Other, thus the conflict that might be taken to exist otherwise exclusively between the Jewish and Palestinian cultures. In so doing, I believe it can represent well a level of complexity that is found throughout the rest of the book. Finally, and as a means of further evaluation, I will be turning to psychoanalytic concepts that call for the recognition of an Other within, and of the challenges that arise when living with an internal Other. Specifically, I will be introducing a clinical concept, termed 'Internal cohabitation' (Richards, 1993; 1999; Sinason, 1993; 1999a) to discuss and evaluate some of the central issues that have been raised earlier by the authors of *Psychoanalysis, Identity and Ideology.*

## A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The socio-political, collective and religious foundations upon which Zionist philosophy

is constructed stand in stark contrast to the psychological, individual and a traditionally secular approach of psychoanalysis whose origins are also Jewish. This book approaches these two fundamentally opposed perspectives by examining historical events both in Europe and Israel in such a way that inherent tensions remain in focus and thus dynamically alive.

But how neutral can psychoanalysis be in exploring Israeli identity and ideology? This is a complex matter as psychoanalysis itself has played its own part in Zionist history, having been both solicited and abandoned at various times for political purposes as an ideological framework. Similarly, Jewish politics have by no means themselves been absent historically within the field of psychoanalysis, not least originally within the Berlin Institute of Psychoanalysis, where the Jewish situation precipitated upheavals during the Nazi regime and out of which the Institute of Psychoanalysis in Israel was born (Rolnik, 2002).

After reading the book I am still left with some questions concerning the issue of neutrality – but saying this, not unhappily. For it is the very fact that psychoanalysis is part of Jewish history alongside the introspective analytic manner in which this insider position is handled that gives *Psychoanalysis, Identity and Ideology* its depth and makes it such an interesting read. Indeed it is the way in which the observer is kept in view alongside the observed that helps to give it credibility and value. By keeping tensions between subjective and objective viewpoints alive here, neither conscious nor unconscious processes as respective objects of socio-political and psychoanalytic enquiry need face unnecessary reduction. Thus undiluted, the psychoanalytic approach can proceed with its own unique way of asking

questions and its work of uncovering the often complex emotional dynamics involved in Israeli national identity and behaviour, dynamics that might otherwise remain out of view. In this instance, the historiographical contribution can add a bridging facility between conscious and unconscious phenomena with a foot so to speak in each domain. In relation to psychoanalysis specifically, history is seen to share an interest in how memories that arise out of the past might give shape to the present.

In contrasting the political ideas of Freud with Herzl (who lived physically only a few streets apart), Beit-Hallahmi exposes the divorce that can occur between conscious and unconscious attitudes, between different takes on reality. Whilst on the one hand, Freud is seen historically to have regarded Jewish nationalism and separation from Europe as a false consolation that was out of touch with reality, identity being for him a personal and emotional matter; on the other hand, and in contrast, Herzl viewed assimilation into Europe as an illusion in the face of the external social realities of anti-Semitism. These two takes on reality are all too easily able to pathologize the other, as may be understood by way of Beit-Hallahmi's paper (2002).

Diner (2002) also examines historically an equivalent divorce, in this case by looking at national identity and a sense of belonging, from a temporal standpoint. Here in the first place, Zionist concepts such as the 'Ingathering of Exiles' as well as the 'Law of Return', are seen to be built on collective terms that are committed to a timeless and eternal (biblical) framework. Alternatively and in the second place, ideas of individual rights rooted in Western democratic and scientific principles (and upon which psychoanalysis itself is philosophically founded) offer a time-limited

vision in which the present time – in contrast to mythical time – is the one and only reality. From the standpoint of the former hypothesis, the Israeli-Palestine conflict is viewed typically by the Zionist culture as a holy war. However from the viewpoint of the latter, Israel's occupation of Palestine is seen to be a profoundly illegitimate colonial encounter that is far from anything that might be described as 'holy'. In practice, the opposition between these two positions has remained non-negotiable, providing so far only a source for deadly war. As an example of this chasm in Israel, Rolnik (2002) explores some of the difficulties of developing psychoanalysis as an academic and clinical discipline in Israel today. In this case, current constructivist, collectivist social values within the medical workplace are seen to lock out ideas of an individual and critical nature as held by the Israeli Institute of Psychoanalysis. As yet it would appear that neither institution has found a way of working with the other.

