Pacific
Journalism Review

15 years jail for raising this flag

ENDANGERED JOURNALISTS

Featuring Johnny Blades, Ricardo Morris, Jason MacLeod, Alexandra Wake, Paul Scott, Katherine Ellis, Janet Fulton, Georgios Terzis, Lee Duffield and others

✧ Foreign media access to West Papua

✧ 'Journalism of hope' in post-election Fiji

✧ Are educators doing enough for at-risk freelancers?

✧ Framing a Manus Island riot

✧ The end of hypocrisy: Online activism and conflict

✧ Reporting ventures into the Pacific

✧ FOI scholarship, NZ and secrecy

PLUS

A FRONTLINE double:

✧ Interrogating power Kayt Davies

✧ State terrorism – a Pacific case study David Robie

PUBLISHED BY THE PACIFIC MEDIA CENTRE

Cover images: *Jubi Tabloid* editor Victor Mambor of West Papua and a protester in symbolic handcuffs.

Credit: Del Abcede

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TE WĀNANGA ARONUI
O TĀMAKI MAKAU RAU

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EDITORIAL: Ruthless tidal wave

T HIS edition of *Pacific Journalism Review* began with a theme around 'Endangered Journalists'. However, by the time it was into full editorial production it was clear that this was also about the global silence and injustice imposed on West Papua and the 'endangered' indigenous people in this mountainous land on the cusp of Asia and the Pacific.

While the edition layout was being prepared, remarkable events were happening in West Papua and elsewhere in Indonesia this year around the historically significant anniversary date of 1 May 2016—fifty-three years after a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) handed power over the former Dutch colony in West New Guinea to Jakarta with a mandate to rule until such time as the Papuan people decided on their future in a free vote.

Instead, the sham 'Act of Free Choice' was orchestrated in 1969 with a handpicked group of 1050 men and women (out of a population at the time of more than 800,000 people) who were publicly coerced into choosing to be incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia.

Such critical dates as this—and 1 December 1961, when colonial Ordinances came into force recognising Papuan 'independence' with a Dutch blessing, a Manifesto, a national flag (the striking *Morning Star*, which is banned in Indonesia), and a national anthem ('*Oh My Land Papua*')—have been observed every year since an Indonesian paratroop invasion in January 1962.

However, in May 2016 a wave of mass 'pre-emptive' arrests engulfed hundreds of activists. It demonstrated without a doubt the compelling popular support among Papuans for self-determination and how this has been steadily growing stronger over the past half century, partly fuelled by recent social media campaigns by solidarity groups around the globe. As an advocate for the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, Veronica Koman, wrote in *The Jakarta Post*:

> In early May, 2109 Papuan independence protesters were arrested by police – and that number is more than double the 1025 who were press-ganged into legitimising Indonesia's rule of Papua through the 1969 'Act of Free Choice'.
>
> Despite our Indonesian Embassy in the United Kingdom denying in *The Guardian* that the arrests took place, the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute documented them all, and holds the names of every one of the 2109 demonstrators …
>
> This is the historical reality that underpins today's grievances about state violence, environmental degradation and suppression of free speech in Papua.

Until these grievances are addressed, argues Koman, the protests by Papuans

will continue and the numbers will continue to grow. She notes that, according to her agency's records, as at mid-May 2016, 'the figure stands at 2282 peaceful demonstrators detained by police'.

Also happening in this eventful month was an extraordinary meeting of more than 100 parliamentarians, politicians, civil rights lawyers and activists from some 23 countries who gathered in London to adopt the Westminster Declaration, which branded the 1969 vote as a 'gross violation of the right to self-determination'. It also called for an internationally supervised referendum in Papua.

As I have commented elsewhere, reporting of both Timor Leste and West Papua over several decades has been, and still is, a 'highly risky business', as evinced by the killing of six Australian-based journalists—the so-called Balibó Five and then Roger East who went there to investigate their deaths—during the invasion of East Timor in 1975 (immortalised in the 2009 Robert Connolly feature film *Balib*ó, www.balibo.com) (Robie, 2013).

In July 2014, Green Party MP Catherine Delahunty stunned the New Zealand Parliament with an untabled motion calling on the then new Indonesian President Joko Widodo to 'commit to genuine media freedom' in West Papua, 'including the right of local and international journalists to report there without risk of imprisonment or harassment'. Her motion won unanimous cross-party support (Robie, 2014).

This misleading new leaf-turning by Widodo led to the first television crew from New Zealand in half a century travelling to West Papua in August—Māori Television's *Native Affairs* reporter Adrian Stevanon with Pacific Media Centre researcher Karen Abplanalp were followed by a Radio New Zealand International team, Johnny Blades and Koroi Hawkins, in October. While this opened up some light on developments in West Papua for a New Zealand audience—Stevanon managed an intriguing report on an aid-funded kumara production project in the Highlands—they were still stage-managed media visits in many respects.

A Catholic Justice and Peace Commission fact-finding mission from Australia visited West Papua earlier this year, in lieu of the Pacific Islands Forum summit's initiative decided at the Port Moresby summit in September 2015—but blocked by Indonesian authorities—and produced a devastating report in May that called for urgent action to support Papuans who were 'living with unrelenting intimidation and brutality' (Archdiocese of Brisbane, 2016). The report said:

> The situation in West Papua is fast approaching a tipping point. In less than five years, the position of Papuans in their own land will be worse than precarious. They are already experiencing a demographic tidal wave. Ruthless Indonesian political, economic, social and cultural domination threatens to engulf the proud people who have inhabited the land they call Tanah Papua for thousands of years. (Ibid., p. 2)

The report was equally damning on issues of freedom of expression and the media, concluding:

> Despite an announcement in May 2015 by President Widodo that journalists would have free access to West Papua, media access is still restricted. There is no freedom of expression. Almost 40 political prisoners are currently in jail [written before the 2000 plus arrests on May 1/2 this year], customary land rights are not protected and there is no systemic policy of affirmative action. West Papuan human rights are also not protected. Throughout 2015, the Indonesian security forces have targeted young people in particular, all of whom have been unarmed. (Ibid., p. 11)

The implications for freedom of expression and the press, and safety of journalists, in West Papua is obscured by various global media freedom reports which effectively hide the region (the two provinces of Papua and West Papua) in the body of their dossier. According to Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) 2016 World Press Freedom Index, Indonesia was 130th out of 180 nations surveyed and the report noted Widodo's presidency continued to be 'marked by serious media freedom violations, including lack of access to West Papua, a media freedom black hole.' The report continued:

> Journalists and fixers working there are liable to be arrested. The problem is compounded by Indonesia's visa law, which discriminates against foreign journalists. At the same time, many poorly paid journalists accept bribes in return for positive coverage. (RSF, 2016)

In Freedom House's latest World Press Freedom report on Indonesia, the West Papuan situation also comes in for criticism:

> Media coverage of the sensitive issue of Papuan separatism continued to draw special scrutiny and restrictions from the government … Before taking office, President Widodo pledged that he would allow international journalists and organisations access to Papua and West Papua; however, this did not happen by year's end. The Indonesian authorities effectively block foreign media from reporting in the two provinces by restricting access to those with official government approval, which is rarely granted. The few journalists who do gain permission are closely monitored by government agents, who control their movements and access to local residents. (Freedom House, 2015)

According to Human Rights Watch, 'the military has also financed and trained journalists and bloggers, citing alleged foreign interference in the region, including by the US government' (Ibid.)

Following the mass arrests in early May, RSF issued a communique calling on the Indonesian government to 'stop violating the rights of journalists in West Papua'. It particularly condemned the Jayapura police for preventing reporters from covering a peaceful demonstration in support of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua on May 2—ironically, the eve of World Press Freedom Day. The communique said:

> **Ardi Bayage**, a journalist working for the *Suarapapua.com* news website, was arrested at the same time as other protesters although he showed his press card to the police. The authorities, who accused him of lying, broke his mobile phone and took him to the mobile brigade's headquarters, where he was held for several hours. (RSF, 2014b)

Benjamin Ismaïl, head of RSF's Asia-Pacific desk, said: 'We condemn this violence and censorship of local journalists whose coverage of these demonstrations was in the public interest.' He also cited the ban on France 24 journalist Cyril Payen from future visits after an in-depth report by him on West Papua, and a violent attack by police on local *Tabloid Jubi* journalist Abeth You on 8 October 2015 while covering a demonstration in Jayapura by a group called Solidarity for Victims of Human Rights Violations in Papua. Police also arrested and questioned two fixers working for a French journalist, according to Ismaïl.

It is highly appropriate then that two of the articles in this *PJR* collection should deal with human rights and freedom of expression violations in West Papua.

* * *

THIS edition opens with a commentary by **Johnny Blades**, New Zealand's first radio journalist to visit West Papua in five decades. He concludes: 'The labyrinthine process of applying for a journalist visa was a warning that change does not happen overnight for West Papua media freedom. On the ground, it is a risky business for a journalist covering West Papua.' Blades also pays tribute to *Tabloid Jubi* editor Victor Mambor, who features on *PJR's* cover, in his tireless crusade for the human rights of West Papuan people and journalists.

Ricardo Morris, president of the Fijian Media Association and editor of *República*, follows with a commentary about the reality of media life in Fiji after the September 2014 general election while the notorious *Media Industry Development Decree 2010* remains in force. Researched and written while he was on a fellowship at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University, Morris says their challenge is to 'recognise the façade of democracy' that has descended on Fiji and to 'peel it back'.

West Papua is again the subject of the first research article in this edition, with academic and author **Jason MacLeod** writing about citizen media and civil resistance in the region that he has specialised in for many years. He concludes with some optimism for the future as global attention grows: 'The movement has matured into a coordinated international force, committed to a strategy of nonviolent resistance and diplomacy with citizen media at its heart.'

Alexandra Wake examines the risks and dangers facing young, mostly freelance, journalists who have absorbed Western news values – 'including the myth of the heroic war reporter and truth seeker' – and argues for greater understanding of the cultural and political nuances of countries from which they intend to report. She says media educators need to also pay more attention to risk-assessment skills, including sufficient pre-deployment training.

The framing of asylum seekers in the Australian news publications *The Australian* and *The Guardian Australian Edition* during their coverage of the riots at the Manus Island processing centre, Papua New Guinea, in February 2014, is the topic of the next article. Writing about this framing, **Katherine Ellis, Janet Fulton** and **Paul Scott** of the University of Newcastle found major differences in the framing of the riot by both newspapers and a ban by the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection on journalists having access to the centre was also influential in the reporting.

Concluding that democracy was no longer a 'foreign flower' in Tonga following the 2014 general election, **Philip Cass** of Unitec in Auckland explores the influence of the diasporic media, the attitudes of the Tongan community in Auckland and the views of the online community and concludes that they all contributed to the change that brought 'Akilisi Pohiva to and the Democracts to power in the kingdom.

Georgios Terzis of the European Union's INFOCORE Project on conflict and war reporting examines the evolution of media in conjunction with activism, from traditional media ethno-political conflict reporting, to today's whistleblowers and hacktivists who use the internet as their main platform.

Gregory Treadwell of AUT University's School of Communication Studies explores scepticism among journalism practitioners and researchers about the 'realpolitik success' of freedom of information regimes, especially a tendency towards state secrecy since the declaration of the so-called war on terror. He also considers literature specifically about New Zealand's Freedom of Information regime.

A reporting field trip by Australian journalism students to New Caledonia and Vanuatu in mid-2014 produced markedly differing impressions of the neighbouring island societies, linked to their 'independence' status—one as an integrated territory of France, the other as an independent state. **Lee Duffield,** the course coordinator of Queensland University of Technology, synthesises the collected work from the field, producing a thematic statement of findings, ranging from

unresolved conflicts to the problems of development.

Alan Cocker, head of AUT's School of Communication Studies, has studied Malcolm Ross, New Zealand's first official war correspondent. However, in contrast to other research about his role, this article examines his less-known work as a photographer. Cocker asks whether in a multi-skilled digital era, 'the role of the writer and image-taker are still two different and not necessarily complementary skills'.

The last edition of *PJR* did not feature any *Frontline* reports, the section edited by Professor **Wendy Bacon** and featuring journalism as research, but this issue carries two such reports. The first, by **Kayt Davies** of Edith Cowan University, features *Tracking Onslow*, a collaboration between a university and local government that used journalism as a methodology to 'document and interrogate the interaction' between Chevron, the state and local governments and the Onslow community in the Pilbara region of Western Australia in a three-year 'secret deal' involving A\$250 million.

The other *Frontline* section features the *Rainbow Warrior*, secrecy and state terrorism and how an iconic act of French state terrorism in 1985 inspired a major microsite—a community-driven collaborative project in 2015 with a specialist Pacific community publisher. Written by **David Robie** of the Pacific Media Centre, the article details how the project interrogated participants over a three-decade period and 'challenged the nature of mainstream media in New Zealand' with an alternative reader's media model.

The final research articles in the edition feature an examination by **Ruth Callaghan** of the challenges and opportunities provided by the news curation tool Storify in a journalism school newsroom, and a study by **Trevor Cullen** and **Ruth Callaghan** of an Edith Cowan University journalism pilot collaboration with the West Australian AIDS Council comprising media training and education programmes to share model frameworks about sexually transmitted diseases.

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THE NEXT edition of *Pacific Journalism Review* (22(2)) will feature Asia-Pacific strategies in journalism education with many papers being presented at the 4th World Journalism Education Congress (WJEC) and the Journalism Education and Research Association of Australia (JERAA), Pacific Media Centre (PMC) and Media Educators Pacific (MEP) Preconference collaboration in Auckland in mid-July. This edition will be edited by associate editor Philip Cass as David Robie will be on research leave. It will also be published later than the usual second semester edition time, coming out in December.

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1. Watching this space, West Papua

Commentary: President Joko Widodo's announcement in May 2015 that Indonesia would allow foreign journalists to have access to West Papua was widely, but cautiously, welcomed. Some journalists decided to have another attempt at getting into this region, long cordoned off to outside access. The labyrinthine process of applying for a journalist visa was a warning that change does not happen overnight for West Papuan media freedom. On the ground, it is a risky business for a journalist covering West Papua. Local independent journalists, especially, face regular threats. The attackers are empowered by the knowledge that there is no formal accountability processes over intimidation and the murder of journalists or media workers. However, there appears to be a genuine hope that President Jokowi's term in office represents a small window of opportunity for improvement for Papua. The handling of journalists and media freedom in West Papua is very much a test case for this. Watch this space.

Keywords: bureaucracy, Indonesia, journalism, media freedom, Melanesia, New Guinea, police, West Papua

JOHNNY BLADES
Journalist, Radio New Zealand International

THE ANNOUNCEMENT in May 2015 by Indonesian President Joko Widodo that he was lifting the ban on foreign media entering West Papua was applauded abroad. International media organisations rightly praised the move, although some were possibly rather too quick to uncork the champagne. The Pacific Freedom Forum enthused that years of pressure were finally starting to pay off:

> It seems that the word has finally gone out from Jakarta to the military thugs in Jayapura and beyond—leave the media alone. (PFF, 2015)

But generally the optimism was tempered with caution. The West Papua commentariat had come to expect media subterfuge from regional governments seeking to deflect attention from the serious and long-running lack of access to Indonesia's eastern region, not just for journalists, but also for foreign researchers, humanitarian and social workers.

The caution seemed to be justified when, following President Widodo's comments, ministers in his own government poured cold water on the suggestion that access to Papua would be easier. The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, explained that foreign journalists seeking permits to cover Papua would be screened, monitored and forbidden from certain areas (presumably the Highlands). He warned foreign media not to seek false information from armed groups about security forces' violations.

'So, let the journalists have a firsthand glimpse of the situation in Papua. There is no news alike what is reported by the overseas media,' he said, adding that government was no longer using a repressive security approach in Papua, but instead one with a welfare focus. (Antara, 2015)

University of Indonesia international law expert Hikmahanto Juwana suggested that foreign journalists who entered Papua, and their media outlets, would be subject to sanctions from the Indonesian Press Council 'if found guilty of violating the journalistic code of ethics' (Salim et al, 2015).

Clearing house

It had been standard Indonesian government practice to deny that there was a ban on foreign media in West Papua. This was technically true, but in reality, securing permission to go to Papua was exceedingly rare as it required approval from 12 separate state agencies, including the military, which met each week at a Clearing Committee managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consider such applications. The clearing house process had been in effect since the early days of the Suharto rule and proved most convoluted to negotiate. As one diplomat in Jakarta put it, 'even Jesus Christ cannot get the permit to go to Papua' (Harsano, 2015).

However, in the last fseveral years a few foreign journalists had made it to Papua, such as Mark Davis of SBS and Fairfax's Michael Bachelard. In 2014, Davis examined whether Papua was experiencing a 'new dawn', having returned to Papua 15 years after he had ventured into the jungles of Irian Jaya to find out about the hidden independence struggle (Davis, 2014). Bachelard, a Jakarta correspondent, went to Papua twice and produced a series of incisive articles. One looked at how West Papuan children were being removed to Islamic religious schools in Java for 're-education'(Bachelard, 2013). Another focused on the failings of the Papua public service on the region's AIDS epidemic (Bachelard, 2013b).

Other foreign journalists went via the riskier route of entering West Papua without permits to work. In August 2014, two French journalists working for German television channel Arte, Thomas Dandois and Valentine Bourrat, were arrested in West Papua when found by police to be working without a permit in the Highlands. Their swift detention in Jayapura immediately seized international headlines. The pair faced a five-year jail term for violating their tourist

visas and their efforts to interview elements of the independence movement also landed at least one Papuan in indefinite custody. Foreign journalists caught working without a proper permit in Indonesia were usually promptly deported, but at this time, the tail end of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's term in office in late 2014, Indonesian authorities were sending a signal to foreign media ahead of the presidential elections. In the end the pair were given a two and a half month jail sentence.

Rohan Radheya is a Dutch journalist who has visited West Papua several times in recent years to work undercover, spending time with the OPM Free Papua Movement as well as political prisoners. His work resulted in the documentary film *Melanesian Dreams* (Apro productions, 2015). Despite the huge personal risk he took, Radheya was mindful of the risk for Papuans he met and interviewed.

'When I approach people … they feel somehow that they have to talk to me because they are Papuans and they are occupied and they have a sort of a duty to talk to me,' he told Radio New Zealand International. 'They can be in prison for talking to me, and that's something I have to be very careful about.' (Blades, 2015b).

Despite the announcement by President Widodo (who is known widely as Jokowi) about the lifting of the ban on foreign journalists, Radheya was skeptical about the prospects for improvement. If anything, he felt Indonesia was seeking to exert more control over foreign journalists who visited Papua, monitoring and restricting movement, including meeting with the opposition in rural areas.

> And that is exactly the problem: foreigners are restricted from travelling to rural areas. There's much lawlessness, much corruption in those areas, and that's where the human rights violations take place. That's actually the hotspot. It's like the security forces, they have a blank cheque, they can do whatever they want. They get away with it too. It's very difficult to know what's happened there, there's no internet, no telephone coverage, the roads are not good. So these are actually the hotspots where the security forces, the military, are committing the most human rights violations. (Blades, 2015b)

During Jokowi's term of office so far, the focus has largely been around fostering economic development in those parts of Papua where basic services were lacking. In this, his policy has not been too dissimilar to his predecessor, Yudhoyono. However, it has quickly become clear that Jokowi is taking a different approach on West Papua by travelling more frequently to the remote region to take a hands-on approach to development, including efforts to actually listen to Papuans. The most visible gestures he has made include talking about opening up media access and freeing political prisoners.

Much like his predecessor, Jokowi downplayed suggestions of ongoing 'separatist' troubles in West Papua. However, the 'what conflict?' angle is hard to

reconcile with the steady stream of ground reports about abuses against Papuans by security forces. Many of these reports have been hard to verify, hence the need to have better access to the region to produce accurate reports about claims of atrocities and other serious matters. Indonesian diplomats have claimed that security risks in West Papua made it too dangerous for foreign journalists to venture there. However, this simply does not stack up with assertions by Jakarta that Papua is a peaceful region where it is making significant efforts to foster economic development for the indigenous people to participate in.

Officials I met at the Indonesian Embassy in New Zealand felt there was often a lack of understanding about Indonesia in New Zealand. One of their criticisms was that New Zealand media had a negative perception about the country. In the case of Radio New Zealand International's coverage of West Papua, they felt we did not often enough incorporate the Indonesian government voice in our reports. It was probably a fair call, but this imbalance was not for want of trying. Making contact with Indonesian government officials or security forces spokespeople in Papua has long been a problem because of the remoteness of the place, its patchy telecommunications and the language barrier. There is also a defensiveness that Jakarta exhibits around Papua-related matters which is not easily traversed from afar. We wanted to hear and see their side of the story, if only they would let us. After all, I was interested to see some of the efforts to nurture economic development in Papua which I had read so much about in Indonesian media in recent years.

I had previously been declined for a visa to West Papua. However, after the May announcement, I decided to give it another attempt. The process was still convoluted. My fraught experience of the application process may serve as a useful example of how Indonesia currently handles media freedom and journalism in West Papua.

The place that sends you mad

The complex process of applying for a journalist visa as well as for a permit to shoot video for my colleague Koroi Hawkins and I, led me in and out of the Indonesian Embassy in Wellington half a dozen times through the bitter winter of 2015. Because more was required than just filling in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's online forms, an official at the embassy guided me through the requirements of the application, which included a detailed reporting schedule, list of interviewees and letters of recommendation from local officials and interviewees.

The embassy official assured me of his help in applying for a permit to Papua, but was keen to first build a friendship, or trust, as he put it. So there were several meetings with cups of tea and discussions about New Zealand media perceptions of Indonesia. Early on, he offered a place on the upcoming Indonesian Foreign

Ministry's journalist visitor's programme which involved prescribed visits for overseas-based journalists to Bandung, Bali and Jakarta, featuring scheduled interviews with government officials. I declined, preferring to focus on Papua.

Getting hold of people in Papua and pinning them down months in advance for an interview was challenging. A lot of e-mails and phone messages were dispatched through intermediaries, but there were few replies. I noted that Papuan church figures were usually good communicators; Indonesian officials less so— perhaps because their grasp of English tended to not be as good as the Papuans.

It sometimes took a month to get answers, so it seemed a minor victory when I received a signed letter from the Governor of Papua province, Lukas Enembe, endorsing our visit. Still, the official at the embassy felt I would need more letters to get over the line. Among the people I hoped to interview were leading Indonesian government and security forces figures. I made no headway with the police or military, but I managed to get through to one of the key Jakarta people, Judith Dipodiputro, a sort of special envoy for President Jokowi on community development in Papua.

It had been relatively easy to contact Dipodiputro via WhatsApp, an app favoured by many in Indonesia. Over the phone she agreed to be interviewed, due to the fact that she would probably be in Jayapura the same time as our planned trip there. That seemed straightforward enough. When I included her name on our submission, the official at the Indonesian Embassy said that I would need a letter of recommendation from Dipodiputro in order to get an interview. I went back and tried to contact Dipodiputro, but she was busy. Things drifted for a few weeks before I received a message from her to contact her assistant in Jakarta to request the interview. Through him, I learned that a letter of recommendation was needed from my manager at RNZI before Dipodiputro could produce a letter from her end: a government requirement, apparently. Next, I was asked for interview questions to be sent in advance. I did as required, although a letter of recommendation from the Indonesian side was not forthcoming.

Separate from the journalist visa, the video permit, we were told, would have to be issued by the Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM), Indonesia's state agency for coordinating investment. This seemed strange, given the journalistic nature of our planned trip. It was not some commercial piece. Contacts in Jakarta believed there was still some confusion about the directive from President Jokowi that foreign media were to be given access to Papua. There were no clear instructions on how this was to be implemented. An unwieldy network of ministries and state agencies with different agendas simply kept operating as they had long done.

The same embassy official I was dealing with had also facilitated journalists' visa applications for two other New Zealand journalists, Adrian Stevanon and Karen Abplanalp, to go to Papua in August, for Māori Television, filming a programme

about the indigenous people of West Papua, including material from the Highlands town of Wamena. (Abplanalp was also completing her master's degree thesis on media access to West Papua [Abplanalp, 2015]). After seeing the preview for their programme, the embassy official was sweating about how Māori Television's portrayal of Papua would go down with his superiors. He was worried too about being held responsible for helping RNZ International in case it did further harm. His job could be on the line, the official suggested. He reminded me about comments made by the Indonesian Ambassador, Joses Tavares, that Jakarta had no problem with foreign journalists covering Papua, as long as the coverage was 'independent'.

We finally heard from the embassy official that he had sent the papers off to Jakarta for the application to be considered by the committee and it was only a day later that we heard back that our journalist visas were approved. But then things got complicated with the BKPM. When it transpired that our man at the embassy had not sent off our application for a video permit until shortly before we were due to go to Papua, I started to get worried. Abplanalp and Stevanon had been told they had to travel to Jakarta to personally pick up their video permit. Otherwise, they would have probably flown via Denpasar, Bali. On the other hand, I sought to travel to West Papua via Papua New Guinea. The embassy official, who had offered to send through the papers for our video permit applications, said that it might be possible to not have to travel to Papua via Jakarta, and recommended I organise a friend or colleague to pick up the permit from the BKPM in the Indonesian capital and then send it to me. I therefore organised an expatriate New Zealand journalist who I knew who was living in Jakarta to do this pick-up. But when the time came to collect the permit, the agency told him it did not have enough information about the purpose of our planned visit to Papua to give approval. This required more exchanges and in the meantime the BKPM started asking my contact in Jakarta questions about the aim of our plans. This man was in fact merely picking up the permit as a functionary and was not privy to our reporting plans. Yet suddenly he was in the firing line. The BKPM's suspicion about my plans for Papua made him distinctly uneasy. Down the phone line from Jakarta, he explained to me in no uncertain terms that the authorities could make his ability to live and work in Indonesia difficult if it turned out that Koroi and I had a 'secret agenda'. I was aghast at the thought of implicating him through our reporting. What if our coverage of Papua somehow caused the authorities in Jakarta to knock on this man's door one night and tear him away from his young family? There was no secret agenda on our part, but I felt another layer of pressure being built into the Papua trip.

The official spoke about our applications needing to go through proper channels, but there were so many of them and they were so inefficient. It had begun to feel like *The Twelve Tasks of Asterix* where one of a set of Herculean challenges facing the protagonist leads him and his offsider, Obelix, into a

bureaucratic office complex to seek a particular permit, only for staff to direct them up and down floors, back and forth between more 'clinically unhelpful people' in a never-ending wild goosechase that would drive mere mortals steadily insane (Goscinny et al, 1978).

Regarding the elusive video permit, our friend at the embassy said not to worry, that it was just communication issues between the BKPM and the Foreign Ministry. I took it that his late despatch of our papers had been part of this. The BKPM approved the permit, simply sending an electronic copy the day before we left for Papua. Presumably we could have done it this way all along. As if to underline the lack of cohesiveness in this whole process, I found that while the vaunted letter of recommendation from Judith Dipodiputro's people had still not been issued after a month of communications, a simple call to her on our way in to New Guinea was all it took to seal the arrangement. For her part, she was happy to meet and talk about Jokowi's development drive. Mandarins had merely complicated everything. Throughout the bureaucracy there seemed to be suspicion that foreign journalists were some sort of destabilising agents.

Glimpses

We went into Papua by land via Indonesia's border with Papua New Guinea, the only international land border in the Pacific Islands region. The main border access point at Wutung is tightly guarded by Indonesian military. It is the same land but the differences between Papua New Guinea and West Papua come sharply into focus as you cross over to the western side, especially the presence of military and police. Without permission, we were not allowed to film or photograph the security forces. My earlier communications to seek interviews with the regional commanders had fallen short. But they knew we were coming.

Shortly before we had arrived, local journalists in Jayapura had a briefing from police and military about foreign journalists. In attendance was Victor Mambor, the editor and publisher of West Papuan independent newspaper *Tabloid Jubi*. Mambor was our fixer and guide while we visited Papua, just as he had been for Māori Television and for France 24's Cyril Payen. I had met Mambor at the 2013 Melanesian Spearhead Group leaders' summit in Noumea. He was doing more than any other West Papua journalist in recent years to cover the wider Pacific region and to bring the stories of Papuans to the wider Pacific region. He had travelled to New Zealand in 2014 lobbying for support for freedom of media access to Papua (Majavu, 2014). At the Jayapura briefing, police had warned about local agents working on behalf of foreigners. Mambor, a veritable interface to West Papua for us foreign journalists, had no doubt that they were referring to him.

Mambor was one of a handful of journalists who accompanied Jokowi around Papua during the president's May 2015 visit to Papua. While he may have been

Figure 1. *Tabloid Jubi* **editor Victor Mambor and journalist Engelbert Wally (in background) at Lake Sentani.**

considered acceptable to the Jokowi administration, officials in the embassy in New Zealand, for instance, considered Mambor anti-government. Yet Mambor was not so much anti-government as pro-Papuan, chiefly concerned with disinterring West Papuan stories that were otherwise veiled by a Jakarta-spun version of events. Jakarta, he knew, was keeping an increasingly close watch on international coverage. We expected in advance that intelligence agents would be watching our steps. Sure enough, each morning in Jayapura I opened the curtains in the hotel room and noticed a couple of men in the square, keeping an eye on us. I came to expect them, and when I waved, they waved back.

In West Papua, we met a good range of people: Papuans and non-Papuans; government officials, people on the street, fishermen, public servants, the political prisoner Filep Karma. Some were cautious about speaking on tape. Beyond Papuans'

aspirations for independence, there is a clear sentiment among the indigenous people of Indonesia's eastern region that the time is well overdue for mature discussion in Indonesia about basic human conditions and rights denied to them. Papuans see little reason why they should be branded as 'separatists' just for speaking up about Papua's core problems such as transmigration, the presence of security forces and the culture of impunity around military and police abuses.

However, the situation in West Papua is not set in stone. The old stereotype of the Papuan freedom fighter waging jungle warfare against the Indonesian state is less useful these days. There is an emerging generation more focused on advancing the Papuan cause through peaceful means, including social empowerment. There are plenty of non-Papuans who also want a non-military solution. There seems to be genuine hope that Jokowi's term represents a small window of opportunity for improvement in Papua. Media freedom is a testing ground for this, with the likes of Victor Mambor on the front line.

> I work for my people here, I deliver the truth. Sometimes because we wrote the story of what West Papua wants, we get stigmatised by the authorities, especially police and military. One of my journalists was killed in Merauke. Then last month, one of my journalists got shot at... intimidated and harassed by police. So this is conflict land. Anything can happen. I know the risk, but we have a commitment to facing the risks. Young journalists have the same conviction as me. (V. Mambor, interview with author, 17/10/15)

Dian Kandipi is a journalist with Antara news agency. She told me working in West Papua carried risk. 'If you are not be careful, you can lose your life, lose your safety, lose your career' (Kandipi, 2016). Kandipi claimed she had generally

Figure 2. The *Tabloid Jubi* office in Jayapura, Papua.

been able to cover a range of issues, but that media freedom came with what the journalist described as a requirement of 'clarification'.

'Sometimes, people in Papua do not understand about clarification, so if we wrong or false write a news, they can threaten our family or our self' (Kandipi, 2016).

False information spreads readily throughout Papua. Bribing journalists is relatively common. This comes into context when misleading reports surface in Indonesian national media about perpetrators of violence in the region where it has long been easy to pin blame on Papuan 'separatists'. However, it is clear that Indonesia can no longer control the flow of information in West Papua the way it used to. Social media has witnessed the mushrooming of West Papua solidarity amid busy information feeds carrying grisly reports of abuses from Papua. The growing international interest in Papua is something Jakarta is scrambling to manage. Jokowi and his core team at least seem to have realised that cordoning off West Papua to outside journalists appears repressive.

In November 2015, an international delegation of representatives of 10 media and freedom of expression organisations visited Indonesia at the invitation of the Alliance of Independent Journalists to investigate the state of the country's media and advocate for improvement. They made a stop in Papua which was found to be among the most concerning parts of the republic, media freedom-wise.

'Indonesia's existing climate of impunity continues to impact negatively on journalist safety and working conditions,' the delegation reported. 'Attackers are empowered by the knowledge that there are currently no formal accountability processes on investigations into attacks, intimidation and murder of journalists and media workers' (CPJ, n.d.). It also noted the obstacles to foreign journalists' reporting in Papua including surveillance and threats against their sources; finding that 'in some cases arrests of sources have taken place' (CPJ, n.d.).

While in Papua, we had a brush with police, when we went to a provincial volleyball tournament that the Papua Governor was formally opening. The place was crawling with police, perhaps because both the Papua police and military commanders were also in attendance. We were there to interview Governor Enembe, but police quickly swooped on us to check our papers. They were in order, but our plans to interview Enembe had to be put on hold for a few hours after a problem arose with police from General Paulus Waterpauw's office. They told me we had failed to report to the police upon entry to Papua. I explained that the Indonesian Embassy had assured me there was no requirement to do this. Besides, the command already knew about our presence because I had been communicating with Waterpauw in patchy Bahasa by text message a few days earlier, trying (unsuccessfully) to tee up an interview with the head policeman.

We were eventually cleared by police and subsequently directed by Governor Enembe to interview him back at his residence where it seems he was more at

liberty to answer questions, away from the commanders. But while things were in limbo at the stadium, police and undercover personnel hovered around me, one of them making bizarre conversation with me, asking if I read the Bible; another gesturing shooting actions. It was intimidating stuff.

'See what we go through all the time?' said Victor Mambor that evening.

The visit to West Papua was just a glimpse, but it was most instructive (Blades, 2015a). My admiration for independent journalists based in Papua has only grown. The need for adequate support and protection for them to be able to do their job is even more important than the need for foreign journalists' access to Papua.

The step taken by President Jokowi to ease restrictions on media access in Papua was a welcome move. However, he is something of a lone figure on this, beholden to leading elements in his party and the parliament. It is felt by some Jakarta insiders that the president has not issued clear enough instructions on the media issue. Different ministries appear to be unsure of the change of process, or are determined to delay and frustrate foreign media applications because that is how it has always been done. To add to the confusion, the security forces—which are beyond civilian control in Papua—have their own ideas.

Meanwhile, Jakarta has refused Cyril Payen another visa to return to Papua and at the time of writing, I had just received the first communication in months from the official at the Indonesian Embassy in Wellington. He emailed a question-naire on perceptions within New Zealand about Indonesia. The bid for greater understanding of each other continues.

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2. 'Journalism of hope' realities in post-election Fiji

Commentary: In the lead up to Fiji General Election in September 2014, there was an air of positivity among media workers that despite the difficulties since the military takeover in December 2006—including the imposition of the *Media Industry Development Decree* in 2010—their operating environment would possibly be easing. The *Fiji Sun*, which had chosen in 2009 after the abolition of the 1997 Constitution to change its stance, adopting an editorial policy unabashedly partisan towards the Voreqe Bainimarama-led government, opened up its pages to all political parties and candidates giving them relatively free rein to comment on the political landscape as they saw it. Media organisations ran reports that criticised the military-led regime's performance as campaigning began to pick up. However, not long after the much-hailed return-to-democracy election it became clear that the reappearance of media vibrancy and plurality would not happen overnight. The author critically examines the post-election climate and draws on his personal experience as a Fiji news media editor.

RICARDO MORRIS
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Introduction

NOT LONG after Fiji's much hailed democracy-returning election in September 2014, it became clear that the reappearance of media vibrancy and plurality would not happen overnight. The media still had to contend with the realities of doing business under the *2010 Media Industry Development Decree*. Generally, the media avoided problems by sticking to 'positive' news, ministers' speeches and government announcements, police and court reports, although there would be the occasional news story that scratched the surface of some matter that could be deemed controversial. To its credit, for example, the Fiji Broadcasting Corporation and other media organisations have continued to report the drawn-out court appearances of local government minister Parveen Kumar Bala who was accused of causing the death of a woman in 2013 by dangerous driving. But that has been an exception and news often breaks on social media long before it is picked up by mainstream media outlets.

Critics, even ones generally supportive of the government's reform agenda, agree that the draconian measures in the media decree introduced a chilling effect in which in-depth, analytical and investigative stories were avoided because of a complex mix of personalities and legal interpretation that could come into play. The media decree created the regulatory body called the Media Industry Development Authority (MIDA), which looms large over media organisations and workers. Its chairman Ashwin Raj, an employee of the University of the South Pacific but with no media experience himself, has urged the Fijian media to not focus on the penalties but to think about 'productive ways in which we can work around things that we deem regressive' (Fiji media urged to test media law limits, 2015). This is easier said than done in a country with a media workforce that consists of a large proportion of young people who have grown up in the difficult media operating environment and have never seen other journalists regularly holding power to account or the official narrative openly challenged.

A prominent example of the chilling effect stems from the reference in the media decree to the 'public interest', which a journalist can be accused of breaching but which is not defined in the decree itself. This leaves MIDA and its officials at liberty to define what they see as the public interest and to declare when it has been breached.

For a small country emerging from years of isolation from its traditional foreign partners such as Australia and New Zealand, Fiji has managed to increase its influence and is undoubtedly a strategic Pacific country for many of the world's major powers. In the nine years since Voreqe Bainimarama has been in power, the media landscape has changed profoundly—for the better in some ways, but in many aspects, such as in investigative journalism, the change has been regressive (Robie, 2015). Fiji had been an independent country for 17 years when it suffered its first coup in 1987. In the 27 years from that moment until the general election in September 2014, Fiji had spent more than half the period (169 months out of a total 328 months) under non-democratic rule, with the so-called civilian coup in May 2000 and the longest period under dictatorship being Bainimarama's regime from December 2006.

Perhaps more than any other period in Fiji's post-1987 history, the current milieu can be characterised by what Timothy Garton Ash describes as a 'strange mixture of democracy and dictatorship: a demokratura' (Ash, 2009), led by leaders that Joel Simon calls 'democratators' (Simon, 2015, p. 33). Since the election, this façade of democracy has been accepted because of the sheer force of will the government of the day exerts on all aspects of life in the country. In his 2015 discussion paper, Scott MacWilliam labels Bainimarama as the Bonaparte of the South Pacific, arguing that he may yet develop an even more repressive streak because of the difficulties inherent in mediating 'politically within the capitalist class without being of capital' (MacWilliam, 2015).

In January 2016, *The Fiji Times* took a surprising and impressive decision when it published a damning opinion column by opposition parliamentarian Professor Biman Prasad, the leader of the National Federation Party. Titled 'Is our democracy really working?' Prasad criticised what he said was a 'dysfunctional political system born of a deeply flawed and imposed Constitution, and economic policies designed to boost the government's image, not Fiji's long-term economic future'. Prasad, and Professor Wadan Narsey have been advocating for free media in Fiji. They have condemned the media decree as draconian, and Prasad says the decree has worked to 'deny the opposition any voice'. Prasad adds: 'The lack of access to a free and independent media has been the single most frustrating obstacle for the opposition parties when they try to make the government publicly accountable on various national issues' (Prasad, 2016).

The media and the election

Before the election, there was an air of positivity among media workers. MIDA's Raj urged journalists not to fear and promised that he would defend their freedom to report as long as they upheld the ethics embedded in the media decree. The Constitution, promulgated in 2013, was often quoted for its Bill of Rights provisions that guaranteed—albeit with claw-back clauses—freedom of speech, expression and publication (Section 17). The proliferation of critical voices in the mainstream media and on social media contributed to a sense of euphoria that Fiji was returning to democratic rule.

Despite a 48-hour blackout on political reporting, advertising and discussion on any form of media before polling day, the period passed without any major issues reported inside Fiji. However, Radio New Zealand International reported an alleged breach by Fiji Broadcasting Corporation because an advertisement for the regime's FijiFirst party was still visible on the outlet's website the day before the poll. However, Raj said he did not trust screenshots as evidence of such a breach and did not pursue the matter (Perrottet, 2014). On election day, September 17, joining the 413 local media workers registered by MIDA and the Fijian Elections Office to cover Fiji's first national polls in eight years, were 37 foreign journalists (Naleba, 2014). Studies have shown that Fiji's journalistic cadre is relatively young (Hanusch & Uppal, 2015; Robie, 2004). Combined with the industry's high turnover rate and the immense brain drain of experienced editors and journalists after 2000 and 2006, this would have meant that in 2014 many journalists would have been covering their first general election, one in which they would also have voted for the first time.

Just weeks before the election, MIDA Director Matai Akauola resigned to contest the general election, leaving Raj as the lone MIDA personality during the poll. While Akauola did not win a seat in the election (gaining 615 votes of a total 496,364), he was subsequently sworn into Parliament on 9 February 2016

after vacancies in the house arose during 2015. Thus an important figure in the regime's pre-election media control scheme had made the transition to Parliament.

Development journalism vs Fiji's 'journalism of hope'

Over the past decade, several media scholars on Fiji have suggested a rethinking of the journalistic model putting forward variations on the 'development journalism' approach they argued could be more constructive for Fiji given its history of ethnic and political divisions (Hanusch & Uppal, 2015; Perrottet, 2015; Robie, 2008; Singh, 2014).

A prominent proponent of the genre is Kunda Dixit, the *Nepali Times* editor-in-chief who views development journalism as a tool for the vigorous examination in a nuanced fashion of issues confronting communities and countries, not merely an account of development issues. He believes development journalism can and should be applied locally as well as scaled to an international level (Dixit, 2010). Hemant Shah (1996), attempting to advance the understanding of the concept, argues that journalists should play an activist role within new social movements in the process of national development. In the Pacific, David Robie has long argued widely for 'critical investigative journalism' or 'deliberative journalism' that should expose corruption and human rights abuses, and seek solutions in contrast to much of the simplistic and patronising reporting about developing countries by many Western media. In short, deliberative journalism should be contextual, balanced and truthful (2012).