In view of these apparently irreconcilable differences of opinion, a chasm between socio-political/collective notions and individual/psychological attitudes, Zuckerman (2002) draws upon the psychoanalytic concepts of the Frankfurt School as a means of bridging the gap. Here, it is considered that a relatively successful attempt has been made to connect categories of psychoanalysis and a macro-sociological analysis of society. Within this micro-macro framework, an affinity has been drawn between individual character structures that are built on dependence and submission to authority, and anti-democratic social and political organizations. From this viewpoint, instances such as the Holocaust in Jewish history have required the help of often extreme modes of psychic defence such as projection and identification to ensure psychic survival. Zuckerman points out how

this may have resulted nationally speaking, in an interchangeable status between categories of 'Nazis' and 'Palestinians' – together representing the demon Other.

Similarly within the Palestinian community, a muddle has occurred through identification with the Israeli aggressor. (Certainly it would seem that victim and aggressor could no more become muddled and undifferentiated than in the case of the suicide bomber.) Suleiman (2002) describes in this instance an internalization of power relations that is based on prevailing majority-minority relations within Israel. This internalization, in psychoanalytic terms, of the warring couple has meant typically within the Palestinian community that memories of ethnic origin can become erased in such a way that the upholding of collective identity is severely compromised. Similarly, in respect of the Israeli community, as referred to earlier by Zuckerman, forgetting the past – in this case the Diaspora and the Shoah survivors – has been also a means of trying unconsciously to manage trauma. Israeli negation of the Diaspora, and likewise the Palestinian people, is seen by Zuckerman to involve unbearable guilt and shame that has not been mourned. Mourning, however, requires an ability to admit to painful suffering both within and without. However, as Zuckerman (2002, 66) writes: 'in a state of perpetuated violence, also increasingly committed by Palestinians, there is little mental much less political room to recognize the suffering of the other, especially of the "enemy".'

Guilt, shame, helplessness and difficulties in mourning loss are subjects that are worked with directly by Moses, Berman and Gampel in their psychoanalytic capacities as training analysts in Israel. In this instance calls are made for a careful reconsideration of psychoanalytic traditions that firstly

decry public participation in political debate (Moses, 2002), and secondly exclude politics from the consulting room in order to 'protect' the transference (Berman, 2002). In both cases, keeping private and public domains apart as has been hitherto the norm is seen to be not only unrealistic but also potentially unethical under the circumstances. Indeed in regard to his own personal practice, Berman proposes that 'attention to historical, social and political processes can help Israeli psychoanalysts and psychotherapists in better understanding their own lives, the lives of their patients, and the juncture in which they and their patients meet, namely the transferential relationship' (Berman, 2002, 193). Needless to say, the complexities of these issues are great and Gampel (2002) outlines some of the difficulties in his own personal attempts to work with Israeli and Palestinian groups within the country.

In order to address these matters more closely and before going on to a further evaluation, I would like now to turn to Brunner's (2002, 85–107) essay and contribution, which itself focuses upon the contentious public debate over Israel's creation.

## THE DEBATE OVER ISRAEL'S CREATION

Myths of origin and creational moments are regarded by Brunner as expressions of the understanding a collective can have of itself, as well as indicators of how the past may hold meaning for the present. The press becomes a case in point here as it is seen to represent an arena in which collective identity is both constructed and contested, as well as one where collective imaginations may be subverted.

The debate within the press involves 'affirmative' and 'critical' historians and scholars who disagree fundamentally on the nature of the Zionist creation myths. Although there are different camps within each side, the arguments generally support or contest traditional attitudes that have hitherto underpinned Israeli statehood. In the first discourse, Israel is affirmed as the outcome of highly moral pioneers who have achieved a unique project by sacrificing their lives. Within this image, Israel is understood to be an ancient nation with a singular destiny, a small and vulnerable State that has sought peace in the face of a large and hostile Arab 'Other'. Affirmatives thus regard Zionists as a chosen and special people who can be rightfully proud of their liberation from the 'old' world in which they stood historically as persecuted victims, into a 'new' one in which they may be reborn as courageous pioneers and warriors of supreme integrity.