However, in 2009 the Fijian authorities seized upon the concept of development journalism and a bastardised version was brandished as a government-approved form of journalism in Fiji's 'new legal order' that followed the abolition of the 1997 Constitution in April that year. Taking a leaf out of the books of countries like Singapore and Malaysia, the Fijian authorities prohibited news reports they deemed problematic to their efforts to 'move Fiji forward' (Morris, 2012). Rather than any robust and critical examination of government decisions and policies, the media took this 'development' concept to mean 'soft' stories that would not cause political ripples or slow down the regime's plans. The media were given an ultimatum: toe the line on 'journalism of hope' or else. The harsh reaction of the regime to media organisations and journalists deemed non-compliant was often enough to keep them onside; several media outlets and personalities had before then and since been made examples of.

MIDA and the media

Fiji's media fraternity has had a mixed relationship with its regulatory body, MIDA, since its establishment in 2010. The first two chairmen were both professors of literature and while they had articulated their vision for an industry under the new media law, they maintained a largely low profile. Ashwin Raj,

however, famed for his use of polysyllabic, wordy statements, immediately made his presence felt and since August 2014, with the resignation of MIDA director Matai Akauola to contest the election, he has been the only public face of MIDA.

Raj took up the position in October 2013 at the same time as Akauola was promoted from media member to director of MIDA. Between them they stamped their mark early with a news conference in which the chairman declared the independence of MIDA and outlined what he said the authority's role was:

- Advance the critical work of the media in building a culture of deep democracy in Fiji;
- Promote cohesiveness;
- Foster mutual understanding, critical thinking, maintenance of independence and objectivity, and;
- Urge media workers to take responsibility and uphold media codes and ethics. (Raj, 2013a)

In the course of the news conference Raj announced that freelance journalists and foreign media trainers in Fiji would also need to register themselves with the authority. The media decree itself is silent on the direct registration of journalists or media trainers (only media organisations are obliged to register) and the decree does not once mention the term 'freelance journalist'. This prompted the Pacific Freedom Forum, a grouping of free speech advocates, to issue a statement signed by its co-chairs calling the announcement a 'restriction' and a retrograde step (Hill, 2013; Miller & Gabi, 2013). That triggered an immediate response from MIDA labeling the PFF statement 'misleading and mischievous because registration and restriction are two different things'. MIDA also called on this author, then newly appointed PFF regional coordinator (an unpaid role), as a Suva-based journalist and editor of *República* magazine, to 'declare his interest … whether they are media proprietors or non-governmental organisation officials (NGOs). They cannot have it all' (Raj, 2013b).

That episode illustrated early in Raj's term as MIDA chairman the views he and his director held on media advocacy by journalists with the clear implication that one could not speak out in defence of press freedom if one was a journalist. It leaves the question: if Fiji is to find 'homegrown' solutions in defining its media landscape, who in Fiji should be speaking up for press freedom if journalists themselves are forbidden from doing so according to MIDA's interpretation of the law? In the end, the pressure put on Morris through MIDA forced him to relinquish the position of regional coordinator, although the PFF continued to express the hope that the Fijian media authority would keep an open mind about media monitoring and advocacy (Miller & Gabi, 2014).

After that explosive start, MIDA embarked on a series of media workshops, although one Australian-funded workshop was cancelled after Raj became

embroiled in a public spat with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. The dispute stemmed from a report by Sean Dorney about the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA) Pacific Media Summit held in Noumea in February 2014 (Hill, 2014; Vuibau, 2014a).

The first major issue involving a local media company came in early April 2014, when Fiji TV broadcast a speech by a chief about ethnicity in Fiji. Just a day after the formal complaint from the Ministry of Information, Raj announced his ruling in a news conference before even Fiji Television was informed of the decision. The controversy was in relation to a 6pm news report, which Raj described as 'racial vilification', 'hate speech' and a breach of the media decree's code of ethics and content regulation (Raj, 2014).

In May, a World Media Freedom Day panel discussion was organised at the University of the South Pacific (USP), which included Raj and representatives from media companies. In the first of its kind in a long time in Fiji, issues about media freedom and self-censorship were brought to the fore in a two-and-half hour discussion. There were instances of hostility from the audience towards Raj (the entire event was live streamed by USP) and economist, social commentator and media freedom advocate Professor Wadan Narsey was especially vocal about MIDA's role, media ownership structures and self-censorship in the media (Craddock, 2014; Narsey, 2014; Vuibau, 2014b). Raj reiterated his pledge to defend media freedom as long as journalists maintained their ethics.

No media organisation was cited for or found guilty of breaching the 48-hour blackout rule on election-related reporting and advertisements until the close of polling at 6pm on election day (Naleba, 2014).

A month after Bainimarama was returned to power with a democratic mandate, a Fijian state delegation appeared before the UN's Human Rights Council in Geneva where Raj defended the government's approach to media rights in the country and rejected suggestions that the media operated in a restrictive framework. It reported that only one prosecution had taken place under its regulations (against *The Fiji Times*' directors for breach of the residency rules) and that no media organisation had been prosecuted for breaches of the code of ethics, or content rules (Draft report of the Working Group on the Univeral Periodic Review: Fiji, 2014). However, this made no mention of the previous 'rulings' that Raj was supposed to have handed down against media companies.

In early December 2014, Raj was to strongly condemn comments made at the *Pacific Journalism Review* conference in Auckland by this author, as president of the Fijian Media Association, and University of the South Pacific media academic Shailendra Singh, reflecting on the state of Fiji's media industry. In a *Fiji Sun* report, Raj took issue with the characterisation of the media decree as a noose around the media's neck (Delaibatiki, 2014). (In the speech, the reference of a 'noose' was used specifically to describe Fiji TV's licensing situation

discussed below.) Raj based his criticism on a brief report with paraphrased comments published on the Pacific Media Centre website without the benefit of context from the full statements made at the conference.

In January 2015, Raj convened a meeting of editors where he agreed the authority would focus on fostering freedom of expression and media ethics and promised to look into the editors' concerns relating to media regulation (Vuibau, 2015). The meeting was considered a positive step and there was some hope that Raj would be able to influence amendments to the media decree in the new Parliament. Unfortunately, just a few days later, Raj became embroiled in a legal matter that put paid to any further action on his part on the points the editors had raised (Gibson & Tokalau, 2015). The charges of annoyance against Raj were dropped the next month.

A somewhat unexpected event involving Raj and the *Fiji Sun* came the following month. It stemmed from a complaint by youth activist Peter Waqavonovono about two of the newspaper's reports—one a gossip column piece he said had defamed him, and another about his Social Democractic Party (SODELPA) that was described in a front-page report as clinging to issues surrounding ethnicity and land in its election campaign. Raj upheld the complaint citing its 'antagonistic' nature. After a defiant response from the *Fiji Sun*, which threatened legal action, Raj soon retracted and apologised for his statements, admitting that he had acted 'ultra vires'—outside his powers—in coming to his decision.

Fiji Sun publisher Peter Lomas said there was no evidence for the complaint to be upheld and that if it was allowed to stand 'it could mean that Fijian journalism can be stifled by the opinion of one man' (Delaibatiki, 2015). This was a curious incident because just two months previously, Raj had been afforded considerable space in the newspaper to criticise the opinions of other media personalities about the state of media in Fiji. Left unasked and unanswered after this debacle was what his reversal meant for the other decisions that he had reached in a similar manner against other media organisations.

Fiji TV's travails

Similar to *The Fiji Times*, Fiji Television has long been in the crosshairs of Fijian authorities. Apart from the MIDA ruling on hate speech, Fiji TV had between 2012 and 2015 functioned on a broadcast licence granted for only six months at a time. Its main competitor, on the other hand, the government-owned Fiji Broadcasting Corporation, had secured a 12-year licence when it launched its TV service in 2011. From 2012, when its exclusive licence came to an end, Fiji TV operated on a knife edge, its staff petrified of getting on the wrong side of government for fear the broadcaster might lose its operating licence. Several of its editorial staff had in previous years already been sidelined or forced out by government pressure over perceived biases or slights.

The pressure on Fiji TV came to a head in late 2014 over an issue many Fijians are passionate about: rugby.

In May of that year, the Attorney-General and Minister for Communications, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum had promulgated a decree called the *Television (Cross Carriage of Designated Events) Decree* which purported to ensure all Fijians could view important national events on free-to-air television. However, the decree's provisions were also extended to live rugby feeds, and other major sporting events. Fiji TV, which held the exclusive rights to broadcast the World Rugby Sevens in Fiji was forced to share it with the other broadcasters, FBC TV and Mai TV (Kumar, 2014; Sayed-Khaiyum, 2014). In December, three months after the election, just as Fiji was leading the HSBC Sevens Series, the ramifications of the decree hit home. World Rugby cut the feed to Fiji TV saying there was no prior consultation by the Fijian government about the impact of the decree and that Fiji TV would breach its contractual obligations by sharing the feed as the decree insisted (Field, 2014). There was uproar and consternation in Fiji, the likes that even politics rarely generates. Crisis meetings followed between government and TV officials as well as World Rugby representatives. There was defiance from top Fiji TV executives, ultimatums from the Attorney-General and finally the sackings by a compliant Fiji TV board of its chief executive officer Tevita Gonelevu and head of content Tanya Waqanika.

A month later, the sacked pair called a news conference where they laid bare the events that led up to their firing. They accused the Attorney-General of interfering in the functioning of Fiji TV, a listed company, by sending demands direct to the board chairman. They also claimed he had misled Parliament earlier over the dispute, an allegation that had also been raised by an opposition MP in Parliament. A few months later, the Speaker ruled the Attorney-General had not misled Parliament.

Early in 2015, the government amended the cross carriage decree in Parliament after a deal was struck with World Rugby in which its events were removed from the decree's listing, while it would allow the licence holders to sub-lease the live feed (Smith, 2015).

The evisceration of Fiji TV continued into 2015. In August when the government for the first time amended the media decree in Parliament, one of the changes was to allow foreign ownership of pay TV in Fiji. This was done to clear the way for the Fiji arm of international mobile company Digicel, to buy Sky Pacific from Fiji TV. Attorney-General Sayed-Khaiyum revealed this in Parliament before the stock market was informed so Fiji TV had to rush a market announcement out after it had been broadcast on live TV. The deal with Digicel was finally concluded in March 2016, when it received a 12-year licence. Sky Pacific was a huge earner for Fiji TV, with customers in a large footprint across the Pacific. Fiji TV also wholly owned Media Niugini Limited in Papua New Guinea until

the Fiji TV board agreed to divest the company. After years of building itself into a regional powerhouse, the government's actions have undone all this and now Fiji TV is just a national broadcaster once more with a formidable foe in the government-owned Fiji Broadcasting Corporation.

Exclusive government advertising

Perhaps one of the most economically effective ways the Fijian government asserts its influence over mainstream media in Fiji is through advertising-spend. Long before it put out a tender in August 2015, it was a de facto policy of government that it would only advertise with outlets it deemed to reflect its own values. The *Fiji Sun* and FBC were two of the more prominent outlets that had benefited early on from this policy by raking in major money through government advertising. *The Fiji Times* would occasionally receive advertisements from government departments or statutory bodies, but following the results of the tender announced in December 2015, this will no longer be the case.

The tender would probably not have been called if it was not for the opposition MP, Professor Biman Prasad moving a motion in Parliament in July calling on the Minister for Communication (Sayed-Khaiyum) to review his decision to grant exclusive advertisements because it breached the Constitution. He called for *The Fiji Times* and *Fiji Sun* to be treated equally (Narsey, 2015). The motion was, of course, defeated owing to the government's superior numbers but the opposition had succeeded in shining a light on the issue.

The tender, among other indicators, stated that media companies would have to 'demonstrate a commitment to national unity, national identity development and national building', 'a commitment to the development of the Fijian economy' and report 'development and government issues in an unbiased and responsible manner'.

Around Christmas 2015, the Solicitor-General, Sharvada Sharma, announced the 'approved media organisations' for government advertisements. The *Fiji Sun* and FBC were on the list. A surprising addition was rugby magazine *Teivovo*, which also publishes a newly launched general interest publication called *Niuwave*. Communications Fiji Limited, Fiji's largest non-government broadcaster, also received approval for certain advertisements.

Media feeling its way back

In outlining the issues facing the Fijian media industry, it is not to say that there have been no improvements. The media decree has arguably brought about a sense of responsibility (although this has been used to sometimes stifle genuinely newsworthy reports) and the media are now aware of the power they wield and how this power can be misused. The media's role in nation building and restoring the fractured relationship between Fiji's communities has also improved in recent years.

In the years ahead, Fiji's media will play a crucial role in holding its leaders to account and giving voice to the issues the public care about. It must do this while navigating the complexities of regulation, personalities and a democracy in which voices dissenting from the ruling-power narrative are often ignored or shut down, a democracy in which the call to practise 'responsible journalism' often becomes a barrier to investigative journalism or holding the powers-that-be to account for their actions or promises. For Fiji's journalists, the challenge is to recognise the façade of democracy that has descended on their country and peel it back. They will need to work around numerous barriers to provide the public with the information, ideas, analysis and discussion that they deserve in order to understand the new Fiji that is taking shape.

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3. Citizen media and civil resistance in West Papua

Abstract: This article charts the dynamics and trajectory of citizen media activism in West Papua's fight for freedom which has progressed from not even registering in news rooms around the world to influencing sub-regional and regional bodies. Citizen media has played an essential role in this transformation. In 1998, when the Indonesian military massacred more than 100 unarmed West Papuans in Biak Island, it took weeks and months to get the news out. Back then West Papua was a military operations area (Daerah Operasi Militer). Few journalists were willing to risk travelling into the country to get the story out. In January 2016 West Papua remains an occupied colony. The Indonesian government still tries to curtail open access to West Papua for foreign journalists but courageous young people armed with cell phones are finding ways to bypass the government's failed attempt at an informational blockade and it is making a difference. West Papuans are now members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the Pacific Island Forum is starting to take notice of the Pacific's longest running self-determination and decolonisation struggle.

Keywords: citizen media, conflict reporting, human rights, Indonesia, Melanesia, peace journalism, political journalism, West Papua

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I N JULY 1998, Papuans gathered around the water tower in Biak City. For four days they sang hymns, prayed, danced, hoisted the Morning Star flag and demanded freedom. Protest leader Filep Karma stressed that he was engaged in a bold experiment (Karma, 2014; see also Karma, 2013):

> I said that Papuans must fight peacefully…. I then told the people that my objective in raising the Morning Star flag at the Biak water tower was to tell the world that the Papuan nation desires to be free. [Before when Papuans raised] the flag in the jungle it was ineffective. Soldiers don't reach that area. No one sees it. But if you [raise the flag] in the town a lot of people can see it including the media and automatically the story gets disseminated globally. When I raised the Morning Star flag in Biak no one had ever done it. No one had kept the flag flying for 24 hours. When I did it in Biak I told my brothers and sisters who helped me, to keep it

flying for more than 24 hours. Now we managed to do that. We kept the flag flying for four days.

In 1998 in Biak City, Karma and his compatriots were under the opinion that if they raised the Morning Star flag and kept it flying for at least 24 continuous hours then the United Nations would intervene and West Papua would become an independent state. West Papuans may not have had the most nuanced understanding of the vagaries of international politics but the Indonesian military were fully cognisant of the millenarian momentum behind Karma's movement (Kirksey, 2012). Indonesian politicians understood the power and value of symbols and rituals. Openly allowing expressions of Papuan sovereignty was not a view they were prepared to tolerate. In the days leading up to 6 July 1998 Indonesian troops had been gathering in Biak City. Three warships—at least one of which was sold to Indonesia by the then East Germany government—and C-130 Hercules planes, the kind of aircraft the Australian government eagerly donated to Indonesia, brought in heavily armed troops—Hassanuddin Company from Sulawesi and Pattimura from Ambon, two neighbouring provinces. Local villagers from the surrounding hamlets were press ganged into militias and told to arm themselves with sharp implements. Captain Andrew Plunkett, a former intelligence officer who worked at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, was quoted saying it 'was a dress rehearsal' for the militia-backed, military-led bloodletting and destruction that occurred post-referendum in East Timor in 1999 (Biak Tribunal, 2013).

Agus (2013), a West Papuan primary school student at the time, remembers what happened:

> On the first day of the demonstration we heard people on the street. They were yelling 'Papua Merdeka'. At that time I did not understand what they were shouting about. We just followed the people to the tower. People were praying and singing. I saw a different flag flying from the top of the tower and I was really surprised. There were so many people and lots of police. The police saw us in our school uniforms. They told us to go back to school then they took us back to school. When the principal saw us he was angry. He said if anyone goes to the tower they will get a penalty.
>
> On July 5 the headmaster closed the school but we had to stay because we were living at the school. The only other person at the school was a school security guard. No one went outside. No one went to the market. The headmaster and the teachers just told us to stay at school for our own safety. People everywhere were preparing to leave but we did not know what was happening….
>
> The massacre was on a Monday. The night before—Sunday and the following morning—we heard everything. Our school is surrounded by a big fence. We couldn't see anything but we could hear what was happening.

You need to know that a military police post and army complex is next to our school. So when the army moves we can hear everything. On the Sunday night we could hear heavy boots running beside the fence. Lots of boots. Running. We could not see but we could hear. We were so scared. We just sat there terrified, crying, listening to the sound of heavy boots running close to where we were. At that time we thought something would happen and we were really afraid. We just sat there hugging each other.

Around 4 am or 4.30 am on Monday, July 6, we heard gunshots. It was before dawn. We sat there in that room in the school hugging each other and crying. The shooting kept going. I was one of the youngest. The oldest was around 15. We did not know what to do except shed tears. All we could do was say, 'Oh God, what is happening?' The guns kept shooting until around 7 am.

When the shooting stopped my older brother came round to pick me up . . . About two blocks from the Tower a woman ran up to the car begging for help. She was covered with blood. My brother quickly helped her get into the back of the car. When I turned around he told me not to look at her.

About a week later when I was back in East Biak I heard my parents tell of fishermen who were pulling up bodies in their nets….

After a month we went back to school. The headmaster forbids us to talk about what happened on that day. He said, 'Do not talk about the past.' He said that school could not be responsible for our safety. Two of our friends had disappeared. Their names are Johanes Orboy and Hermanus Fakdawer. They were both twelve years at the time. They were my friends but we never knew what happened to them and I did not dare ask. We just had to keep these things inside and leave them there.

A week later Edmund McWilliams, Political Counsellor at the US Embassy in Jakarta, arrived in Biak but it was many months before muted news of the massacre hit the foreign press (see Murdoch, 1998). McWilliams saw the bullet holes, chest high; pock marks over the water tower (McWilliams, 2013). It is not known how many died that day and in the days that followed. Some estimate over one hundred. Many Biak islanders who witnessed it say in excess of 150 people were killed that day and in the days that followed. No independent investigation has ever taken place. None of the mass graves dotted around Biak have been exhumed so the missing have not been accounted for and the dead have not been given a proper burial. Like other human rights atrocities such as the bloodletting after the 1965 coup, the Indonesian government refuses to even acknowledge what happened. The truth—just like the truth of what happened in so many other places in West Papua, such as Paniai in the mid-1960s, the Baliem Valley in 1977, Abepura in 2000, Wamena in 2000 and 2008, Waisor in 2001, Enarotali in 2014—has been buried.

If protesters thought the killings would end with the shooting at the water

tower they were mistaken. Much worse—unimaginable horror—was yet to come. Tieneke Rumkabu, who was caught up in the army attack when she took coffee to the protesters under the tower, testified to a quasi-legal citizens tribunal at Sydney University in 2013 about how she was imprisoned and tortured by police (Biak Tribunal, 2013).

> They threw me onto a truck…. They took us to a place but we didn't know where. We were tortured with weapons—they make a cut on my hands and burn me with cigarettes. They cut with a sharp bayonet, then they pour acid. When I scream they burn me with cigarettes on both hands…. They brought candles and they burn the candles. They put it inside, into my vagina. I saw one of my friends, Martha, who was also tortured with the candles…. They put a bayonet in her neck and then in the vagina and also cut off her breasts and beheaded her…. Then a man showed us a little knife, the one you use to shave, and he said 'we are going to use this to cut off your vaginas, from above and below, and from the left and from the right.' I saw a little girl, they raped her and then she died. All over the place it was blood everywhere because women's vaginas and clitorises had been cut out and they had been raped many, many times. They also hit another woman with a bayonet and then cut off the neck and also the breasts of the woman. Eight women were killed and they let four of us stay alive…. We didn't go home. I hide in the forest, the jungle, for two months.

When Tineke Rumkabu came out of the jungle she was arrested again and thrown in jail. The massacre may have occurred many years ago but the survivors are still being harassed. When I travelled to Biak in January 2015 I met with some of the survivors of that massacre. They had formed a support group, United for Truth (*Bersatu untuk Kebenaran*), and had begun advocating not just for themselves but for survivors of other human rights violations in West Papua as well. We had just fifteen minutes together before immigration and police intelligence raided the meeting. They did not want us to talk to the survivors.

According to ELSHAM (Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in West Papua) and witnesses like Tineke Rumkabu, the dead and dying were dumped in trucks and taken to the wharf where they were loaded onto three waiting warships, KRI *Kapap*, KRI *Telek Berau* and one other. We know this from the pictures Dr Eben Kirksey, a US anthropologist, took from his hotel window at the time. Many of those still alive were then killed. The bodies were mutilated then thrown overboard. In the days following July 6, corpses and many body parts washed up on the beaches of Biak. Irene Dimara, now a refugee living in Cairns, Australia, told me a fisherman found her brother, Dance Korwa: 'His penis had been cut off, he had no eyes, his teeth had been pulled out and he had more than five stab wounds in his belly' (Dimara, 2013).

When news did start to trickle out about the massacre the Indonesian authorities could not hide all the bodies. Instead they claimed that the corpses were from the 17 July 1998 tsunami, the epicentre of which was off Aitape on the north coast of Papua New Guinea, more than 700 kilometres from Biak. However, the bodies that washed ashore did not wash up elsewhere in West Papua. One witness described a cadaver clothed in a Golkar shirt (an Indonesian political party). Another said the Morning Star flag could be seen, painted on the victim's chest.

Papuans call it Bloody Biak (*Biak Berdarah*), the 'Biak Massacre' in English and it was not the only mass killing that has taken place in West Papua. Many questions remain unanswered about it. Although human rights investigators from ELSHAM, the Institute for the Study and Advocacy of Human Rights in West Papua, visited Biak a week later and interviewed survivors and witnesses they were not able to conduct their work openly. Their detailed 69-page report, 'Graves without Names; Names without Graves' (ELSHAM, 1999) is the most comprehensive information we have but it remains, because of the circumstances—then and now—incomplete. Human Rights Watch (1998) also sent an undercover reporter but still there are substantial gaps. Further evidence, compiled during The Biak Massacre Citizens Tribunal that took place in Sydney fifteen years after the massacre, includes testimony from survivors, witnesses, journalists and investigators.

It is the Biak Massacre, its horror, the colluding silence in the domestic and international press; the complicity of Western powers who continue to train and arm the Indonesian military and police; the opportunistic avarice of the foreign corporations who exploit Papuan resources, giving nothing but crumbs in return; and the determination of Papuans to resist the occupation that sharpens Papuan resistance.

Papuan Spring

The fact that the post-Suharto state responded so decisively with the Biak Massacre was a rude awakening to those moderate West Papuan leaders who hoped that human rights violations and repression in West Papua would end with the demise of Suharto and his New Order.

After a series of discussions with high-ranking Indonesian politicians and bureaucrats, known as the Jakarta Informal Meetings, a team of 100 people (called Team 100) were invited to Jakarta for a special meeting with the then Indonesian President B J Habibie in February 1999. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss West Papuan grievances and a process of resolution. Prior to the meeting with Habibie, the West Papuan activists decided to limit discussion to problems related to development. However, emboldened by the knowledge that several members of the US Congress had sent a letter to Habibie and his most powerful opponent, Amien Rais, calling for dialogue on the political status of

East Timor and West Papua, several political leaders involved with Team 100 privately began to re-evaluate their objectives to include full independence.

When Team 100 met with Habibie, a number of West Papuans launched into an impassioned plea for independence. Stunned and clearly misinformed about the depth and extent of discontent in West Papua, Habibie put aside his prepared response and in an emotional appeal urged the West Papuan delegation to reconsider their desire to separate from Indonesia. Although there was no clear outcome from the meeting, the West Papuan struggle had exploded onto Indonesia's political centre stage. West Papuans' long-suppressed desire for independence was now on the table and Team 100 returned home to a hero's welcome.

After returning from the meeting with Habibie a number of prominent West Papuan political leaders immediately began preparations for a national consultation called Musyuwarah Besar, often shortened to Mubes, on the causes of conflict in West Papua and strategies to achieve *merdeka* (freedom and independence). Mubes, which was held in February 2000, attracted thousands of West Papuans from all around the country. It was a bold act of political defiance. The long-banned Morning Star flag flew free and the desire for independence was expressed openly. Delegates held elections to form the PDP, the *Presidium Dewan Papua* or Papuan Presidium Council, a kind of parallel government made up of a 31-member executive (the Presidium) and a 500-member panel of local representatives from every region of West Papua (the Council). The PDP then agreed to hold a congress six months later—the Second Papuan Congress, taking its name from the 1961 national congress that formed the West New Guinea Raad, the parliament established by the Dutch.

The Second Papuan Congress, held between May 29 and 4 June 2000 in Port Numbay/Jayapura, was attended by West Papuan leaders living in exile and representatives from every sector of society and region in West Papua. Outside the meeting tens of thousands of West Papuans who could not fit into the overflowing auditorium danced and held vigil, applying moral pressure on even the most moderate West Papuan leader to support independence. Based on photographs from the time and interviews with participants and witnesses, including the handful of foreigners, I estimate around 50,000 West Papuans were in attendance.

The PDP targeted the Achilles' heel of Indonesia's occupation, directly challenging Indonesia's legitimacy to rule West Papua. They rejected both the 1962 New York Agreement and the sham UN-sponsored Act of Free Choice and declared that West Papua was already independent and was currently being illegally occupied by the Indonesian state. In a communiqué released at the conclusion of Mubes, Theys Eluay, PDP chair and his deputy, Thom Beanal, issued the following statement:

> We condemn outright the illegal transfer of sovereignty of the Papuan
> people from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia
> via the United Nations [that] concluded on 1st of May 1963. The transfer
> is deemed illegal as we, the very people directly affected by the decision,
> have never been consulted nor given any opportunity to have any say what-
> soever through our national legislature, The Papuan National Council, the
> mandated body in existence at the time that should have ultimately been
> responsible for determining the political destiny of the Papuan people.

The Presidium's goal was a third party-mediated dialogue on the political status
of West Papua. Unfortunately for the PDP, the space for dialogue with Jakarta
had clearly closed after the meeting with Habibie. There was no longer a credi-
ble nonviolent movement in West Papua that could compel Jakarta to sit at the
table. Moreover, in the wake of 'losing' East Timor, renewed nationalist vigour
in Indonesia functioned to harden the Indonesian government's position. The
chance of dialogue with Jakarta, when the opening bid was independence, was
clearly non-existent.

However, the formation of the PDP also acted as a catalyst for third party
support, dramatically raising the profile of the struggle, leading to renewed grass-
roots movement building work in Europe, North America, Australia, Aotearoa/
New Zealand and to a lesser extent the Pacific. In the face of a persistent and
disciplined nonviolent movement and growing international support that exposed
human rights violations by the Indonesian state and questioned Jakarta's legiti-
macy in West Papua, the Indonesian government, eager to maintain its newfound
reformist image, found it increasingly difficult to justify repression and military
operations in the way that it had been able to do in the past.

The Indonesian state's strategy to reassert its control in West Papua, after
losing ground to the PDP, was made clear in a leaked letter entitled '*Rencana
Operasi Pengkondisian Wilayah dan Pembangunan Jaringan Kommunikasi
dalam Menyikapi arah Politik Irian Jaya untuk Merdeka dan Melepaskan Diri
dari Negri Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*' ('Operational Plan for Changing Con-
ditions in the Territory and the Establishment of a Communications Network in
Dealing with the Direction of Political Developments in Irian Jaya in Favour of
Independence and Demanding Separatism from Indonesia'). The letter outlined
a carrot-and-stick approach that included decapitating the West Papuan leader-
ship, military operations to eradicate separatism, establishing pro-Indonesian
militias, and improving social welfare.

Collapse of Special Autonomy and return to repression

The carrot to complement the Indonesian government's stick was first Special Au-
tonomy, then administrative division, *pemekaran*, a policy ironically translated as
'expansion' and sometimes as 'flourishing'. On paper Special Autonomy was a far-

reaching proposal that sincerely attempted to address core West Papuan grievances within the framework of a united Indonesian state. However, its promise has not been realised. Despite a substantial redirection of revenue from mining, oil and gas, proceeds that formerly went to Jakarta and are now returned back to the provincial government in West Papua, health and income levels have actually deteriorated under Special Autonomy. As the pro-democracy activists in other parts of Indonesia worked to institutionalise the 1998 reform agenda, in West Papua human rights violations, including torture, increased (Hernawan 2013).

Even as Special Autonomy was instituted, Jakarta's iron fist fell. Efforts to keep the Morning Star flag flying in Wamena were brutally repressed in October 2000. Then on 10 November 2001, the flamboyant chair of the PDP, Theys Eluay, was strangled to death by soldiers from Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus or Indonesian Special Forces Command) after attending a dinner party as the military's guest of honour. And while individual members of the PDP continue to be politically active, the jailing of PDP leaders, followed by the assassination of Theys Eluay, was a blow from which the PDP never recovered.

The military also renewed military operations, particularly in the Highland areas. One such operation in 2005 left over 6000 internally displaced people barely eking out an existence in the mountains and jungles and hundreds of homes, schools, churches, and health clinics burned to the ground (Wing and King, 2005). Another military operation in December 2006 resulted in similar numbers of internally displaced people being too scared to return to their homes. In addition, a network of militias was established. By 2000, reports started circulating that Laskar Jihad, a Muslim militia group, had established itself in West Papua and begun a programme of training and recruitment. In the Highlands, the militia group BMP (Barisan Merah Putih or Red and White Garrison) was formed. In Timika, Eurico Gutteres—the notorious East Timorese militia leader out on bail for his part in the post-referendum violence that was organised and perpetrated by the TNI and their militia proxies in East Timor—formed the Red and White Defenders Front.

It was clear that by 2001 the brief Papuan Spring that burst into flower so dramatically in 1998 had come to an end.

The movement for dialogue and Papua as a land of peace

Despite localised movement successes, including two dramatic strikes at the giant US-Anglo Freeport gold and copper mine and the important learning about organisation and resistance that came with them, the larger picture remained grim. The Indonesian military was quickly reasserting its control over the territory. Religious leaders were concerned that the formation of militias like Laskar Jihad could ignite the kind of inter-communal violence between diverse ethnic and religious communities that had occurred in Central Sulawesi

and Maluku. In this context the idea of Papua as a Land of Peace with its goal of peaceful dialogue began to take shape. The Papua Land of Peace campaign created a dilemma for the military. Would the military speak out against the campaign and risk signalling their resistance to peace in Papua as well as alienating one of the most respected constituencies in Papuan society, religious leaders; or would they support the concept of Papua being a Land of Peace and thereby undermine their ability to ferment militia activities? Although TNI military commanders in Papua emphasised that there was no need for the campaign because there was already peace in Papua, the campaign most likely played an important role in constraining more covert militia operations. By mid to late 2000, reports of militia activity virtually ceased and by late 2002 Laskar Jihad was officially disbanded. While rumours of other Muslim and nationalist militias continued, their activities were low level, confined to training and meetings, and never reached the peak of the early 2000s. On the side of the pro-independence movement there were changes as well. Papuan guerrillas stood down and for several years publicly committed to giving space for peaceful dialogue to work.

However, the opportunity for peace talks was squandered. Jakarta rebuffed overtures by political and religious leaders in West Papua and simply refused to talk unless the question of West Papua's political status and future was taken off the agenda. In the meantime, direct violence, economic exploitation and marginalisation, alienation from traditional lands, cultural dislocation, plus a steady stream of mass migration from other parts of Indonesia combined with institutional racism was giving rise to a discourse of 'slow motion genocide'. Papuan activists across the political spectrum from religious to resistance leaders still talked about the desire for political dialogue with Jakarta. But they were no longer talking about Papua as a Land of Peace. Instead they used the phrase 'Papua, Zone of Emergency' (*Papua Zona Darurat*). By 2008/9 the Papua Land of Peace campaign was essentially over.

Non-cooperation spreads to state institutions

Special Autonomy was also losing the little lustre it had. The newly formed Council of Customary Chiefs, the *Dewan Adat Papua*, organised a large mobilisation of 10,000 to 15,000 people to march with a coffin marked 'Otsus'—the Indonesian language contraction for Special, *Khusus*, and Autonomy, *Otonomi*—through the streets of Jayapura to the Provincial Parliament Building. While the demonstration laid the symbol of the death of Otsus at the door of the Provincial Parliament, the protesters's demands were mainly centred on external targets. The international community was a key focus.

Mass demonstrations against Special Autonomy resumed again in 2010. This time the protest was led by members of the *Majelis Rakyat Papua* (Papuan People's Assembly), a kind of indigenous senate, assisted by youth leaders

and a small group of strategically savvy elders. On June 18, several thousand demonstrators (reports vary from between 2000 to 15,000) from seven districts converged on the provincial parliament in Jayapura to officially hand over the people's decision. Protest leaders gave members of the DPRP until July 8 to hand back Otsus. That time expired with no indication from the DPRP that they would even publicly discuss the issue. So on the morning of July 8 demonstrators mobilised outside the MRP building in Kotaraja and began a long march into the DPRP building in Jayapura (approximately 10 kilometres away). Accounts of exact numbers vary. The International Crisis Group and police reported 2500 to 3000 demonstrators but several photos and eyewitness accounts obtained by me indicate that the number was in excess of 10,000, and possibly as high as 25,000. Mass based organisations like DAP, the West Papua National Committee and the West Papua National Authority helped mobilise their members and reported to West Papua Media, an external based independent media outlet, in real time to coordinate international media.

When members of the DPRP failed to receive them—the Speaker of the House, John Ibo, was away in Jakarta—5000 demonstrators decided to occupy the parliament overnight. Simultaneous demonstrations were organised in Timika, Manokwari, Merauke and Wamena. Privately a small block of a dozen parliamentarians supported the protesters's demands but, caught between the government in Jakarta who demanded loyalty to the state and their constituents who were clamouring for a referendum, the group felt too scared to say anything publicly. By 5pm on Friday July 9, nearly 36 hours after the Papuans occupied parliament, police were getting ready to forcibly remove the demonstrators.

The decision by protesters to peacefully disperse was made a few hours later. When it was given, everybody—a few thousand people representing a range of different groups and with different ethnic affiliations—all left the parliament grounds. This nonviolent discipline in itself was remarkable. Contrast this to when protesters threw stones in 2006, ultimately killing five members of the Indonesian security apparatus. Back then the police reacted with deadly violence. As a result of the killing of the Indonesian officers, any moral high ground the protesters might have had evaporated. This time—in July 2010—there was a clear organising structure and discipline was maintained, which kept the emphasis on the message, the failure of Otsus, rather than on protester behaviour. And although the action was high risk, no one was killed.

The protesters did not succeed in achieving their most immediate objective—a special session of parliament to debate the failure of Otsus—but they did learn a lot about organising and the power of unity.

Independence declared—again

The occupation of parliament failed to result in a third-party-mediated dialogue,

or a referendum. Nor did it precipitate discussion about Special Autonomy. Faced with intransigence on the part of the Indonesian government, Papuan leaders escalated tactics, calling for another mass public meeting, the Third Papuan People's Congress, to debate the struggle. On 19 October 2011, the last day of the Congress—a three-day gathering of unarmed resistance groups— Papuan leaders formed the NFRWP (National Federal Republic of West Papua) and declared independence, again. The response from the security forces was swift and brutal. About an hour after the congress concluded, the Indonesian security forces opened fire. Three Papuans were shot dead. Two were fatally stabbed. Three hundred people were arrested and beaten. Six of the leaders were jailed, charged with treason. The police—who shot, stabbed, beat and tortured people—received warning letters.

The killing of protesters at the congress—relayed by mobile phone, Facebook, YouTube and mailing lists—outraged Papuans and their supporters outside the country. The arrest, beating and killing of protesters even divided political elites inside Indonesia. It attracted more third-party support for the West Papuan cause and revealed the extent to which the Indonesian state would go to deny Papuan aspirations for freedom.

The occupation of the provincial parliament in June 2010 and the Indonesian security forces's fatal attack on unarmed Papuans at the Third Congress in October 2011 was also evidence that the social media revolution had well and truly arrived in West Papua. In July 1998, when the Indonesian military opened fire on activists under the water tower in Biak, it took weeks and months for the news to get out. Even now we still do not have a comprehensive forensic account of what happened. By October 2011 the news was instantaneous, even though no international journalists were present. (I do not think I will ever forget the frightened voices of Papuan friends who called me from the grounds of the Catholic Seminary where the Third Congress was held. In the background I could hear the sound of gunshots.)

By 2013 social media was influencing the opinion of heads of state. At the MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group), an important sub-regional forum with links to both the Pacific Island Forum and the United Nations, Gordon Lilo, former Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, said that social media was highlighting human rights violations in West Papua, calling the situation a 'cyber war' with Indonesia and likened social media posts to 'cyber bullets' (Dorney 2013). In February 2015, Peter O'Neill, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, was even more forthright (Garrett, 2015). In an extraordinary speech he embraced West Papuans as 'our people':

> I think as a country the time has come for us to speak about the oppression of our people. Pictures of the brutality of our people appear daily on

social media and yet we take no notice. We have a moral obligation to speak for those who are not allowed to talk. We must be the eyes for those who are blindfolded. Again, Papua New Guinea, as a regional leader, must lead these discussions with our friends in a mature and engaging manner.

Then, on 10 May 2015, Indonesian President Joko Widowo issued a surprise announcement: foreign journalists would be free to visit West Papua. Unfortunately, Jokowi's statement was not backed up by a Presidential Decree or any other legal mechanism that might give the 'new' policy certainty. Less than 24 hours after Jokowi's statement the Minister for Security and Political Affairs, Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, told the Indonesian media that the nothing had changed, journalists would still need permission from various government agencies. That permission involves navigating an 'interagency clearance house supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and involving 18 working units from 12 different ministries, including the National Police and the State Intelligence Agency' (Human Rights Watch, 2015, pp. 1-2). This can take months for many journalists and often ends in rejection. Indonesian military commander General Moeldoko confirmed Purdijanto's statement separately, saying that the previous rules remained. Papuan police also announced that foreign journalists would still be required to report to them and that their activities would be monitored. As long as the Indonesian government values propaganda over a free press, the battle for open access to West Papua will be ongoing. The Surat Jalan system, the architecture through which the police and intelligence services try to monitor foreign visitors, remains in place.

Denying access is hurting the Indonesian government's reputation. Besides, social media is making it impossible to enforce. The challenge for the movement is to use citizen media activism more effectively, to extensively cover the geographic expanse of Papua, to record and disseminate accurate data, and to upskill the movement more systematically, in order to promote and direct moral outrage.

Resurgence of the diplomatic struggle

On the diplomatic level Papuans also continue to organise employing both human rights mechanisms through the UN Human Rights Council and political mechanisms through international forums. There is also ongoing exploration of the possibilities of legal challenges to Indonesian sovereignty. In addition, Papuan churches are renewing their links with the Pacific Conference of Churches. In a game-changing intervention, the Vanuatu government, Council of Churches and the Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs, brought together West Papuan leaders to Port Vila in November 2014 to reconcile and unify (MacLeod, 2015). Assisted by a team from the Pacific Conference of Churches the West Papuans agreed to form the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), an

umbrella group that united the three largest coalitions of resistance groups inside the country. Perhaps the most visible sign that the struggle has become internationalised occurred at the Melanesian Spearhead Group meeting in Honiara in June 2015 when the ULMWP were accepted as observers (MacLeod 2015). A vibrant social media, sticker and poster campaign 'Bring West Papua Back to the Family' was widely taken up by solidarity groups in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. When West Papuan leaders travelled to Honiara one of the first things they did was establish relationships with journalists from the two dailies, *The Solomon Star* and the *Island Sun*, assisted by the local solidarity group 'Solomon Islands for West Papua'. The ULMWP also organised their own press secretary, the eminently capable Joey Tau, who helped place 140 separate stories in the *Solomon Star* and the *Island Sun* plus additional stories in other media outlets across the Pacific. In private and public, MSG leaders were clear: their people demanded that Melanesian leaders accept West Papua as members. After the MSG the ULMWP then went on to successfully push the Pacific Island Forum to call for a human rights fact-finding mission.

Conclusion

Since 1998, nonviolent means for addressing Papuan grievances and pursuing Papuan aspirations have been used more regularly and more extensively than violence or conventional political activity. In July 1998 Papuans kept the flag flying, hoping it would herald independence. Local media were too scared to report the story and foreign media were completely unaware it was happening. Seventeen years later, in 2015, the movement has matured into a co-ordinated international force, committed to a strategy of nonviolent resistance and diplomacy with citizen media at its heart. The struggle has gone from international obscurity to an important agenda item at sub-regional and regional forums.

Although at the time of writing, the formation of the ULMWP is still recent, it remains, in my view, the most significant event in the history of Papuan resistance. Eschewing brittle hierarchical forms of organisation, the ULMWP has established a decentralised network structure with visible leadership based outside the country and a hidden collective leadership structure inside the country. To date the secretariat seems to be negotiating this complex inside/outside arrangement with mature agility. As a result of this visible unity and coordination provided by the five-member executive, the ULMWP is attracting broad-based support from allies across the Pacific.

Merdeka ('freedom') may still be a distant dream, but it is one that is more alive than ever before.

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4. Distant, disconnected and in danger

Are educators doing enough to prepare students for frontline freelance risks?

Abstract: For anyone who has worked in another country, the journalistic 'rules of engagement' differ in each port. Foreign correspondents argue passionately for the freedom of the press, saying that by 'bearing witness' to crimes against civilians they will be able to effect change. However, in taking risks to report on such events, most journalists recognise that—if their reports displease a particular country's power elite—they can quickly find themselves deported, banned from future entry, languishing behind bars or, in a worst-case scenario, killed. Using Bourdieuan considerations, this article concentrates on the young, mostly freelance, journalists who have absorbed Western news values—including the myth of the heroic war reporter and truth-seeker—and suggests greater understanding of the cultural and political nuances of countries from which they intend to report. Using journalism as a methodology, this article looks at several cases in which reporters have found themselves in difficulties, and suggests that educators consider sharing three lessons: know your employer; acknowledge local differences between countries; and learn the skill of risk assessment. Risk-assessment skills include stressing the need for sufficient pre-deployment training in first aid, personal safety, security and other protocols and, most importantly, managing exposure to traumatic situations.

Keywords: conflict reporting, foreign journalist, freelance journalists, newsgathering, peer support, psychological health, safety, trauma, violence and the press

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Introduction

> Journalists are no longer *on* the front lines. We *are* the front lines. (Peter Greste, 2014).

WITH the advent of social media, those students who used to disappear from our universities to become bylines in our morning newspapers or pop up on the occasional radio or television news report, are now front and centre in our Facebook feeds each day. There's Bridget, surrounded by soldiers in the Congo (Honan, 2013), less than a year after graduation. There's Manny (Maung & Winn, 2014), reporting from burnt-out homes in Myanmar. Robbie, barely out of this author's class, filing from Red Shirt protests in Thailand without a helmet, flak jacket, satellite phone or encrypted communication (Baird, 2014). For the past few years, as this author has opened her Facebook news feed, Instagram or Twitter apps, she has had a mounting fear that a former student—encouraged to freelance because of the changing models of journalism—would appear one day in an orange jumpsuit, or worse. Even knowing that good journalism often involves some degree of risk, it is disconcerting for educators in advanced Western countries to think that they have not done

enough to prepare students for a world where journalists are now being deliberately targeted for political purposes and killed with impunity (Aedy, 2014). It used to be enough for some journalism programmes to prepare students to not lose their minds (Barnes, 2013) to the trauma of reporting. Now we are worried about them losing their lives. As Fairfax photographer Kate Geraghty recalls, how people react to armed conflict is not something that is generally taught:

> No one tells you what it's like to, you know, wait for a scud missile to land because there's an air raid going on and to be trapped during a fire-fight. There's no book or movie that can tell you how you're going to feel. (as cited in Anderson & Trembath 2011, p. 13)

By presenting this paper, the author is not disapproving of such freelance efforts, nor approving of the actions being taken by militant groups to stop journalists from bearing witness to their activities in war zones or other trouble spots. As ABC foreign correspondent Mark Willacy argues, it is important to have Australians in the field:

> If Australian reporters aren't on the frontline, who can Australians rely on to tell them the story? CNN? Fox News? Even the BBC's reporting is slanted to suit a British audience. It becomes even more important to have Australian reporters on the ground if there are Australian forces involved in the conflict—which, in the last decade or so, has been the case in every US-led misadventure. (as cited in Anderson & Trembath 2011, p. 313)

However, this article seeks to consider some of the issues that have arisen around reporting on modern-day conflicts, and calls for better preparation of journalists who freelance and find that they are not being paid enough to acquire the appropriate protective equipment, insurance, training, and post-reporting counselling (e.g., for post-traumatic stress disorder). This author also does not wish to overlook or diminish the vital work of local 'fixers' who sometimes work assisting Western journalists. *The Guardian* newspaper noted in November 2014 that in the previous 10 months at least 17 Iraqi journalists had been executed by Islamic State (IS) (Henley, 2014). Many others were kidnapped, their fate unknown. The work of these local journalists, who often take the job as fixers for Western reporters, is featured in Murrell's 2011 doctoral thesis, *Foreign correspondents and fixers: An investigation of teamwork in international television newsgathering*. Murrell acknowledges the vital role fixers play in providing journalists with 'contacts, access, local knowledge, and expert understanding' (Murrell, 2011, p. 243).

In using journalism as a methodology, this article takes its lead from Duffield's (2009) arguments on the distinct advantages of using such a methodology

in academic research. Duffield (2009, pp. 3-4) suggests that journalism methodology has a number of characteristics, including: observation that is similar to participant observation but not as structured and engaged; empathy between subjects and researchers because of shared professional assumptions and experiences; a strong life knowledge of the researcher about how news is gathered; sense-making of large amounts of information; and, finally, using news values to judge the 'exactitude' of the work under review. This article uses all of these techniques.

Freelancers pay the ultimate price

There has been growing disquiet about inexperienced freelance reporters and photojournalists turning up with a determination to work in trouble-spots, including war zones. Even before the latest round of high-profile journalist deaths, new minimum standards for journalists working in conflict zones were suggested (Farrell, 2013, p. 27).

When imprisoned in Egypt, Australian journalist Peter Greste—who had been on assignment for Al Jazeera English when he was arrested—raised the issue of freelance work when honouring colleagues Foley and Sotloff, who were both killed by IS in Syria. From prison, Greste wrote: 'Both James and Steven paid the ultimate price for working in an industry increasingly reliant on brave, committed freelancers. They occupied a space where risk-averse news organisations are increasingly outsourcing coverage itself' (Greste, 2014).

War zones are increasingly dangerous places for journalists of any age. British researcher Cristina Archetti found that 40 years ago the average age of a correspondent was 41 and 85 percent were men (Archetti, 2013, p. 424). In the Great War of 1914-1918, two journalists died. In World War II, a total of 69 died. In the Korean War, 17 died. And during the Vietnam War, 58 died (Feinstein & Sinyor, 2009). In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 16 Western journalists died in the first two weeks, and, ultimately, more than 200 journalists were killed in that conflict (Feinstein, 2014). In Syria, 94 journalists have been killed since the beginning of the latest conflict (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2016).

The Guardian newspaper's Martin Chulvov noted that the Middle East conflict was being reported on, predominantly, by young people:

> For more than three years now, much of what the world has seen, read and learned about the Middle East has been produced by journalism's newest hands. They are not recruits, in the true sense of the word: Few have the endorsement of established media outlets. Even fewer have been sent to the region with budgets, backing, or even basic training. (Chulov, 2014)

Others have noted that even experienced war journalists, such as Marie Colvin—who had spent decades reporting from conflict zones—died because

of the dangerous and unpredictable nature of civil conflict. Colvin was targeted by the Syrian army in the city of Homs in 2012, dying along with experienced French photographer Remi Ochlik (Borri, 2013). Their deaths sparked a withdrawal of most Western media staff, but not all freelance reporters:

> A lightly resourced, laughably paid, almost wholly uninsured cadre of freelancers, often armed with little more than a notebook and a mobile phone, infiltrated Syria anyway. A few were crazy narcissists or war-zone tourists, but most were serious reporters. Four-fifths of all journalists working in Syria, according to one estimate, are freelance and answering to no one but themselves. (Peter, 2014)

Inspiring greatness

Journalism educators spend a good deal of time trying to inspire students to greatness; to bear witness, to be like noted foreign correspondents, to shine a light, to live those journalistic clichés that are recognised by most people raised in advanced liberal democracies. Associated Press executive editor Kathleen Carroll puts it in simple terms: 'As long as people are fighting and killing each other, and doing so in the acquisition of power or territory or a point of view, journalists have to be there' (as cited in Al Jazeera, 2014).

In class, educators point to reporters such as Kate Adie, Christine Amanpour, Janine di Giovanni, Zoe Daniel, Eric Campbell, Sally Sara, Mark Willacy, Michael Ware, Debbie Whitmont and Emma Griffiths, among others, who have done extraordinary work. Their work in dangerous places has helped cover and uncover atrocities, spurred governments into action, and given answers to citizens. It has long been seen as difficult work, as veteran Australian reporter Philip Williams wrote after meeting the families from the crash of MH17 in the Ukraine:

> It was simply horrific and the act of bearing witness was distressing … I could give them something they craved—information and a sense of that sad place. I had forgotten the importance of bearing witness. As we left, there were tears and hugs. (Williams, 2014)

Until recent events in Syria, Australian journalists and educators had all but forgotten the Lebanese hostage crisis of the early 1990s, where journalist John McCartney was held hostage for five years before being finally released (McCarthy & Morrell, 1994). The world was reminded again, after 11 September 2001, about the dangers of journalism when American Daniel Pearl was murdered, prompting the United States to enact the *Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act 2009*. Australian Michael Ware, a former *Time* and CNN correspondent, was briefly captured and released by jihadists in 2004 (Anderson & Trembath 2011, p. 15). However, after more than 10 years with few horrific

headlines—for Western journalists, at least—those who gather and report the news are again being used as 'targets, or commodities to be traded for ransom' (Leridon, 2014).

Journalists have become the target

Journalists are no longer considered observers of the story. In some cases, they have become the story. The change was first noted after the 1992-95 Bosnian war (di Giovanni, 2014), but really came into focus after 11 September 2001, according to Canadian psychiatry professor Anthony Feinstein:

> It took the kidnapping of the *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl and his subsequent beheading to put journalists on notice that they, too, were now firmly in the cross-hairs of insurgents, militants, terrorists, thugs, call them what you will according to your level of political sensitivity. (Feinstein, 2014)

While in jail in Egypt, Greste noted that recent conflicts in the Middle East—particularly those since the Arab Spring—have put journalists squarely in the sights of combatants in a way he had not seen before: 'Of course propaganda is as old as war itself, and warring factions have always sought to control the narrative of a conflict. But, in these wars over stuff, the target has generally been the message rather than the messenger' (Greste, 2014).

Another Al Jazeera journalist, Kimberley Dozier, suggested that those in the field were well aware that the word 'press' put them in the firing line:

> To them, I'm a Western with a potential price tag on my head. When we help someone who had no way of reaching the levers of power, that's what the Fourth Estate is all about. That's why I'm risking my life. If you want to get to some of these stories, then you have to take the risks that are being faced by the people living through these things. Sometimes that means risking torture, risking kidnapping, risking death. (as cited in Al Jazeera, 2014)

American reporter Jeffery Goldberg was even more candid:

> Western journalists who seek out jihadists are courting death. The extremists don't need us anymore. Fourteen years ago, while I was staying at the Taliban madrasa, its administrators were launching a web site. I remember being amused by this. I shouldn't have been. There is no need for a middleman now. Journalists have been replaced by YouTube and Twitter. And when there is no need for us, we become targets. (Goldberg, 2014)

Mental preparedness

Most Australian universities use the resources of the Dart Asia Pacific Center for Journalism and Trauma (Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma, 2014), and Mindframe (Mindframe National Media Initiative, 2014), to warn that reporting from conflict zones is both important *and* mentally challenging. As former ABC foreign correspondent Sally Sara wrote of her own experience of post-traumatic stress disorder:

> One of the big misconceptions is that PTSD is all about the blood and bullets and the bombs and the fear. But, for many people, it's more complicated than that. Mental health experts use a term called moral injury. That means that what you saw was not just physically confronting, but it was wrong, morally wrong. (Sara, 2014)

The resources from the Dart Center and Mindframe focus on students' and journalists' mental preparedness, rather than on physical preparedness or risk assessment. How many courses actually prepare students to take care of themselves physically? Do educators give them the skills to make a proper risk assessment? Do they make sure they understand the differing rules of engagement from place to place? Or are educators so busy trying to ensure students are skilled to work as freelance operatives, that they forget they are preparing tomorrow's journalists for an increasingly physically dangerous world where reporting the news, particularly for young women, can put their lives on the line? News organisations, including the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, use hostile environments training organisation such as Dynamiq or the AKE Group, but these are rarely accessible to, or affordable by, young freelance journalists.

The blood, and the bang bang

This article recognises that Western news values create an insatiable thirst for dramatic stories and vision that can encourage freelance journalists to take inappropriate risks in order to 'get the story' or 'grab the money shot'. Sometimes this goes beyond encouragement to do dangerous stories, as Italian journalist Francesca Io explained:

> Editors back in Italy only ask us for the blood, the bang-bang. I write about the Islamists and their network of social services, the roots of their power—a piece that is definitely more complex to build than a frontline piece. I strive to explain, not just to move, to touch, and I am answered with: 'What's this? Six thousand words and nobody died?' (as cited in Borri, 2013)

The United Nations security council has strengthened the laws governing the protection of journalists, and the UN General Assembly moved in 2014 to ratify

new laws to further protect journalists (United Nations, 2013). But it does not matter how many times you tell a young journalist that you cannot file if you are dead, there will always be other players urging them on:

> There was a tension between the safety of reporters and their desire to meet editors's needs to gain dramatic vision of disasters, from riots to bushfire. Editors, in turn, were aiming, perhaps not quite consciously, to satisfy audience desires both for information and for *schadenfreude*. This German word, with no direct equivalent in English, describes a kind of pleasure or satisfaction felt at someone else's misfortune which might be a contributor to the popularity of disaster footage. (McLean & Power, 2013, p. 14)

Borri noted there were few financial rewards for doing life-threatening journalism, and the poor pay encouraged freelancers to take inappropriate risks:

> … whether you're writing from Aleppo or Gaza or Rome, the editors see no difference. You are paid the same: $70 per piece. Even in places like Syria, where prices triple because of rampant speculation. So, for example, sleeping in this rebel base, under mortar fire, on a mattress on the ground, with yellow water that gave me typhoid, costs $50 per night; a car costs $250 per day. So you end up maximizing, rather than minimizing, the risks. Not only can you not afford insurance—it's almost $1000 a month—but you cannot afford a fixer or a translator. You find yourself alone in the unknown. The editors are well aware that $70-a-piece pushes you to save on everything. They know, too, that if you happen to be seriously wounded, there is a temptation to hope not to survive, because you cannot afford to be wounded. But they buy your article anyway, even if they would never buy the Nike soccer ball handmade by a Pakistani child. (Borri, 2013)

'Don't shoot: we're from Channel Nine'

This author's unease with the preparation of students started long before Foley's death hit front pages and television screens (Chulov, 2014). It's something that this author has talked to students about since the 2009 film *Balibo* was released. It is hard not to be struck by the movie's dramatisation of the moments before the group of five Australian and British journalists were killed on 16 October 1975. In that moment—and, of course, the precise truth of what happened is unclear—one of the journalists, who had been sheltering in a house with a painting on its wall of a large Australian flag, put his hands in the air and shouted 'Don't shoot, we're from Channel Nine', or words to that effect. The call was ignored, and the journalists killed. It is footage played to students in their broadcast journalism classes, and this author always asks: 'What is it that makes journalists think that they will not be targeted?' Usually, students say, because the targets are journalists, killing them would cause the perpetrators

greater trouble than letting them go. As the Balibo Five families know, this is not necessarily the case. There still has been no one held to account for those deaths and the Australian Federal Police investigation of the matter was abandoned in 2014 (MEAA, 2014).

The difference between the Balibo Five and many young journalists who head out to gather global news today is that most of the Balibo Five were employees. To some extent, they also had others—albeit in another country—looking over their shoulders and trying to keep them safe. However, freelance journalists, particularly young ones without an extensive network of contacts, are unlikely to have a foreign editor yelling at them to get themselves out of there, now. With the courage and idealism of youth, instead they book a flight to somewhere dangerous, take out their iPhones, and start filing for anyone who will pay (Hyland, 2012). It proves an addictive adrenaline rush.

Educators need to make sure students are prepared physically as well as mentally. For that, students can get training from the International Federation of Journalists or tap into the online safety resources of the Committee to Protect Journalists and the International News Safety Initiative. There are no guarantees, though, as a convoy of journalists discovered in the Philippines in 2009 (Hodal, 2012). Even though they were traveling in a large group, it did not stop 32 journalists from being executed in a pre-meditated political massacre (Pollard, 2009).

Educators also need to warn female journalists that they face added danger when travelling and reporting in some countries. The International News Safety Institute is among those bodies that have created a special safety advisory for female journalists (International News Safety Institute, 2014). Figures on sexual violence against women in Egypt, for example, are particularly frightening. Egyptian journalist Nadine Marroushi wrote of the situation in Cairo's Tahir Square in 2013:

> On 25 January, at least 25 women were sexually assaulted and in some cases raped with sharp objects by mobs of men. There have been at least 500 survivors of sexual violence crimes in Egypt between February 2011 and January 2014. (Marroushi, 2014)

This danger was earlier underscored by the mob rape of US CBS correspondent Lara Logan in Tahir Square in Egypt in 2011. Logan thought she was going to die the night Hosni Mubarak's government fell in Cairo in February 2011. She was in the square preparing a report for *60 Minutes* when the crowd's celebratory mood turned threatening and she was dragged away from her producer and bodyguard by a group of men. They tore her clothes off and raped her with their hands for an extended period of time—a 'brutal and sustained sexual assault and beating'—an attack involving 200 to 300 men (Stelter, 2011). In the weeks following Logan's assault, other women recounted being harassed and

assaulted while working overseas, and groups like the Committee to Protect Journalists said they would revise their handbooks to better address sexual assault.

Embed yourself

Educators could encourage students to consider embedding themselves with a defence force or perhaps even a non-government organisation (NGO). Acknowledging, of course, that being embedded will impact on their perception of the stories they produce. Some of Australia's top journalists—such as Walkley Award-winning reporter Chris Masters, Geoff Thompson, Michael Cox, Michael Ware and Lindsay Murdoch—have embedded with the Australian military (Anderson & Trembath, 2011, p. 360). The ABC's Tony Hill suggested embedding was useful for 'safety, physical access, the clones of combat and the proximity to spokespeople and the military' and the Nine Network noted that it was valuable to be able to 'interact with the troops and gain information which differed from the official briefings' (Anderson & Trembath, 2011, p. 359). Australian reporters Trevor Bormann, Kate Geraghty, Mark Willacy and Louie Eroglu can all bear witness to the dangers faced by journalists not under the control of the military (Anderson & Trembath, 2011, p. 371).

Educators also need to talk to students about the value—and danger—of embedding with the 'enemy', as *VICE News* reporter Medyan Dairieh did for his 2014 documentary, *The Islamic State*. Elsewhere, captured journalist John Cantlie was presumably forced to host videos for IS from Kobani on the Syria-Turkey border, where he was videoed by IS, stating:

> Now, I know what you're thinking. You're thinking: 'He's only doing this because he's a prisoner, he's got a gun at his head and he's being forced to do this.' Right? Well it's true. I am a prisoner. That I cannot deny. (as cited in Barry, 2014)

It is also worth revisiting the work of Wilfred Burchett, the Australian journalist known for his reporting of conflicts in Asia and his Communist sympathies (Bradbury & Young, 1981). Burchett and *The Age* photographer Hugh Bull were the first journalists to enter Hiroshima after the atomic bomb was dropped. Burchett later attracted controversy for reporting behind enemy lines during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. New Zealand academic David Robie described Burchett as 'one of the most courageous journalists' he had met, but noted that he was 'loathed by many of his countrymen who regarded him as public enemy number one because they believed he was a traitor' (Robie 2014, p. 21). Robie had been editor of the Melbourne *Sunday Observer* whose chief correspondent was Burchett and which hired an aircraft in 1970 to fly him back to Australia from Noumea to regain his Australian passport.

Veteran ABC correspondent Peter Cave, however, warned against embedding with armies that he thought 'were breaking international law or committing atrocities' (Anderson & Trembath 2011, p. 359). The reality in Syria in 2013-14 was also difficult, as Borri noted:

> We are squeezed between a regime that grants you a visa only if you are against the rebels, and rebels who, if you are with them, allow you to see only what they want you to see. The truth is, we are failure. (Borri 2013)

Lesson one—know your employer

The changing media landscape has made a huge difference to the employment prospects of young journalists (Rottwilm, 2014). Not only is there a greater demand for instantaneous news, there are also fewer newspapers, fewer foreign bureaux and greater editorial control. There is also a greater reliance on syndicated news and work from freelance journalists. Even the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, once considered a leading example for international reporting, has had to cut its number of overseas offices and staff (Meade, 2010a). Murrell (2014, p. 17) notes that freelance journalists often believe that, if they work in conflict zones, it will help 'parlay their experience into more permanent work with media organisations'. Using Bourdieu's idea of cultural capital, Murrell (2014) notes that the 'B-team'—usually freelance journalists—have less cultural capital than staff members and have to 'hustle and live on their wits'.

Those who are employed by large media outlets such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation or Fairfax will find that the duty of care extended to *employees* will keep them a little safer—news managers are unlikely to approve seriously dangerous work and, if they believe their staff are in danger, they will recall them. The former editor-in-chief of *The Age,* Andrew Holden, was quoted, saying: 'All correspondents going into a war zone must file a security plan before they leave, which is assessed by an international security expert, and on this person's recommendations we either approve or disapprove' (as cited in Garg & Mann, 2014).

There is a growing appreciation of the dangers faced by freelance journalists among the major news outlets. ABC (America) recently recalled a freelance cameraman who contracted Ebola (Besser, Leong, & Candea, 2014) while working for them and Reuters, too, has a proactive approach to its freelance journalists. But news outlets are not all equally supportive of freelance personnel. Greste discovered an initial lack of support from Al Jazeera English after he and two colleagues were detained in Cairo on 29 December 2013 and charged with spreading 'false news'. Although Al Jazeera English claims editorial independence, the local Egyptian Al Jazeera channel, Mubasher Misr, had taken a political stance (Verbossen, 2014, p. 8) and was the subject of a legal battle with the Egyptian

government at the same time as Greste and his colleagues were fighting a court case (Peter Greste Trial, 2014).

While few major news outlets are prepared to let staff members work inside dangerous countries, some are prepared to commission freelance journalists to do the work, even though it is inherently dangerous. In 2011, Libya was considered a 'buyers' market' for freelance journalists, where many worked with 'no insurance, no expenses, or even airfares to get them home again' (Chulov, 2014). Of 72 journalists killed in Syria since the outbreak of the latest conflict in 2014 (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2014), 27 were freelance reporters and photographers, but only three were employed by news organisations based outside the Middle East. In a report for the Samir Kassir Foundation, security risk analyst and freelance journalist Shane Farrell (2013) reported a massive increase in the number of freelance journalists killed since the Committee to Protect Journalists began collecting data in 1992.

Some news agencies and outlets, such as Agence France-Presse (AFP) and *The Sunday Times* (Taibi, 2014), have decided to no longer accept freelance reports from Syria because of the danger to freelance reporters. AFP hopes the ban on images and information from freelance operators in Syria will not encourage journalists to take risks which could lead to them to 'being used as a vehicle for hateful, ultra-violent propaganda' (as cited in Taibi, 2014). It is important to note that journalists killed in Syria had also undergone other abuses. At least four who were held hostage by IS were waterboarded before being murdered (Goldman & Tate, 2014).

Not all organisations are refusing to accept freelance work from Syria. In late 2014, the Melbourne-based Newsmodo content marketing agency was still encouraging freelance journalists to file on IS for Australian news outlets in its invitation to 'pitch to this brief':

> information on these (ISIS) terrorists, including exclusive interviews with either them, their families or people who know them well. What motivated them to join ISIS? What are they hoping to achieve? What is their background? Both video and print submissions will be accepted. (Newsmodo, 2014)

The UK-based Rory Peck Trust—which was set up to honour the freelance cameraman killed in Russia in 1993—urges freelance journalists to attend a five-day hostile environment course, and to learn not to accept assignments without checking where they stand with those commissioning their work. The trust's head of communication, Molly Clarke, suggests asking editors a number of questions: 'Is there a protocol if something is to happen to me? Would I be covered by insurance? Do you have a communications plan? Do you provide

cash up front? Will you help organise my travel, fixers, drivers, etc.?' (as cited in Weiss, 2013).

Lesson two – learn the local code (understand difference)

Journalists from advanced liberal democracies such as Australia are enculturated to believe everyone everywhere should expect to enjoy the same foundations of individual liberty that Australians have: relatively free speech, self-determination, property rights, as well as freedom of association, worship and movement. Freedom of speech, and by extension the freedom to report, is thought to be a concern for 'everyone'.

This article argues that it is important that journalists working outside their own lands acknowledge, before they start work, that they will hold normative Western journalistic views. According to Schultz (2007), culturally specific journalistic habitus:

> implies understanding the journalistic game from a Western liberal point of view, and being able to master the rules of that same game. But the game can be played from different positions, and different dispositions point to different forms of mastering the game. (Schultz, 2007, p. 193)

The superiority of the Western journalistic model has taken on almost mythic proportions. Veteran Australian current affairs journalist and foreign correspondent Peter Lloyd articulated this deep-held belief:

> I've spent too many years living in, working in, and reporting on broken and rorted countries not to learn this: The common denominator is a weak media sector. All of us keep the bastards honest, and beware the politician. Every one of them benefits when we lose a second on air, or a soldier in the trench. This is not (a) career; it is a vocation, and it's time the army spoke out. (as cited in Knott, 2014)

Journalists working internationally may enter a country understanding from the 'journalist habitus' who the good guy is and who the bad guys are, but once on the ground it may seem very different. As Chulov noted of his experience in Libya: 'The good guy/bad guy narrative that appeared clear-cut at the start, drifted steadily to uncertainty. Difficult, important decisions needed to be made about who to trust and when to cut and run' (Chulov, 2014).

Greste addressed this issue in a speech, saying Western ideals of neutral and independent reporting were gone:

> Journalists are no longer on the front lines. We are the front lines. In this wider conflict, there is no such thing as a neutral, independent reporter. In the view of both sides, if you cross the lines in pursuit of our most funda-

mental principles of balance, fairness and accuracy, you effectively join the enemy. The compelling world views seem so widely divergent that to even try to understand the other side is to commit what many governments now consider to be treason. (Greste, 2014)

Farrell also noted the need for ethical and fair journalists, suggesting that free-lance operators were 'ambassadors for their profession': 'Malpractice by one individual— whether willingly or through ignorance—can taint the reputation of all journalists, making newsgathering more difficult the longer the conflict lasts' (Farrell, 2013, p. 16).

Greste (2014) suggested that journalists could not rely on the public to support them in their role, even if they wanted reliable news. He suggested that, regardless, it was important to improve professional standards:

> Our best strategy as an industry starts with a rock-solid commitment to our core ethical and professional standards. The more sloppy we get, the more we degrade public support for our business, the more excuses we give to governments to limit and control what we do. (Greste, 2014)

The call to improve global journalism is hardly new, but was particularly fervent in the period after 9/11, the 2001 Afghanistan war, and the 2003 Iraq war. German scholar Kai Hafez argued that those conflicts showed how the world's journalists framed the story on 'home-grown narratives' (Hafez, 2009):

> Western media cover the country through the lens of the nuclear issue, Muslim veiling and Ahmadinejad. The enormous paradoxes of the country go unnoticed. Columbus thought he had reached India when he had, in fact, discovered America. But are we today really that much further than Columbus was? (Hafez 2009, p. 330)

Hafez argues—as Daniel Hallin (1986) did with his study of the coverage of the Vietnam War—that there is a susceptibility of journalism cultures to 'patriotic, ethnocentric and other biases' which are related to world-views of audiences, 'which are themselves partly the product of the international patchwork journalism of modern mainstream media' (Hafez, 2009, p. 330).

Hafez (2009) puts the blame for poor global journalism on a lack of international education among most journalists, language hurdles, shrinking networks of foreign correspondents, public relations and propaganda being peddled through newsrooms, and the dependence of the media on domestic markets:

> Despite telling Western audiences that the Middle East is simply conflic-driven, the USA [is] an imperialist monolith or China 'the next superpower', we must try [to] understand the complexities of such world regions, their

> multiple histories and current often paradoxical developments. We must try [to] understand each other—just like in a real village. (Hafez, 2009, p. 331)

Farrell (2013) suggests language skills, even basic ones, could help get someone out of trouble, and that an understanding of and empathy with religious issues could be vital. Writing before more recent IS attacks on Western journalists, Farrell (2013, p. 12) observed how a knowledge of the fundamentals of Islam in Muslim-majority countries could save someone's life. He drew on the experiences of a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) staff member who was kidnapped by Islamist militants in Chechnya and saved her own life by singing the call to prayer just before she was to be shot (Garthwaite, 2001, p. 34).

Lesson three – learn risk assessment

This article argues that it is essential to teach student journalists how to do a risk assessment, or at least direct them to where they can learn about risk assessment. It could be worthwhile for Australian educators to look to the experience of educators in Fiji and Papua New Guinea who have found that their students have sometimes faced direct action or threats over stories they have prepared as part of their classes. Pacific academic David Robie advocates what he calls 'critical development journalism' and suggests that, instead of teaching normative Western journalism skills alone, that students be taught how to report on what may be considered blasphemy, sedition and treason as well as and how to deal with physical threats and bribery (Robie, 2014, p. 344).

One of the most important lessons to teach is that journalists have increasingly become hunted as targets (Borri, 2013). And being an Australian does nothing to mitigate that risk. ABC correspondent Trevor Bormann noted that the attitude to Australia changed after the first Iraq war:

> Once upon a time, if you were an Australian journalist abroad you could bank on the fact that you were from a fairly obscure country … The perception was that it was fairly innocuous, fairly neutral in any conflict. But now that's changed … every single Iraqi I met knew that Australia was part of the coalition, so because of that they questioned whether you were there to enhance the Australian war effort. (as cited in Anderson & Trembath, 2011)

This has only been exacerbated more recently with IS extremists specifically naming Australia, and former Prime Minister Tony Abbott, in its propaganda (Wroe, 2014). While hostile environment training is now mandatory for permanently employed foreign correspondents (Garg & Mann, 2014), many news organisations now require freelancers to complete hostile environment training before they will commission a reporter, and so it is useful to have safety training before freelance journalists pitch a project.

There are Australian-based training companies that prepare journalists from Australia's major media outlets: RedR, Cavell Group, Dynamic Alternatives Group, BLP Training and Services, and Betlin. Betlin does not currently appear to be active online, however one of their graduates, *The Age's* Jewel Topsfield, said:

> The best thing about this training is it is conducted by ex-military people who teach journalists how to plan… Journalists are used to responding to deadlines, so they wing things. The training teaches basic first aid, including bullet wound management and has simulation sessions that can be intimidating initially. (Garg & Mann, 2014)

In the United Kingdom, the Rory Peck Trust also organises training and, in 2013, offered 38 bursaries to freelance journalists from Europe, the US and the Middle East to attend its five-day hostile environment course (Rory Peck Trust, 2013, p. 48). There are a range of international organisations that can also help with risk assessment, such as the US-based Committee to Protect Journalists, which urges journalists to consider the normal risk assessments of battlefield hazards and abductions for political gain. It urges journalists to:

> be in regular contact with an editor, colleague, family member, or other reliable person … Most important, you and the contact person must decide in advance at exactly what point a failure to check in is considered an emergency and whom to call for a comprehensive response in locating you and securing your exit or release. The response often entails systematically reaching out to colleagues and friends who can assess the situation, to authorities who can investigate, and to the diplomatic community to provide potential support and leverage. (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2014)

Many experienced foreign correspondents are also keen to share their knowledge. *The Times'* correspondent Iona Craig wrote of the need for journalists to return to old-school methods of communication to ensure their safety in conflict zones or to use encrypted methods of email, telephony or social media: 'What should not be forgotten when working in conflict zones is that the hidden threat of government surveillance is as real as the visible one from bombs and bullets' (Craig, 2014, p. 12).

The Rory Peck Trust also urges journalists to complete a risk assessment before they begin a project, to help 'manage and minimise risks, be better prepared before an assignment and able to respond to an emergency on location" (Rory Peck Trust, 2014). Feinstein (2014) makes the point that journalists are unlike other people in war zones—they are not schooled in violence. There is no training programme to truly prepare them for the front lines:

> Transplanted overnight from the safety of a desk job back home to a bureau under threat in a country where security is tenuous or absent, the

language incomprehensible, the heat sapping and the local government, if still functioning, hostile to a free press, journalists must learn on the go, in haste and with little room for error, because in war zones, survival is often measured in milliseconds or millimetres. (Feinstein, 2014)

Conclusion

This article has argued that changing employment conditions for young, mostly freelance journalists have put greater pressure on journalism educators to ensure students are better prepared for freelancing. While this article has looked at events in the Middle East, much closer to home journalists are being jailed as well, as two experienced French journalists found out when they attempted to illegally report in Indonesia's Papua province (Agence France-Presse, 2014).

This article suggests journalism educators should ensure that j-school graduates recognise three lessons:

1. That they know the dangers of working for various employers when freelancing;
2. That they understand that the professional and cultural norms of advanced Western nations may not be observed in the countries from which they are reporting;
3. That they know of the need to understand risk assessment, which includes pre-deployment training in first aid, personal safety, security and other protocols and managing exposure to traumatic situations.

While these three lessons may discourage young people from reporting internationally, the stories still need to be told. Agence France-Presse agrees that, while there is no easy answer to reporting the events in Syria, it is important that a balance be struck between: '… our duty to inform the public, the need to keep our reporters safe, our concern for the dignity of victims being paraded by extremists, and the need to avoid being used as a vehicle for hateful, ultraviolent propaganda' (Leridon, 2014).

Leridon (2014) says that the AFP suggests that it is possible in other war zones—such as the Ukraine, Gaza and the Central African Republic—to continue to report because there are usually safe havens in war zones where journalists can work and file stories and get some rest. The same, however, cannot be said for Syria where the country is now seen as being 'dangerous from one end to the other' (Leridon, 2014).

Farrell also makes a strong argument in support of journalistic work from conflict zones, stating that its role in serving the public interest is often overlooked because of more commercial, 'trivial' news:

War reporters often lay the foundations for how history will be written and events remembered. At the best of times, war correspondents have had a positive impact on policy decisions and provided witness accounts

for criminal proceedings; crimes for which the perpetrators would never have been brought to justice otherwise. Such reporting helps cut through opposing, often propagandistic, narratives and present facts as they really are. It is in society's interest to maintain the quality of journalism, and, by extension, it is in society's interest to have minimum working standards for all journalists working in conflict zones. (Farrell, 2013, p. 27)

There does not appear to be great public support for the work of war correspondents, nor consciousness of their problems or concerns, nor—as US journalist Nicholas Kristof wrote in 2014—about the brevity of coverage being given, despite strong public pressure for more news on ongoing conflicts:

So far this year, nightly newscasts on ABC, CBS and NBC have offered a combined total of 3 minutes of coverage of the civil war and impending famine in South Sudan, and 9 minutes about mass atrocities in the Central African Republic, according to Andrew Tyndall of the Tyndall Report, which tracks such things. In contrast, the missing Malaysian airliner drew 304 minutes (almost five times as much as the Syrian civil war) (Kristof, 2014).

Goldberg said he used to be sought out by young people wanting a career in the Middle East. He recently changed his advice:

I would tell them that this was an excellent idea: save some money, go learn Arabic, be a newspaper stringer, grab for the big stories, and you'll have an interesting life. Steven Sotloff was one of those who sought my advice. His Middle East career was already under way (he was living in Israel at the time), and I prefer to think that he could not have been dissuaded. But I'm capable of learning, and my advice now is to go somewhere else. (Goldberg, 2014)

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5. Detention attention
Framing a Manus Island riot

Abstract: This article reports on a research project that investigated the framing of asylum seekers in the Australian news publications *The Australian* and *The Guardian Australia Edition*, during their coverage of a riot that occurred in an asylum seeker processing centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, in February 2014. Analysis found themes of asylum seekers represented as threats to national identity, State sovereignty, and as victims. The research discusses the potential impacts framing may have on the way asylum seekers are perceived by readers of these publications. Its findings showed that the process of framing in news reports can both privilege and exclude aspects of an event being reported.

Keywords: asylum seekers, critical discourse analysis, framing, national identity, Papua New Guinea, protest, sovereignty

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Introduction

ON the 16 and 17 February 2014, protesting by asylum seekers at the Manus Island processing centre led to riots involving asylum seekers and members of the centre's staff and security. As a result of the riots, 24-year-old Iranian asylum seeker Reza Barati died, and 77 other asylum seekers sustained injuries. This article reports on a research project that investigated how *The Australian* and *The Guardian Australia Edition* (hereafter called *Guardian Aus*) reported on the riot and the immediate aftermath. The research used critical discourse analysis (CDA) to investigate the framing of asylum seekers in the two newspapers. Articles published between February 17, when the riots were first reported, and February 26, when the cause of death of Reza Barati was revealed, were analysed for the research. The two publications were chosen because they are known to have differing political perspectives and levels of influence. Through analysis of news reportage, this research aimed to discover the way each publication framed asylum seekers and the potential influences media framing could have on the way asylum seekers are perceived by readers. Analysis of the data uncovered three main themes: (1) asylum seekers as threatening national identity; (2) asylum seekers as threatening sovereignty; and, (3) asylum seekers as victims of both violence and government policy.

Previous studies into Australia's media discourse on asylum seekers have

investigated balance in media coverage (Every & Augustinos, 2008b; Pickering, 2001), the use of social categorisations, such as refugee, detainee and boat people, to describe asylum seekers (O'Doherty & Leceouteur, 2007; Pickering, 2001), and the use and influence of media coverage on people's opinions of asylum seekers (McKay, Thomas & Kneebone, 2011). The majority of these studies noted that media coverage on asylum seekers is one-sided and reliant upon stereotypes to present asylum seekers as deviant, illegal, or different. Such coverage can amplify negative frames of asylum seekers. This study adds to the current body of literature by performing an in-depth analysis of a specific event that became an important national and international issue.

Human rights groups and international bodies have spoken out against Australia's offshore processing policies, requesting an end to offshore processing following the riot (AFP, 2014) and, as has been outlined by Pickering (2001, p. 173) and Every & Augustinos (2008a, p. 566), the way the media frames issues can be used to justify the continuation or disruption of policy. Therefore, an analysis of news reportage in *The Australian* and *Guardian Aus* during the riot can contribute a greater understanding of the framing of asylum seekers through this event, and how framing may influence a reader's perceptions of both the riot and asylum seekers as a whole.

Coverage of the riot in *The Australian* and *Guardian Aus* detailed conflicting claims over who started the riot, debates over the adequacy of offshore processing policies, and whether the Australian or Papua New Guinean (PNG) governments were responsible for stopping rioting. *The Australian's* coverage of the riot largely presented asylum seekers as threatening both national identity and State sovereignty by framing asylum seekers as violent, threatening Australia's borders and as the social and cultural 'Other'. Images used in *The Australian's* coverage of the riot also framed asylum seekers in a threatening manner as they depicted asylum seekers in large groups, which prevents their humanisation (Machin & Mayr, 2012). Images, although not frequent in coverage of the riot, also showed asylum seekers from a distance, behind fences, and surrounded by authority figures which can connote threat by implying unwanted social relations and criminality (Bleiker, Campbell, Hutchinson & Nicholson, 2013). Sources from the Australian government were the most commonly employed in *The Australian*, and emphasised asylum seekers as violent and to blame for rioting.

Guardian Aus was found to have framed asylum seekers as victims of both local violence and Australian policy, and most often used sources who were refugee advocates and opposed to government policy. However, the images selected in *Guardian Aus* conveyed a similar framing of asylum seekers to *The Australian*—some images were used multiple times in both publications. The scarcity and repetition of images in coverage of the riot, and their divergence from *Guardian Aus's* textual framing of asylum seekers, indicates media organisations were limited

in what material they could use when reporting on the riot. Analysis discovered the Australian government was influential in what was reported by both periodicals in their coverage of the riot, due to a media ban in offshore processing centres maintained by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Methodology

The research employed critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyse newspaper coverage of the riot in *The Australian* and *Guardian Aus*. Fairclough (2013) notes that CDA provides both scope and framework for analysis of the relationship between discourse and other elements of the social process. CDA was used in this study to investigate the framing of news reports by focusing on the language used and sources quoted in both news reportage and opinion pieces in the two publications. Framing theory was employed to provide a theoretical perspective to underpin the approach of the research. According to McQuail (2005), framing theory focuses on the way factors such as events, persons, values and ideas are defined. The factors are attributed a value and priority that can affect how an individual constructs reality.

Data was interpreted using lexical analysis, which Machin and Mayr (2012) describe as analysis of the kinds of words used. Analysis looked at whether the lexical choices selected by each publication when describing asylum seekers and their actions during the riot could establish a distinct discourse by signifying a specific identity or value. Lexical analysis was employed because, as Bazeley (2013) notes, how people say things can be as important as what they say. Lexical analysis allowed the research to investigate any underlying beliefs in each publication that may not be specifically asserted, which Machin and Mayr (2012) note is a key purpose of CDA. Similarly, O'Doherty and Lecouteur's (2007) study of the social categorisation of asylum seekers argued the lexical choices made when referring to asylum seekers—whether referring to them as asylum seekers, refugees, detainees or boat people—can legitimise certain perspectives on the asylum seeker debate and establish a field through which meaning is interpreted.

Analysis also considered the use of sources in the data. It noted what sources appeared, their frequency and placement in reportage, and whether they were balanced against sources with opposing viewpoints. Analysis sought to uncover whether the selection of sources by each publication could be used to maximise or minimise certain frames of asylum seekers. As Bazeley (2013) states, lexical choices can minimise certain individuals and perspectives in a debate, therefore, analysing the sources used in media coverage allowed the research to uncover how each publication's selection of sources may influence their framing of asylum seekers. By analysing the sources used and lexical choices made by each publication, the research focused on how media coverage of the riot could construct the events, and asylum seekers, in a particular way and how such construction

may impact readers through legitimising or minimising different perspectives on the debate.

A population of data between February 17 and February 26 was analysed. This data included 38 articles from the online editions of *The Australian* and 28 articles from *Guardian Aus.* The data represented the entirety of editorial and opinion pieces published by *The Australian* and *Guardian Aus* relevant to the riot. The specific time period was chosen for the reasons outlined in the introduction to this article.