Israel's critical historians however deny affirmative concepts that underline the uniqueness of the Zionist project and in this case offer an alternative narrative. Here, the Jewish State is seen to be the outcome of a cynical and manipulative colonialist venture, one that has been supported by Western imperialism and justified in the wake of the Holocaust. The concern of critical scholars thus centres primarily upon the ethics of the ongoing violence that is directed towards the Palestinians population and Israeli policies that are seen to comprise 'ethnic cleansing'. From this perspective, Zionism is pictured as 'militaristic, undemocratic and oppressive approach', far away from the moral and redemptive project of the affirmative vision. In counterattack however, the latter accuse those who criticize in this way as being enemies of the State, saboteurs who undermine Israel's will to survive as a nation, thus destructive instigators of national collapse.

Clearly, on both sides of the divide passions run deep and concepts are adhered to with little room for compromise. In order, therefore, to begin to understand and map this emotional territory analytically, Brunner turns to psychoanalytic theory, in particular Kohut's concepts of collective narcissism in which a non-pathological, 'higher' form of narcissism is described. This higher type of narcissism is regarded as a necessary ingredient within definitions of collective and national identity that otherwise might exist in a socio-cultural vacuum.

Building on Kohut's idea that all individuals partake to some extent in a non-pathological collective narcissism, Brunner differentiates between what he terms 'self-appreciation' and 'self-infatuation'. In other words, a narcissistic attitude that values the individual and/or collective Self, and in turn, alternatively, a more pathological approach in which self-valuation depends on a denigration of the Other. (In Chapter 5, Moses makes a similar distinction between what he calls 'patriotism' and 'chauvinism' – the latter arising as a defence against unconscious guilt and mourning.) In Brunner's terms, however, self-infatuation leads an individual, society or nation most typically towards the subordination and exclusion of those who differ in race, language and/or religion, thus describes a 'love amongst 'us' and rage against 'them' mentality. Brunner (2002, 125) writes:

> Collective self-infatuation, as defined here, leads to rage against all dissent and difference. This is but the other side of exaggerated self-love, self-reference, self-absorption, self-idealization and self-aggrandizement, a façade which serves to hide from oneself as well as from others unconscious but strong anxieties and fears that have to do with deep-seated feelings of vulnerability, emptiness and worthlessness.

This excessive self love can mean that mere otherness comes to be regarded as an offence to be punished, an intolerable limit to power and purity. It contrasts starkly therefore with self-appreciation, which comprises the kind of aggression that is rage free, as might be found in a healthy competitive spirit. In other words, a perspective that is able to tolerate and even welcome difference both within and without its own self and community. This perspective does not overvalue and thus idealize its own nation.

In relation therefore to the public debate that can 'rage' between affirmative and critical protagonists, narcissistic injuries and thus anxieties are seen by Brunner to be evoked most often by an extremism that includes moral devaluation and disdain on both sides. Whilst in the first place, affirmative discourse demonizes Arab-Palestinian Others, in the second instance, critical narratives demonize Zionism by depicting Arab-Palestinians as passive victims of Zionist violation.

## CONCEPTS OF AN INTERNAL 'OTHER'

Traditionally, the psychoanalytic developmental approach describes one ego structure at birth, which can separate and fragment. If not integrated sufficiently, split-off 'others' may group together to become a single pathological narcissistic organization that operates autonomously apart from the ego (Rosenfeld, 1971; Sohn, 1985; O'Shaughnessy, 1999). Thus both 'psychotic and non-psychotic' organizations are seen to exist in individuals and groups (Bion, 1957, 1961).