The publications analysed were selected due to their varying levels of influence and different political stances. News Corporation owns *The Australian*. The paper was first published in 1964 and its political influence is noted by Robin (2014), who has argued '[t]he *Oz* might have a small readership, but in Canberra, it's undoubtedly the most influential paper'. *The Australian's* former editor-in-chief, Chris Mitchell has stated he does not 'think there's much right-of-centre in the news pages. I would argue that our news pages are rigorously straight'. Mitchell has also noted that 'the editorial and op-ed pages of the newspaper are centre-right' (Mitchell, 2006) and has discussed how *The Australian* is prepared to embark upon campaign journalism (Robin, 2014).

Guardian Aus was first published in Australia in 2013. It is the Australian arm of the United Kingdom newspaper *The Guardian*, which has been labelled a 'mouthpiece of the left' (Marketing Magazine, 2013), and its Australian counterpart has been labelled by other publications, including *The Australian,* as left-leaning (Tabakoff & Owen, 2013). *Guardian Aus* claims to be an independent publication (Sweney, 2013) and is funded by philanthropist Graeme Wood, who made the largest-ever single political donation in Australia's history—A$1.6 million to the Australian Greens (Sweney, 2013).

Analysis and Discussion

As noted earlier, analysis of the publications found three key themes in coverage of the riot: asylum seekers framed as threats to national identity, as threats to State sovereignty, and as victims. Additional discourses on the riot were also found but are not included in this analysis as they are not specific to asylum seekers. Such discourses included: the framing of who was responsible for escalating the protests into violence; whether Australian or PNG service people were responsible for stopping the violence; and whether the Australian or PNG governments were responsible for investigations into the riot. An investigation of these discourses would be of importance to any future research on the riot.

Notions of asylum seekers as threats were found to link with arguments put forward by Edward Said (2003), particularly the notion of Asian and Middle Eastern cultures being discursively defined in opposition to the West as 'the Other' (Said, 2003). 'Otherness' was emphasised in *The Australian*, which often

framed asylum seekers through binaries, emphasising racial, ethnic and societal differences. Initially, *Guardian Aus* also adopted a similar stance. However, *Guardian Aus* coverage of the riot was typically humanising of asylum seekers and critical of Australian government policy. Analysis found the selection of sources and the structure of news articles are important in establishing a framing of asylum seekers. As Van Dijk (2013) notes, the ordering of information can convey a publication's stance on an issue by revealing what information it considers the most important. Furthermore, analysis also identified that the choices made by each publication with regard to their reportage were limited by a media ban enforced by the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection, affecting both the sources and images used.

Asylum seekers as a threat to national identity

It has been argued that Australia's migration and immigration policies have been established on the basis of excluding 'the Other' (Rashid, 2007). This approach may be exemplified by *The Migration Act 1958*, which serves to regulate the presence of 'non-citizens' in Australia (Every, 2008, p. 214), and, perhaps most significantly, the White Australia Policy *(Immigration Restriction Act 1901),* which excluded non-European immigrants from entering Australia through measures such as dictation testing (Rashid, 2007). Additionally, the introduction of controversial mandatory detention and offshore processing policies in 1992 and 2001 respectively, coincided with the arrival of asylum seekers on boats from Asia and the Middle East (Every, 2008; Every & Augustinos, 2008b). In the past 15 years, both the Australian Labor and Coalition governments have supported the exclusion of asylum seekers who have arrived in Australia by boat.

The Australian

The Australian's coverage of the riot largely emphasised the racial and ethnic differences of Australians and asylum seekers. *The Australian* often referred to asylum seekers by their race when talking about the riot, for example, referring to the asylum seeker killed in the riot as an 'Iranian asylum seeker', 'Iranian man', or 'Iranian asylum seeker/man, Reza Barati'. Caldas-Coulthard (2003) argues that descriptions of asylum seekers referencing race or ethnicity draw on sociopolitical stereotypes, giving asylum seekers a negative classification. According to McKay, Thomas & Kneebone (2011) and Masocha & Simpson (2011), sociopolitical stereotypes can include associations with terrorism and unwillingness to renounce cultural values. Describing asylum seekers with reference to their race can frame them as a threat to national identity by emphasising their difference and inferring socio-political stereotypes, creating an us/them binary. This may make it more likely for readers to perceive asylum seekers as a threat. Similarly,

McKay, Thomas and Kneebone (2011) detected a link between socio-political stereotypes and public perception, finding that socio-political stereotypes have been influential on the Australian public's attitudes to asylum seekers and have been used to justify support of offshore processing policies.

The Guardian Australian's coverage of the riot also refers to ethnicity in descriptions of asylum seekers as dangerous or violent. This is exemplified in an opinion piece published on February 25:

> Whenever people are held in custody against their will, there is some danger. There is a particular danger in the case of asylum-seekers because among their number is a very tough group, substantially though not entirely Iranian, which is determined to make the centres unworkable and break the government's will … (Sheridan, 2014).

In this example, associations can be drawn between Middle Eastern culture and violence by stating the centres are dangerous due to a 'tough' group of 'substantially … Iranian' asylum seekers (Sheridan, 2014). Associating Middle Eastern culture with violence assists in establishing a binary opposition of asylum seekers and Australian culture, which Pickering (2001) notes can work to establish Australian culture as threatened by 'the Other'. Representations of asylum seekers through 'Otherness' were found in news articles in *The Australian*. For example, an article published on February 20 detailed alleged rape threats made by asylum seekers in the lead up to the rioting. It used quotes from Manus Member of Parliament (MP) Ron Knight, who stated that local detention centre guards were subject to 'foul language and abuse' from asylum seekers who 'made sexual (comments), saying they were going to get out and rape their mothers and their sisters' (Martin, 2014). By detailing these revelations, asylum seekers could be viewed as potential rapists. Said (2003) and Hall (1997) note sexual and violent threat is an aspect of framing the 'Other'. Such framing casts the 'Other' as being incapable of practising 'civilised' restraint in sexual and emotional life (Hall 1997, p. 243) and establishes asylum seekers as a threat.

Additionally, *The Australian's* use of Manus MP Ron Knight as a source provides both power and authority to his account of asylum seekers as violent or deviant by drawing credibility from Knight's official position (McQuail, 1994). The article provides no other sources or reports of any investigations into the legitimacy of the claims made by Knight. The non-contested statements of Knight may further lead readers to see asylum seekers as a threat by limiting the information on the riot that is made available to them (Hallahan, 1999). This selection of sources was typical of the approach used in *The Australian's* coverage of the riot. *The Australian* often employed few sources in its reporting and alternate sources were more likely to be positioned toward the end of articles, which, as

Van Dijk (2013) states, can minimise a source's contribution to the discourse. Van Dijk's (2013) work on news schemata identified that news reports are organised hierarchically, in accordance with the perceived importance of information.

The Guardian Australia Edition

Unlike *The Australian*, *Guardian Aus* rarely mentioned race or ethnicity in its reportage. For example, the man who died during the rioting was referred to primarily by name or as a man, and not by nationality. Furthermore, while both publications included Australian government officials as sources, the *Guardian Aus* treated these sources differently to *The Australian*. While in both publications, government officials were the most common proponents of the threatening frame of asylum seekers, the *Guardian Aus* more often positioned government sources toward the end of articles, and included alternate sources. For example, in an article published in the *Guardian Aus* on 19 February 2014, then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection Scott Morrison described the riot as 'a very dangerous situation where people decided to protest in a very violent way …' and stated that 'if you behave in an unruly and disorderly way then you subject yourself to the response of law enforcement' (Davidson, 2014a). While this comment by minister Morrison in *Guardian Aus* may be seen as framing asylum seekers as threats, the use of opposing voices could be seen to lessen the impact of such framing. *Guardian Aus* frequently included sources such as the Refugee Action Coalition and UN Human Rights Commission officials and positioned accounts of the riot by these sources above those by government figures. This structuring placed refugee advocates' accounts of the riot in a position of power because they are placed toward the top of articles, giving the first description of the events and placing alternate frames in a prime position. The structuring of information and sources in *Guardian Aus* may be considered to reveal the information or persons perceived as most important to the story by the publication (Van Dijk, 2013). For example, in the extract cited above, minister Morrison's implication of asylum seekers in the violence was situated toward the end of the article, with refugee advocates giving the first account of the violence.

The *Guardian Aus*'s coverage of the riot also differed from *The Australian* in regard to the information on the riot it prioritised. *Guardian Aus* focused more on the asylum seekers injured in the riot, whereas *The Australian* placed more emphasis on revelations of asylum seekers being arrested. *Guardian Aus*'s use of asylum seeker accounts and sources such as the Refugee Action Coalition demonstrate this focus. In articles published on February 18 and 19, the Refugee Action Coalition stated that locals and PNG police carried out 'systematic and brutal' attacks on asylum seekers (Davidson & Laughland, 2014a; Davidson & Laughland, 2014b). These sources describe asylum seekers as victims of violence

and living in unsafe conditions. These reports are privileged by being positioned above alternate accounts by government sources. *Guardian Aus's* emphasis on asylum seekers being injured during rioting could minimise notions of asylum seekers as a threat to national identity. This framing portrays asylum seekers as victims and may increase readers' sympathy toward them.

Comparison of results

Framing of asylum seekers as a threat to national identity was more prominent in *The Australian* than *Guardian Aus*. *The Australian's* coverage of asylum seekers highlighted racial and ethnic differences between asylum seekers and Australians, which could obfuscate views of asylum seekers as people seeking humanitarian aid. This focus on nationality and ethnicity also invokes socio-political stereotypes. It emphasises the 'Otherness' of asylum seekers, framing them as unwilling to adopt Australian values and as possessing societally undesirable personality traits. On the other hand, *Guardian Aus* largely did not convey a threatening frame of asylum seekers. Coverage focused on asylum seekers' safety within the centre, which could have a humanising effect. Cultural, ethnic and racial differences were not points of focus in *Guardian Aus's* coverage, which could minimise frames of asylum seekers as threatening national identity and instead position them as victims.

These findings show how the selection of sources and structure of news reportage can restrict the information readers have to draw upon when making sense of reportage. *The Australian's* emphasis on the cultural 'Other' may lead readers to object to asylum seekers and could increase support for offshore processing policies based on perceived differences between asylum seekers and Australians. By comparison, *Guardian Aus's* humanisation of asylum seekers and framing of asylum seekers as victims may evoke reader sympathy toward asylum seekers and encourage challenges to Australian government policy based on humanitarian grounds.

Asylum seekers as a threat to State sovereignty

State sovereignty concerns the power of the State to do what is necessary to self-govern, such as make laws encompassing citizens, groups and institutions (Heywood, 2007). Notions that asylum seekers are a threat to State sovereignty primarily emphasise asylum seekers, especially those arriving by boat, as threatening borders via invasion (Babacan & Babacan, 2008; Every & Augustinos, 2008a; Price, 2014; Rowe & O'Brien, 2013). Vas Dev (2009) argues that notions of asylum seekers threatening sovereignty have been a fundamental premise of Australia's immigration policy. This can be demonstrated by the way offshore processing policy is described on the Australian government's Customs and Border Protection Service website as a 'military-led border se-

curity initiative to stop the boats' (Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, 2014, n.p). By coupling the military and border protection, asylum seekers are positioned as threatening sovereignty and warranting military intervention.

Similar to the framing of asylum seekers as threatening national identity, the selection of sources and structure of reportage was crucial in conveying a publication's framing. *The Australian* predominantly framed asylum seekers as threatening State sovereignty, whereas *Guardian Aus* countered this, positioning asylum seekers as victims. The Department of Immigration and Border Protection's media ban was found to be most influential regarding framing of asylum seekers as a threat to State sovereignty, particularly with regard to reportage in *Guardian Aus*.

The Australian

Throughout reportage on the riot, *The Australian* presented asylum seekers as instigating the event. This was achieved primarily through the structuring of reportage, which positioned asylum seekers as actively instigating the violence. For example, *The Australian's* coverage of the riot describes asylum seekers as breaking down fences and damaging the centre, making weapons from everyday objects, and insulting and fighting with security guards. Alternate accounts of the riot, which argued that Manus locals and Papua New Guinean police played a role in escalating violence, were diminished by their positioning toward the end of articles, and a rejection of such claims by official sources. As McQuail (1994) outlines, sources such as government officials have more power and credibility when quoted in the media because of their status. Through positioning asylum seekers as being at fault for the riot, they can be framed as having a violent nature. Offshore processing policy may, therefore, be justified as preventing this threat to sovereignty from materialising. Pickering (2001) also notes this, arguing that representations of asylum seekers as threatening national security contribute to the invocation and validation of repressive State policies.

Structural opposition was also used in *The Australian* to convey asylum seekers as inherently violent and dangerous. An example of this can be found in an article published on February 20, where Manus MP Ron Knight states:

> The insinuation that Manus is a lawless society of machete wielding cannibals is insulting and not worth trying to defend.
> Manus has the reputation of the friendliest place in PNG, with among the most compassionate people on earth. Our police reacted under PNG law to protect lives and property with reasonable force … (Callick, 2014a)

This use of structural opposition establishes a binary representation of the 'people

of Manus', who are presented as compassionate and friendly, and asylum seekers in the centre, who necessitated a response from law enforcement. This immediately presents a dichotomy in the values upheld by each group and potentially allows for asylum seekers to be framed as threatening State sovereignty by representing them as inherently violent, threatening law and order, and as incapable of behaving in a civilised manner.

Similarly, the use of war-like terms in *The Australian* can also construct asylum seekers as threatening sovereignty. *The Australian* often referred to asylum seeker policies as border protection policies, which can establish asylum seekers as threatening State sovereignty through invasion. Additionally, minister Morrison, in an article published on February 18, refers to the Australian government's 'absolute resolve' to stick to its policy in the face of asylum seekers who wish to 'take down' asylum seeker policies and processing centres, and 'destroy the regime we have put in place' (Owens, 2014). By stating asylum seekers wish to stop current policy and 'destroy the regime', asylum seekers can be seen as opposed to the Australian government, which is standing up to threats to its laws. This can further establish difference in us/them binaries, and may lead to justifications of policy and tough measures on asylum seekers based on notions of threat. Pickering (2001) has drawn similar conclusions, noting a prominence of military terminology in her analysis of media discourses on asylum seekers and arguing that the use of war terms can be employed as a justification of violence by the established threatened party.

The Guardian Australia Edition

Guardian Aus framing of asylum seekers as a threat to State sovereignty changes over the course of its reportage. When the riot was first reported on February 17, asylum seekers were described as 'agitated', 'chanting', and as having 'damaged light stands, glass panels, fences and bunk beds' (Davidson & Cordell, 2014). In a similar way to *The Australian*, this framing can establish asylum seekers as threatening State sovereignty by depicting them as potentially violent, capable of wilful damage to property, and behaving in a manner that would be unacceptable in Australia. Klocker and Dunn (2003) drew similar conclusions in their content analysis of asylum seeker discourses in the post September 11 and Tampa Incident period, finding that descriptions of asylum seekers using weapons frame them as inherently bad in character and behaviour, and as a physical and cultural threat. While this framing of asylum seekers is evident when *Guardian Aus* first published news of the riot, its framing of asylum seekers changed as coverage developed. *Guardian Aus* altered its framing of asylum seekers, prioritising information of asylum seekers injured in the riot over framing of asylum seekers as threatening, and using sources who described the riot in a manner that humanised asylum seekers, placing other sources,

including minister Morrison, in a responding position down lower in articles.

An example of the change in *Guardian Aus's* coverage of the riot can be found in an article published on February 18, which detailed claims by 'sources inside the centre', that:

> PNG police and locals were the ones who breached fences, coming inside the compound and attacking asylum seekers. They were armed with machetes, pipes, stones and at least one firearm (Davidson, 2014a).

Following this description of the events leading up to the riot, it is detailed that minister Morrison rejected the reports, saying that there had been a 'rolling series of protests orchestrated by people within the centre' (Davidson, 2014a). Positioning accounts of the riot by unnamed sources above government sources could be seen to limit the Australian Government's power over the discourse. Descriptions of the weapons used by PNG police and locals established them as the aggressors and initiators of the attack that preceded the riot. *Guardian Aus*'s transition toward a more sympathetic coverage of asylum seekers may lead readers to be sceptical of accounts of the riot framing asylum seekers as threatening State sovereignty. Readers may see asylum seekers as victims due to *Guardian Aus*'s structure of reportage and prioritisation of sources.

In a manner similar to *The Australian*, structural opposition was present in reportage on the riot by *Guardian Aus*. However, it was employed in a different way. In an article published on February 20, for example, Manus MP Ron Knight described the riot being caused by a 'continually aggressive' minority of asylum seekers who were only stopped by PNG mobile police units (Davidson, 2014b). Knight's description of asylum seekers could establish a divide between asylum seekers and PNG police, and frame them as a threat to State sovereignty by referring to them as violent, and needing to be stopped by police. However, this depiction of asylum seekers is structurally opposed within the article by including a description of the mobile police unit by alternate sources as 'thuggish parliamentary type forces, allegedly responsible for beatings, rapes and murders over decades' (Davidson, 2014b). Structurally opposing descriptions of asylum seekers as threatening with claims against the mobile police unit can delegitimise the threatening framing of asylum seekers and reframe them as victims of violence rather than the instigators of rioting.

Comparison of results

In *The Australian*, asylum seekers were structurally represented as at fault for the riot. They were described as an inherently violent 'Other', and the events of the riot were discussed through the use of terminology commonly associated with the discourse of war. This framing can be viewed as positioning

asylum seekers as threatening State sovereignty by emphasising characteristics eschewing violence, difference and lawlessness that are not tolerated in Western societies. Due to these frames, readers may see asylum seekers as posing a threat to State sovereignty and justify offshore processing policy as stopping the violent and illegal 'Other' entering the country. *Guardian Aus*, on the other hand, contrasted notions of asylum seekers as threatening sovereignty through its descriptions of asylum seekers, structure of articles and selection of sources. Structural opposition lessened the impact of threatening frames of asylum seekers by sources such as the Australian Government, and implicated the Australian Government as having some level of responsibility for the riot. The contrast between the representation of asylum seekers by Government sources and *Guardian Aus* shows the potential influence the Department of Immigration and Border Protection media ban has over the way asylum seekers can be represented. Due to the less threatening framing of asylum seekers in *Guardian Aus*, readers may be more likely to sympathise with asylum seekers on a humanitarian level and be sceptical of justifications of offshore processing policy based on notions of asylum seekers threatening State sovereignty.

Asylum seekers as victim

The establishment of us/them binaries in *The Australian* and *Guardian Aus* framing of asylum seekers necessarily creates a victim and an 'Other', but each publication approached the notion of the victim differently. Reportage on the riot by *The Australian* depicted a binary where threatening asylum seekers are positioned against the victimised Australian public, a binary that has been noted in other research (Babacan, 2008; Pickering, 2001). However, as the research analysis has revealed, *Guardian Aus* typically challenged notions of threat by framing asylum seekers as victims, embodying a binary noted by McKay, Thomas and Blood (2011) and Price (2014), where asylum seekers are presented as a threat, victim, or both.

The Australian

As previous sections have noted, *The Australian* largely depicted asylum seekers as threatening and violent 'Others' in its reportage on the riot on Manus Island. This was mainly achieved through source selection and story structure. Notions of threat featured heavily in the framing of asylum seekers by officials from the PNG and Australian governments. Government officials gave the first account of the violence in 21 of the 31 news articles in *The Australian's* coverage of the riot (the seven remaining articles were opinion pieces and did not contain sources). Alternate sources that framed asylum seekers as victims, such as those from the Refugee Action Coalition or UN Human Rights Commission, featured in the first half of two articles and were omitted entirely from 11.

The Australian, did, however, depict asylum seekers as victims at sea, by quantifying the results of offshore processing policy. *The Australian* noted an absence of asylum seeker boat arrivals, a drop in asylum applications in Indonesia, and fewer asylum seekers in Indonesian refugee camps as successes of policy, because asylum seekers were no longer risking their lives to come to Australia. Furthermore, offshore processing policy was framed as humanitarian because it stops asylum seekers endangering themselves by boarding 'rickety boats' in an attempt to get to Australia (Callick, 2014b). An opinion piece published on February 26 also contained this quantification. It compared the number of asylum seekers who arrived by boat during the previous Labor government (50,000 on 800 boats) and the lives lost in the process (1200), to the one life lost in the riot (Albrechtsen, 2014). By comparing the number of lives lost at sea to those lost in the riot, asylum seekers were framed as victims at sea under the former Labor government.

The Australian's framing of asylum seekers as victims at sea may influence readers' opinions on asylum seekers and asylum seeker policy. Readers could consider offshore processing policy as the most appropriate method to process asylum seekers as it stops them putting themselves in danger by boarding boats, whilst simultaneously stopping the threat asylum seekers pose to State sovereignty and national identity.

The Guardian Australia Edition

As noted previously, *Guardian Aus* largely framed asylum seekers as victims, especially in countering notions of threat. *Guardian Aus's* source selection and article structure played a large role in conveying this framing. Accounts of the riot by refugee advocates were most often positioned above government sources, which can give them more power over the discourse. Descriptions of the riot by refugee advocates focused on the injuries sustained by asylum seekers, and positioned asylum seekers as attempting to avoid confrontation by hiding from PNG police and Manus locals who were wielding weapons. One asylum seeker is quoted in an article, saying:

> 'We tried to hide under the containers, but they dragged us out and beat us. We couldn't get away.' (Laughland, 2014a)

An article published on February 21 contained humanised descriptions of Reza Barati, the asylum seeker killed in the riot. In the article, Barati is described as a 'joker' and 'gentle giant', whom centre staff were teaching English to by reading children's books (Laughland, 2014b). This framing infers child-like qualities on Barati by referring to children's books. It also counters sociopolitical stereotypes surrounding cultural values by depicting Barati as eager to learn English. The framing of asylum seekers achieved through *Guardian*

Aus's structuring and selection of sources may lead readers to sympathise with asylum seekers and their circumstances; it may also influence readers to see asylum seekers as victims of violence by humanising their actions during the riot and shift notions of threat onto Papua New Guinean police or Manus locals.

Guardian Aus framed asylum seekers as the victims of offshore processing policy. In opinion pieces, offshore processing policy is referred to as a policy of deterrence, where the injuries and death that took place in the riot add to the mentality of the policy. An opinion piece published on February 18 referred to the policy as a 'nasty little comic book' funded by the Australian government, and intended to 'deter those seeking asylum from making the journey to Australia' (Sparrow, 2014). Offshore processing policy was similarly framed in news articles, particularly in an article published on February 26, which detailed whistle-blower accounts of rioting. In the article, a whistleblower stated that Manus Island was 'designed as an experiment in the active creation of horror to secure deterrence' (Farrell, 2014), and stated that the death of Reza Barati provides an opportunity for this logic to be extended. This description of offshore processing policy framed asylum seekers as victims, by inferring that the policy capitalises on uncertainty and violence, and that Reza Barati's death strengthens this mentality. *Guardian Aus*'s framing of asylum seekers as victims largely adopted a position emphasising Australia's collective duty to assist asylum seekers by stopping offshore processing. Every (2008) notes that this element has been lacking in media coverage of asylum seekers, indicating that *Guardian Aus* could add a new element to the discourse on asylum seekers in Australia's media landscape.

Comparison of results

The Australian and *Guardian Aus* had contrasting frames of 'the victim' in their coverage of the riot. *The Australian* largely represented the Australian people, government, and government processes as victims of asylum seeker violence. *The Australian* did, however, frame asylum seekers as victims at sea, which allowed for the image of the threatening asylum seeker to be maintained, whilst presenting Australia as both humanitarian and protecting its borders from threat. The framing of 'the victim' in *The Australian* may influence readers' opinions on asylum seekers by making the frame of the threatening asylum seeker dominant. *Guardian Aus*, on the other hand, predominantly portrayed asylum seekers as victims of a violent 'Other', such as PNG mobile police units, Manus locals and security staff at the processing centre. *Guardian Aus* conveyed this framing through its selection of sources and structure of articles, which minimised accounts of the riot by government officials who largely framed asylum seekers as threatening. The prominence of accounts by alternative sources humanised asylum seekers and placed accountability for the violence onto Australian policy.

This framing may encourage readers to view asylum seekers as victims of local violence and policy.

Conclusion

The continued presence of asylum seekers, and ongoing controversy over asylum seeker policy in the Australian media, make an understanding of the media's role in informing readers' constructions of asylum seekers critical. Data analysis of media coverage in *The Australian* and *Guardian Aus* regarding the riot on Manus Island in February 2014 discovered three main discourses: asylum seekers as a threat to national identity; asylum seekers as a threat to State sovereignty; and, asylum seekers as victim. The findings presented in this analysis demonstrate how the selection of sources, structuring of information and use of descriptions can minimise or emphasise certain elements of a discourse. Thus, the selection of sources and structure of news reportage by each publication can affect the framing of asylum seekers and may lead readers to view asylum seekers in a certain way.

Analysis found the framing of asylum seekers as a threat to national identity and State sovereignty more prominent in *The Australian* than *Guardian Aus*. *The Australian*'s use of sources, binary opposition and lexical choices largely represented asylum seekers as inherently violent or criminal, opposing the Australian government or Australian values. *The Australian* also focused more on cultural differences, inferring socio-political stereotypes, and representing asylum seekers as 'the Other'. Framing of asylum seekers as victims was largely absent from reportage. Readers may be influenced by this framing to perceive asylum seekers as threats, and offshore processing policy as the best approach to stop threatening asylum seekers entering Australia.

By comparison, *Guardian Aus*'s reportage largely contrasted that of *The Australian*. Cultural difference and socio-political stereotypes were not discovered in *Guardian Aus,* with asylum seekers depicted through what Every (2008) terms a humanitarian frame—presenting asylum seekers as victims rather than emphasising threats to national identity and sovereignty. It should also be noted that the *Guardian Aus*'s approach to framing asylum seekers was not noted in the literature examined as part of the research, indicating that *Guardian Aus* may add a new element to the media discourse on asylum seekers in Australia.

However, the analysis also found that a media ban maintained by the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection denying journalists access to offshore processing centres was influential in reporting. This was evidenced by the prominence of government officials in reportage, despite the different framing of asylum seekers by each publication, which indicates that the Australian government still maintains some level of influence over the way asylum seekers may be framed in the media.

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6. A foreign flower no more
Tongan diasporic media and the 2014 Tongan election

Abstract: The use of social media and the involvement of diasporic population in politics is a growing trend among diasporic Polynesian communities and Island politicians. Auckland-based Tongan media, which are the focus of this article, appear to have had an effect on voter behaviour in the 2014 Tongan elections. Using the Auckland-based news site *Kaniva News* as a case study and drawing on interviews with Tongan journalists, this article sets out to show the links between the development of online media among the Tongan diaspora, the rise of 'Akilisi Pohiva's democracy movement and the mediated involvement of New Zealand's Tongan community in that democratic process. Similar developments have also been noted in Fiji and the Cook Islands where online media played an important part in recent elections.

Keywords: Kaniva News, Tonga, diaspora, diasporic media, democracy, elections, 'Akilisi Pohiva

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I N RECENT years, Pacific Islanders from the diasporic Polynesian communities have used metropolitan centres as points from which they have participated in democratic campaigns that combine traditional social structures and extended family functions, augmented by digital media. The way the democratic process has been conducted reflects a process of adaptation and adoption by communities taking part in their own culturally adapted versions of Parliamentary democracy, often mediated by digital platforms. Rather than being what *The Fiji Times* once called 'a foreign flower' (Larmour, 1994), the democratic process has, like so much, been adapted to the fa'a Pasifika.

The use of social media and the involvement of diasporic communities is a growing trend among Island politicians. Fijians have been heavy users of Facebook and other media in recent years. There was fierce debate on Fijian websites about issues relating to Fiji and the most recent national elections. In 2014, the Fijian Prime Minister, Voreqe Bainimarama visited Auckland to speak to Fijians living in Auckland, who are able to vote (Field, 2014). The former Fijian Prime Minister, ex-colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, went to the Democracy in the Pacific conference at the University of Canterbury in 2012 to talk about politics and to boost

his own profile among overseas Fijians (Mann & Turner, 2012). Both Kailahi (2015a) and Latu (2014a) attributed the influence of Tongans in Auckland to the importance of their remittances to the kingdom's economy. In the Cook Islands, politicians turned to social media during the 2014 elections, with Democratic Party campaign manager Piltz Napa saying the party's Facebook page had been viewed by many people living outside the island nation who wanted to be kept informed (RNZI 2014a & b; Technology Plays a Part in Election, 2014)

Auckland-based Tongan media, which are the focus of this article, appear to have had an effect on voting patterns and voter behaviour in the 2014 Tongan elections. Tongan politicians conducted part of their campaign in New Zealand because even though Tongans living in New Zealand cannot vote in Tonga, they used new media to influence relatives at home, aided and abetted by diasporic media located in New Zealand's largest city. These trends reflect the development of online media as political fora noted by Georgiou (2004) and on the growing influence of diasporic media on their home countries predicted by Karim (1998). Barcham et al (2009) contend that electronic communication has played an important part in the flow of ideas and knowledge between members of Polynesian diasporic communities and their home countries:

> Electronic forums ensure that many members of the Polynesian diaspora— both first-and second-generation migrants—still feel in touch with events back 'home'. Planet Tonga (http://www.planet-tonga.com) receives over 1 million 'hits' per month, thus providing a popular forum for communication among the Tongan diaspora: 'Tongan participants from all over the world . . . are eager to communicate with one another, share their experiences and opinions, and access news and information about Tonga itself, often sparking an interest in Tonga that was either absent or minimal before' (Lee, 2004, p. 247)…[ ] … electronic forums have allowed people to express concerns about their society or culture that could not be expressed elsewhere; for example, challenging the Tongan monarchy.

Writing in 2004, Lee (p. 242) noted that:

> The 'long distance' Tongan nationalists are becoming increasingly vocal, as they become more concerned for the future of their homeland, and they are likely to seek ways to be more directly involved. In the not too distant future it would not be surprising if at least some of the overseas population unites to demand more of a say in the nation-building process.

As this article makes clear, Lee's prediction about the demands of the diasporic community for a greater say has come true. It also makes clear that the role of the diasporic media identified by Spoonley (cited by Papoutsaki, 2008) has gone far beyond one of serving the local diasporic community in a simplistic

manner or connecting it with its country of origin. De Souza's (2014) depiction of the functions fulfilled by the diasporic media (boosterism, assimilation etc) may also be usefully revised in light of the political uses to which diasporic online media are being put in the Pacific.

Tongans in Auckland

According to a PACMAS report (Papoutsaki et al, 2013) the Tongan population in Auckland has continued to grow in recent years. In 2006, Tongans were the third largest Pacific ethnic group in New Zealand, making up 50,478 or 19 percent of New Zealand's Pacific population (265,974). The Tongan population increased by 24 percent (9,763) between 2001 and 2006. According to the 2013 census there were 60,336 Tongans living in New Zealand, which makes up 1.5 percent of the total New Zealand population (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). The population in Tonga is 104,500. Estimates by Statistics New Zealand indicate that the growth of the Asian population will be the greatest, from the 2006 figure of 10 percent to 16 percent in 2026 compared to Pacific peoples from 7 percent to 10 percent and Māori from 15 to 16 percent (Ministry of Social Development, 2010, cited by Noronha). Tongans are the fastest growing community in New Zealand, with a birth rate twice the national average (Te Ara, 2014).

There are other substantial Pacific Islands diasporae in New Zealand. In many cases the population in New Zealand far outweighs that in the home country. Among the Tongan diaspora in New Zealand:
- 61 percent of the Tongan community speak Tongan
- But there is concern about second and third generation language loss
- 64 percent of Tongan adults have a formal educational qualification (secondary school or post-school qualification).
- 80 percent (40,140) of New Zealand's Tongan population lives in the Auckland region
- Tongans born in New Zealand account for 56 percent (27,693) of the total Tongan population.
- People may identify as Tongan even when they have multiple ethnic backgrounds.

Tongan media

According to Kailahi, (2015a) there are strong media content and communication flows from Tonga to New Zealand and to diasporae in Australia and the United States. There is a strong awareness of the different audiences's needs, desires and capabilities, especially for those Tongans living in other countries. The PACMAS report on the media in Tonga highlights the kingdom's active online community, especially among the diaspora who access Tongan news and other content (Papoutsaki et al, 2013). The report highlights Tonga's

active online community, especially among the diaspora who access Tongan news and other content. This also includes the use of online social networks. Family websites with large networks are an emerging phenomenon. Internet access and using email are common ways for families to stay connected. However, research at Deakin University suggests that Tongans in New Zealand are far more likely to use Tongan media, to be aware of what is happening in the kingdom or to participate in domestic issues than Tongans in Australia (Pyke et al, 2012).

A new public sphere

Castells (2008) argues that the public sphere, as articulated in different ways at different times and through different kinds of technology and space, is the cornerstone of civil society and thus of democracy. He argues that the world has moved towards a situation in which it is possible to move from purely domestic to global public spheres and forms of civil society.

> … the public sphere as the space of debate on public affairs has … shifted from the national to the global and is increasingly constructed around global communication networks. Public diplomacy, as the diplomacy of the public, not of the government, intervenes in this global public sphere, laying the ground for traditional forms of diplomacy to act beyond the strict negotiation of power relationships by building on shared cultural meaning, the essence of communication.

Kailahi argues that Tongans living outside the kingdom have connected and formed a new 'public sphere' online through Facebook. This virtual community has many different pages dedicated to Tongan diaspora, including the 'I'm proud to be Tongan' page which has 57,592 members; Royal Tongan Dynasties/Nobles Forum which has 18,769; Tonganow Online Community which is a closed membership of 5855; and the Tonga closed group page consisting of 14,634 members[1] (Kailahi, 2015a). Posts to I'm Proud to be Tongan and Tonganow are in a mixture of English and Tongan while posts to the royal forums are in English.

These pages allow Tongans living outside of the kingdom to freely express their opinions, thoughts and promote discussion about all things Tongan within the sites's rules and regulations.

What we see happening with the diasporic media in Auckland, the creation of online communities and the elections and political processes in the Pacific— and in this case, specifically in Tonga, is a reflection—at least in embryo—of Castell's vision of a global (or, because it is diasporic, globalised) civil society.

Tongans in Auckland use Tongan news and social media outlets to maintain cultural, family or political links. Kailahi maintains that the first two are priorities

for Tongan families and is supported in her claim by *Kaniva News* editor Kalino Latu, who said:

> Tongan news and social media are the only avenues available to the majority of Tongans living overseas to follow up current affairs and news at home and abroad. They keep them up-to-date with the cultural, family and political happenings in Tonga. (Latu, 2015e)

According to John Pulu of *Tagata Pasifika*, social media have become a powerful tool and source of information among the dispersed Tongan community. They allow families to maintain their links to people in Tonga and this can influence families. He said Tongan politicians were aware of its influence and most politicians were on Facebook (Pulu, 2015).

If we accept that participation in the public sphere is a vital part of democracy, then Tongans certainly take part in democratic campaigns, but in a way that is very specific to the intersection of digital media with the Tongan community in New Zealand and the drive towards democracy in the kingdom led by 'Akilisi Pohiva. To criticise members of the royal family, to try to hold them to account for their behaviour on the internet, is a democratic act. To try to influence the media by sending them images and stories that attack government inefficiency, corruption and malfeasance is to be part of the democratic process.

Prince Ata's baptism

One example of the use of diasporic media to criticise the royal family occurred when the long running saga of whether Prince Ata would become a Mormon finally came to a head. His baptism at a secret ceremony in Honolulu split leading figures in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS) and their supporters, as recorded in *Kaniva News* (Latu, 2015c).

> Hon. Semisi Sika, the President of the Church's Liahona High School Global Alumni, lashed out on Facebook, calling the baptism an act of 'terrorism', 'attention seeking' and alleging that Prince Ata had been bribed.
>
> Hon. Sika, Chairman of Tonga's Parliamentary Whole House Committee, accused Vava'u Governor Lord Fulivai of being behind the plan to baptise Prince Ata.
>
> 'Why does Lord Fulivai keeps silent in Vava'u?' Hon. Sika asked in Tongan.
>
> Supporters of the Prince's baptism hit back on Facebook.
>
> Loseline Hola Uasike wrote in Tongan: 'Why is God's mission called terrorism? I am afraid Bin Laden was involved with the Church's work. The cup has been spilled and cannot be collected. This issue should have not been brought to Facebook by church members as it would cause a rift with other churches.'

> One commentator, Sitalingi Tovo, claimed on Facebook that an LDS leader in Salt Lake City said those involved in the baptism should be expelled from the Church.

Politics in Tonga

Tonga's new political system, which was implemented in 2010, introduced an electoral system comprising two electorates: The hereditary land-holding nobles, plus nine Life Peers (honorary Nobles), who elect nine hereditary Nobles. The rest of the population elects 17 representatives, 10 of them on the main island, Tongatapu. The kingdom's current political system was designed to have all members of the unicameral parliament elected every four years. The system does not recognise political parties; instead MPs are meant to represent the 'whole country'.

However, Prime Minister 'Akilisi Pohiva, whose decades of struggle led to the changes in Tonga's political system, leads what is a de facto Democratic Party that now rules with the assistance of several independents. The Democratic Party became an effective opposition after the first democratic election in 2010. Tonga's democratic system is an adaptation of the Westminster system and with its hereditary peers and royal family, it is probably closer to the British system than most in the Commonwealth. However, given the power of the nobles and royal family and the kingdom's endemic corruption, it is rather closer to the Britain of the Hanoverians than the second Elizabethan era. Pohiva has made it clear he is not a republican and regards democracy as safeguarding Tonga's traditional social structure:

> Pohiva told an Auckland audience that democracy would provide the people's right to rule their government and safeguard the monarch from becoming subject to accusations by taxpayers because of any decision he made. He said he regarded those who opposed his democratic views as opportunists who used the king and the royals for personal gain and at times over-stepped the social boundaries, which discredited the monarchy. (Latu, 2014b)

The 2014 election

Before the election campaign Pohiva visited Auckland where he had established a power base many decades ago after facing major legal and other problems in Tonga. The size and influence of the Tongan diaspora in New Zealand has meant that it has begun to exercise an influence on life in the kingdom. Many people in Tonga are heavily reliant on remittances and the size of the flow of money into and out of the kingdom is such that the government expects to be able to fund a substantial part of the building programme for the South Pacific Games by a modest increase of charges on foreign exchange transactions.

The period before the election was marked by upheavals in the Democratic group, much of it carried out in the open in the pages of Pohiva's newspaper, *Ke'lea*. There was great disquiet in the party when Pohiva appeared to support a candidates' list drawn up by his son-in-law, who was then editor of the newspaper. Local newspapers in Tonga and the New Zealand Tongan Development Society proposed their own Democratic Party candidates for the election. The New Zealand Tongan Development Society said it would support those MPs who were loyal to the Party after two members, Sangastar Saulala and Siosifa Tu'utafaiva, defected to the government of PM Lord Tu'ivakano.

Pohiva's Democratic party won nine seats in the 2014 elections, fewer than the 12 secured in 2010, but this time Pohiva was able to secure alliances in a way he could not after the previous election. Deals with independents secured the alliances he needed to ensure his election by his fellow parliamentarians as Prime Minister. The parliamentarians, who represent commoners and Nobles, voted 15-11 for Pohiva (Field, 2014).

Since then Pohiva has been accused of nepotism for appointing his son as his secretary. Pohiva has sacked several party members, dropped others from the candidates' list and often acted without apparently seeking advice from the party hierarchy or cabinet.

Under the Tongan electoral system, non-resident Tongans cannot vote. However, if they have maintained a presence on the Tongan electoral roll and have lived in the kingdom for three months prior to an election, they may stand for Parliament. Theoretically a Tongan living in New Zealand could go back to Tonga, live there for three months and be elected to Parliament. Many Auckland Tongans would like to vote in the Tongan elections and have suggested that they be able to do this either online or by voting at the official Tongan residence in Auckland, 'Atalanga. This proposal has been rejected by the Tongan government, with the Attorney-General citing cost as a major factor. It is worth keeping in mind Lee's suggestion (2004) that if the overseas Tongans who have retained Tongan citizenship were allowed to vote, it could make a significant difference to the outcome of elections.

Tongan politicians used the Tongan diasporic media to carry their messages during the election. Stories and documents were leaked and statements released to the media and it is clear that the Auckland-based media were targeted as much as the domestic media. Kailahi points out that that Tongans in Auckland are in a strong position to use new media to influence relatives at home, aided and abetted by diasporic media located in New Zealand's largest city.

> (Politicians) know with the amount of remittances sent from New Zealand to Tonga, families here will probably have an influence on their kainga (extended family) back in Tonga. It's also a way for them to keep connected

with the diaspora who live here because Tongans still keep connected with
what is happening back in the Islands. (Kailahi, 2015b)

Latu said Tongans in New Zealand had been actively interested in Tonga's poli-
tics since the 1990s, especially in supporting 'Akilisi Pohiva and the democrats.
That support grew significantly in the last election. This had led to a growing
influence from Tongans in Auckland and attempts to influence their family in
Tonga on the way to vote in 2014 (Latu, 2015d).

After the election

After the Tongan election, Pohiva travelled to Auckland where he spoke to
about 500 people at Lotofale'ia Methodist Church hall (Latu, 2015b). During
the meeting he was asked many questions about domestic matters, including
the employment of civil servants, religion and the role of China in Tonga. Ton-
gans in Auckland clearly felt they have a right to a say in what is happening
in the kingdom. According to Latu, this is because Tongans in Auckland think
differently about politics to their families at home because they live in a country
where dissent is expected and tolerated. The first Tongan-speaking Member of
New Zealand's Parliament, Jenny Salesa, was elected in 2014.