A more recent clinical concept, termed 'internal cohabitation' (Sinason, 1993, 1999a; Richards, 1993, 1999) suggests a significant alternative to this developmental

view by considering two ego structures at birth, thus a self and internal 'other'. Both self and internal 'other' are conceptualized in this case as being sentient entities in their own right, which have very different approaches to reality. Whilst one self has a wider and longer term vision, which is capable of comprehending complexities, the internal other self is short-term and conceptually limited in approach; thus operating respectively according to symbolic equation and unable to comprehend symbolism (Segal, 1957). The self that is governed by symbolic equation is seen to have an autonomous existence in its own right and is thus not construed as a split-off 'part' of the self and differentiation rather than integration is considered to be an appropriate therapeutic intervention. Here, a dual-track approach is followed which maps both points of view concurrently. It is very hard to keep track of the other mind due to its automatic ways and it may easily be missed and so mistaken for the self. The attempt to see this as requiring integration leads only to its concealment and a loss of the ability to differentiate complex social relations from simplified psychotic social solutions. This is exemplified by the idea of a 'final solution', which dealt with people as physical objects. The case for differentiation of coexisting personalities internally has also been made by Bion in his paper 'Differentiation of the psychotic from the non-psychotic personalities' (Bion, 1957).

In regard to the two sentient minds within, Sinason (2004, 3) explains the way in which 'each mind constructs a different representation of reality – one capable of addressing the complexities of social reality and the other [which] is more attuned to the world of physical objects.' Both social and political consequences are seen to occur when the two minds are not explicitly differentiated, thus when the socially aware mind has become confused with the 'other' mind. In instances where the socially aware self becomes identified with the physically aware self, sanity becomes a tool to both support and sustain madness, acting thus as a 'political wing of the psychotic personality': 'Where prejudice is part of the socially-legitimized political wing of the psychotic personality, then understanding why psychotic advocacy can rule internally can help to address its social and political manifestations' (Sinason and Gibson, 2001, 9).

When the non-psychotic personality is subsumed by the psychotic personality, the conviction that relationships are fundamentally exploitative may remain unquestioned. In this case people will be characterized as either inherently superior or inferior beings. Likewise, authority will be equated with the abuse of power. Such a hierarchical vision of the world can add fuel to social attitudes of prejudice and racism (Richards, 2001).

Cavell (2000) argues that the psychoanalytic emphasis on an inner world can elide the differences between real others and internal representations of others. An intersubjective account, rather than a more causal developmental account, is thus suggested as a means of understanding 'the social character of thinking'. Ideas of there being two subjects within as proposed by 'internal cohabitation' may be seen in this way to hold ideas in common with an intersubjective understanding that is able more readily to connect reality with imagination. Such a view collaborates well also with Matte Blanco's (1975, 1988) concept of 'bi-logic', which posits two ubiquitous and irreducible forms of logic within and so similarly challenges causal, developmental assumptions, in other words the view that primary processes mature into secondary

processes. Termed 'asymmetry' and 'symmetry', these two types of logic operate respectively according to rational and emotional principles, neither of which may be ever integrated into the other. Such theoretical formulations, which explain an innate objectivity and otherness within, may help to forge communications between sociopolitical and psychological standpoints that hitherto remain somewhat isolated from one another.

In order now to evaluate *Psychoanalysis, Identity and Ideology,* I would like to consider some of the issues raised so far from the above standpoint.

## WHOSE IDENTITY?

In war-zones such as Israel today, where reality becomes itself an extreme all-or-nothing, do-or-die matter, the boundaries between sanity and madness, real and imagined threat, can be difficult to determine. In this environment, the asymbolic self can come into its own by strongly putting forward its view that automatic, concrete attitudes that waste no time on the complexities of thinking are the sane solution; indeed the only approach that in reality can save life both individually and collectively. Because this 'other' mind is both convinced and convincing with its black-and-white convictions, the relational self may well buy into the war-time propaganda and lose sight of its own values – become dominated and so eclipsed by the 'mad voice inside' (Sinason, 1993). With an eclipse of this kind, the voice of the socially aware self might be silenced and thus confused with that of the physically aware self. If this is the case, it might become all the more imperative to differentiate nationally between the two identities, as has Brunner with his notions of 'self-appreciation' and 'self-infatuation', and

Moses when he distinguishes between a 'patriot' and a 'chauvinist'.

Although Brunner and Moses are able to differentiate helpfully between these two national mentalities, Kohut's concepts of 'lower and higher narcissism', upon which their ideas are founded, support a developmental view. The implicit suggestion here is that peace may arise only when the self-infatuated chauvinist (an authoritarian oppressor) is able to mature into a self-appreciative patriot (an authoritative negotiator). This view promotes the secondary processes of the socially aware mind as favourable and in so doing demotes and downgrades the primary processes of the physically aware mind. An alternative non-developmental approach, however, might not prioritize either mentality, but instead regard both the self-infatuated chauvinist and the self-appreciative patriot as autonomous personalities in their own right, thus each with its own respective mode of functioning.

Here, the aim would be, in Bion's terms, to contain the terror of the psychotic personality by looking neutrally upon its paranoid perspective, and instead of trying to get rid of its rigid, absolutist and exploitative attitudes, to acknowledge it exists in its own right. Alternatively, a developmental approach suggests by its very terminology that self-appreciative patriots function on a 'higher' level than self-infatuated chauvinists who in this case are seen to be 'lower' primitive beings caught in a stage that ideally they may be able to grow out of one day. Such a view may exacerbate paranoia and encourage self-infatuated chauvinists to seek an underground retreat in which to conceal themselves in their state of terror (hatred and fear). Although above ground, the general atmosphere could appear at these times as peaceful, this peace would be a 'deadly peace', a state that could be all

the more dangerous for its silence. More 'lively peace' could be attained only where the psychotic personality's terror was afforded a permanent place alongside the non-psychotic personality – the latter personality being the only one capable of negotiating a peace process both internally and externally (Tower, 2003). It would be thus in affording each perspective a right to be, acknowledging that each would see itself naturally as 'sane' and the other 'mad', that the potential ferocity of the self-infatuated chauvinist might be kept within workable bounds.

When Brunner refers to the 'rage against all dissent and difference' in terms of race, language and/or religion, and in turn relates this to 'fears that have to do with deep-seated feelings of vulnerability, emptiness and worthlessness', it is easy to see how self-infatuated chauvinists might be threatened by notions that see them as inferior and seek to exclude them.

With reference to the clinical sphere, Richards (2001) points out how a trigger for racism may be the internal cohabitant's perception of being misunderstood and excluded from the working therapeutic partnership. Introduction of a concept of internal cohabitation in this case is seen to provide a framework for exploring racist views. Indeed, by locating racist assumptions in the transference within the mind that operates according to psychotic principles, patients may be able to differentiate racist views from their own:

> This sometimes enabled a patient to recognize the madness and cruelty of the psychotically based racist thoughts held by the internal cohabitant, and also to have some understanding of how truly frightening it is for that self, with its paranoid and all-or-nothing mentality, to live in a world that is perceived to be permanently hierarchical – because if you are not on top you are on the bottom. Through the process of differentiating

themselves from the ill other mind, patients were enabled to gain some understanding that the trigger for the expression of racist views, or the belief that I was racist, was often a perception of the internal cohabitant of being painfully excluded from those relationships of the patient's where a working partnership had been established. (Richards, 2001, 14)

## TWO IDENTITIES IN ISRAEL

In Israel, both Jews and Palestinians alike live with fears of permanent exclusion or annihilation by their neighbours. If in this case the paranoia of the internal cohabitant is not differentiated explicitly from the realistic fears of the non-psychotic self, it may transpire that paranoid attitudes based on excessive imagination, and necessary anxiety founded on reality may become confused and entangled beyond repair. Without this differentiation, it will be difficult to keep in sight the self-appreciative patriot when faced with a self-infatuated chauvinist who no doubt will be present in times of such deep trauma.