> Tonga's democracy is still in its early stages while New Zealand had it
> many decades ago. Tongans in Auckland look at politics as one of the
> avenues that brings them fortune and greater opportunities in New Zea-
> land. In Tonga people look at politics as something that could bring good
> governance, transparency and accountability to the nation. (Latu, 2015e)

Pulu agreed, saying that Tongans in Auckland were different from their rela-
tives in the kingdom. He said they came to New Zealand and discovered that it
was permissible to disagree (Pulu, 2015).

Nepotism

That freedom to disagree has been extended to Pohiva himself. His contro-
versial appointment of his son as his private secretary caused an uproar which
spilled over into Facebook (Latu, 2015a).

> Olivia Ve'etutu T said: 'PM does not look good with it in the international
> level after all those numerous years of calling for good governance!'
>   Arthur Fonua said: '…the appointment of his own son does not en-
> hance or strengthen his own foundational vision of inclusion ... not well
> thought out from a democratic perspective and metric".
>   Senolita Swan commented: 'What a shame…Do what you preach…
> I had such a high hope for this PM.'

However, Pohiva supporters rallied around.

> Sione Talanoa Fifita Mālie commented on the Democracy for Tonga Facebook page that Hon Pōhiva had not committed nepotism because his son was paid from the Prime Minister's salary.
> Maggie Tupou said: 'The way I see it, there is no conflict of interest as his son's wages are paid out of the PM's pocket. It is normal for people to hand pick their own personal assistants.'
> Alex Tora said: 'PMs the world over pick their own personal assistants and pay for them from their own pay packets. If that is what PM Pōhiva has done then I do not see any problem with that. I think he is worried about having someone who will not be able to do the job as he wants it done.'

According to Latu, Pohiva managed to change the way Tongans voted. Traditionally they supported a candidate either because they were family or friends, were in the same church or because the candidates wooed them with money and gifts (Latu, 2014a):

> Pohiva told voters: 'I have no money to give you so that you can vote for me. I can only afford kava to drink with you while sharing my political views for a country that would serve us better.'

However, Latu said the traditional way of voting had not completely disappeared. It still existed in some places, but most people on mainland Tongatapu and Ha'apai as well as 'Eua had changed their way of voting and only voted for people with appealing policies. It is worth noting a claim made in *Tagata Pasifika*'s coverage of the first democratic election in 2010 that people were still not voting by party, but for candidates who had attached themselves to Pohiva's mana (*Tagata Pasifika,* 2010a & b).

Whether Pohiva would have found that statement flattering, or disappointing because it did not suggest a democratically-minded electorate, is difficult to guess. However, while his mana undoubtedly still played a part in 2014, the influence of the diasporic media, the attitudes of the Tongan community in Auckland and the views of the online community all contributed to the change that brought Pohiva and the Democrats to power in Tonga.

Note

1. Figures correct at 4 April 2016.

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Appendix 1: Tongan media in Auckland

This is a composite list based on a variety of sources and is subject to the usual caveats regarding the functionality of urls and the often fleeting existence of some publications.

Radio stations or stations with Tongan content in Auckland

Planet FM www.planetaudio.org.nz
NiuFM www.niufm.com/
Radio531pi
www.radio531pi.com/on-air/community-language-shows/2010/11/le-o-e-otu-felenite
myradiostream.com/radiotonganz (online)
Tonga on the Airwaves (Tama OhiFM) (East & Bays Courier August 3, 2011)
www.radioheritage.net/Story214.asp
Wave of the Pacific 87.8FM
Le'o 'oe Huelo Koula 87.5FM
Le'o 'oe Tapuaki 87.5 FM
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_radio_stations_in_Auckland

TV in Auckland

Pacific TV (via Facebook)
Tagata Pasifika tvnz.co.nz/tagata-pasifika; YouTube channel www.youtube.com/user/tagatapasifika1

Newspapers in Auckland

Taimi'o Tonga was originally published in Auckland, but is now produced in Tonga. An edition is still published in Auckland for distribution to New Zealand, Australia and the US.

Online platforms

Matangi Tonga matangitonga.to
Taimi Media Network/Taioi Online www.taimionline.com
Planet Tonga www.planet-tonga.com
Kaniva News www.kanivatonga.co.nz

Radio station available by streaming from Tonga

Radio Tonga A3Z
Millenium Radio
Letio Faka-Kalisiatane

7. The end of hypocrisy
Online activism and ethno-political conflicts

Abstract: In the past twenty years, democratic participation through activism and civil disobedience has been increasingly expanded with the evolution of information and communication technology. It is assumed that the role of traditional media is not as influential as it once was due to the growing presence of self-made war journalists, hacktivists and whistleblowers, facilitated through the potential of the internet. The use of the latter as a tool from which information is disseminated rapidly, is fast influencing societal understanding and exposure to issues as they develop. Social media demonstrates precisely this phenomenon, in which people are able to accrue information and act upon it through mass communication and mobilisation. This article will therefore endeavor to analyse the evolution of media in conjunction with activism, from traditional media ethno-political conflict reporting, to today's whistleblowers and hacktivists that use the internet as their main platform. By factoring in these different aspects, this article is able to present a detailed account of the advantages and drawbacks of the latest developments in internet and technology, with special emphasis being placed on the role of online activism.

Keywords: Anonymous, activism, censorship, civil disobedience, cyber activism, democracy, hacktivists, mobilisation, peace journalism, propaganda, social media, technology, war correspondence, WikiLeaks, whistleblowers

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Introduction

ACTIVISM and civil disobedience has always been part of democratic participation, yet in the past twenty years the activists' landscape has significantly broadened with the evolution of information and communication technology. But while the internet is generally considered a tool for more cooperation, public participation, and democracy, others consider it as a cause of increased political violence and a peril for societies.

Regardless of one's stance, there is no doubt that the internet created new opportunities for peace activism and conflict management. Mesthene captured already in 1986 a more 'balanced' understanding of the relationship between the internet and society when he stated: 'New technology creates new opportunities for men and society, and it also generates new problems for them. It has both positive and negative effects, and usually has the two at the same time and in virtue

of each other' (Mesthene, 1986, p. 76). In recent years especially, the internet has begun demonstrating the extent of its efficacy in challenging old traditional media structures, increasing the proximity of the public to the decision-making process by conveying a message, rallying support and implementing change; for both non-violent and violent initiatives. This article will therefore be an analysis of the impacts the internet has had in achieving just this.

Activism is no longer limited to picket protests that go through any weather condition, deal with any police force and spend the majority of their time collecting money to fund their actions. All one seems to need today is a computer, an internet connection and a good network of netizens. This is particularly troublesome in light of times of war and conflicts, in which society's support needs to be rallied by governments and its interest maintained through the predominant course of traditional media information from a one directional top-down flow. The internet is challenging precisely this structure, allowing people to mobilise themselves in order to voice discontent and implement change for instance through peace campaigns with the emergence of the e-movements.

Today initiatives are essentially born and publicised to a large targeted group in a matter of minutes (e.g. 'Kony 2012') through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others. Such advancements are made possible by the nature of the internet itself, which enables the mass dissemination of information from a small or individual source which can reach wide audience, even in remotest places due to increasing internet connectivity and tech availability.

Technological advances and creativity are now, however, leading to a time in which the dissemination of sensitive information can help shape an activist campaign or can in itself be the reason for a campaign. Wikileaks for example, has shed new light on the 'freedom of expression and the freedom of information'. Moreover, the whistleblower website unleashed new campaigns against government practices, as Giri quoted in Zizek (2011, p. 409) puts it, WikiLeaks 'challenged power by challenging the normal channels of challenging power' i.e. the independent press, NGOs, etc.

Recently, this form of online initiative has opened the way for a new form of online activism led by 'hacktivitist', hacker groups using the advancements in technology and internet connectivity to target specific government authorities or companies in response to a specific event; for example Anonymous hacking *inter alia* Visa and Mastercard in response to the freezing of WikiLeaks' accounts. Although their efficiency has not been measured yet, it seems that hacktivists work mostly in conjunction with activist campaigns in order to provide support and ensure visibility.

Ethno-political conflict in offline and online media

Media plays a crucial role in the information wars that define the world today.

This is because the media uses different channels and mediums, which are collectively used to communicate simultaneously to large groups of people; such as radio, television, magazines, newspaper and the internet (Howard, 2004, p.149). These media have played a significant role in the mediatisation of conflicts in their contribution to the dissemination of ideas, information and images about them (Cottle, 2006, p. 8).

Traditional media (consisting of the aforementioned media, excluding the internet), should operate according to normative theory with the intention of helping the public to make educated and well-informed decisions regarding current issues in a timely manner (Caparini, 2005, p. 43). The media as such is not only meant to serve as a tool for good governance by enabling communication exchange between the public and their leaders, but also to act as a mechanism of ensuring accountability by revealing wrongdoings, such as criminal misconduct and corruption. Essentially, they should be assisting in the democratic process by encouraging open debates while engaging the public and delivering reliable information; a crucial role because it is imperative that the public is well informed prior to making political decisions. This is especially important during times of conflict because of their consequences and especially the myriad of consequences that the decision to go to war brings with it, from the loss of lives, to economic costs in increased military expenditures, as well as political implications such as controls on civil liberties (Caparini, 2005, p. 31).

During such a time, the media is expected to provide the public with accurate information regarding the State's foreign policy, military strategies and the progress of the war as a whole, thus ensuring the continued inclusion of the public in the developments of State decisions. It therefore becomes imperative that the media, particularly news media, endeavour to operate in a balanced way because the information transmitted can serve to influence public opinion, for instance continuing to maintain public support for the decision to engage in war.

Accurate and balanced reporting is a critical component and *ethos* which should underpin journalistic practices, as the predominant aim is to uncover and deliver accurate information (Tumber, 2005, p.216). The accuracy and balance of information is also heavily affected by the source from which it is derived. For instance, official sources such as government authorities convey one perspective often through censorship, grey or black propaganda (White, 2005, p. 4), a practice which is also prevalent within the media industry (McGoldrick, 2005, p. 203).

This becomes problematic when such information is disseminated through traditional mass media sources, leaving the public to understand their situation in fragmented bits, limiting perspectives, influencing opinions, and in extreme cases, spreading negative and hateful sentiments to further support the State's predetermined agenda (White, 2005, p. 53). The latter in particular, features heavily within the realm of conflicts and violence covered in traditional media

sources, often through the manipulation of information and images in the delivery of broadcasts (Howard, 2005, p. 149). Inevitably, such practices by traditional news media outlets work to create a chain of distrust between the various actors involved; for instance authority figures and media agents which culminates in sabotaging public confidence in the news (White, 2005, p. 54).

However, with the proliferation in internet connectivity and access to technology, traditional media and the legitimacy of their dispatches is being questioned and confronted. The internet is able to provide users with a multitude of alternative information sources, thereby sometimes reducing the effects of biases, disinformation, rumours, hate propaganda and other sentiments which can lead to increased tensions or induce conflicts. Offsetting the aforementioned information types can lead to the re-education of the parties involved in the con-flict, consequently changing the information environments of disputes, a critical component of the resolution process.

A balanced approach also assists in contextualising and defining the conflict by identifying underlying interests, worries and concerns; thus providing the foundation upon which reconciliation can begin. This is made possible due to the reformation of communication distribution made possible through the inter-net. Instead of being a top-down process in which traditional media outlets and government authorities disseminate information to the public, many-to-many interactivity becomes achievable.

This is made a reality through the open access, and multi-directional character of the internet, allowing for the rapid exchange of information, often from few or individual sources, regardless of geographical or national boundaries; thus serving to circumvent State censorship or information manipulation attempts. 'Information sovereignty' (Regan, 2000, p. 8) becomes inadvertently challenged by the internet, making it impossible for authorities in totalitarian countries for instance, to prevent their citizens from accessing alternative online news sources (Matic, 1999, p. 3). Cyprus provides such an example, in which the inhabitants from the two sides of the island had been denied the opportunity to communicate via traditional means of face-to-face communication, telephone or traditional media until April 2004. Local authorities and administrators however, were un-able to maintain the disruption in communication because of the public's use of internet (Gumpert, 1997, p. 287). Hence, the internet can be used as a medium of communication between conflicting parities to reconstruct relations by fostering understanding tolerance, and reciprocal respect through educative information (Breuilly, 1994, p. 406).

Although a communication line is not the definitive solution for decreasing tensions or stopping conflicts, it contributes significantly towards planting the seeds for change and finding a peaceful solution, as open lines of communication are a prerequisite for conflict resolution (Bachman, 1996, p. 2-5). In peace media

literature, scholars have suggested that peace media can contribute to a declining evolution of the conflict dynamic curve of violence. Peace media can therefore be an important factor in the process of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, reconciliation and confidence building. Robert Karl Manoff (1997), enumerates the potential role of the media in prevention and conflict management as follows:

- Channeling communication between parties
- Educating the parties
- Engaging in confidence-building measures
- Counteracting misperception and incendiary rumours
- Analysing the conflict
- De-objectifying and de-humanising conflict parties to each other
- Identifying the interests underlying the issues
- Providing an emotional outlet
- Encouraging a balance of power among unequal parties
- Framing and defining the conflict
- Engaging in face-saving and consensus-building measures
- Engaging in the solution-building process

Following on from the definition of peace media, it becomes possible to define online peace activism initiatives (or e-peace) as the following: All kinds of initiatives with a mission to use facets of the internet, such as electronic mail, the World Wide Web and social media to achieve peaceful conditions of life and resolution of conflict, or counteract hate media, by proposing balanced information, and offering alternative and open sources of information (Marks & Janssen, 2000, p. 3-4) through 'Awareness/Advocacy, Organisation/Mobilisation, Action/Reaction' (Vegh, 2003). As such, online peace initiatives are located within the theoretical framework of peace media and within the literature on the use of media for conflict prevention and conflict management (Hanitzsch, 2004).

Online war and peace activism

In practice however, the internet is a medium that can be simultaneously utilised for peaceful or violent initiatives. Online communication in particular, for example, can be used to break down or reinforce existing barriers because the internet brings together previously disparate and disconnected cultures, religions and societies into closer proximity with each other (Wheeler, 2000, p. 208). Thus, if approached 'incorrectly', frequent communications between parties can be used to strengthen, even highlight differences between ethnic, racial and social groups, ultimately increasing tensions with and laying the foundations for hate and violence.

The first so-called 'web war' or 'internet war', however, is the war in Kosovo (Hall, 2000, pp. 387-404). The novel term 'web war' refers primarily to the introduction of a new medium along which a conflict is waged or understood;

previous examples of which include the first 'television war' of Vietnam, and the first 'satellite war' of the first Gulf War of 1991. Hall (2000) argues that Kosovo is the first 'web war', because the volume and range of information about this war on the internet had radical implications for how global audiences perceived the war and how the different parties during the conflict dispersed war propaganda and information.

Conversely, Jon Katz (1999), contests this point of view, arguing that although coverage of the Kosovo war on the internet was enormous, the ultimate impact had no significance. According to Katz none of the reports found on the internet adequately shaped or influenced the policy of either side, nor did these affect the manner in which the fighting was conducted.

Setting aside the arguments regarding the significant or insignificant influences the online information war had on strategies or tactics during the Kosovo war, the internet itself had become a new battleground for online activists. This new movement manifested itself during the Kosovo war, with web hacks being a common practice. Examples include a US hacking group, breaking into government sites and posting statements such as, 'Tell your governments to stop the war', or replacement and defacement campaigns of at least five websites displayed the black and red banner 'Free Kosovo' by the Kosovo Hackers group (Denning, 2001, p. 72). Denning (2001, p. 70) illustrates this growing trend as *hacktivism*, a fusion of hacking with activism, which will be discussed in more detail later:

> The practice of online activism has spread, manifesting itself into different conflicts. In the fall of 2000, the clash of Palestinian and Israeli forces, led Arab and Israeli hackers to participate in the conflict through online initiatives. According to the *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, the encounters began in October, shortly after the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement abducted three Israeli soldiers. Pro-Israeli hackers responded by crippling the guerrilla movement's website, which had been displaying videos of Palestinians being killed in recent clashes and which had called on Palestinians to kill as many Israelis as possible. Pro-Palestinian hackers retaliated, shutting down the main Israeli government website and the Israeli Foreign Ministry website. An Israeli hacker planted the Star of David and some Hebrew text on one of Hezbollah's mirror sites, while pro-Palestinian hackers attacked additional Israeli sites, including those of the Bank of Israel and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Hackers from around the world also began to participate, assisting in sabotaging over 100 websites, helping to disrupt the internet service within the Middle East.

Ethnopolitical conflicts between the Sri Lankan army and the Tamil Tigers, East Timor guerrillas and the Indonesian army, China and Taiwan, China and US, China and Japan, Hungary and Romania, and India and Pakistan are just some of the documented encounters with equivalent online cyber activism and

wars (Vegh, 2003, p. 80). It is thus being argued that the prediction made in 2001 by Denning that in the future 'every major conflict in the physical world will have a parallel operation in cyberspace. Further, there may be cyberspace battles with no corresponding physical operations' (Denning, 2001, p. 74) is already true.

In contrast to the above, in 1997 the Nobel Peace Price was given to the online peace initiative for the ban of landmines in conflicts. Jody Williams, from the small town of Putney, Vermont, used her e-mail account to co-ordinate with more than 700 organisations in more than 60 countries that made up the coalition against the use of landmines (Studemeister, 1998, p. 2). This landmark accomplishment thus ushered in a new age demonstrating the potency of the internet coupled with a strong initiative, particularly a peaceful one.

Online activism has in this sense been able to aid ethnic minorities and grassroots activists in their struggle. The creation of a cyberspace community by the Zapatistas is an example in which the internet was used to resist a regime. In their struggle for democratic rights, land and jobs the Indians of Chiapas used the internet to sway international public opinion and to put international pressure on the Mexican government (Lie, 2001, p. 23-22; Cleaver, 1998). The decentralised structure of the internet helped to circumvent all censoring regulations and to put pressure on the Mexican government. Given the way the traditional media works, however, this success would not have been possible without the internet (Zurawski, 1996, p.6).

Burma is another example in which the internet was able to make a difference regarding the ethnopolitical conflict through the management of information. Burmese and non-Burmese activists from the United States and elsewhere used the internet to create grassroots support for the pro-democracy movement in Burma. Furthermore the internet was used to influence international public opinion and attract the interest of more traditional news media. According to Danitz and Strobel (1999, p. 2), the internet was crucially influential in forcing the passage of a series of laws regarding business and political dealings with Burma.

More recently, social media was introduced into the equation of online activism. Social media has been defined as 'all the devices and platforms that allow users globally to virtually create and share information with each other. Platforms are the virtual spaces that allow users to come together, and create and share information. Devices are the computing technologies that enable users to access the platform' (Gupta & Brooks, 2013, p. 18). Unlike traditional media, social media are 'by nature' a two-way or many-to-many communication. This approach of working from the bottom-up has in the past few years enabled online activists to raise momentum for events like the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, the happenings at Cairo's Tahrir Square, and the ongoing civil war in Syria.

In early 2011, the public suicide of Mouhamed Bouazizi quickly spread

throughout Tunisia via social network platforms like Facebook and Twitter, igniting protests that ultimately led to the overthrow of the Tunisian government (Gupta & Brooks, 2013, p. 4). Yet, news organisations such as Al Jazeera and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) did not pick up on the story until they started noticing the thousands of tweets and multiple YouTube videos coming out of Tunisia (Gupta & Brooks, 2013, p. 5).

Inspired by the achievements of the Tunisian protesters, Egypt was struck by the revolution as well. By using Twitter, Egyptian protesters communicated logistical information such as the time and place of organised protests, as well as information on the whereabouts of government forces and methods to protect oneself from police attention. Even more impressive was the way in which the protesters had set-up specific hashtags that only likeminded people were knowledgeable about in order to stay under the government radar (Gupta & Brooks, 2013, p. 7).

The social media techniques and revolutionary fervor used during these afore-mentioned revolutions did not limit themselves to the Arab world. Moreover, the Behsir 2.0 Rally in Malaysia as well as the Occupy movement both drew upon the same principles and platforms used in the Arab revolutions. In a nutshell, it is important to bear in mind that the online activists of today are ever more connected, outspoken, culturally aware, and as Philip Seib points out: 'People born in the last decades of the twentieth century constitute the first truly global generation. New information and communication technologies connect them to each other regardless of physical distance or political obstruction' (Seib, 2012, p. 16).

In addition, the new generation of online activists do not spend time on endless remarks outlining their beliefs, rather, they use an *'instant ethos'* that enables them to reach many likeminded individuals in a short statement that is quickly spread (Gurak & Logie, 2003, p.31). In some cases, short statements are not even made because real-time footage can be shared in a matter of seconds due to the technological advancements of mobile phones and phone networks. In the Syria conflict for example, a large amount of the footage shown through the Western media often comes from young men and woman who uploaded it on social media networks, such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram.

Advantages and constraints of online activism in ethnopolitical conflicts
As is evident from the above examples, one of the main advantages of an e-initiative is its use of the internet as an organisational tool, for both on line and offline actions. A handful of organisers can rapidly generate dozens of letters and e-mails to decision-makers, the cyber equivalent of lobbying, with a few well-timed on-line appeals. Unlike other media forms, the internet enables an increase in speed, is inexpensive, integrates and converges different media forms such as text, audio, visuals and moving pictures, and allows for anonymity that

makes it easier to express opinions without risking social sanctions.

Anonymity, in conjunction with the internet's mass connectivity, also allows members of the international community to comment and affect domestic, local and international public opinion, which in itself is potentially problematic. This is because, while the internet can help foster understanding and sensitivity it also works to solidify prejudices and reinforce existing (often incorrect) convictions, thus using the online space to rant instead of productively exchanging views (Ward, 2005, p. 138). This, however, is the challenge of operating within a pluralistic world.

In return, the proliferation of new ICTs and internet access has gradually been altering the traditional structure of old media despite their continuous dominance in the new on-line news world. This is because the public is able to access multiple and alternative sources of information, unlike off-line traditional media sources that presented limited viewpoints. The civic journalists and on-line activists become more able to deliver 'purer' forms of information often due to citizen initiatives or public journalism. Civic journalism above all, seeks to counter citizen alienation from the political process (Ward, 2005, p. 139).

When framing e-initiatives for the information management of ethno-political conflicts, it is also useful to put these initiatives in the wider context of the literature on information technology (IT) and society, and the relative media effects theory that reveal a number of contradictions of the 'claims' made by both politicians and activists alike.

First, when analysing the impact of the internet we have to consider the dispersion of internet users in societies. It is impossible to assess the exact number of users in the world, however, the majority of the computers linked to the internet are found in the United States, Europe and Asia (*Computer Industry Almanac*). For example, e-initiatives in Cyprus, Greece or Turkey, which are wired countries will have far larger potential than initiatives in the African continents (Deflander & Attias, 2002, p. 4), but far smaller than the ones in USA or North Europe.

Second, E-advocacy initiatives severely suffer from existing language barriers. Especially among e-peace groups who try to get in touch with one another, English (to a limited extent, French) is the language used. This in particular excludes large parts of populations that do not speak English and thus leaves these initiatives once again in the hands of an educated elite or the diaspora. Important to note here is that there is a clear distinction between those experiencing wrongdoing and wanting to get out of their situation, and those campaigning to help those suffering through e-initiatives. This problem of being somewhat disconnected, can bring about misunderstandings as to what the priorities are for those on the ground. At the same time, this indicates the importance of groundwork, assessment of the situation, analysing the needs and beliefs of people on the front; something that does not necessarily come with e-initiatives.

Third, the impact of online activism on the information management of ethno-political conflicts is crucial for the flow of communications during crises (Reljic, 1998, p. 39) making the question of timing of e-initiatives very important. Research has proven that the need for information and communication is significantly higher in times of political, economical, cultural, religious or social crises (Kellow & Steeves, 1998, p. 110). Providing communications remains key in times of crisis, especially with regards to the morale of people, taking away fear and uncertainty, and providing protection by announcing the so-called 'safe spots'. For example, BBC News Online experienced a five-fold increase in traffic from the Balkans during the conflict in that region, while CNN.com experienced some of the heaviest traffic to that date, as its website usage specifically on the Balkans, increased tenfold during the bombing of Serbia in the Kosovo war in 1999 (Hall, 2000, p. 389).

Surprisingly, negative information and propaganda can equally satisfy the information-need of those suffering in a crisis. During the civil war in former Yugoslavia, research demonstrated that the Croatian population considered propaganda as necessary and normal, even though they knew that it was biased and propagandistic information. Such seeming contradiction can be explained by the great information-need of people who are living in times of uncertainty (Reljic, 1998, p. 52).

Finally, the effects of online activism have also been misrepresented by both activists and politicians as the effects of previous political communication through traditional media have. The attribution of the Arab 'Spring' to Facebook revolutions have caused an embarrassment to Facebook itself, which was quick to distance itself from taking the credit (and the responsibility). At the same time, documentaries on British television were quick to talk and indirectly give credit to training on the use of social media for activism that some of the organisers of the demonstrations received abroad. The fifteen-year experience in online activism of organisations such as Search for Common Ground and the evaluations of these organisations reveal that even when there is considerable impact at the informational level, and sufficient impact on the attitudinal level, there is very little or no impact at the behavioural level when online activism takes place in isolation from other peace initiatives at political or economical level (Search for Common Ground, Independent Programme Evaluations, Middle East and FYR Macedonia).

Current trends of online activism

While social media will continue to play a significant role in online activism, the role of whistleblowers have taken up a central role in fueling protests and providing information to the people. Wikileaks, the most known and perhaps notorious website for disseminating information acquired via anonymous

sources, shook global politics when it revealed detailed information on the Iraq war and US diplomatic practices (Leigh & Harding, 2011, Sifry, 2011; Greenberg, 2011).

This quest for classified information is particularly interesting because of the scale of information which Wikileaks and persons such as Edward Snowden managed to acquire. Subsequently, the usage of traditional media (i.e. newspapers such as *Der Spiegel, The Guardian* and others) in combination with their own website, enabled Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, to target a wide audience (Sifry, 2011), encompassing all ages. This in itself was particularly important due to the gravity of the released information.

Whereas activists in the past had to base themselves on general assumptions, news outlets and occasionally inside information, Wikileaks has provided them with clear cut information that in itself fuels protest (e.g. the 'Collateral Murder' video). In releasing such large quantities of sensitive information, Wikileaks put itself against the wall. In the weeks following their 'Diplomatic Cables' publication (Sifry, 2011), attempts were made to take the whistleblower website offline and freeze their assets.

In response to the governmental actions taken against Wikileaks, a newly developed form of activism based on hacktivism emerged. In the past, a hacktivist was essentially one person who was a fantastic computer programmer but could be perceived as a cyber criminal because (s)he would detect weak spots in networks, computer systems and others, and subsequently target them. This could be done for reasons of entertainment, on assignment, for purely criminal outcomes or as a response to certain happenings (e.g. political campaigns) (Olson, 2012, p. 6-7). Today, a hacktivist is perceived as a hacker with political motives.

The Wikileaks saga brought about a new collective that named itself Anonymous. This congregation of hacktivists operates with no clear hierarchy or conventional structure as one would find in most activist groups. What is clear, however, is that this collective includes thousands of members that do not know each other, have never seen each other and essentially do not talk to each other. Moreover, they operate in an *ad hoc* fashion depending on what one of the members or 'leaders' proposes and whether a sufficient number of skilled fellow hackers can be 'recruited' (Olson, 2013, p.8).

The main method of working for Anonymous was a technique in which thousands of users overload a website's server with traffic in order for it to fall offline. This technique was most notably used in response to the Wikileaks saga, targeted specifically against Visa, Mastercard and Paypal (Olsen, 2013, p. 6, p. 11) in order to make a definitive statement with regards to freezing Wikileaks' assets (Olson, 2013, p.107-124).

Similarly, Wikileaks requested those who supported them to download an encrypted file called 'the insurance', which automatically safeguards the information

Wikileaks acquired. The idea behind this is that if anything were to happen to Assange or the website, the unbreakable key to open the document will be released. In addition, WikiLeaks requested supporters to 'mirror' its website in order to keep it online. Such activism had never been seen before. Moreover, the level of civil disobedience involved by simply downloading a file that includes an unbreakable code, can cause serious damage to governments if released.

These new trends and possibilities foster opportunities for the activist of today. The fast and efficient organisation of Anonymous as well as the rather effective methods of Wikileaks' quest for transparency, can bring online activism to a whole new level, as we currently see with the revelations of the Panama Papers.

Conclusion: The end of hypocrisy

It is evident that these new trends in online activism pose new opportunities and a number of advantages. First and foremost, the speed with which the general audience is fed with information is remarkable. Whereas CNN made a giant leap in journalism approaches when Peter Arnett reported live from Baghdad during the 1990-91 Gulf War (Herman & Peterson, 2000, p.111), we can now receive information from any front at any time of the day and from any angle we desire. Second, social media presents great opportunities for protest movements that can easily recruit likeminded followers worldwide and rapidly organise in order to get a global message out.

Third, more than ever, people are exercising their right to free speech and freedom of expression. Whether it is by 'liking' something, uploading a video, copying statements or commenting on posts, the important factor here is that the new generations are again directly involved in things that matter to them.

Lastly, the ease in which information is available nowadays contributes to the growing hunger (Seib, 2012, p. 16) of social media societies that can ultimately lead to a better understanding of conflicts, and henceforth contribute to peace. Social media activism allows the audience to shape better worldviews because there is currently monitoring on virtually every ongoing conflict whereas in the past the traditional offline media were 'highly selective in their focus on wars and conflicts,' (Boyd-Barret, 2004, p. 26). For example, compared to the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq war, many more (four million) lives were lost in the period between 1997–2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), yet, there was little publicity on the matter (Allan & Zelizer, 2004, p. 26).

On the other hand, it is important to note that despite the momentous revolution in online activism, a number of new problems have arisen. First, the decentralisation of media as a consequence of social networks and other new technologies do not necessarily pose a de facto improvement in journalism. It is evident that different news agencies and journalists have their own sources and biases, yet, it becomes much harder to track these when there is a sudden

oversaturation in available information whose sources are hard to verify. In addition, every newsfeed, tweet or YouTube upload is created by someone with an agenda, whether it is genuine or not, which is never very clear (e.g. direct footage coming in from the Syrian front).

Second, social media can potentially fragment the multiple organisations concerned with various fields of online activism. That is not to say that there is less interest in activism. On the contrary, it is clear that the number of online initiatives has incrementally increased. Yet, for initiatives to be effective and efficient, classic models of big organisations coordinating with their supporters, are still the better way to go. It seems to be easy these days to quickly start new initiatives that do not necessarily differ in objective but are more likely set-up in the aftermath of personal battles.

Third, Gupta and Brooks point out that: 'Social media can help create and exacerbate security problems in even the most secure and stable parts of the world and become even more complicated for security forces to deal with when they involve location-specific technologies' (Gupta & Brooks, 2013, p. 9). In other words, while social media holds great potential, it brings with it severe security problems at the personal, regional, national and international level.

Furthermore, building on this latter statement, it is important to outline how social media can be used just as much to spread hate and recruit young people who are easy to influence. A good example of this can be found in the context of the Syrian conflict. Extremist groups such as Sharia4Belgium have been heavily recruiting young men through crowdsourcing.

The road ahead is still unclear, yet it seems that as the Deputy Assistant Secretary-General of NATO (and the organisation's spin doctor during the Kosovo war), Jamie Shea summarised in a recent speech, what we will get in the ethno-political conflicts communication environment is more fragmented communication, more floating supporters and opponents, more cyber warfare and cyber activism, more two-way and multi-polar communication, more embedded journalism, more media centres in security organisations, even more ubiquitous social media and as a result the end of hypocrisy of political leaders and activists alike, since very few things will remain private (Shea, 2013). And as Zizek (2011, p. 408 and p. 410) argues:

> from the very outset, there was something about the WikiLeaks activity which went well beyond the liberal topic of the free flow of information. We should not look for this excess at the level of content. The only truly surprising thing about the revelations is that there was no surprise in them: didn't we learn exactly what we expected to learn? All that was disturbed was the capacity to 'keep appearances': we can no longer pretend that we don't know what everyone knows we know. this is the paradox of the public space: even if everyone knows an unpleasant fact, stating it

publicly changes everything. (...) And this, exactly, is our situation today: we are facing the shameless cynicism of the existing global order whose agents only imagine that they believe in their ideas of democracy, human rights, etc., and through moves like the WikiLeaks disclosures, the shame (our shame for tolerating such power over us) is made more shameful by publicising it.

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8. FOI scholarship reflects a return to secrecy

Abstract: When Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto launched the third summit of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in October 2015, protesters disputed his highly scripted account of his government's transparency. The OGP may be growing but increasingly scholars and journalists are reporting a degradation of freedom of information (FOI), even in comparatively open societies like Aotearoa/New Zealand. Stemming from a doctoral review of FOI scholarship, this article traces FOI's origins and role in democratic governance and finds scholars situate access to state-held information as a fundamental human right. However, it describes scepticism among journalism practitioners and researchers alike about the realpolitik success of FOI regimes. Researchers have recorded tendencies back to state secrecy since the declaration of the so-called war on terror and document various other FOI failures, from blatant disregard for the law to an ever-growing structural pluralism that is casting shadows over state expenditure. This article also considers literature on New Zealand FOI regime, work largely produced by legal-studies and policy-studies scholars. It outlines what research does exist within journalism studies but contends a lack of more significant contributions has restricted our understanding of the regime.

Keywords: freedom of information, New Zealand, Official Information Act, Open Government Partnership, state secrecy, transparency,

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Introduction

WHEN Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto launched the third summit of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in October 2015, protesters outside the event disputed the scripted account of his government's transparency. Mexico is considered one of the most dangerous countries to be a journalist and state officials are regularly accused of the repression and even murder of reporters (Reporters Without Borders, n.d.). 'México está lejos de cumplir con un gobierno abierto,' *Mexico is far from reaching open government.* countered the human rights and transparency advocate CENCOS (Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social-Cencos, n.d.). This article will argue this

contradiction is indicative of an emerging situation in the world of freedom of information (FOI). Worldwide, the membership of the OGP—an 'international effort to strengthen democracies around the world by cultivating transparency, participation, and accountability in governance' (Harrison & Sayogo, 2014, p. 513)—may be growing but increasingly scholars and journalists are reporting a degradation of FOI when it really matters, even in comparatively open societies like Aotearoa/New Zealand. This article, based on a doctoral review of the literature, considers the origins of FOI and then its rapid spread (Banisar, 2006; Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006; Roberts, 2006) across the world. It attempts to define FOI's critical role in democratic governance (Dunn, 1999; Birkinshaw, 2006; Lidberg, 2006; Lamble, 2002) and finds that scholarship increasingly situates FOI among fundamental human rights (Hazell & Worthy, 2010). However, it describes scepticism among journalism scholars and other researchers (Nader, 1970; Hager, 2001; Roberts, 2006) about the realpolitik success of freedom of information regimes, thanks to, among other things, the so-called war on terror (Giddens, 2000) and the wide-scale privatisation of public services in the West (Roberts, 2006). It argues that in New Zealand more research with a journalism-studies perspective—that is, a perspective that privileges journalists' needs for information to fulfil their Fourth Estate role—would deepen our understanding of the nation's FOI regime.

What is FOI and why do we need it?

Freedom of information regimes are legislative mechanisms that ensure a society's citizens have unfettered access to information held by their government as a 'presumptive right' (Birkinshaw, 2006, p. 188). Since Socrates demanded the 'liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties' (cited in Pearson, 2014), such liberty has been linked to meaningful participation in society. The prescient statement that 'information is the currency of democracy' has been perhaps unreliably attributed to the architect of the American Declaration of Independence, Thomas K Jefferson (Carnaby & Rao, 2003, p. 401), but whoever said it began a train of thought that has endured the peripatetic journeys that liberal democracies have taken since. In 1970, almost 200 years after the independence declaration, citizen and consumer advocate Ralph Nader called a well-informed public the 'lifeblood' of democracy (p. 1). Legal scholars (Birkinshaw, 2006) provide a more notional take on the value of FOI, arguing that, like freedom of speech, FOI is 'both intrinsically and instrumentally good' (pp. 203-204), encouraging government to have a necessary trust in its people.

Researchers agree (Lidberg, 2006; Danks, 1980) that, broadly speaking, FOI regimes have three central purposes in common:

- Firstly, they provide access for all citizens to information the state holds on them, a check on the power of the state and an affirmation of individuality

and a citizen's autonomy.

- Secondly, FOI improves accountability of government through the transparency it creates. Citizens can only take effective part in the accountability process if they can access information they need in a timely manner.
- Thirdly, FOI legislation is intended to improve and increase citizen participation in government, a political ideal in monitory and participative democracies.

The Committee on Official Information, an ad hoc body charged with shaping the introduction of FOI into New Zealand, told Prime Minister Robert Muldoon in 1980 that the case for more openness rested on 'the democratic principles of encouraging participation in public affairs and ensuring the accountability of those in office; it also derives from concern for the interests of individuals' (Danks, 1980, p. 13). In more than 100 nations across the world now, such ideas are the drivers of disclosure, or right to information (RTI), laws.

FOI was enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and is often considered a prerequisite for and enabler of many, if not all, human rights today. Birkinshaw (2006, p. 4) says FOI deserves to be ranked with freedom of speech, access to justice and a fair trial, and protection of privacy. According to UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Communication and Information Abdul Waheel Kahn, a free flow of information lies 'at the heart of the very notion of democracy and is crucial to effective respect for human rights':

> In the absence of respect for the right to freedom of expression, which includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas, it is not possible to exercise the right to vote, human rights abuses take place in secret, and there is no way to expose corrupt, inefficient government. Central to the guarantee in practice of a free flow of information and ideas is the principle that public bodies hold information not for themselves but on behalf of the public. These bodies hold a vast wealth of information and, if this is held in secret, the right to freedom of expression, guaranteed under international law as well as most constitutions, is seriously undermined. (Mendel, 2008, p. 1)

The origins of FOI

Once the preserve of liberal Western societies, there are now (December, 2015) 104 FOI regimes around the world (Freedomofinfo.org, 2015) and enacting disclosure laws is seen increasingly as a rite of passage for emerging democracies (Lidberg, 2006, p. 11). But the first FOI legislation was passed in Sweden as long ago as 1766. Radical opposition politicians, led by Anders Chydenius (1729-1803), 'cunningly' (Lidberg, 2006, p. 44) took advantage of a lethargic Parliament and pressed into law the *Freedom of Press and the Right of Access to Public Records Act.* Chydenius was inspired by contemporary philosophers like John

Locke (1632-1704) but also by the thinking of the Tang Dynasty, which ruled China from the 7th to the 10th century. During that time China established an 'Imperial Censorate', a body of officials close to the Emperor whose job it was to 'tell the leader when things were right or wrong, when he was being led astray, and when plans or actions were likely to have deleterious effects or be contrary to moral or established principles' (Steinberg, 1997, p. 2). It promoted accountable imperial leadership and has been cited as the distant progenitor of today's FOI regimes (Lidberg, 2006, pp. 25-26; Lamble, 2002, p. 3; Steinberg, 1997, pp. 1-2). Lidberg finds it 'interesting to note that Chydenius translated the more than 1000 year old Chinese experiences into his contemporary political climate by choosing the political press as the key "accountability agency"' (2006, p. 26).

The global explosion in FOI

After Sweden (and Finland, which was part of Sweden then) in 1766 and, to some extent, Colombia in 1888, the next FOI legislation was not passed until the second half of the 20th century when the United States (1966) and then France (1978) enacted laws guaranteeing their citizens' right to access state-held information. Australia and New Zealand followed suit in 1982 (though Australia's federal law preceded some of its states' right-to-access laws) and Canada in 1983 (FOI Countries by Date, n.d.). 'These [early] efforts were mainly a result of extended campaigns led by the media with some government support and many took decades to succeed' (Banisar, 2006, p. 19). It was a wave made up of wealthy, stable democracies that had active media and a growing 'skepticism about state authority' (Roberts, 2006, p. 107) and many thought these prevalent conditions—wealth, stability, strong media and authentic free speech—to be prerequisite to the establishment of FOI. But then came something of a flood of disclosure laws around the world, from countries as diverse as Belgium (in 1995) and Zimbabwe (2002). By 1990 there were 14 nations with FOI laws (Roberts, 2006, p. 107) and by 2006 there were 69 (Mendel, 2008, p. 22). By January 2015 there were 100 across the globe, with Paraguay having joined the ever-swelling ranks of the global movement for openness (FOI Countries by Date, n.d.). Noam Chomsky's journalist from Mars (2002) would see a spreading flow of openness underway on Earth. One does not need to dig far to find, of course, that the reality of even liberal democracies is some distance from the stated aims of lawmakers who created such regimes. Banisar notes the passing of a right to information law (RTI) is just the start:

> For it to be of any use, it must be implemented. Governments must change their internal cultures. Civil society must test it and demand information. Governments resist releasing information, causing long delays, courts undercut legal requirements and users give up hope and stop making requests. (Banisar, 2006, p. 26)

The undermining of access

FOI is undermined in a number of ways and because a country has legislated for openness does not make its government open. A review of the literature highlights areas of concern:

Window dressing

Some FOI laws are inconvenient but effectively mandatory prerequisites to trade or international finance deals, with many intergovernmental organisations pressuring 'poorer and more fragile states' (Roberts, 2006, p. 109) into adopting disclosure laws. In the worst of these situations, little or no will to openness existed prior to the legislation being passed and not much changed afterwards:

> Some of these window-dressing dilemmas have to do with the technical and legal characteristics of FOI laws. Others have to do with the bureaucratic capacity of governments to implement good laws, much less enforce them. Still others can be traced to the origin of so many open-government statutes, which often begin as items pushed onto the policy agendas of developing countries by international or regional organisations without much if any prior grassroots demand. (Michener, 2011, pp. 146)

Other FOI regimes are, in fact, tools of oppression. Banisar, known for his global FOI audits, says the most egregious of these is the 'baldly misnamed' (2006, p. 27) *Zimbabwean Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, whose access provisions are 'all but unused probably for fear that any person brave enough to ask for information will be beaten by government supporters'. Elsewhere, such legislation itself may appear sound in terms of the legislative principles of FOI, but governments ignore it. In the Cook Islands, for example, where the nation's 2009 *Official Information Act*, was based closely on New Zealand's act, there has been little sign of transparent governance as a result. Newspaper editor John Woods wrote:

> Despite our *Official Information Act*, the Cook Islands is being denied its right to know at the highest level. The most powerful entity of government, Cabinet, is still a stronghold of secrecy and non-disclosure. We believe, and argue, that the public has every right to know what Cabinet decides, what deals it does and what funds it spends. For the past five years we have pleaded for weekly cabinet media briefings, and for release of cabinet minutes and documents, but we are continually denied information. Nowadays we rely on leaks (when it suits an individual) and on papers falling off the back of a truck. (Woods, 2010, p. 18)

In a five-country comparison of the promise and the practice of FOI laws, Lidberg (2006, p. 10) stated that while such laws were potentially one of the most potent accountability tools going, his doctoral research showed that in some

cases they were 'little more than a toothless paper construct and democratic "showcase" rather than the effective scrutinising tool they were intended to be'.