In his detailed account of the war of words between the affirmative and critical historians, Brunner is able to illustrate how easily and unnoticeably judgementalism can replace judgement and likewise how 'an eye for an eye' retaliatory mentality might proliferate when not sufficiently separated out from a mentality that is capable of evaluation. When Diner looks at the issue of validity in Israeli political discourse, he describes well the logic behind the different standpoints. Here the affirmatives may be seen to validate their approach on the basis of mythical, biblical time, whilst the critical historians validate their beliefs from a time-limited viewpoint, which regards only present time as real and thus valid. This difference, which Diner outlines, between a religious and scientific approach can compare usefully with

Matte-Blanco's concept of bi-logic and is helpful in understanding the central issues that occupy discourse regarding the Israeli-Palestine conflict. However, it describes two essences only, which may or may not lead to conflict; thus neither of these 'temporal emblematics of belonging', in Diner's terms, may be said to be psychotic or non-psychotic. They only become so when they are adopted by either the psychotic or non-psychotic personality and expressed accordingly. When acquired by asymbolic internal cohabitants (either one alone or in company) interest will no longer be in diversity but instead in making room only for one form of logic or the other. (See Wilson and Sinason, 1999.)

Historians, psychoanalysts, and leaders of countries have internal cohabitants according to this viewpoint. Indeed, the psychotic personality resides in us all, in the sane as well as in the clinically psychotic. Psychosis proper erupts only when a non-psychotic mind is so buried that it became relatively inaccessible. If psychotic functioning were understood to reside only in the clinically ill, how could we explain dehumanizing, destructive enactments that happen not only in times of war and terror both in Israel and elsewhere, but also in everyday living? The authors of *Psychoanalysis, Identity and Ideology* help us so usefully to recognize this reality: to recognize how psychotic functioning may be the driving force behind the extreme nationalism that supports without question 'official' acts of terror as perpetrated by the Israeli government towards the Palestinians; and similarly, the kind of religious fundamentalism that can convince everyday Palestinians to strap bombs to their bodies to blow up both Jewish-Israeli civilians and themselves.

Without recognition of a permanent presence of an 'extremist' mind within, it becomes more likely that the appearance of the 'other' mind with its psychotic functioning will not be anticipated sufficiently. This can happen particularly in cases of leadership. Idealization of leaders is less likely if leaders are recognized as having internal cohabitants who differ in mentality from themselves – internal 'others' who by nature regard leadership and dictatorship as synonymous.

Moses refers to the idealization of leaders in Israel, which is used at times by the general population as a means of abdicating a sense of self-responsibility and ensuring group cohesion. Denigration of the demonized and dehumanized 'Other' often accompanies idealization and is seen in this case to be a projection of unconscious guilt, which would require a mourning process if it were to be worked through appropriately. Likewise, Zuckerman proposes mourning as a means of ameliorating unconscious guilt regarding on the one hand, Israeli negation of the Diaspora Jewry and, on the other hand, Israel's foundation as a nation at the expense of the Palestinians. As a foundation for his application of psychoanalytic theory to social issues, Zuckerman builds here on ideas proposed by the Frankfurt School, drawing a parallel between oppressive psychological and social structures that exist in the internal and external world respectively.

Although clearly becoming aware of unconscious guilt through a process of mourning can be very useful in affording a space in which thinking, feeling and understanding may begin to emerge, it may represent psychologically only half of the story. If emphasis is on an emotional etiology only – unconscious guilt and its mourning – without reference to cognitive determinants and faculties within, it can elide, in Cavell's terms, the differences between real and imagined others and thus

polarize the psychological and socio-political standpoints. However, if a clear differentiation may be made between irreducible cognitive and emotional structures internally (asymmetry and symmetry in Matte Blanco's terms) then both psychoanalytic and cognitive viewpoints will be protected from unnecessary reduction and dilution. The psychotic personality in this case will be defined neither by the emotional nor cognitive, neither the imagined nor the real, but rather as an eclipse of one mode at the expense of the other. In reference to Matte Blanco's (1999b) concept of bi-logic and building on an earlier paper on 'unrecognized switches of identity', Sinason (2004, 2) writes:

> A radically self-sufficient internal other will actively promote the use of either form of logic in isolation from its opposite in a way that is akin to a cutting of the cerebral hemispheres in split brain studies. This is a functional rather than an anatomical substituting of one or other uni-logic mode in place of the bi-logic appraisal of reality that is needed.