The war on openness

Roberts (2006) and others have studied 21st-century influences on FOI that frustrate its success, including a reduction in openness since the New York attacks on September 11, 2001, increased secrecy around state-security services, powerful networks that are 'opaque' and operate at levels removed from public access, and the secrecy of corporations whose operations are arguably in the public interest but who have few or no disclosure obligations. Within weeks of the 9/11 attacks, large amounts of government information, previously open to all, were withdrawn from public scrutiny, despite the US FOIA.

> In the three years following the September 11th attacks, complaints about the erosion of these [access] rights were common, although the evidence was still inchoate. In one prominent case, a Utah-based environmental group, Living Rivers, challenged the Interior Department's refusal to provide maps that showed the likely impact of a failure of the Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River, the second highest concrete-arch dam in the United States. (Roberts, 2006, p. 39)

Barack Obama has been criticised for campaigning on openness and then running an administration with a higher rate of FOI refusals than his predecessor's (Moos, 2012). In the UK, British Prime Minister Tony Blair took power in 1997 on the back of a promise to sweep aside Britain's longstanding culture of governmental secrecy only to bemoan his stupidity in his memoirs years later (Blair, 2010). He told the Associated Press: 'What happens in the end is that you make politicians very nervous of actually debating things honestly, because they're worried about what's going to happen when there's a FOI request' (Stringer, 2011).

The 'privatised sector'

Structural pluralism, a term used by Giddens (2000) to define an economic environment in which services to the public that are deemed essential are provided by both the state (e.g., most education) and the private sector (e.g., telephone services). Multiple forms of privatisation—from entire divestment of a state service to any one of a variety of types of state-owned or controlled enterprise—have created a group in the economy that might be thought of as the 'privatised sector'. This sector has characteristics of both state service and private enterprise but is neither, oriented operationally, as it is, to the private sector, while being fundamentally connected to the public purse. The public interest in the provision of the service—be it public roading or television news—is clear but so too is the requirement that the quasi-private organisation providing

the service subjects itself to market forces and conditions. Of particular interest here are the varying levels of secrecy that such organisations expect and demand for their operations.

Roberts argues that such ongoing privatisation and the state's withdrawal from the provision of services to the public is having a deleterious effect on FOI. Contractors and others engaged in this new world of outsourced and market-driven services have pressured governments to exclude them from the public scrutiny formerly applied to the provision of the same services (2006, p. 151):

> . . . the effectiveness of many FOI laws has been undermined as a consequence of restructuring. These laws have traditionally applied to government departments or other agencies that are tightly linked to these departments. As authority has shifted to quasi-governmental or private organizations, the ambit of the law has shrunk. Many public functions now are undertaken by entities that do not conform to standards of transparency imposed on core government ministries. There is little consensus on how to address this problem. (Roberts, 2001, pp. 2-3)

However, Roberts (2011) goes further, arguing the public's right to access information is based on 'physical and economic security, privacy, and political enfranchisement' and that these are reasons for a free flow of information from *any* organisation that holds information the public needs. This approach 'rejects the classical liberal insistence on differential treatment of the public and private spheres, recognises that harm to fundamental interests could as easily arise from either sector, and establishes information rights where these seem likely to avert such harm' (p. 3). The right to secrecy of private or quasi-private organisations is considerably weakened when information they hold is in the public interest. Roberts' argues this as an FOI theorist and pulls in entirely the opposite direction to the increasing reluctance of governments and corporations to operate transparently in the interests of an open society.

Administrative discretion
In one of democracy's great ironies, FOI laws are dependent for their success on the very officials and politicians whose behaviour they are intended to control. Despite the legislation's aim to correct a power imbalance (the State has the information, the citizen does not and information is power), the mechanism of balance itself is characterised by an imbalance of power. Echoing Nader (1972), Roberts wrote:

> Whether a freedom of information law succeeds in securing the right to information depends heavily on the predispositions of the political executives and officials who are required to administer it. Statutory entitlements could be undermined if government institutions refuse to commit adequate resources for implementation or consistently exercise

discretionary powers granted by the law in ways that are inimical to aims of the legislation. In fact, critics in many jurisdictions argue that FOI laws have been weakened by the emergence of internal practices designed to ensure that governments are not embarrassed or surprised by the release of certain kinds of politically sensitive information. (Roberts, 2002, p. 176)

When seen from the perspective of journalists attempting to perform their so-called Fourth Estate duty, the FOI regime in Aotearoa/New Zealand is more complex than the somewhat heroic narratives about it (Aitken, 1998; Elwood, 1999; Shroff, 2005, Hazel & Worthy, 2010) would suggest. When journalism studies adds its thread to the FOI narrative, it adds both a strong understanding of the practical need for such a legislative guarantee of access (Nader, 1972; du Fresne, 2005; Price, n.d.) and a strong understanding of the gap between the promise and the practice of FOI (Lidberg, 2006; Price, n.d.).

FOI and Aotearoa/New Zealand

Studies exist into the many aspects of FOI regimes around the world (Nader, 1970; Banisar, 2006; Martin, c2008; Nam, 2012), but there is little academic work with New Zealand's FOI laws as its primary centre of interest and, in particular, the media's role in making a meaningful success of the OIA. Much of the literature on New Zealand's FOI regime is comparative in nature (Snell, 2006; Hazel & Worthy, 2010) and does not unravel local and specific complexities. Snell (2006) examined the differences that emerged in the development of the Australian and New Zealand regimes, which diverged significantly, despite both countries being Westminister-based democracies with many similarities. For example, New Zealand's strongly liberal approach allowed its FOI regime to capture 'information', not just 'documents'. In addition, in New Zealand information is withheld if its release would be less in the public interest than withholding it, while in Australia a decision is made according to the category of information to which it belongs.

The New Zealand OIA shows what can be achieved by starting from first principles, designing legislation suited to the local political and administrative culture, ensuring that the focus [is] on the front end user and making the major objective the making, on [a] progressive and proactive basis, more high quality policy information available on a timely basis to its citizens. (Snell, 2006, pp. 13-14)

New Zealand is considered a benchmark in a number of overseas studies (Hazell, 1991; Hazell & Worthy, 2010; Nam, 2012) but direct, local research is relatively thin. Among policy-research projects (Poot, 1997) that seek to understand how FOI affects the workings of the state bureaucracy is White's argument (2007) that

New Zealand's official information system is resulting in *less* trust in the state sector, rather than the increased levels of trust that are meant to result. In an important study, from which emerged her book *Free and Frank: Making the Official Information Act 1982 Work Better,* White, like most researchers, acknowledges the fundamental openness that was embedded in New Zealand society by the OIA. However, her research highlights significant issues with both the principles and the operation of the Act. She lists (2007, pp. 90-92) 10 'themes' that emerged from her study:

- New Zealand government is much more open because of the Act.
- Many requests for information are unproblematic.
- Real uncertainty exists about the public's right to information.
- The ombudsman's role has been a success.
- Processing delays have long been a problem and have not improved.
- Large requests are problematic.
- Officials need more training.
- The protection of officials' advice from disclosure is still contentious.
- The digital age brings its challenges.
- It may be time (2007) to introduce a pre-emptive, push-model of information release.

From a legal studies perspective, Price (2006) asked how the OIA was working in practice and concluded that while there was much to be pleased about, there were significant problems, with state officials frequently flouting the act's guidelines on the release of information (p. 50). Working journalists, including investigative journalist Nicky Hager (2002), have lamented a deterioration of the system since its early days. Hager, a regular requester of state-held information, praised the readiness of officials to release information in the early years of FOI in New Zealand but says it changed significantly under the Labour Government in the late 1980s and 1990s. 'Ministers and officials developed ways of routinely subverting the provisions of the *Official Information Act*, including delaying information releases and misusing exclusion clauses' (Hager, 2002). Palmer notes (2007, p. 14) Price's conclusion that New Zealand effectively has two FOI systems—one for requesters wanting non-sensitive information who have their requests processed efficiently and without fuss and another for requesters of sensitive material, characterised by a disregard for the spirit of the law.

> They are more likely to be transferred to the minister's office, often with questionable or no justification. Many are refused outright. Information is withheld, either wholesale, or in larger than necessary chunks. Price noted, with more than a little sense of irony, that his own OIA requests for the purpose of this research apparently fell under this second, much less user-friendly OIA. (Palmer, 2007, p. 14)

The New Zealand Law Commission, charged with two reviews of New Zealand's FOI regime since it was introduced, declared in 2012 that the 'basic pillars of the legislation remain fundamentally sound' (New Zealand Law Commission, 2012) but also recommended more than 100 changes, including extending its reach to parts of the government's parliamentary services. The commission argued because of the significance of the changes and the importance of the legislation, it should be drafted afresh. The government disagreed, declining both the suggestions that the OIA needed a fresh start and that it should cover the business of Parliament (Davison, 2013).

In its 1997 review of the OIA, the commission had concluded that because of its open-textured nature, the act had weathered societal changes well and was still achieving its purposes. However, it also identified a number of problems:

- the burden caused by large and broadly defined requests
- tardiness in responding to requests
- resistance by agencies outside the core state sector
- the absence of a co-ordinated approach to supervision, compliance, policy advice and education regarding the Act and other information issues (Palmer, 2007, p. 11)

While very little has changed about its FOI regime since the 1980s, New Zealand society has changed dramatically. The country's ongoing privatisation of once-public services and organisations is a key part of its brand of economic liberalism, unleashed with dramatic effect in the mid-1980s. Under the neo-liberal economic policies of successive New Zealand governments since, the state has withdrawn from the provision of services that it could encourage the private sector to take over (Kelsey, 1993). Now significant amounts of public money are being spent outside the watchful eyes of those who rely on FOI legislation to monitor state behaviour, arguably a damaging constraint on press freedom. Some of these services have high levels of public interest attached to them, including the relatively recent innovations of private prisons and charter schools. As these services shift to the private sector, the public loses sight of their operation to varying degrees, despite often being the major or sole funders of the service. The transparency intended under the OIA starts to become murky.

The need for a journalism studies perspective

While Price (2006) included journalists in a section on the views of information 'requesters', no singular study focuses on the media's use of the OIA 1982. Elsewhere in the world, too, the focus of researchers tends to be on whether the passing of legislation to protect freedom of information has achieved its goals of, for example, access, transparency and openness. The media, despite being a key user of FOI legislation and an acknowledged mechanism in the accountability of officials and politicians, is often excluded. FOI in New Zealand was for

many years considered within a conventional discourse that emerged through, principally, legal studies (Banisar, 2006; Elwood, 1999; Hazell, 1989; Law Commission, 1998 & 2012; Price, n.d.a) and policy studies (Poot, 1992; White, 2007), each of which has its distinct reasons for an interest in the legislation. Together they wove a two-strand, dominant narrative that had New Zealand as a world leader in FOI (Elwood, 1999; Hazell, 1991; Hazell & Worthy, 2010; Nam, 2012; Price, n.d.). Its tendencies were towards a strongly liberal regime, which made it a standout when the OIA was enacted in 1982 and became widely regarded as a 'model of how progressive access to an information regime should work' (Hazell & Worthy, 2010, p. 353).

However, the contributions of journalism studies to this discourse are relatively minor. Practitioners with special interest in the legislation have written about their experiences using the *Official Information Act 1982* (Hager, 2002) or published work intended to explain, and underscore the importance of such freedoms (du Fresne, 2005). But there is very little academic research with the experiences of journalists attempting to perform their role of monitoring the state at its centre. The media, despite being an acknowledged mechanism in the accountability of officials and politicians in liberal, monitory democracies, tend to be excluded from the horizons of such scholarship (Nam, 2012). Despite there usually being very few, if any, specific provisions for journalists under FOI regimes, they are arguably key participants in them. Their role in disseminating a wide variety of information to the citizen body and electorate means they can have far wider influence with the information they gather than other requesters. This alone is a good argument for an increased focus from journalism researchers on FOI laws and their impact on journalistic practice and press freedoms. Journalism studies can bring a refined focus to this issue, concentrating not on the efficacy of an FOI regime as it pertains to an entire population but on its impact on the work of public interest journalists. Among the journalism studies scholarship on FOI in New Zealand, and an example of its importance, is Robie's (2007) unravelling of the famous case of the guilty pleas of the *Rainbow Warrior* bombers, after French agents sank the Greenpeace vessel at its Auckland berth in July, 1985, killing Portuguese photographer Fernando Pereira. The only two charged were agents Alain Mafart and Dominique Prieur and it took advocates of openness 20 years to have the court footage, deemed to be restricted on the grounds of privacy, released so New Zealanders could finally see their guilty pleas being made on videotape. Such a journalism perspective is needed in FOI scholarship to balance the dominant narratives that parade the nation as a South Seas information paradise (Treadwell & Hollings, 2015).

Conclusion
Let us go back to the summit of the Project for Open Government Partnership in

Mexico, where outside protesters are disagreeing with the President. Launched in 2011, the OGP has grown to have 69 participating member countries in 2015 (Open Government Partnership, n.d.a). Digital publishing has enabled pro-active publishing of information and in the interests of open government, states are joining. Government ministries across the world are starting to publish information without being asked for it, creating the beginnings of what must eventually become massive and accessible databases. So-called 'push models', can, according to Lidberg (2015), improve public access to information The open data movement, which promotes automated access to statistical data and metadata to enable 'better decision-making [in] many fields of research and policy-making' (Open Data Foundation, n.d.) continues to impact access to state-held data. When signing New Zealand up to the OGP, Prime Minister John Key (Open Government Partnership, n.d.b) said the OGP's principles were in line with the New Zealand government's commitment to transparency. Our journalist from Mars (Chomsky, 2002) might be forgiven for thinking the wave of openness sweeping Earth had just entered another realm of transparency altogether, one based on free access to almost unlimited data sets. But researchers with a journalism studies perspective will beg to differ (e.g., Felle & Mair, 2015). At the level of realpolitik, sensitive material is as hard, if not harder, than ever for journalists to get from governments. In New Zealand, known as one of the most open societies on the planet, the Ombudsman is submerged with complaints (Treadwell & Hollings, 2015) about refusals to release information. Prime Minister John Key last year admitted his government sometimes withheld sensitive information as long as possible, instead of releasing it to journalists as soon as practicable, as the law requires. At the centre of the so-called 'dirty politics' scandal before and during the 2014 general election was evidence of abuse of the OIA, including preferential treatment of an attack blogger's information requests in order to embarrass an Opposition politician. Such was the atmosphere of suspicion around the OIA, that the Chief Ombudsman initiated an inquiry into the way state agencies responded to their duties under it. The Ombudsman's report (Wakem, 2015), much like those by the New Zealand Law Commission, found the OIA was 'fundamentally sound, but it [was] not always working in practice' (p. 140). Such a situation is in contrast to the positive vibrations of the open-government movement. Much like New Zealand's two-tier system (Price, 2006), governments around the world appear to be developing one attitude for information it doesn't mind disseminating and another approach entirely to information they decide they need to keep secret from the media.

Has it always been like this? No. Veteran investigative journalist David Fisher told a gathering of civil servants that when he started as a journalist in the early 1990s, he would simply ring officials for the information he needed. 'It seems a

novel idea now. I can barely convey to you now what a wonderful feeling that is, to be a man with a question the public wants answering connecting with the public servant who has the information' (Fisher, 2014). His first OIA request ever was because of an evasive, difficult official who was clearly ahead of his time, he said. A journalism studies approach would privilege the needs and experiences of journalists such as Fisher who rely on FOI and on whom the public relies to extract public interest information from the depths of government.

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9. New Caledonia and Vanuatu

Differences defined in a student reporting venture into the Pacific

Abstract: A reporting field trip by Australian journalism students to New Caledonia and Vanuatu in mid-2014 produced markedly differing impressions of the neighbouring island societies, linked to their 'independence' status—one as an integrated territory of France, the other as an independent state. The field trip, one of a series from the Queensland University of Technology, aimed at developing reporting skills through work in unaccustomed territory, especially different cultural settings. Over 17 days, six students and the coordinator, and author of this article, generated 18 feature-length reports for online outlets and a radio documentary. The article synthesises the collected work from the field, producing a thematic statement of findings. It records broad consensus in New Caledonia in favour of enacting the Matignon and Noumea Accords on independence, while noting an undercurrent of unresolved conflicts. It characterises public life in Vanuatu in terms of a democratic spirit, and the invocation of traditional ties within society, as the country grapples with problems of development and impacts of the outside world. This work is interpretative, concerned with identifying processes underlying events in daily news. It is proposed as a first step towards a scholarly construction of meta-analyses of the interpretative and informative power of journalistic reporting.

Keywords: Australia, conflict reporting, culture, democracy, development, field trips, France, independence, journalistic practice, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, work integrated learning

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Introduction

A REPORTING field trip by Australian journalism students to New Caledonia and Vanuatu produced some markedly differing impressions of the neighbouring island societies, linked to their 'independence' status—one as an integrated territory of France, the other as an independent state. Lee Duffield, an academic and former overseas correspondent coordinated the project for the Queensland University of Technology. As an exercise in professional preparation, it gave the reporters a stiff test in the field, performing itinerant journalism away from familiar territory, with the added stimulus of working across cultures.

The objective of the operation was to update main issues from those locations. It became a fairly hectic, realistic exercise in overseas journalism, over two weeks in mid-2014—June 24-July 7. The exercise was in collaboration with the Pacific Media Centre (PMC) at Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand, where the group spent four more days, July 7-14, for debriefing, additional backgrounding sessions with journalists or researchers there, and production work at a newsroom. Six student reporters had been selected, a competent team, who were mostly postgraduate students or in their final Journalism year.

Their task was to produce an online portfolio, 'South Pacific Special Report', for the campus-based publication *QUT News.* The site carries text, and audio or video publications. Eighteen articles were published, e.g. on the dispute over independence and impacts of nickel mining in New Caledonia; tourism and culture, and keeping the peace in Port Vila, (www.qutnews.com/2014/07/#. Vp27MUYnlBc). A 'South Pacific Special Report' was broadcast on Brisbane multi-cultural radio 4EB-FM on 22 July 2014. Two extended articles by this writer were published in *EUAustralia Online: European news for Australia*; the publication at the time drawing 300 000 site visits p.a., www.euaustralia.com, 12 July 2014 and 17 August 2014. Output was provided also to the PMC, which republished a selection of the reports, www.pmc.aut.ac.nz, 20 June 2014, 23, 24, 29 July 2014. The Appendix lists the reports published by the team members.

Background to reporting field trips

The venture was the 19th in a series of field trips for Journalism students since 2000, providing course credit, seen as highly useful professional preparation because of the way such experience, taking place away from familiar supports, would focus the mind on practice. Student groups previously had gone to Southeast Asia and China, New Zealand, the European Union, and Papua New Guinea. The pedagogical foundations of the series have been described in successive articles by the writer, notably in the *Pacific Journalism Review* (Duffield, 2014, 2008), placing it in the context of internationalisation of the curriculum, and workplace-integrated learning. Similar projects run by the University of Queensland have referenced these field trips (see Woolley, 2015).

Reporting in the South Pacific

The 2014 operation would be distinctive and different because of its South Pacific setting. Hadlow in *PJR* (2010; also quoted in Duffield, 2015, p. 3) listed some of the features and characteristics familiar to watchers of the region and its media; beginning with 'geographical remoteness, small populations and vast sea distances', and a set of contrasts: 'That a region so wealthy in languages, cultures and social traditions could also be a place of coups and tensions and where media freedoms are often trampled upon, is also little known to many casual observers.'

The themes of Pacific media, reflecting lives of the island communities, are often characterised as a story of crisis, in the sense of mixing danger and opportunity. Put another way, problems and conflict provide part of the paradigm for understanding the field for news, while a cultural richness, a 'Pacific way', offering opportunity and hope for the future, provides the balance. For journalists from outside it can be elusive. All efforts were made in three preparatory sessions in the case reported on here, to help members of the reporting team make ready for that. The debriefings in Auckland would add more substance, following up questions brought back immediately from the field, especially in interpreting the cultural backdrop to events. As in all such exercises, time was made at the start for backgrounding, including a researched paper by one of the participants, introductions to Melanesian people living in Australia, or specialist journalists with background in the region, and resourcefulness training with equipment and communication tools. The challenge then remained to deploy one's professional and personal resources to find, understand and explain the story.

For this writer, an informal workshop after the travelling phase produced a telling, even if anecdotal observation. Did the participants see a difference overall between what they found in their reporting in New Caledonia and in Vanuatu? The uniform response would characterise the former somewhat as a field of tension, conflict or resentment, the latter as also a field carrying problems but ones being confronted in a better spirit. The reportage itself would reflect much of this, a difference in the level of openness or quality of information readily given; in New Caledonia a sense of being in a place where relations are unresolved, and in Vanuatu of being privy to some free discussion over problems the country was having to face.

This comparing of notes within the reporting team led the writer to inject an element of doubt into a round-up on New Caledonia: 'The mood in New Caledonia, the racially and ethnically divided French territory of the Southwest Pacific, is there for the outsider to easily sample. It has great promise, with a studied accord for getting to some form, or other, of independence; and in other ways it does not feel good' (see Lee Duffield, Appendix). The situation in Vanuatu, on the other hand, was characterised as grappling with modernisation and outside influences, including efforts expressly to apply traditional cultural ways for handling change.

Reporting practices

As reportage, the writing from the field would be more impressionistic than interpretative, though fortified by the consultation and sharing of impressions with a colleague group, and was in the tradition of journalistic writing where the reporter tells the story plainly 'as they see it'. The reporting practice that would produce the above qualified observations about New Caledonia and

Vanuatu was fitted to the circumstances of the group's deployment. Essentially it was an application of news values with an admonition to seek out where possible and allow for longer-term background and cultural factors not available on the surface. The imprecation, 'Don't be a parachutist or firefighter', is directed especially at unversed and unbriefed reporters arriving in unfamiliar terrain for a crisis, like a violent uprising. In part-defence of that, standing doctrine in the Western news tradition may insist that news can be universalistic, provided there is best practice: appraisal of the quality of sources, ability to check, exploiting transparency in the field of inquiry and due scepticism. It also insists on journalists knowing the field they are in, or at least being briefed well, more possible this century through online sourcing; see for example Van Druten's (in Duffield and Cokley, 2006, pp. 53-76) idea of the 'neo-firefighter', advocating high professional standards in preparation for fieldwork.

However, in the present case the group task was to refresh information on ongoing processes in the news, through mostly softer writing or feature material, in fact without the option, or time to attend events that generate hard news. Whereas the chief journalistic way of covering *process*, is to report news of successive *events*, good amenability can be provided to audiences through offering more, in a slower time frame: news features, scene-setting, analysis and commentary. The shortcomings of events-driven news coverage have been dealt with often; succinctly in the case of an insightful commentary from Mayer (in Henningham, 1992, p. 37): 'Hard news can't handle process. It is reductionist, treats events and politics in an ahistorical way, as a glut of occurrences; and cannot cope with any long-term historical processes, nor with complexity.'

The pre-arranged briefings and interviews for New Caledonia were with the Australian Consulate-General; a spokesperson for the conservative political party, and *Caldoche* interest, the Rassemblement-UMP, (*Caldoches* being the long-term French settler society); the news director of the Kanak station Radio Djiido (broadcasting for the Kanak, Melanesian community), and the director of the Tjibaou Cultural Centre. Late arrangements to meet two French military reserve officers in Noumea fell through over a breakdown in messaging. A further encounter with the Kanak movement would be 'offshore', an appointment with two senior figures at the headquarters of the international agency, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, in Port Vila. Other appointments in Vanuatu were with the editors of the two principal newspapers; with a non-governmental agency, the Pacific Institute of Public Policy (PiPP); photojournalist Ben Bohane, and the proprietor of Tanna Coffee, Terry Adlington.

Several leads were improvised, for example: interviewing members of a motor cycle club spotted outside of Noumea, (considered newsworthy as at the time such gatherings were forbidden under 'anti-bikie' legislation in Queensland, the reporters' home market); cold calling at the Vanuatu police headquarters,

producing some well-sourced material on community policing; a report on the expanding cruise ship industry taking world tourism to outer islands, prompted by the presence of a ship in Port Vila Harbour; a visit to the Vanuatu National Cultural Centre, and to a kava bar. The itinerary was confined to Noumea and Port Vila except for short journeys outside the capital cities mostly for recreation. In New Caledonia one member of the party had French language, sufficient for most organising purposes, and one case requiring translation. None of the group spoke the Vanuatu *lingua franca*, Bislama, but English proved most common there.

Synthesising the outcomes of reportage

As an inquiry into journalistic practice, the present article acts on the premise that journalism will unearth, analyse and edit such large volumes of information on a daily basis it becomes a leading source of historical knowledge; especially with the advent of massive online databases, (see Duffield 2002, pp. 277-84).The article is not presented as being itself an artefact, exemplar or instance of published journalism researching and telling history. It is a description, commentary and reconstruction of such practice, one that shows how journalism may be applied to serve such purposes as to record history; in the case of the journalistic output of the seven reporters on the South Pacific tour. In this, it remakes the collection of reports, combining them to produce an overall interpretative account of the situation in the two societies put under review for initially journalistic purposes. The following then, is a digest of information, and treatment of information obtained through a synthesis of the content of reportage performed by the seven journalists.

New Caledonia

In the New Caledonia coverage, background information is given on the 'French' and 'Kanak' communities, majorities respectively in different geographical locations. In the scene-setting, townscapes are able to be represented as 'like a dozen French towns … (where) with a little imagining it might be somewhere around Nice'; 'knots of people … mingle at the salubrious Place des Cocotiers …'; 'small groups of young, black unemployed wait uneasily around job centres and a training school' (see Duffield, Appendix). Also part of the setting; in the local news, an acid spill at a nickel mine has provoked violent demonstrations, with road blocks by crowds of youths, stoning passing buses, two police officers shot, non-lethal, and 80 arrests with the Gendarmerie out pursuing more suspects.

All informants agreed there were two dominant subjects to contemplate: implementation of the Matîgnon (1988) and Noumea (1998) Accords, setting out a roadmap for independence; and the lucrative, expanding nickel industry. The calculus and discussion is overwhelmingly carried out in terms of the strictures of the formal, legal agreements; but this can be misleading, as there are signs

also of more visceral politics. Key statistics describe the political impasse in New Caledonia. The Melanesian *Kanaks* make up just over 40 percent of the population, corresponding with total representation of their various 'pro-independence' parties in the New Caledonia parliament, the Congress (38.2 percent, 25 seats). European French, including Caldoches, have just under 30 percent of total population, but have been able to mobilise voter turnout and build a social coalition, resulting in close to 57.5 percent (29 seats) for the 'anti-independence' bloc. 'Others' in the population of just under 270,000 include a third major grouping, Polynesian, nearly 11 percent. One more statistic hangs over the debate on New Caledonia independence; high unemployment, conservatively estimated at 13.8 percent to 17 percent. Estimates exceeding double that average for 'Kanak' youth are uncontested. (Sources: www.tradingeconomics.com/new-caledonia/unemployment-rate; www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nc.html; www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/01/08/New-Caledonia-census-raises-thorny-political-questions.aspx; www.isee.nc/component/finder/search?q=+chiffres+cles&Itemid=101).

Three discourses

An overall narrative will have two alternative themes or treatments for the independence issue, and a third based on the mining issue. On one hand there is the arithmetic and a pragmatic argument about a form of independence. The 'French' have kept an upper hand, by democratic means; they invest and provide state finances from national budgets; the state-provided infrastructure is excellent by the standards of Pacific states, with an increasing share going to Kanak citizens, e.g. for education; France contributes to regional security and stability, and the Accords reached among the communities and the metropolitan government are being allowed to run their course. These binding agreements commit New Caledonia to a referendum on independence by the end of 2018. In the meantime there is power-sharing, with Kanak Ministers in the present government. Political civility prevails. The form of the eventual referendum will be whether to transfer a balance of five remaining powers to the Noumea parliament—foreign affairs, justice, public order, currency and defence. Failure to conduct the vote, occasioning direct intervention from France, is broadly rejected as only a last resort. Journalists are told, that whatever residual rancour exists, there is some consensus backing this measured-out solution as a main chance which must be tried.

On the other hand, there is the second treatment, that adopts a Kanak perspective, built on a key point common to all discourse on decolonisation: *they were there first*. In the Kanak villages, the *tribus* built among the wild greenery of country areas, that argument prevails; ultimate power must be restored to original inhabitants. They have found outside support, e.g. in sympathetic hearings from the

United Nations Decolonisation Committee, where they have also argued against claims by Caldoche representatives for recognition of their own generational status, since first colonisation in the 1850s. The Kanak case seeks to promote 'cultural power' following the dicta of the late independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou, who organised the first festivals for cultural revival, arguing that preservation of the original culture would clearly identify a continuing native society, that should warrant having its independence restored.

The third field of discourse is built around mining and refining nickel, New Caledonia being among its five main producers. As was established in the 2014 reportage, this resource industry is undergoing massive quantitative expansion. The long-established nickel company SLN, 60 percent owned by the French company Eramet, with French government interest and local investors holding 4 percent, uses the refinery located in central Noumea. Of two much bigger, and newer undertakings, the Koniambo mine in the North of the main island, Grande Terre, is 51 percent publicly owned through the provincial government there, the balance of 49 percent taken over by the Canadian company Glencore, previously Glencore-Xstrata. In the other case, Goro mine in the South of the island has a negligible public holding, virtually wholly owned by Vale in Brazil. Nickel already provided over 93 percent of total exports from New Caledonia in 2007, valued at US$2.11billion. (Source: www.isee.nc/component/finder/se arch?q=+chiffres+cles&Itemid=101).

Elements in the debate surrounding nickel: The two large mines are in provinces with substantial Kanak populations, with Kanak parties dominating or prominent in local assemblies, highly sensitive to periodic accidents and environmental despoliation, and to industrial problems among the workforce. (Social tensions and disputes over this situation are identified in the field coverage—see Simpson and Veivers, Appendix.) All parties understand that government must obtain revenue from the mines to maintain a high standard of services, and a high nominal standard of living—where per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in New Caledonia is comparable with Australia's (Source: www.tradingeconomics. com/new-caledonia/gdp-per-capita). However, the government is bound by initial incentives contracts exempting the new mines from taxation, for 15 years after they reach agreed levels of full production. The mines commenced production in 2010 and 2014 respectively, entered a period of weaker commodity prices, and have not shown themselves likely to go quickly towards that full capacity. The frustration of the political community over this blocking-off of anticipated revenues, is complicated by disputes over whether to apply the eventual proceeds through a sovereign wealth fund, or immediately towards poverty relief and employment. Conservative interests will advance a 'mining-related' argument against independence: powerful multi-national companies in effect would recolonise a small and weak independent state; better for that power to remain with France.

Sources and testimonies

Whereas journalism is not simply a bare recording and indexing of facts, but creative work sensitive to nuance and tone, interpreting information and the way things are said; much of the 'sense-making' by journalists will depend on the rhetoric or images in play, inadvertent comments, or unexpectedly getting a document. The following is a selection drawing on the way informants explained their situation.

Kanak leaders have publicly committed to the orderly road towards an ambiguous goal of independence—though inclined to make clear that the process must deliver a final outcome which in their eyes will be just. The head of the FLNKS—Kanak delegation at the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), based at Port Vila, Jimmy Naouma, told his interviewer it was an 'efficient pathway to decolonisation'. New Caledonia would become an economic leader in the region and 'doorway to Europe', when full independent government was achieved: 'Those powers will come across, we are convinced'. 'We are getting ready for independence', he said. Romain Hmeun, news editor on the Kanak community radio, disavowed that the resentments within his community would upset the plan for a prosperous future, saying the Matignon accords had produced a 'consensual system of government, which means both sides govern together, working for everyone'. 'The Matignon accords set this up as a frame of law and even with independence they would be a protection of people's interests', he said. As for the islands' history of violent confrontation, the gap in wealth between communities was closing and people had no appetite for conflict: 'The real victims of history have been the Kanaks, but now the younger generation see the Caldoches as equals; they have no wish for revenge if independence is granted'. Yet, as if held in reserve, there is cultural power, as embodied in the popular radio outlet itself, taking up freedoms guaranteed by the Accords: 'This is a people not just a community; people can speak freely and that's where the power comes from; the station is part of a symbolic and historical movement' (see Kelly, Appendix).

Vaea Frogier from the conservative political party, the Rassemblement-UMP, represents the Caldoche interests in this coverage, and similarly, takes up the consensual themes—while holding some quiet insistence in reserve. 'We all have to be able to talk and find a solution,' she says. 'We recognise one another.' There is the same focus on a strong economic future built on the nickel industry, a settlement of conflicts over it, and getting revenue from it: 'We will not find a political solution unless a nickel solution is found.' However, Frogier also will engage directly with 'real life' conflicts of interest and opinion, if somewhat masked by the restrained discourse over an organised settlement. As to, 'Who was here first?': The European French, the Caldoches in particular, must be able to share a right to the land with Kanaks: 'Both are legitimate interests; the country belongs to both; in a democracy, if you live here you have a right to vote' (see Kelly, Appendix).

Also prepared to engage is Rose Wete, a Kanak identity who calls up bad memories of policies extending into the 1980s, offering the vote freely to recent arrivals from metropolitan France. 'The French were encouraging full white immigration to New Caledonia and making Kanaks a minority in our own country,' she says. New laws require voters to have been residents since 1998, but there were severe arguments still going on over the strategic enfranchisement of parcels of French voters, and several Kanaks not getting a vote. Wete, a senior official with the MSG, objected to claims made during elections on the 'French' side, that a vote for independence would sabotage the Matignon 'road map' and cut off economic benefits of association with France. 'My blood would start to boil…,' she said. 'They were saying we will end up like Vanuatu, we will become poor and undeveloped. Did they really think that was going to happen? These parties had all actually signed the Accord … themselves committed to the process.' The Accord process may succeed, but until such time, 'the whole system has disadvantaged the Kanaks' (see Duffield, Appendix; Harvey, Appendix).

A conclusion might be drawn from this dialogue with reporters. Old conflicts are being dampened down, and the parties are making strong efforts, seeking to enact a settlement set out on paper, under the chairmanship of the metropolitan government, according to best principles of reasonableness. There are reservations, and actual power held in reserve, be it power to withhold full benefits of the modern economy, or to mobilise a people in opposition. That is an impression obtained: a good chance of a solution, but with conflicts pushed below the surface, and the big question, who will rule and how, unresolved.

Democracy in Vanuatu

For a scene setter at Port Vila, a retrospective passage from Richard Shears (1980, p. 53) would still resonate: 'Taxis prowled the streets waiting for a call from French, English, Melanesian or Australian shoppers. The tourist ship *Sea Princess* still called by... The souvenir shops displayed wooden statuettes and coral necklaces. In this country with a split personality you could still … imagine you were in France, England, Australia, or a Pacific Island.' Within that colourful scenario the country would move on: independence in 1980, rapid population growth especially in the city, and the internet revolution, aggravating the pace of politics and change.

In Vanuatu the citizens 'don't hold back' when they debate political or social issues on *Yumi Toktok Stret* ('Straight-talking'), the strongly popular 'citizen journalism' site, says Royson Willie, editor of the *Vanuatu Daily Post*, describing it as a useful news source, which mainstream reporters pick up and check (see Veivers, Appendix). Derek Brien sees social media generating a 'broader debate and a richer debate'. He is chief executive officer of the PiPP, which works for community development, organising large gatherings to debate public issues. He

sees the 'independence' generation now being replaced with younger and better educated leaders, and use of all media is part of that: 'Before, those in power operated in a vacuum with less inclination to share. Now there are political actors, not necessarily MPs, on the scene, and the politicians see that it is beyond their control; they might not be part of the conversation… There is simply no widespread opposition to people having access to communication and technology' (see Simpson and Clarke, Appendix).

Journalists themselves, like Royson Willie, affirm the impression of a climate of free speech. In part they have been able to make progress, for instance reporting on cases of official corruption without interference, through calling in help from outside bodies like the Commonwealth Press Association. They have weathered passages of even physical bullying, Willie himself assaulted in an infamous incident, and witholding of information by government. As two of the Australian reporters put it in a despatch: 'Media workers in Vanuatu say they are upsetting the usual story of a small developing country, by getting more freedom of information not less—though it has never been easy.' (see Simpson and Clarke, Appendix). Eveylyne Toa, editor of the *Vanuatu Independent,* and president of the Vanuatu Media Association, agrees an assertive media is succeeding: 'We believe in the right for our own people to be informed; our aim is to be informative and educational,' she says, and recommends a democratic antidote to repression: 'We had one minister who would come in and bang his fists on that desk, and if they do that we will tell the people … Now we have more freedom, but we must also be responsible.'

The existence of pluralistic media services and open public debates cannot of themselves generate an ideal state of society but in some sense are a precondition for it, signifying healthy change. To take the description of the situation briefly onward, to early 2016, and the lead-up to the Vanuatu elections; it would be a vote produced by no less a crisis that the gaoling of 14 MPs, including Ministers, for corruption offences, but accompanied by robust and open campaigning, including through social media. If the system of electoral politics appeared somewhat immature, with 36 political parties covering many strands of policy or regional interest, it also appeared to be well alive, 261 candidates contesting the 52 available seats, (*Vanuatu Daily Digest*, 11 January 2016). The voting would produce changes, some 'out with the old; in with the new.'

Discourses: development and custom

The 'freedom' context is one way in which the independent state of Vanuatu presents itself to visiting media, together with two other important agendas: problems of poverty and development, and social tensions; and holding to custom and tradition as a way of coping with pressures of modern times. Issues raised in open forums, like the heavily-used online election debates, provide a

description of a developing country with some advancing problems, yet also lasting strengths and potential for success. Rural villages house 75 percent of the population of almost 250,000, giving security and support, but themselves lacking in amenities and government services, with deteriorating roads and public buildings including schools. The capital city, Port Vila, where population has increased nearly ten-fold to 50,000 since World War II, exhibits problems with urban drift, people moving in from the islands: pressure on land use, high unemployment among youth, poor housing, social tensions, more crime. On the key measure of infant mortality, deaths per 1000 live births, the country rates at 15.7, compared to the world average of 35.4, or elsewhere in the Pacific, Papua New Guinea (38.55), Australia (4.37). Compared to New Caledonia, not so segmented into distinctive ethnic identities, there is one, Melanesian culture, fragmented into language and island groups, but thinking as a whole, as the Ni-Vanuatu, people of the country. (Sources: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ …; also WHO statistics putting the global rate at 32, www.who.int/gho/child_health/mortality/neonatal_infant_text/en/).

A police officer outlines a community outreach program taking officers into townships or villages, in cooperation with chiefs, then despairingly reports on the frustration of police unable to respond to street crime in Port Vila: 'I am sorry to tell you that we don't have enough resources to deal with what is happening now... Youth get into mixed groups, from the different islands, and do not have the same controls as in their home areas ... We get issues like violence towards women and assault. The range of crime has now extended to breaking into houses and properties.' While crime rates remain moderate on any world standard, and police have access to training and assistance from other national forces, they become paralysed if unable to patrol because there is no petrol, or being without adequate communications, must resort to using their private mobile phones (see Clarke, Appendix).

Vanuatu, unlike New Caledonia, has no nickel mines and no France to bankroll a higher living standard. Per capita GDP remains at a little under US$2,530, (against US$38,896 in New Caledonia). Opportunities do exist in tourism, replanting neglected coconut plantations, or value adding by more processing of farm products. To make change requires finding ways to get things done, often still by going to traditional authorities. Derek Brien of the PiPP explained difficulties faced in taking economic advantage of new communications technology: 'The next big break is broader access to the internet through mobile phones but there is a long way to go for that in rural areas…' Installing telephone towers and lines had met with suspicion over alienating the customary use of land, requiring concentrated diplomacy by industry and officials: 'The phone providers had discussions with traditional land owners to ensure they were happy with the phone infrastructure … In this part of the world it's all about communicating by

telling stories. It's about putting everything we do in fairly plain language …' (see Veivers, Appendix).

Resorting to village tradition and authority might be the wisest available course to head off social break-down under great pressure for change, says the PiPP communication director, Ben Bohane. He had seen that when conflicts arose between communities, it was always the custom to try and get an amelioration, symbolised by an exchange of valuables—hand-crafted mats or betel nuts. It becomes a joint effort, avoiding pay-back, so 'the peace tends to hold' (see Mahoney (2), Appendix). The Ni-Vanuatu preserve a complex set of kinship relations and each one's island of birth remains a key identifier. Political candidates preparing for election often include a policy supporting recognition and consultation by government with the *Malvatumauri*, the National Council of Chiefs.