Analytic differentiation between the two appraisers of reality, self and internal 'other', can help here to restore the bi-logic mode of the non-psychotic personality, which can be eclipsed by a more simplified uni-logic: the 'either-or' attitudes of the psychotic personality. Sinason (2004, 1) continues:

> Explicit recognition of the existence of an internal 'other' provides a way of gaining purchase on the complexity of an interchange that involves differentiating internal self and other, as well as internal and external other. This can assist [in our] understanding of social experiences that may otherwise be explained entirely by the influence of external others – a simplification that undermines [our] ability to perceive internal moves towards enactments of a damaging kind.

A concept of internal otherness, as posited both by Matte Blanco and Sinason, is able thus to connect the individual to the social by allowing for a notion of externality within.

Beit-Hallahmi's account of Freud's assimilationist and Herzl's separatist views regarding the creation of Israel, illustrates vividly the exclusive 'either-or' attitudes that have existed between individual and socio-political perspectives since the founding of psychoanalysis. Although an application of psychoanalytic concepts into the socio-political domain is generally more accepted by the established institutions today, it is still subject to some suspicion. The introduction of politics into the clinical domain is however more controversial. In *Psychoanalysis, Identity and Ideology,* Berman, Gampel and Moses address this controversy directly from their position as training analysts in Israel, in a manner that opens the debate and invites us all to join in considering some of its central issues. Building on Ferenczi and more recent relational, intersubjective formulations, Berman suggests that keeping the political and psychoanalytic domains apart can be out of touch with reality in Israel:

> The Holocaust, migration, the 1933–1945 rupture, intergenerational transmission, war and peace, and political activism, are central preoccupations of Israeli culture, typical of a society in which history and politics have visibly affected the life of so many individuals, and in which analytic and therapeutic involvement often activates questions of national, ethnic, religious and ideological identity.

> We cannot understand our patients, I suggest, if we are not attentive to the way history and politics shape their destiny, in subtle and complex interaction with intrapsychic factors. We cannot understand ourselves without similar self-scrutiny. (Berman, 2002, 182)

Harm is therefore not seen to be done by bringing political issues into clinical practice, but rather by an analyst's 'authoritarian

certainty, whether in interpreting the patient's unconscious, or in interpreting the political situation' (Berman, 2002, 195).

## CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions drawn in *Psychoanalysis, Identity and Ideology* do not seem to be whether or not we introduce the subjective (psychoanalysis) into the objective (socio-political) domain or vice versa, but instead how we might do so without overly compromising one or other of these two opposite standpoints. However, without introducing ideas of otherness within it is difficult to see how we might keep the internal and external differentiations separate in such a way to avoid diluting internal, subjective reality with objective, external reality, thus one approach with another.

Although psychoanalytic relational concepts of inter-subjectivity introduce a notion of objectivity in that there may be two subjects that are involved in an interaction, they are not able to do so in a way that conceptually links the internal to the external world. I have suggested that locating 'other' within as well as without, as do concepts of bi-logic and internal cohabitation, can bridge an otherwise unbridgeable gap, and make it possible to see a link between these two irreducible domains.

The authors of *Psychoanalysis, Identity and Ideology* approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a developmental angle based upon the hypothesis of a single psychic structure that is subject to splitting. This approach regards reintegration of the split-off pathological organizations – 'parts' of the ego – as the operative way to restore the kind of object-relating that is capable of negotiation and engaging in a peace process. This is, of course, an approach that can offer many insights. However, by promoting secondary processing above primary processes, it may exacerbate hierarchical, black-and-white attitudes that reduce complexity and thus exacerbate a war-zone mentality.

Nevertheless, despite the conceptual difficulties inherent within the application of the developmental model to the social arena, the authors of *Psychoanalysis, Identity and Ideology* are successful in addressing the very difficult and often complex situation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in ways that are both instructive and thought provoking at once. The multi-disciplinary nature of the book comprising viewpoints of psychologists, historians and psychoanalysts, thus an academic and clinical perspective, adds both to the reader's experience of depth and width. It also makes the book more accessible to psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic readers alike. In particular, however, it is its capacity to remain self-evaluative and questioning about psychoanalysis, an attitude that allows for the observer to be kept in mind as much as the observed, which involved me personally in its reading.

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