Against that, impacts of dislocation like urban drift and the spreading, globalised cash economy are manifest. A shopper in the car complains about cheap manufactures: 'People cook with a lot of rice; we can still get Australian rice but it is dearer, and now people are offered Chinese rice, which is a poor quality one with small grains, but very cheap, so they buy it, and I think it is not good for them. Even the iron pots are not as good; they were French once, but now Chinese, cheaper but not as heavy and long-lasting, not as good for the cooking' (see Duffield (2), Appendix). Widespread recreational use of kava, the mildly sedative drink, has replaced the original restricted and ceremonial use, reserved mostly for elders. Edgar Hinge does not like it. He takes visitors around the spacious National Culture Centre, explaining the antiques and later traditional artefacts, drawing stories in a sand-pit. As for kava, he says: 'It is a problem with people over-using kava because when they drink too much they become creative and say that they will achieve all these things. But the next day they don't remember and they achieve nothing because kava has affected their thoughts' (see Veivers (2), Appendix).

Summary and conclusions

This article has sought to analyse a portfolio of journalistic articles obtained on a reporting field trip to New Caledonia and Vanuatu, to extract themes, and support the assertion that media coverage is adaptable to providing convincing historical accounts. As a case study it draws on a collaborative review and recapitulation by journalists involved in the coverage; then a revisiting, re-editing and revising of information used in the published accounts. It is in effect a first step towards producing a meta-analysis of the interpretative and informative power of journalistic reporting for use in scholastic work. It is concerned with identifying processes in the news, extending beyond the limitations of 'component' events of such processes, reported piecemeal on a daily news basis. The reporters had privileged access to helpful, well informed sources. The journalistic focus on

processes in public life, culture and society, approached on a documentary or commentary basis, delivered a documentary radio program and a set of feature articles well suited to the format of their online outlets. It retained a conventional journalistic focus on establishing facts, on what was new, and on providing a reasoned and fair analysis. The review here, has synthesised the product, with adjustments such as some further fact-checking, to extract an overall interpretation, built on differences between the two neighbouring Pacific Island societies. An essential difference seen is between the as yet unresolved independence issue in New Caledonia, depicted in terms of a peaceful and consensual process, but with undercurrents of tension and conflict; and the struggle of independent Vanuatu, its citizens grappling with their issues of economic survival, justice, freedom and authority—between their own hands.

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Appendix: Project published articles

The articles from *QUT News* are on either of two pages*:* www.qutnews.com/2014/07/#. Vp3M50YnlBc*,* (Retrieved on January 19, 2016)*, or* www.qutnews.com/2014/07/ page/2/#.Vp3ceUYnlBd (retrieved on January 19, 2016).

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10. Malcolm Ross, journalist and photographer
The perfect war correspondent?

Abstract: Malcolm Ross was New Zealand's first official war correspondent and from 1915 until the end of the First World War he provided copy to the New Zealand press. His journalism has been the subject of recent academic investigation, but Ross had another string to his bow—he was an enthusiastic photographer with the skill to develop his own film 'in the field'. It might therefore be expected that Ross was the ideal war correspondent, an individual who could not only write the stories, but also potentially illustrate them with photography from the battlefields. Yet by the end of the conflict his body of photographs was largely unpublished and unrecognised. This article looks at Ross's photography and, in an era when media organisations increasingly require journalists to be multi-media skilled, asks whether the role of the writer and image-taker are still two different and not necessarily complementary skills.

Keywords: conflict reporting, multimedia, New Zealand, photography, photojournalism, Samoa, war correspondence

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MALCOLM ROSS, New Zealand's first official war correspondent was a multi-talented individual –journalist, photographer, mountaineer and sportsman. He seemingly embodied attributes now viewed as essential for journalism, the ability to provide both words and visuals. As a writer in the *Guardian* has argued: 'Today's journalists must be multi-platform wonders and those who fail to adapt to these new expectations will find it increasingly difficult to compete' (Whelan, 2008, p.1). A century ago Malcolm Ross headed for the First World War battlefields as a correspondent capable of complementing his copy with photographs.

However, those who have surveyed his contribution as a journalist during the war do not rate him highly. In his 2007 Master's thesis on Ross, Ron Palenski compared him to Australia's official war correspondent Charles Bean. Palenski states that Bean is 'an honoured and revered figure in Australia' (Palenski, 2007, p. 1) yet Ross is barely known in his own country and 'where Bean succeeded

in the tasks set him, Ross failed' (Ibid). Writing about the Gallipoli campaign, Allison Oosterman remarked that 'all journalists at Gallipoli suffered from the vagaries of a badly directed and often capricious censorship but ways round this could be achieved through diligence, imagination and excellent writing, as demonstrated by (British correspondent) Ashmead-Bartlett and Bean. It seems this was beyond Ross's capabilities' (Oosterman, 2008, p. 19).

Ross certainly had the experience and at 52 years of age had reached 'what appeared to be the pinnacle of his career' (Ibid, p.xii). Aside from his record in print he was also recognised for his photographic skills. Before the war Ross had supplied illustrated stories for special weekly and Christmas editions of New Zealand publications. Below (Figure 1) is an example from the *Otago Witness'* Christmas Annual in 1905.

There is evidence that Ross took his camera with him on all his significant trips as a journalist when he returned to journalism after a period as private secretary to the managing director of the Union Steam Ship Company from

Figure 1: Through Te Heuheu's Territory: Tales of Today and Yesterday, by Malcolm Ross (with illustrations by the author). Image: Papers Past, National Library of New Zealand.

1889 to 1897. By the early 1900s he was 'well established as one of the leading journalists in New Zealand' (Palenski, 2007, p. 15) and was also a correspondent for *The Times* in London. Although the daily papers he worked for did not feature photography, their weekly and special editions, such as the Christmas Annuals, certainly did. Ross was also to use his own photographs in his tourism and mountaineering books.

Palenski (2007) argues that perhaps no series of stories established Ross in the national consciousness more than his dispatches from Samoa during the period when that country became the subject of a tug of war between the imperial powers Germany, the United States and Great Britain. The three powers had agreed to a treaty in 1889 providing for the neutrality and autonomous government of the Samoan Islands. However, this broke down after the death of the Samoan king in 1898 and the three imperial states backed rival claimants.

Ross arrived in February 1899 and from his first dispatch quickly supported the British imperial view blaming German agents for fomenting the rising and arming 'rebel' Samoans. An example from one of his dispatches to the *Otago Witness* in which he invokes the memory of the most notable European to settle in Samoa, Robert Louis Stevenson, shows a writer of some descriptive power.

> Would that the thin, wasted finger of the Scottish scholar had been spared for a few years to finish his footnote to history. In what burning words he would have sent it forth to all the world. But the red-roofed house that just peeps through the palms of Vailima is tenantless. The weeds are running wild in the tropic garden, and we can only make pilgrimage to the tomb on the mountain that overlooks the harbour where, under the wide and starry sky, the sailor is home from the sea, and the hunter home from the hill. (*Otago Witness,* 23 February 1899, p. 20)

Ross could enrich his descriptions visually. He took his camera with him and took images of Samoan life and the combatants, apparently ready for action.

The picture (Figure 2) on the opposite page is, however, the closest Malcolm Ross ever got to capturing actual combat in all of his war reporting. Many of his photographs in the collection of 261 photographic negatives held by the New Zealand National Library are distant from their subject and even when Ross gets closer he appears to have no rapport with his subjects. A year after his reportage of the events in Samoa, Ross was back in the South Pacific accompanying the Governor-General, Lord Ranfurly, on a voyage which saw the Cook Islands and Niue assimilated into the British Empire. Ross took photographs throughout the voyage and developed the glass plates on board the ship. He outlined the difficulties in a dispatch back to the *Otago Witness*: 'At night-time I would turn the engineer's cabin into a photographic darkroom. With every crevice shut, and the lights still burning under a red cloth, it would immediately become a

Figure 2: Samoan combatants ready for action. Image: Malcolm Ross, courtesy of National Library Ref.No.1/1-006636-G.

Turkish bath and the perspiration would trickle down and try to spoil my plates' (*Otago Witness,* 21 November 1900, p. 11.) The result of all this effort was often disappointing.

The photograph on page 156 (Figure 3) shows the arrival of Lord Ranfurly's party in Rarotonga for the ceremony marking the annexation of the Cook Islands. Ross takes the image from a respectful distance and it appears he has made little effort to seek a more visually arresting record. Ross the photographer is distant from the action, seemingly more concerned not to upset the dignitaries rather than getting the shot.

This distance from the action and apparent deference to authority marked Ross's photography during the First World War. Certainly Ross was noted for the care with which he fostered his relationships with senior New Zealand politicians, military leaders and the Governor-General. As a Parliamentary reporter Ross had formed close links with a number of senior politicians with his home, across the road from Parliament, known as a 'frequent rendezvous for keen Parliamentary debates and intelligent discussions' (McCallum, 1900, p. 11). Ross was particularly friendly with William Massey, the Leader of the Reform Party and New Zealand Prime Minister from 1912 to 1925. This involvement with Reform Party politicians also included James Allen, who would be the

Figure 3: The arrival of Lord Ranfurly's party in Rarotonga, 1990. Image: Malcolm Ross, courtesy of National Library Ref.No.1/2-021251-G.

Minister of Defence during the war. When Ross was appointed New Zealand's official war correspondent in 1915, the *New Zealand Truth* printed a poem by an anonymous fellow journalist:

> Another little tit-bit for Malcolm;
> Another little lucky bag for Ross;
> He's Jamsie's little jewel and joy,
> He's Willie's white-haired boy.
> And he's always so obsequious to the Boss!
> Though other day-lie pen pushers are cross,
> With 'Maykum', sure they aren't worth a toss,
> Oh, his pen just shouts aloud,
> And he does his sponsors proud,
> As they turn to gold his literary dross! (*NZ Truth*, 18 September, 1915, p. 7)

In this ditty Jamsie is presumed to be James Allen and Willie, William Massey. The poem shows that among fellow correspondents there was the view that Malcolm Ross was not an independent journalist and was far too deferential to the country's political leadership. Certainly Lord Ranfurly was obviously suffi-ciently comfortable with Ross to invite him to join his party when he visited the

Figure 4: Lord Ranfurly's party visit the Tūhoe in the Ureweras.
Image: Malcolm Ross, Courtesy of National Library Ref.No.PA1-q-634-47-2.

Tūhoe people in the Ureweras in 1904. This was another arduous trip but Ross again took his camera (Figure 4) and had a very comprehensive photographic record of the trip. It should have been an opportunity to capture the character of the country and its people but again Ross's photography seems distant and detached.

Even when Ross gets closer to his subjects there is the absence of any rapport with his subjects or a sense of what differentiates a record of an event from a memorable image. Malcolm's wife, Forrestina Ross, was viewed by fellow journalist and editor of the *Fielding Star* Thomas Mills as having a keener news sense than her husband.[1] She was also a keen photographer and painter and although few of her photographs survive, they also appear to show more flair than those taken by her husband. The image on the next page (Figure 5, page 158) is credited to her and portrays the clerk of the course at a Māori race meeting in the Waikato.

When the First World War was declared in August 1914, Ross's connections gave him an advantage other his journalist rivals. He persuaded the commander of the New Zealand forces, General Alexander Godley, to allow him to join the advance party to Samoa to wrest control of the German transmission station. Ross had come to know Godley when he was appointed from the British army

Figure 5: The clerk of the course at a Māori race meeting in the Waikato. Image: Forrestina Ross. Courtesy of the National Library of New Zealand, Ref. No. PUBL-0170-002.

on the recommendation of Lord Kitchener to head and train New Zealand's military forces in 1910.

Malcolm Ross boarded ship with his camera equipment as the solitary newspaper reporter with the force. However, his approach to the task was signaled when he passed up the opportunity to file a story in New Caledonia when the New Zealand forces met up with Australian naval vessels on the way to Samoa. He outlined his reasoning in a later dispatch:

> One might have posted news of our expedition here, but so far as I was concerned, I decided to play the game and say nothing. Letters sent from here might fall into the hands of the enemy, and, so as far as our expedition was concerned, might give away the whole show. (Ross, 1914, p. 17)

It may be viewed as an act of patriotic self-censorship or of Ross being unwilling to risk his relationship with General Godley. The *New Zealand Herald* correspondent in New Caledonia had no such qualms and sent off a report about the stopover which was published in the newspaper on September 3. The incident appears to show that Ross's instinct as a journalist was secondary to his desire to support the imperial cause and maintain his position with politicians and army leaders.

Of the photographs Ross took in Samoa none appear to have been used to accompany his dispatches. *The New Zealand Herald* used two pictures of the New Zealand force occupying Samoa on September 16, 1914[2], but neither was

Figure 6: Hosting the Union Jack in Apia, Samoa, on 29 August 1914. Image by Alfred James Tattersall, courtesy of the National Library, Ref: PA1-q-107-32-1.

by Malcolm Ross. A photograph of the hoisting of the Union Jack in the capital Apia on the August 29 was by Alfred James Tattersall, a New Zealand photographer resident in Samoa at the time.

The image above (Figure 6) taken from an elevated position is far superior to anything taken by Ross where he pictured the New Zealand administrator Colonel Robert Logan reading a proclamation and another picture taken in the road outside the courthouse pictured above. It might be fairly judged that where Ross positioned himself at this event and the photographs he took indicated that he viewed the pictorial record as absolutely subsidiary to his primary role as a journalist. This points to a major issue concerning the differences between a journalist at an event to capture the words of those at the centre of the story and those at the same occasion whose focus is on gaining the most arresting visual image. It must be argued that what is evident is the application of two distinct skill-sets and the differing focus is important for the optimal coverage of any event. The notion of the multimedia journalist must be tempered by an understanding that any individual who seeks to supply both words and images for a news story may have cost-saving advantages to his employer or may be the best recourse if that individual is 'first on the spot' but is less than ideal if specialist journalists and image-takers are available.

Cost was certainly a factor when New Zealand appointed its first official war correspondent in April 1915. But there is no evidence that Ross's ability to take and develop photographs was a factor in his appointment. Yet as Caitlin Patrick argues: 'There is little doubt that photography was a part of warfare at all levels for the first time during the Great War' (Patrick, 2014, p. 1). When Ross finally set foot on the Gallipoli peninsula on 26 June 1915, some two months after the Anzac landings on April 25, he joined three fellow correspondents who were very active in creating a visual record of what was happening. Ashmead Ellis-Bartlett, working for a number of British papers, took still photographs, lantern slides and even films, one of which has been restored by New Zealand film director Peter Jackson.

Australian war correspondents Charles Bean (the official Australian war correspondent) and Phillip Schuler (special correspondent for *The Age)* were also keen photographers and took many photographs while based on the Gallipoli peninsula. Examples of Bean's work appear in the *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol.12.* This volume which he co-edited, was subtitled 'Photographic Record of the War' and he wrote in the preface that it was intended to 'contain in itself, as far as possible, a complete authentic pictorial narrative of the effort of Australia in the war' (Bean & Gullett, 1939, p. v). He further adds that photographs of the Gallipoli campaign are 'dependent upon those taken by the Official War Correspondent (that is himself) and by officers and men, who, in consequence of the non-enforcement on the Peninsula of the order against photographers, were enabled to carry their cameras' (Ibid, p. vi). A photograph by Bean in this history, with annotations explaining the action, illustrates what was achieved by him, Ashmead-Bartlett and other amateur photographers with cameras at Gallipoli. It pictures the scene at a front-line position known as 'Quinn's Post' and shows a company of Australian troops about to attack the Turkish trenches. Bean could only have taken such a photograph at considerable personal risk as the text accompanying the photograph indicates that it was taken with snipers in action and at about the time of the death of Major Hugh Quinn, the Australian battalion commander at the position.

Jane Carmichael writes that 'during the First World War there was a growing recognition for the status of the topical photograph as a news medium' (Carmichael, 1989, p.146). This understanding does not appear to have influenced Malcolm Ross's approach.

Ross took photographs in Egypt, on the Gallipoli peninsula and on the Western Front but none appear to have accompanied his dispatches from the war zone even though his written accounts were being sent by steamer to New Zealand for cost reasons, whereas those of Bean and other correspondents were normally sent by telegraph. Although the daily press in New Zealand rarely printed photographs, weekly titles such as the *Auckland Weekly News* could be

described as 'illustration-driven'. The first photograph of Gallipoli seen by the New Zealand public was printed on the cover of the *Auckland Weekly News* on 24 June 1915. Reflecting the desire of the home audience to see pictures of where their troops were fighting, the publication insisted that it was a remarkable photograph that 'should prove of very great interest to every New Zealander' (*The Auckland Weekly News,* 24 June, 1915, p. 1).

This photograph was credited to Private R.B.Steele and it is of interest that a soldier was able to take the photograph, send it to Egypt to be developed and then post it to New Zealand while the country's official war correspondent, a practised photographer with the ability to develop his own films, did not, as far as we know, seek to accompany his written accounts with photographs from this campaign or the Western Front.

The explanation of Ross's failure to add photographs to his dispatches have been explained by the official constraints he worked under and the problems of carrying to the battlefield cumbersome photographic equipment. New Zealand military historian Christopher Pugsley says that 'censorship regulations prohibited him from having a camera and taking photographs' (Pugsley, 1995, p. 19). However, there is evidence that Ross carried his camera openly with him when reporting. For example, in the first action of the war by New Zealand forces in Samoa, a photograph of a crowd lingering after the formal possession of the government buildings in Apia shows Ross and his camera in the foreground. This shot (Figure 7, page 162) also shows that the camera Ross was using was not a bulky 'full-plate' camera and the negative descriptions for some of his photographs indicate he used a 'half-plate' which was able to be held in one hand and carried in a relatively compact camera bag. Although not as lightweight as the Kodak Vest Pocket Autographic camera which was commercially marketed as 'the soldier's Kodak', it was nonetheless quite portable. It should also be borne in mind that Ross had before the war taken his camera to the top of New Zealand's highest mountain, Mt Cook.

According to Jane Carmichael, the attitudes of the British commanders in the Dardanelles were relatively accommodating to the taking of photographs (Carmichael, 1989, p. 35) compared with the official prohibition on soldier photography on the Western Front. As for official photography, Sandra Callister notes that an experiment was undertaken where 'war correspondents with cameras were allowed' (Callister, 2005, p. 95). She maintains that the 'New Zealand coverage of Gallipoli was limited, instead, by this very permissiveness: the lack of designated official photographers or accompanying war photographers meant that places and events could only be haphazardly recorded' (Ibid, p. 95).

New Zealand did not appoint an official war photographer until March 1917 when Henry Armytage Sanders joined the New Zealand troops on the Western Front. Callister comments that the momentum for his appointment had been

Figure 7: 'A crowd lingers after the formal possession of the government buildings in German Samoa **has occurred. The man with the camera in the foreground (the figure in the group of the bottom left** of the photograph carrying a camera in his left hand with a bag over his right shoulder) is Malcolm **Ross, who later became New Zealand's first official war correspondent.'**
Image: Photo courtesy of the National Army Museum 1996-286.

building for some time with the New Zealand public demanding to see their troops playing their role in history (Ibid, p. 107) and Pugsley noted: 'Now—for the first time—New Zealand audiences had images to go with the words' (Pugsley, 1995, p. 19). Of course this was not strictly the case as photos supplied by soldiers had often filled the gap, but now there were officially authorised visuals to accompany Ross' dispatches.

The issue remains, however, that Ross was capable from Samoa to Gallipoli and on to the Western Front of supplying images to accompany his words. So why did he not do so? The picture we can draw of his actions indicate some possible reasons. First, Ross can be viewed as a closer associate of the other estates of the realm than the Fourth Estate. There was his close association with the New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey and the Minister of Defence James Allen, his friendship with the former British Governor in New Zealand, Lord Ranfurly, and his relationship with the commander of New Zealand forces, General Alexander Godley. He socialised with these members of the political

and military elite, benefited from his connection with them in his journalistic work and he shared their imperial and political outlook.[3] Ross was not a critical journalist or photojournalist. His personality appears detached and somewhat disassociated, with a strong inclination to conform. It would be unsurprising that Ross would follow any rules, strictures or regulations that political or military masters asked of him. If the command said 'no photographs' Ross would obey even though his fellow correspondents and large numbers of New Zealand and Australian soldiers disregarded the order.

Second, it would appear that Ross lacked confidence in his own abilities and deferred to those with authority and to those whom he felt were better writers. Oosterman quotes the Australian correspondent on Gallipoli, Charles Bean, who wrote of Ross that: 'He has been an outspoken admirer of Bartlett's (British correspondent Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett) from the day B. arrived here, almost to the point of toadyism—but B. is so brilliant that I think it may be just honest admiration' (Oosterman, 2005, p. 172). However, Bean went on to say that: 'At the same time I have heard him give away B. behind his back in a manner which completely staggered me' (Ibid). It was this last comment that led Oosterman to speculate that it could have been Ross who alerted the British Commander General Hamilton that an Australian journalist, Keith Murdoch, was carrying a damaging letter by Ashmead-Bartlett to then Prime Minister Asquith which led to Bartlett's being banished from Gallipoli. I believe that such an action would fit with the profile of the disassociated conformist.

However, the story of Malcolm Ross is finally the story of an individual who did not achieve, as New Zealand's first official war correspondent, peer or public expectations in the position for either his written words or his photographs. It also draws attention to the demands that an individual reporter can excel at two skills, the written word and the image. The example shown in this paper is of the coverage of the raising of the British flag in Samoa as New Zealand troops moved in as the occupying force. Ross is positioned at ground level to take down the words of the appointed New Zealand administrator Colonel Robert Logan. Tattersall, the photographer who captured the image used in the New Zealand press, sought the best position to cover the event visually and moved up to a first floor balcony to look down on the delivery of a proclamation he probably never heard. This is perhaps a clear demonstration of two skills which question the notion of the journalist as scribe and image-maker.

However, in the context of breaking news journalists have always been encouraged to use whatever tools they have at their disposal. New technologies have always been embraced by news organisations and the necessities of covering war has strongly encouraged enterprise by reporters. The American media historian Richard Schwarzlose maintains that the telegraph turned American journalism 'into a news-hungry industry' during the American Civil War of

1861-65 (Burum & Quinn, 2016, p. 22). Burum and Quinn argue in their book *Mojo: The Mobile Journalism Handbook* that the contemporary development in journalism is the mobile phone. The mobile-equipped journalist (Mojo) who can use his device to take images and send material over the internet has the essential tool for breaking news.

A century ago Malcolm Ross went to the First World War better equipped than most of his contemporaries for providing his news outlets and the public with written accounts of the action and images of the distant battlefields in which there was intense interest among the New Zealand public. Certainly the ability to take photographs was not, as far as we know, a factor in his appointment as New Zealand's official war correspondent. However, he appears not only to have failed to provide timely written accounts, but also to have failed to capitalise on his ability to take photographs and process them and so greatly enhance his coverage. Furthermore, his visual sense brings into question the notion that journalists will have the ability to both tell the story and have the visual skill to provide arresting images. If they are first on the spot the images a journalist could provide will have very high news value but if it is not breaking news better images will probably be provided by someone focussing on this aspect of the story. The example of Ross indicates that caution is required if the expectation

Figure 8: The Le Quesnoy victory parade on 4 November 1918—from the rear. Image: Malcolm Ross, courtesy of the National Library Ref.No.1/4-017543-F.

is that all journalists are to be proficient at both 'telling the story' and providing a high quality visual record of any news event.

A final image (Figure 8, opposite page) from the Ross archive tellingly reinforces this point. One of the last military actions by New Zealand troops in the First World War was the capture of the walled town of Le Quesnoy on 4 November 1918. They had scaled the walls of the town with ladders and caught the German defenders by surprise. Ross captured the victory parade of the troops through the town—from behind.

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2. The NZ Occupation of Samoa, two photographs which appeared in *The New Zealand Herald* (16 September 1914) p. 10.
3. Oosterman writes: '…Ross's colours were firmly nailed to the political mast….It was well known that the papers Ross wrote for supported a conservative political position. It was not unexpected that Ross had similar leanings' (Oosterman, 2008, p. 300).

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Interrogating power and disrupting the discourse about Onslow and the gas hubs

Abstract: When government statements talk about a secret deal with a multinational consortium that will see more than A$250 million spent on a town with a population of around 1000 people, questions need to be asked. Basic maths equates the spend to around $250,000 a person and yet many people in the town are unhappy about the whole deal. *Tracking Onslow* was a collaboration between a university and a local government that used journalism as a methodology to document and interrogate the interaction between Chevron, the state and local governments and the Onslow community over a three-year period. This article focuses on the production of the lead feature of the final edition. It presents the published article and a reflexive exegesis that uses Foucault's ideas about power and knowledge to frame and evaluate the journalistic endeavour.

Keywords: Australia, collaborations, community media, exegeses, investigative journalism, journalism as research, mining, reflexivity, research methodologies, resource curse, student press

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Introduction

ONSLOW is a small town on the coast of Western Australia in the resource-rich Pilbara region. *Tracking Onslow* was a collaborative venture between Edith Cowan University, in Perth, and the Shire of Ashburton, the local government that covers Onslow and three other Pilbara towns. The project used journalism to document physical and social changes in Onslow between 2012 and 2015. Over these years the A$29 billion Wheatstone and A$1.5 billion Macedon, gas processing plants were under construction just a few kilometres from the town. Both projects are joint ventures. The Wheatstone JV is led by Chevron and Macedon by BHP Billiton. WA Government

figures released in 2011 forecast that the town's population would grow from 600 to 2000 by 2016 (Powell, 2013), and the companies involved promised the town millions of dollars of infrastructure funding (Ottaviano, 2012). The State government also promised significant investment in Onslow (Premier's Office, 2014).

In his book on the context and practice of investigative journalism, Hugo de Burgh called journalism the 'tribune of the commoner, … protect[ing] the public's right to know, to examine and to criticise' (2000, p. 6). In a similar vein, Julianne Schultz (1998) described journalism as the watchdog that barks to alert the public to corruption and undue influence, acting as a check and balance on government. Journalism textbooks are replete with statements such as these (Franklin et al, 2005; Lamble, 2013; Errington and Miragliotta, 2011), and Knight went as far as to say that 'journalists have professional and ethical responsibilities to look beyond what they have been told by those in authority' (2000, p. 48). From this perspective, these promises about what would happen in Onslow warranted media scrutiny.

The six editions of the *Tracking Onslow* magazine (produced twice yearly between mid-2012 and mid-2015) aimed to fulfil three political functions of journalism described by Errington & Miragliotta (2011). These are: to produce a first draft of history; to provide and facilitate a 'town square' that enables the free exchange of views; and to perform the 'watchdog' role. These aims were explicitly stated in the editorial letters on the first page of each edition. For example:

> This magazine is not a PR tool for the shire, for Chevron, for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, or for any particular group in the community. Our aim instead is to do the things that journalism ideally should do, and one of these is to function as a town square where everyone's views are shared, so that questions can be answered and issues debated. (Davies, 2015, p. 1)

The project provided an opportunity for authentic, work-integrated learning for journalism students who travelled to Onslow and researched, wrote and assisted in the production of the magazine and its companion website. Davies (2014a) describes the pedagogy of the project in more detail. This article presents the lead feature of the final edition (reproduced at the end) and an exegesis. The published article sought to answer difficult questions not answered in previous editions and also to follow up and continue narrative threads commenced in those earlier editions. The exegesis comprises: a summary of the academic context of this work (including the Foucauldian notions of discourse and power that frame it); background information that led to conceptualisation of the lead article and notes on its production; and a discussion about whether, in this case, contemporary Australian journalism (as described by Lamble, 2004; 2013) has been shown to be able to fulfill the watchdog, town square and first draft of

history functions amid corporate and government power struggles over control of the narrative.

Part 1: The exegesis

Conflicting discourse about the social, economic and environmental impacts of the Australian mining industry characterises the substantial body of academic literature on the subject. While the government (Barnett, 2010; Buswell, 2013) and industry representatives (Shann, 2012) have extolled the fiscal benefits of the so-called 'mining boom', other studies have identified inequities in wealth distribution and adverse social implications. (Brueckner et al, 2013; Chapman et al, 2014; Carrington & Pereira, 2011). Researchers at the Australia Institute warn that the mining boom has created a 'two speed economy', by pushing up the exchange rate and cutting the export profits of trade-dependent sectors of the economy (Grudnoff, 2013). Downes et al (2014) from the Reserve Bank of Australia concur, saying that while the mining, construction and import industries have grown, industries like agriculture and manufacturing have suffered. Economist Max Cordon (2012) referred to this effect as 'Dutch disease' and warned about its ripple effects. However, other commentators disagree with him. Hambur and Norman (2013) claim the Dutch disease theory is based on simplistic guesswork. Looking at other impacts, Langton and Mazel (2008) claim that the mining boom has damaged communities and living conditions in remote and regional Australia, to the extent that the country is now in the grip of a 'resource curse'. They use the term to describe how mining, as it is currently practised, can lead to poor economic growth, conflict and declining standards of democracy.

The footprints of the resource industry are pervasive throughout the Western Australian physical, political and economic landscape. While the state's economy was once dominated by agriculture, the mining and petroleum industry share of gross state profile has grown from about a fifth ten years ago to about a third in 2013 (Department of Treasury, 2014). The Western Australian government has invested significantly in the industry. According to Peel et al (2014), the big mining states, WA and Queensland, routinely give the resources industry over a billion dollars a year in assistance. Their study, that sought to put a dollar figure on the level of state assistance, concluded that over six years the WA government had given $6.2 billion. Their article highlights the way that events that bring the government money, such as profits from privatisation and partnerships deals, are often reported in the media (possibly as a result of media statements being issued), but the cost of supporting the industry are less frequently reported. In their words: 'Often the way budget papers are structured means that the spending that is clearly aimed at benefitting the minerals and fossil fuel industries is not readily identifiable' (Peel et al, 2014, p. 27).

The Pilbara

The Pilbara region hosts big players in the resources industry such as Chevron, BHP Billiton, Woodside, Shell, Apache and Rio Tinto, who promote their corporate social responsibility through a substantial glossy literature cache. These volumes of company reports and brochures cite environmental and social studies conducted by researchers who are in most cases contracted by the companies. While these studies may satisfy approval conditions and dazzle the media, they have little academic credibility. Carrington (2013, p. 3) described them as: 'compromised industry-funded research vital to legitimating the resource sector's self-serving knowledge claims.' She states that the unseen costs of mining are borne mostly at a local level by communities on the frontier of the mining boom:

> These include rising rates of fatigue-related death and injuries, rising levels of alcohol-fueled violence, illegally erected and unregulated work camps, soaring housing costs and other costs of living, and stretched basic infrastructure undermining the sustainability of these towns. But these costs have generally escaped industry, government and academic scrutiny. (Carrington, 2013, p. 295)

According to Brueckner et al (2013, p. 112), successive State governments have invested considerably in the 'exploitation of the State's natural assets since foundation', while spending little on the communities and towns living in the shadows of major operations. Owen and Kemp (2012) argue that corporate claims about fulfillment of social and environmental obligations are a crafted industry response to opposition to the sector itself, arising from a series of environmentally and socially damaging incidents such as the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. Brueckner et al (2013) examined the 'social licence to operate' sought and won by WA's mining industry, in the context of the state's 'developmentalist' agenda. They drew on the findings of a multi-disciplinary body of research and found significant risks and challenges evident in the environmental, social and economic sustainability of the industry. They take issue with the social licence arguing that a State that is ideologically entwined with resource-led economic growth gives political licence to the industry but fails to demand adherence to social and environmental obligations.

Looking specifically at the town of Onslow, Haslam McKenzie (2013) documented some of the adjustment pressures experienced by Onslow town residents triggered by the establishment of the gas hubs and discusses the strategies employed by the state and local government, the mining companies and the community to enhance the quality of life in the town. She found that the community engagement strategies and the collaborative planning processes were undermined by disconnects between commercial imperatives, governance

frameworks, investment risk and timeframes. Chapman et al (2014, p. 79) also examined the rapid resource-led development of Onslow, focusing on the failure of timely policy responses that hindered local adjustment and adaptation. They attributed the delays and dissatisfaction to 'governments' inability to respond quickly to the emerging needs…despite the considerable efforts that have gone into problem identification and anticipation, community engagement, and the provision of company funding'.

Tracking Onslow

Given the contestation about the impacts of extractive industries, in Australia, WA, the Pilbara and specifically in Onslow, the *Tracking Onslow* project was well positioned to extend public debate by 'giving voice' to a range of people from the community. The project also sought information from key corporate and government stakeholders; and presented it in a format lay readers could understand and respond to (further facilitating public debate). *Tracking Onslow* was to some extent alone in doing this, as Onslow has no local newspaper, radio station or resident journalists. The closest thing Onslow has had to a local paper is a glossy publication called *Inside Ashburton* produced by the local government to promote shire activities. Notice boards at the supermarket and formerly at the pub facilitated dissemination of information about local events and services, and the staff of the Onslow tourism office produce a newsletter that is a photocopied compilation of pages submitted by members of the community. Between 2012 and 2015, internet connectivity in Onslow improved dramatically and social media, including Facebook groups, emerged as a vibrant vehicle for communication between members of the Onslow community. The nearest ABC office is in Karratha, three hours' drive away, and Karratha also hosts offices of three regional newspapers. The ABC and the statewide newspapers rely on the staff in those offices to report on events in Onslow, but these reporters rarely have opportunities to visit or time to establish local contacts. While a few events in Onslow received brief coverage in State-wide media over the course of the *Tracking Onslow* Project it was, initially, only in response to corporate and government press releases, rarely balanced by other community voices. Frustration at this one-sided style of reporting prompted the Onslow Chamber of Commerce and Industry to hire a media consultant in late 2014 to get their side of the story into the mainstream media. While this is a form of spin in its own right (promoting the case that local businesses should be offered more of the contract work), it went some way towards increasing the diversity of voices people outside of Onslow could hear through mainstream media. The *Tracking Onslow* project itself also attracted some media coverage, in regional newspapers, and local and national ABC radio broadcasts which enabled the range of perspectives our 'town square' approach had curated to be shared more widely.

The use of journalism as a research methodology to document the changes in Onslow was inspired by the academics who have argued that there is potential for journalism to be more widely used as a research methodology in Australia (Lamble, 2004; Nash, 2013; Bacon, 2006). Nash (2013) suggested that academics formulate a definitive definition of journalism as research, so as to engage with the ontological and epistemological systems in operation. In response to these arguments, the Journalism Education and Research Association of Australia (JERAA) released the Journalism Research Australia National Statement, which includes:

> Journalism as an academic research discipline contributes to the body of scholarly knowledge about the contexts, tools, creation, distribution, consumption, impacts and social relations of journalism via journalism studies and journalism practice … Journalism practice is the process by which information is independently researched, gathered, analysed, synthesised and published, or by which innovative approaches to journalism are developed. The Excellence in Research for Australia framework (ERA) acknowledges in-depth, original journalism practice and publication as equivalent to traditional research outputs. (JERAA, 2015)

Bacon (2006) and Nash (2014) have both proposed that journalism better fits the criteria of academic research if it is accompanied by a reflexive exegesis. Mason (2014) also promotes critical reflexivity as a valid method in which to examine journalism from the inside, and suggests this process can facilitate greater understanding of journalism practice and its place in the societal sphere. Her argument builds on Bacon's (2006) assertion that journalism has a lot to do with the day-to-day exercise of power, and that reflexivity about standard journalism practices, such as consideration of whose voices are being privileged (and why), can improve the quality of the work being created and bring new insights. Andrejevic (2008) expands on this in his discussion of Foucault's power/knowledge discourses and argues that through Foucault, journalism can engage in reflexive critique and negotiate relationships of power as instruments of resistance.

In his 1972-1980 writings on truth, power and knowledge, Foucault examined the regimes of truth that regulate societies and power structures. Rather than focusing on the concentrated power that individuals or institutions wield, he explored the invasive mechanisms that entrench power through 'discourse, knowledge and regimes of truth' (1980, p. 30). He argues that, far from being sets of simple ideological statements, discourses actively develop into systems of power that maintain control in society. Although journalism produces discursive statements that invest power in institutions, it can also be a vehicle for resistance and facilitate discontinuity. Nash (2014, p. 93) contends that 'the fundamental

importance of journalism lies in the introduction of the truth object or fact into contemporaneous socio-political discourse, or alternatively, the production of silence about truth objects and facts'.

Foucault proposes that practices of resistance can modify the rules that formulate discursive statements, which are the building blocks of discourses. He calls the modifications 'discontinuities' and says that while they can adapt the structure of a discourse; these practices do not enable us to extricate ourselves from the system. In his words (1980, p. 141): 'One is never outside power, there are no margins for those who break with the system to gambol in. But this does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable form of domination.' Power systems are often hard to see and separate from the explicit political/legal framework. It exists in the realm of fluid interpersonal dynamics that enable spin, lobbying and old boy's networks that can be hard to pin down in terms of watchdog identification of wrongdoing. Foucault warns that:

> What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge and produces discourse. (Foucault, 1980, p. 119)

The things Chevron produces include glossy brochures, television advertisements and press releases glorifying the project's physical and social achievements. The company also induces pleasure by sponsoring community events such as the Perth International Arts Festival, the Passion of the Pilbara Music and Arts Festival, and the Perth City to Surf fun run. This induction of pleasure and production of things allows Chevron to insert attractive and digestible discursive statements into the field of discourse with the aim of controlling what other stakeholders perceive to be 'truth'. The truth being promoted is a fabric that journalism can pick at by negotiating with other sites of power and giving voice to other players. These practices are modes of resistance.

Foucault (1972) said knowledge can be defined as true or false only within the framework of social systems of truth, which can be changed from the inside. In journalism, knowledge and power are held by those whose social status allows them a voice. Those without a social position or prestige often struggle to have their voices heard in the public sphere. The knowledge they possess is hidden knowledge that Foucault describes as subjugated. In trying to discover and publish 'hidden facts', in order to expose the sequence of actual events, the force journalism often encounters is commonly called 'spin'. Stockwell (2007) described spin as a strategy used by governments (and other powerful entities) in the 'permanent campaign' to retain power. He said it involves attempting to control the news agenda by embellishing some actual events, and hiding others, as part of a bid to construct a favourable meta-narrative. Its entrenchment

in contemporary Australian news production was documented in the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism's 2010 'Spinning the Media' study. The team looked at 2203 stories from 10 newspapers and found that 55 percent of them were driven by some sort of PR (Bacon et al, 2010). In addition to creating news, spin can also hinder its production. Errington and Miragliotta (2011) decry that the watchdog role has become harder to fulfil because of the increasing power of government media units and advisers, who often place themselves between politicians and journalists. Journalist Margot Kingston (2004, cited in Errington & Miragliotta, 2011, p.89) calls media advisers 'information blockers, not information providers', while Helen Ester (2007, p. 123) declared that journalists may struggle to: 'withstand the pressures of modern-day government media management and manipulation.'

There is a perception that this pressure is increasing because the sheer number, as well as the professionalism, of media managers is on the rise. PR is described by practitioner and educator Kim Harrison (2011) as the deliberate, planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain 'mutual understanding' between organisations and publics. He teaches that 'framing' is an important strategy in PR that involves inclusion, exclusion and emphasis. Given that it is openly stated that the PR practitioner's job is to control or limit access to information, this article examines how much it influenced the extent to which journalistic practice could succeed in scrutinising government and corporate behaviour in Onslow.

Background information

Rather than investing in civil infrastructure in the Pilbara, the WA government has in the past opted to negotiate State Agreements with proponents of major resource projects. These State Agreements are made binding by an Act of State Parliament, and generally outline a project's terms and conditions, and investment and operational obligations. However, the Wheatstone project was not underwritten by a State Agreement. Instead it is described and bound by a contract-based State Development Agreement (SDA). This means that the government and corporate partners entered a contractual agreement that is not ratified by an Act of State Parliament. The Ashburton North Strategic Industrial Area (ANSIA) SDA was approved in late 2011 by the State Premier, Colin Barnett, who informed the parliamentary assembly at the time that:

> The State Development Agreement negotiated by the State Government ensures important benefits for Western Australians... The project is expected to create 6500 direct and indirect jobs at peak construction and 300 new operational jobs, and to deliver an estimated $17 billion to Australian businesses and services over the life of the project... (Parliament of Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, September 27, 2011, p. 7765b)

As a condition of the ANSIA SDA signed by Chevron, BHP Billiton and their partners, three major investment funds were established, that are the means through which the resource companies are funding efforts to demonstrate corporate social responsibility. The three funds are called the Wheatstone Social Infrastructure Fund (WSIF); the Wheatstone Critical Infrastructure Fund (WCIF); and the BHP Billiton Macedon Social Infrastructure Fund (MSIF). Together they are valued at around $255 million.

The article brief and process

While several major projects for the town had been mooted, members of the community had voiced concern in previous editions of *Tracking Onslow* about the lack of progress, and questions had arisen about when, and if, the funds would result in positive outcomes for the town. Barndon (2014, p. 6-7) detailed the concerns of Geoff Herbert, president of the Onslow Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) about Chevron's perceived 'broken promise', and the slow rate of progress of projects. In December 2014 Premier Colin Barnett released a project map through the Department of State Development (DSD) with anticipated timelines and cost projections for 24 projects in Onslow, to be funded entirely or in part through the infrastructure funds (Premier's Office, 2014). This document was the starting point for the lead story for edition six, which sought to establish whether the community was benefiting from this funding by following the money trail.

The first steps in the investigative process were retrieval and examination of primary source material that included; the minutes of Shire of Ashburton council meetings from December 2014 to May 2015; minutes of a January 2015 Department of Planning and Development community meeting; State Parliament Hansard extracts dated May 2012 and August 2013; the 2013-14 Shire of Ashburton Annual Report; the 2010 Shire of Ashburton Onslow Townsite Strategy Background Report; the 2013-14 DSD Annual Report; the 2014 Pilbara Development Commission Profile Report; the Onslow Skate Park Draft Consultation Report and Conceptual Plan; and the DSD list of 24 major projects.

The government agencies on the list of 24 projects were then contacted and cost breakdowns and progress reports were requested. The offices of the Premier, the Opposition Leader and the State Development Shadow Minister, were asked for comment on the progress of the projects in Onslow. Most responses went no further than reiterating the information contained in the documents we had already read. Two questions were sent by phone and email to the office of the Premier asking for clarification of the State and Chevron funding arrangements, and access to the ANSIA SDA was requested. When these requests were denied, Greens MLC Robin Chapple was asked for assistance locating the ANSIA SDA. After trying to access it, his staff responded that the Parliamentary Library was

unable to provide the document, even to members of Parliament, because it was classified as 'commercial-in-confidence'. Three additional questions were sent to the DSD requesting clarification of Chevron and State funding and for comment on community dissatisfaction with the timing of the projects. Chevron PR liaison officer Kathryn Ackroyd, was sent a request for a more complete breakdown of Chevron's financial commitment in Onslow, as she had previously explained all media inquiries 'must' be channelled through her and vetted by the company's corporate hierarchy in the US. Again this process yielded very little new information.

The office of Nationals MLC Vince Catania was contacted with a request for a breakdown of Onslow Royalties for Regions grants (a form of State government funding for regional development). His office sent the information requested. On-the-record interviews were then conducted with the Shire of Ashburton CEO Neil Hartley, the Shire President Kerry White, the OCCI President Geoff Herbert, BHP Billiton representative Bindi Gove and a number of local community members.

Once the material had been compiled it was fact checked via phone calls with Ackroyd from Chevron and a DSD PR officer. This final check sought to clarify whether sums of money mentioned by some sources and in some documents were included in the totals they had given, or additional to those totals. One of the major sources of confusion was that some financial allocations had been reported several times, so we needed to check if this was repetition or additional allocations.

While the PR staff were friendly, and happy to work with us on fact checking, they did not give any additional information. They were also meticulously clear about which of their comments were 'on' and 'off the record', to the extent of 'insisting' that their names were off the record, and they could only be referred to as spokespeople. For example one email included this line: 'Please understand we have a stringent approvals process here, so all my verbal and email guidance over the last 24 hours to you and Karma has been background confirmation of basic facts. Happy for you to say DSD would not provide a full list of projects and leave it at that' (Personal Communication, DSD spokesperson, 11 July 2015). One of the questions we asked Chevron had to do with the company's long running battle with the Australian Taxation Office in relation to the Gorgon gas project, which is separate from Wheatstone but also in WA's northwest. We deemed the question relevant in the light of Chevron's claim that it was practising corporate social responsibility. Chevron's response was not only deliberately bland, in order to detract from the newsworthiness of the story, but also the PR professional also tried to dissuade us from covering the issue, writing: 'Please find responses to your questions below, all attributable to a company spokesperson. Regarding the ATO case, I do want to make the point

the case refers to the period 2004-2008. Prior to the final investment decision on the Wheatstone Project. I would question the relevance of this case to *Tracking Onslow*' (Personal communication, Kathryn Ackroyd/Chevron Spokesperson, 3 July 2015). We published these responses from Chevron in a Q&A format on page nine of *Tracking Onslow*, edition six, so readers could see the 'blandness' strategy first hand.

When it came to writing the edition six lead story the 'follow the money trail' theme was incorporated as a narrative device as it enabled sequential revelation of the details we were able to find and incorporation of the roadblocks we encountered into the text. The headline: Show us the $250 million; echoes the line 'Show me the money' shouted at full volume in the movie *Jerry Maguire* (Crowe, 1996). It was hoped that this device would convey a sense of urgency and frustration about the financial secrecy. It should also be noted that, as with most journalism, there were time and space limitations as the article was only allocated five magazine pages and needed to be produced between early June and mid-July, 2015.

We also used extensive quotes from the interview with OCCI president Geoff Herbert, as in articles in previous editions he had been a very vocal critic of Chevron. For example in edition three he was quoted as saying:

> Some of these companies are so used to operating in third world countries, like Chevron in Africa, that they have difficulty relating to people and communities. Chevron cannot just ride roughshod over us here and try to appease us with the odd hospital or school like they do overseas. … People forget that Chevron is a big company with lots of shareholders, and those shareholders want to make money. ...They do not do anything benevolently, … they only do what they have to. (Barndon, 2013, p. 5).

His comments in the final edition interview represented a turnaround from his earlier position and were included at length as they illustrated the shift in his position over time. The numbers we were able to access were presented in a table, that also clearly illustrated the gaps in the information available.

Discussion

The outcome of the journalistic process is an article that explains where some of the money has been spent and allocated, and that challenges corporate and government silence on the remainder. It offers a narrative that differs from the corporate/government story of mutually beneficial development that is showering prosperity on everyone and imposing no costs on the community. Key elements of the story that achieve this are the focus on the secrecy of the ANSIA SDA and the expression of scepticism about the genuineness of the promise to actually spend $250 million or more on Onslow in the foreseeable future. In doing

this, it provides a counterpoint for other media that may be seeking to present a balanced or sceptical analysis but perceiving a need for a source of doubt. Perhaps evidencing the power of PR to control the narrative, there has been little media follow-up along these lines. Our unsuccessful quest to fully articulate the spending plan for the $250 million has, however, exposed a lack of scrutiny of the figure by journalists at the ABC (New $41.8m hospital, 2014), Seven West Media (Govt announces Onslow upgrades, 2014), and other outlets. No media except *Tracking Onslow* has questioned the plausibility of the promised spend, or published questions about the protracted delays or the chance that the money may not be forthcoming in the foreseeable future.

The question this project set out to answer is: Can journalism fulfill the watchdog, town square and first draft of history functions amid the spin and power struggles contesting the narrative about Onslow? The answer appears to be yes; the following paragraphs detail why and how in doing so it has functioned as a practice of resistance in a Foucauldian sense.

The watchdog function enshrines the notion: 'that the media will stand on guard over democracy, closely watching and evaluating the political decision makers' (Errington & Miragliotta, 2011, p. 8). By monitoring, questioning and documenting the responses of the political and economic decision makers on community (Herbert), local (Hartley/White), corporate (Ackroyd/Gove) and state (Premier/DSD) levels, the journalism fulfilled this function. Although some of the responses reported were refusals or contained no new information, reporting of this obfuscation is congruent with the exposition of political behaviour.

According to Errington and Miragliotta, (2011, p. 9), the town square function enables public dialogue in: 'a marketplace of ideas in which opinions can be debated, contested and ultimately shared.' While the lead story for edition six only featured the voices of people in positions of power, elsewhere in *Tracking Onslow* voices of community members were liberally used. Each magazine also included a six to eight page section devoted to recording the views of people we met in Onslow (in shops, on walks through town and while pursuing other stories). Efforts were made to include people with a wide range of demographic characteristics. A potential problem with this approach was verification of their truth claims. We were consequently careful to label this section *'In Your Words'*, to use quotation style carefully and we ran the following disclaimer:

> We know that not everyone in Onslow agrees with each other, but we seek to allow everyone a space to speak through our pages. Sometimes opinions are based on misunderstood facts and so some of the things people say may not be true.
>
> We can't vouch for the truth of what people we spoke to said, but we have faithfully recorded it so that this edition is a true record of what was being said in and about Onslow in mid-late 2014. (Davies, 2014b, p. 1)

When de Burgh (2000, p. 3) refers to journalism as: 'the first rough draft of history', it is in reference to the similarities between the tasks of the journalist and the historian. While details about the changes in Onslow exist in the primary source documents and academic reports we accessed, *Tracking Onslow* is an illustrated, curated collection that brings together the key points and documents the community responses to those points. Had this work not been done, the voices of people who are not in positions of power would be inaccessible to future historians. To ensure that the collection is accessible it has been lodged in the national, state and university libraries.

In a Foucauldian sense, this process has introduced knowledge into the discursive field, and that is an act of resistance. When Foucault talks of resistance to power, he declares that who controls knowledge controls power. By influencing knowledge, power has been modified and the watchdog role has been fulfilled. As the watchdog brings in other voices to question the 'truth' provided by the powerful players, it plays the town square role, and in doing so creates a first draft of history. Therefore contemporary Australian journalism (as described by Lamble, 2004) can fulfill the functions of journalism described by Errington and Miragliotta (2011) in a resource town amid corporate and government power struggles and bids to control the narrative. And, subsequently, projects like *Tracking Onslow* can fill functional gaps in contemporary Australian journalism practice and process.

The article (on pages 3-7) is here:
http://issuu.com/ecujournalismperth/docs/onslow_mid_2015_for_issuu/1
(It includes a full page table not included in this version.)

Tracking Onslow
Journalism

Dust Storm | Lightening over powerlines | People Sunset

ECU's Tracking Onslow Project is progressing well, providing insight into the impact major resource projects have on their host communities.

In addition to being the subject of a 2013 Vice-Chancellor's Award for community engagement, it has received media coverage in the Pilbara News, and on ABC Northwest Radio and Radio National.

Part 2: The article

Show us the $250 million

The people in Onslow are tired of promises. Big dollar figures have been bandied about since news of the gas hubs first came to town. The figure $250 million is commonly quoted as the amount being spent in the community in connection with Chevron's Wheatstone LNG project and so we tried to track it down. Where is the money, what is it being spent on and when?

WHILE the $250 million figure appears in Chevron, State government and Shire documents, pinning down what it is being spent on is not an easy task. Most often the answer referred to a list of 24 projects that are in varying stages of development.

Asked for a list of figures that add up to $250 million, the Department of State Development (DSD) refused, explaining that not all listed projects have a public cost figure yet. We understand that price projections for future projects can be difficult, but we wondered where the total came from (if the figures that add up to it are unknown) and what will happen to the remainder if some projects are cancelled or completed under budget.

The $250 million is the sum of a list of numbers contained in a document called the 'State Development Agreement' which is not publicly available as it is 'commercial in confidence' (and not even members of parliament can access it).

The DSD, however, stressed that the $250 million is all coming from Chevron and that there is an additional $70 million in State government spending earmarked for Onslow.

The list of 24 projects, published in December 2014, outlines delivery timelines for many of the Onslow projects. Announcing it, Premier and State Development Minister Colin Barnett pledged that most of the projects would be completed over the next three to four years, saying: 'Almost a dozen State agencies are involved in delivering these projects to ensure that the Onslow community directly benefits from major nearby projects like Wheatstone and [BHP Billiton's] Macedon.'

The State government, Shire of Ashburton, Chevron Australia and BHP Billiton are funding the 24 projects. The Shire is responsible for delivery of 11 of them, and the State government for 13. The BHP Billiton contribution is $5 million for the skate park and basketball stadium.

Having watched the progress of the spending, some delays are evident. The swimming pool is listed on the December document as due for completion in late 2016. But according to Ashburton CEO Neil Hartley, it is now scheduled for construction between early-2016 and mid-2017. The basketball stadium and skate park have also moved forward from early-2015/mid-2015 to late-2015/mid-2016.

Bindi Gove from BHP Billiton said the company had been ready to spend the $5 million it has committed to that project for some time, and that the delays were to do with Shire processes. Ashburton Shire president Kerry White said perceptions that the pledged projects were behind schedule were unwarranted, as significant behind the scenes work had been done to scope, plan and cost them and other external factors had affected the delivery timeline for projects.

According to Mrs White, the projects are a high priority for the Onslow community, and the Shire is investing significant resources to see them delivered. A spokesperson for the Department of State Development (DSD) said that the Shire of Ashburton and a number of State government agencies were 'working diligently to deliver more than 20 community and critical infrastructure projects for Onslow'. The department is coordinating many of these projects. She added that five projects were completed between 2012 and 2014, and that two projects were completed this year.

The big ticket item Chevron is spending on is a power and desalination facility for which public costing is yet to be released, although according to the DSD 2013-14

annual report 'engineering design and approvals for these projects are progressing and construction of the first stage (water storage tanks) is now underway'.

The report said that in addition to this project Chevron was contributing a 'further $121 million' for infrastructure projects. The spokesperson added that Chevron is contributing a further $66 million, which along with $10 million from Royalties for Regions funding, has been allocated for the community projects being developed by the Shire.

This $66 million is in addition to the previous $121 million. We calculate that if Chevron's spend is around $250 million, and $66 million is for community projects and $121 million is for infrastructure projects, the power/desal plant seems to be costing at least $63 million, although the DSD would not confirm this figure. Chevron's media releases have confirmed the company is funding both projects [power and desal] and that they will take Chevron's total contribution to more than $250 million.

In terms of the State government spend, there is the $10 million of Royalties for Regions funding towards the Shire-run projects, as well as $10 million for the Cane River Bore-field Upgrade and $19.8 million for the hospital also from Royalties for Regions; and the State Government pitched in $13 million toward the airport, bringing the visible government total to around $53 million. The DSD spokesperson said that "circa $70 million from the State government" was being spent, so there is $17 million of yet-to-be-made-public State government funding presumably involved in the 24 projects.

While the $250 million+ from Chevron is clearly Wheatstone related, working out whether the Government's $70 million is specifically being given to Onslow because of Wheatstone, as some kind of compensation, is more complicated. This is because it is not clear whether the money was heading to Onslow anyway.

For example, commenting in December 2014 on the $19.8 million State government investment in the $41.8 million new Onslow hospital, Regional Development Minister Terry Redman said the hospital upgrade was part of the $161 million Royalties for Regions North West Health Initiative that is working to cater for expanding populations in the north of the State. He added that improvements to service delivery and health infrastructure aim to enable more patients to be treated regionally, creating community satisfaction and building sustainability in the region.

Onslow Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) president Geoff Herbert believes the Shire is mainly responsible for the slow rate of progress. 'The problem with the Shire is that they have no external project management team,' he complained.

'They handle these projects themselves and struggle to deliver things because they are inefficient. They don't have enough staff to deal with all the demands. Local government has so many levels of compliance to get through, it is slow.'

Despite that concern, Mr Herbert expressed optimism about the direction the town is going in, and said the only pitfalls are that the local council is becoming 'more of a basket case', and the expansion of the Light Industrial Area (LIA) is

still needed. Once a fierce critic of Chevron's lack of commitment to the Onslow community, Mr Herbert said that recently Chevron's community liaison team has made real efforts to bridge the gap between the corporate and community reality of Chevron's business. He thought this may be due in part to OCCI's decision last year to hire a media consultant to apply pressure to Chevron and the State government in the wake of the events of mid-2014.

He said: 'They've got a big company out there, and now you can see what they are actually building, they're not here to solve all our social problems they are here to build that plant and process gas.'

He explained that most of the anger directed at Chevron after it received approval from the Premier to build its worker accommodation near the plant rather than in town, had died down, and that Chevron was now seen to be more on board with the community.

He said this was due to better consultation with local businesses. Now when a contract needs to be filled Chevron flies their three preferred tenderers to Onslow and 'we have a big event down at the Business Hub, and all our businesses get to come with their capability statements and meet them and hit them up and tell them who they are.' He said: 'We're not asking for free kicks, we are just asking for access to those connections early on, to have a level playing field.'

He continued: 'What would happen before is the contractors would do all their pricing and hiring in Perth, then rock up here and see we have businesses like signwriting and building and plumbing here already, and they could have saved a fortune if they had known.'

According to Mr Herbert, the West Pilbara Business Support Program that Chevron sponsors is so busy it just employed two new people to help local businesses build their capabilities. Membership of that programme is now up to 116.

He said Chevron also sponsors the Industry Capability Network (ICN), which flew in an expert for a week to meet local businesses and prepare their profiles for listing on the ICN Onslow On-line Business Directory. The profiles were also distributed to the first-tier contractors on-site at Wheatstone.

Mr Herbert also praised the State government. 'The DSD has also come to the table for the first time ever and are working with us by sending tenders to us and referencing the Onslow ICN. So for that $250 million, from both levels, Onslow businesses are finally getting a fair go at it. The only one that lets us down is local government.'

A spokesperson for Chevron told *Tracking Onslow* the company has a clear interest in ensuring Onslow remains a vibrant and sustainable regional community, based on the company's long-standing philosophy that fosters local partnerships to ensure delivery of sustainable outcomes. Chevron has established an office in town, at 16 Second Ave, staffed by members of the community engagement team who work to update the community on the project and answer their questions and concerns.

Chevron said: 'We continue to work with our contractors and local community and business stakeholders to ensure the Wheatstone workforce makes a positive contribution to Onslow, including through participation in volunteering,

recreational activities and patronage of local businesses. With our Wheatstone Project joint venture participants, we have committed more than $250 million to social and critical infrastructure projects in Onslow.'

Chevron now offers bus tours of the construction site, which provides an opportunity for people to see the Wheatstone Project for themselves. The tour is certainly an eye opener, and the massive reach and scope of construction is overwhelming yet impressive.

Mr Herbert believes that in a business sense, where once the whole Wheatstone project appeared to be a massive failure for the town, it is now looking to be a massive success. Through the OCCI he is preparing a 'lessons learnt' business investment document to inform the rest of Australia how business can operate smoothly with industry, in a circumstance like this. He believes it is important to show that there is a success story among the negative press stifling the North-West and other mining regions in Australia.

'We are one of the very few towns that has a very bright future for the next ten years, and that needs to be talked up to inspire confidence, both for business and investment. There's so much news about the end of the mining boom, but this region still needs investors to invest.'

Whether or not the Chevron and government spend ends up equalling $320 million (which is $70 million + $250 million) will take some time to assess, as many of the projects have open-ended dates and are dependent on future population growth and demand. Estimating the current population of Onslow to be about 1000, the $250m represents a spend of about $250,000 per resident. While it will be good if it happens, we wonder whether Chevron might have more easily won social licence to operate by simply writing them cheques.

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The Rainbow Warrior, secrecy and state terrorism
A Pacific journalism case study

Abstract: France detonated 193 of a total of 210 nuclear tests in the South Pacific, at Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls, before halting them in 1996 in the face of Pacific-wide protests. On 10 July 1985, French secret agents bombed the Greenpeace flagship *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbour, killing photographer Fernando Pereira, in a futile bid to stop a protest flotilla going to Moruroa. The author was on board the *Rainbow Warrior* for more than 10 weeks of her last voyage. He was awarded the 1985 New Zealand Media Peace Prize for reportage and investigations into the 'Rainbow Warrior and Rongelap Evacuation'. The following year, the author's book *Eyes of Fire* told the inside story of state terrorism in the Pacific. He has subsequently reflected on a 20-year legal struggle by Television New Zealand and other media campaigners to prevent the French spies gagging reportage of their guilty plea from a public video record and the lingering secrecy about the health legacy of nuclear tests in the Pacific. In the context of the *Frontline* project for journalism as research, his work inspired a microsite—a community-driven collaborative project in 2015 coordinated by the publishers, Little Island Press, interrogating participants over a three-decade period and 'challenging the nature of mainstream media in New Zealand' with an alternative reader's media model.

Keywords: bearing witness, conflict reporting, environmental journalism, exegesis, investigative journalism, journalism as research, journalism history, journalism research, scholarship, state terrorism

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Introduction

THE YEAR 2015 seemed to be a remarkable one of memories and reflection for freedom of speech and bearing witness struggles in the Pacific region. The townsfolk and children of the remote Timor-Leste border town of Balibó marked the 40th anniversary of the murder of five young Australian-based television newsmen dubbed forever as the Balibó Five.

On 16 October 1975, the five journalists—Greg Shackleton, Gary Cunningham (New Zealand), Tony Stewart, Malcolm Rennie and Brian Peters (both British) from channels Seven and Nine—were reporting on Indonesian special forces incursions into independent Timorese territory. They were brutally killed with impunity.

Weeks later, a sixth journalist from Australia, Roger East, who ventured to Timor-Leste to investigate the murders and set up an independent Timorese news agency, was himself executed by the invading Indonesian forces on 8 December 1975. Their fate has been told in the compelling 2009 Robert Connolly film *Balibó*. But the impunity lingers on, not only for the journalist atrocities but for more than 150,000 Timorese victims of the 24 years of Indonesian occupation.

In July 2015, President Joko Widodo of Indonesia appeared to have turned a new leaf on media relations over the two Melanesian provinces that collectively make up the West Papua region by declaring an 'open door' visa policy for foreign journalists. This is far from the reality. Māori Television sent a crew (Adrian Stevanon and Karen Abplanalp) there in August—the first New Zealand TV journalists to visit West Papua in more than 50 years—to bear witness. But their stories, such as a New Zealand aid-assisted thriving kumara (sweet potato) industry in the Baliem Valley, were hardly a testimony to media freedom (Stevanon, 2015). Radio New Zealand International also sent a crew, Johnny Blades and Koroi Hawkins, two months later in October (Blades, 2015).

For me, as a journalist and media educator who has worked in the Asia-Pacific region for almost four decades, the media freedom and bearing witness issue that has outweighed all others is the bombing of the original Greenpeace global environmental flagship *Rainbow Warrior* by French secret agents on 10 July 1985 and the killing of Portuguese-born Dutch photojournalist Fernando Pereira. The thirtieth anniversary of the sabotage, New Zealand's first and only example of state terrorism, came and went in a rather muted fashion (compared with events marking 20 years, for example).

Skipper Peter Willcox, the American who captained the *Rainbow Warrior* when she was bombed in Auckland Harbour, came to New Zealand a week before the 30th anniversary but left almost immediately—on a new Greenpeace assignment in charge of the ship's namesake *Rainbow Warrior III*, an impressive 'super green' vessel, bound to tackle the tuna fishing outrages in the Pacific.

A cohort of the original crew on the bombed ship live on Waiheke Island in Auckland's Hauraki Gulf today while others live in different parts of the world, such as Amsterdam and Dublin.

But for all of us, including me as an independent journalist on board the ship for the final humanitarian voyage to Rongelap in the Marshall Islands to evacuate people irradiated by US nuclear testing, the bombing and the justice and truth-seeking in memory of Fernando have been critical influences in our lives.

Figure 1: The *Eyes of Fire* microsite cover image of Rongelap and navigation.

For July 2015, the Pacific and community publishing specialist Little Island Press developed a three-month microsite project as a public good designed to recreate the history of the *Rainbow Warrior* and Rongelap as an inspiration to future generations through story-telling, community engagement, including most of the original protagonists on the bombed ship, contemporary environmental themes and an inquiry into the legacy of activism. It was a remarkable project and this article interrogates the academic and journalism terrain in an exegesis alongside a new edition of the book and an article by me published on the microsite, 'Rainbow Warrior redux—French terrorism in the Pacific' (Robie, 2015a & b).

Part 1: The exegesis

At the core of this exegesis lies the notion of 'bearing witness' and academic arguments around journalism methodology as research. According to a *Collins English Dictionary* definition, to bear witness is to: '1. give written or oral testimony, or 2. be evidence or proof of', while synonyms include, 'bear out, testify to, be evidence of, attest to, be proof of, or give evidence, testify or give testimony'. In an environmental journalism context, bearing witness draws from the Quaker spiritual tradition that was inspirational in the establishment of Greenpeace. The idea was to 'become living testimonies' for or against something that activists themselves 'had experienced firsthand':

> Bearing witness is defined as the obligation to take action according to
> our conscience: If something is wrong, we stop it. If we can't stop it, we
> expose it. If we can show alternatives, and offer solutions, even better.
> (Wyler, 2008).

According to Greenpeace activist and historian Rex Wyler, using the media to 'tell the earth's story' has been a hallmark of the environmental movement since the beginning. 'However, we now face increasingly consolidated media ownership. The corporate owners have learned how to package their agenda as news, ignore the environment and bury human rights' (Ibid.). Many books and films have explored the bearing witness philosophy as testimony to integrity and truth adopted by journalists, for example, Marijana Wotton's 2005 documentary *Bearing Witness* about women reporting conflict, and David Dadge's book *Silenced* published in the same year.

Unlike in Australia (see Bacon, 2006, 2012; Davies, 2014; Mason, 2014; and Nash, 2013, 2014, 2016); and several other countries, there has been limited contemporary debate about journalism as research in New Zealand. I wrote about the New Zealand academic environment for journalism as research in *Asia Pacific Media Educator* in 2015: 'Clearly there is a legitimate case for practice-led research in journalism studies to be given greater recognition within the PBRF [Performance-based Research Fund] context in New Zealand' (Robie, 2015c). But I also argued that New Zealand media academics needed to do more work in articulating and clarifying the boundaries for a rubic on 'journalism as research'. This process has perhaps more recently been facilitated with the Journalism Education and Research Association of Australia definition of research as revised in 2015 (JERAA, n.d.). The national statement introduces journalism as an academic research discipline 'contributing to the body of scholarly knowledge about the contexts, tools, creation, distribution, consumption, impacts and social relations of journalism via journalism studies and journalism practice'. Specifically, about journalism practice, the statement includes:

> Journalism practice is the process by which information is independently researched, gathered, analysed, synthesised and published, or by which innovative approaches to journalism are developed. (Ibid.)

The statement also notes that the Excellence in Research for Australia framework (ERA) 'acknowledges in-depth, original journalism practice and publication as equivalent to traditional research outputs'. This was a logical step following *Frontline* editor Wendy Bacon's 2012 commentary addressing the interface between professional, or practice-based journalism and scholarly journalism practices (p. 153). She mirrored the rise of similar debates in other countries, noting Sarah Niblock's argument, for example, that the rise of the journalism academic 'who was often an experienced practitioner, was breaking down the "once barricaded boundary lines between journalism practices and journalism theory"'.

She described a breed of new academics who were keen to conduct research but who argued that while textual analysis could reveal significant conclusions

about editorial decisions, a study of journalism that excluded the experiences of those within the industry left 'many important and practical questions unanswered'. (Bacon, 2012, p. 154, citing Niblock, 2007, p. 21)

In a recent article in *Asia Pacific Media Educator*, analysing my work in *Don't Spoil My Beautiful Face* and *Eyes of Fire*, David Blackall wrote of my commitment to research and 'a journalism education that delivers peace and political independence in the Pacific region, freeing it of what he calls "colonial legacy conflicts"' (2015, p. 333). As an example, he referred to a deadly accident on Moruroa Atoll in 1979 which led to my cover story in the 16 February 1980 edition of *NZ Listener* (Robie, 1980):

> These sorts of accidents, and the resultant pollution, are often absent from corporate news because the corporations responsible strive to keep them secret. Since the time of nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific, Robie has written about these tragedies and the ensuing deception by the US and French militaries. He has reported these events extensively, almost single-handedly, while immersed in the story. (p. 334)

A special edition of *Asia Pacific Media Educator* themed around 'Can journalism be counted as academic research output?' concluded in an editorial that 'varying interpretations of "research" and "scholarship" by journalists-turned-educators and media academics who had never worked in the news industry have constructed what seems to be an unsurmountable obstacle' (Loo, 2015). But the themed edition included 14 contributed articles, most arguing for journalism as research. Editor Eric Loo also noted that the University of the Philippines was among institutions that offered vocational-oriented undergraduate and postgraduate journalism programmes, 'which recognise journalism as non-traditional research outputs' (p. 1).

In a forthcoming book, *What is Journalism? The Art and Politics of a Rupture*, Monash journalism professor (and former documentary maker) Chris Nash outlines challenging ideas about time and journalism and the relationship with history. He argues that journalists 'work both within and across temporal boundaries in the daily practice of their profession and lives' and in a Bourdieu-sian field context (Nash, 2016).

> Journalists have to anticipate the relevance and likelihood of future events, their characteristics and their meaning in order to be on location at the correct time and to ask the right questions, e.g. for a press conference or interview. Anticipation depends on the continuation and predictability of process to generate future outcomes. Predictability depends upon the interpretation of past events and processes. (Ibid.)

Nash adds that the 'same temporal process of referencing the past to predict the future' also applies to assessing the value and meaning of events and processes. Nash's book, which offers searching case studies of the work of 'real time systems' artist Hans Haacke and independent journalist I. F. 'Izzy' Stone and his iconic *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, strikes a chord with my three decades of work related to the *Rainbow Warrior*. This particularly relates to experience of institutional pressures leading to certain forms of knowledge being sidelined and silenced.

Background

The sabotage of the *Rainbow Warrior* happened during the height of New Zealand's strong anti-nuclear stance and while many of its citizens were hostile to French nuclear testing in the Pacific and promoting the notion of an 'independent Kanaky' in New Caledonia (Fraser, 1990; Robie, 1989, 2014; Ross, 1993, 2016). French authorities had become increasingly defensive over its nuclear testing and the *force de frappe*. In 1973, New Zealand dispatched a protest frigate to the Moruroa test zone. Australia and New Zealand also filed proceedings against France in the International Court of Justice the following year. Although New Zealand won a judgment, France had announced it was halting atmospheric tests.

France detonated 193 out of a global total of 210 nuclear tests in the South Pacific, at Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls, before halting them in 1995 in the face of Pacific-wide protests. (The other 17 were at Reggane and Ekker in Algeria). Opposition in New Zealand to nuclear weapons and testing grew sharply. By 1976, 333,000 had signed the Campaign Half Million and by 1984 more than 66 percent of New Zealanders lived in Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (Dewes, 2015). However, nuclear-free policies were also gaining ground across the Pacific with Belau/Palau adopting a nuclear-free constitution in 1979, followed by newly independent Vanuatu (1982) and the Solomon Islands (1983). Even in French Polynesia, the capital Pape'ete's airport suburb of Fa'aa had declared itself nuclear-free. (New Zealand followed with its own *Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987*.)

On 10 July 1985, French secret agents of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) bombed the Greenpeace flagship *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbour, killing photographer Fernando Pereira, in an attempt to prevent a protest flotilla led by the *Warrior* going to Moruroa. Campaign coordinator Steve Sawyer described the consequences and drama that unfolded as:

> [Having] all the elements of a best-selling spy thriller, replete with high-level diplomatic meetings, political scandal, nuclear intrigue, government cover-up, military strategy, submarines on secret missions, trade sanctions, and a pair of saboteurs masquerading as honeymooners. (Sawyer, 1986, p. 1325)

The sabotage of the environmental ship was 'one of the most serious international incidents suffered by New Zealand in peacetime', reflected Sir Geoffrey Palmer, then Deputy Prime Minister and Attorney-General, in a Victoria University of Wellington seminar in May 2015 marking the thirtieth anniversary of the bombing.

> These actions constituted an unlawful violation of New Zealand sovereignty as international law and constituted serious offences under the *Crimes Act 1961*. A [Portuguese-born] Dutch national was killed as a result of the action. The news broke in a dramatic fashion and inflamed New Zealand public opinion. It strained relationships between France and New Zealand to breaking point. Wars have begun over less. (Palmer, 2015, p. 1)

This was the context in which I wrote *Eyes of Fire* and three years later a sequel, *Blood on their Banner* about nationalist struggles in the region, which featured the first military coup in Fiji; the start of the decade-long Bougainville war and many assassinations of political leaders across the Pacific.

There is also a subtext to this work: secrecy. There is a myth in New Zealand that somehow local media broke the story of French secret service involvement with the greenlight from the highest government levels. In fact, it was dogged investigation by a police reporter on *Le Monde* which revealed the existence of a 'third team' in the sabotage scenario, the actual bombers, and laid the evidence to the front door of the Élysée Palace in a front page scoop for his newspaper. The background to journalist Edwy Plenel's revelations was published in his book *La Troisième Équipe—Souvenirs de l'Affaire Greenpeace*, published in 2015 to mark the thirtieth anniversary. Today, Plenel is the founding publisher of one of France's leading investigative journalism websites, Mediapart https://www.mediapart.fr/ . Plenel also unmasked the real identities of the two agents who had planted the bombs, Colonel Jean-Luc Kister and Jean Camas, during his 2015 investigation.

It took two decades of legal battles for courtroom videotapes showing the guilty pleas of the two spies arrested in 1985 (Captain Dominique Prieur and Major Alain Mafart), who agreed to the lesser charges of manslaughter and arson, after originally being charged with murder, to be screened for the public. (They delivered the bombs to the actual bombers.) The story of the struggle to broadcast this historic footage and how a remarkable triumph in the public right to know was achieved and balanced against privacy rules has been another of my topics in reporting on this issue (see Robie, 2007, 2014).

Microsite brief and discussion

In early May 2015, while embarking on a revised text and additional research material to examine a decade from the previous edition of *Eyes of Fire*, the

publisher Tony Murrow, indicated he wanted to produce more than a contemporary book examining the past from the point of view of the present. He was determined to publish a microsite dedicated to the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing and the Rongelap evacuation that would bring the history 'alive' for a younger generation of New Zealanders as a public good, with Little Island Press, a Pacific-focused community publisher, collaborating with three Auckland University School of Communication Studies departments and Greenpeace New Zealand. As well as material from the book itself, it would include additional articles and photographs not previously published, contributions from other participants along with multimedia interviews and 'oral histories'. Some of the contributors included Remi Parmentier, a founder of Greenpeace France; Pierre Gleizes, author of *Rainbow Warrior, Mon Amour*; and the ship's second mate Bene Hoffman, who dusted off his on-board diary about the evacuation of Rongelap and published this for the first time. As Murrow recalls: 'The project goal was to present a more rounded view of the sinking of the *Rainbow Warrior* … This event has been presented as a seminal moment in New Zealand history, giving this small nation an international profile and sense of identity it did not previously possess' (Murrow, 2015).

The result was a rich resource of oral histories of the activists and those involved at the time providing fresh perspectives on developments since the bombing in the context of wider Pacific politics and global environmentalism, including interviews with the skipper Peter Willcox, who has also penned his own book (2016); first mate Martin Gotje; third engineer Henk Haazen; deckhand Bunny McDiarmid (now co-executive director of Greenpeace International); relief cook Margaret Mills, and early Greenpeace stalwarts Hilari Anderson and Suzie Newborn, and myself. Current affairs and reflective video stories focused on the legacy of the *Rainbow Warrior* affair and activism in New Zealand, current environmental campaigns, contemporary youth responses, and profiles of independent photographers Gil Hanly and John Miller who captured the saga on film. As one young Samoan neophyte journalist, Mabel Muller, reflected on her assignment:

> I think it's awesome. Further on in the future I'll be able to look back and think, 'My gosh. I was part of that thirtieth anniversary.' Imagine the fiftieth and looking back—they had a thirtieth and I was part of it. It was a really good opportunity for us to grow as future journalists. (Interviewed by Kata, 2015)

Most mainstream media have been rather simplistic or self-serving in the way they have reflected on the 'seminal moment', such as the *New Zealand Herald's* 'miserly bean-counter demanding a receipt' online special feature which focused mainly on the success of the newspaper's reporting at the time (2015). There

was a 'complex back-story' to the events that led up the bombing, which most media ignored. For example, the *Herald* never mentioned Rongelap Atoll or the United States nuclear testing programme in the Pacific in its thirtieth anniversary publications—the very reason why the *Rainbow Warrior* was on the first half of her Pacific voyage. Only the French were cast as villains. Murrow argues that the *Eyes of Fire* microsite project was 'intended to provide that depth'.

The microsite project ran as a campaign from May until the thirtieth anniversary of the bombing in Auckland's Waitemata Harbour on 10 July 2015. More than 60 people were directly involved—two-thirds of them young AUT journalism and television students.

> For the students involved, the project was an opportunity to not only discover the back-story, but also to meet some of these people who were on the ground throughout the last voyage. Over half the original crew of the *Rainbow Warrior* were interviewed by students, including the skipper [Peter Willcox] and the campaign manager [Steve Sawyer]. Students also investigated activism today in order to see what, if any, difference there was between the world of the crew members and contemporary activists and their movements. They also ran stories on current issues in the region, showing how, although there are no longer nuclear tests in the Pacific, that part of the world still suffers environmentally and socially. (Murrow, 2015, p. 1)

For both LIP and the three AUT School of Communication Studies sections concerned, the project was 'ambitious but extremely worthwhile'. Murrow recalls: 'We witnessed the skill and enthusiasm of these young students as they interacted with seasoned activists more than twice their age, and saw an unexpected transference of knowledge and of hope that provided the interviews with great energy and purpose' (Murrow, 2015, p. 2).

> Behind the politics of the bombing, these students were told of the evacuation of Rongelap atoll by the *Rainbow Warrior* and her crew—fourteen days to shift a community of 350 from their radiation-polluted paradise to Mejato, 120 kilometres away. They learnt how these fourteen days had a lasting impression on the crew, motivating almost all of them to continue their activism.
>   This project was not another 'Snowfall'. It was a real and deeply engaging community-driven collaboration that in many ways challenged the nature of mainstream media in New Zealand. The values that the project offered were hope, engagement, integrity, courage and enthusiasm. These students and their lecturers showed they had that and more. (Ibid.)

Features of the innovative collaboration involved:
1. A series of mini journalism reports by the Television Journalism students

(led by lecturer Danni Mulrennan) including a final news bulletin incorporating all twelve news stories.

2. A series of five studio-based in-depth interviews by the Television and Screen production students (led by Gilly Tyler) of key players at the time of the bombing.

3. A series of six in-depth reports by a student of the school's Pacific Media Centre, including international interviews via Skype.

4. An anchor article for the microsite, entitled '*Rainbow Warrior* redux: French terrorism in the Pacific', researched and written by David Robie.

The television journalism students won the annual 2015 Ossie Award for Best Innovative Journalism for what the judge, media writer Myriam Robin of *Crikey*, said was a 'multimedia-rich' website. She added in her citation:

> The *Eyes of Fire* project used the online medium well, through a clear easy-to-navigate and multimedia-rich website, but also contained significant amounts of more traditional print and video reporting, which was tightly edited and interesting. The two were combined well to both entertain and impart information. Looking through it was an education [on] the Rainbow Warrior and its significance. (Ossie winners, 2015)

A postgraduate PMC student, Alistar Kata, of Ngapuhi/Cook Islands heritage, who was also contributing editor of the Pacific Media Watch freedom project at the time, was a key contributor to the microsite before graduating and joining the *Tagata Pasifika* television magazine programme. Collectively, her multimedia package of stories and interviews totalling more than 35 minutes was a strongly researched and insightful reportage on the legacy of the nuclear-free New Zealand and Pacific movement, the aftermath of the bombing and the future of New Zealand activism as the country faced the growing impact of climate change. As part of her research, Kata also conducted a 16-minute studio interview with then Greenpeace New Zealand executive director Bunny McDiarmid, who had been one of the crew members on the bombed ship (Kata, 2015).

On reflection after the end of the project, the idea of news as a commodity—'this now seems a twentieth century approach to me,' argues Murrow—versus the idea of news as a supplement to a related subject/topic is strongly demonstrated by the *Eyes of Fire* microsite.

> One of the key aspects of the new information age is that presented by hypertext (in fact, the term is hypermedia), that encourages us to follow links to related content and, hopefully, get more information about the topic we are interested in.
>
> This works well for us when we are interested in something, but doesn't fit in with the companies that own the news. They need to monetise content

in small units. For them, the only option seems to be that of entertainment, where a range of thin, unrelated items can sit alongside advertisements and the reader is expected to browse (as opposed to research) as an entertainment.

For me, the microsite has shown an alternative to this. It doesn't present a new business model, but it does present a new model for readers, journalists and book publishers. Under this model we persevere with the hypermedia approach first mooted in the 1960s and developed throughout the 1970s and 80s. By the 1990s CERN had made it the basis of the worldwide web.

As a publisher, Murrow accepts that there are boundaries to the subject (the scope). He argues that this notion is very much in keeping with the book publisher's duty to keep authors 'on topic' and the book itself within a certain 'length'. Also research, investigative reporting with depth and storytelling are encouraged, such as with New Journalists, in particular Joan Didion (Marsh, 2015), 'who put themselves inside the story. The *Rainbow Warrior* video interviews, with these young journalists, were a little like that to me.' This publishing format makes sophisticated use of hyperlinks to ever deepening context and enriched information. It also provides a multilayered tapestry of experience, such as through Alistar Kata (2015b), now a *Tagata Pasifika* journalist, who reports on the events and reflections with depth and a Pacific perspective. Her searching questions draw out the past and their present significance.

Figure 2: Header display to the microsite main article.

Part 2: The article

France detonated 193 of a total of 210 nuclear tests in the South Pacific, at Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls, before halting them in 1996 in the face of Pacific-wide protests. On 10 July 1985, French secret agents bombed the Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior *in Auckland Harbour, killing photographer Fernando Pereira in a futile bid to stop a protest flotilla going to Moruroa.*

*New Zealand journalist **David Robie** was on board the* Rainbow Warrior *for more than 10 weeks of its last voyage. His book* Eyes Of Fire *tells the story and here he reflects about the* Rainbow Warrior*'s legacy in the Pacific.*

Microsite link: eyes-of-fire.littleisland.co.nz

The bombed *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbour … not the only Pacific target of the French military.

Rainbow Warrior redux:
French terrorism in the Pacific

NEW ZEALAND wasn't the only target of French 'black ops' in the South Pacific three decades ago. Nor was the *Rainbow Warrior*.

The attack on the Greenpeace environmental flagship on 10 July 1985 was part of a Pacific-wide strategy to crush pro-independence and nuclear-free movements in New Caledonia and French Polynesia—and also in the then recently independent Vanuatu—during the 1980s.

And Operation Satanique, as the 'satanic' *Rainbow Warrior* sabotage plan was aptly named, got the green light because of the political rivalry between then socialist President François Mitterrand and right-wing Prime Minister Jacques Chirac that pushed them into point-scoring efforts against each other.

Although misleading and laughable as early Australian or New Zealand press reports had been about who was thought to be responsible for the bombing in Auckland Harbour—such as focusing on mercenaries, or the French Foreign Legion based in New Caledonia and so on—there was certainly a connection with the neocolonial mind-set of the time.

New Caledonia then had the largest military garrison in the Pacific, about 6000 French Pacific Regiment and other troops, larger than the New Zealand armed

New Caledonia … highly militarised with French troops and hostility to Kanak independence in the mid-1980s.

forces, with about one soldier or paramilitary officer for every 24 citizens in the territory—the nearest Pacific neighbour to Auckland.

A small Pacific fleet included the nuclear submarine *Rubis*, reputed to have picked up one unit of the French secret service agents involved in the Operation Satanic attack on *Rainbow Warrior* off the yacht *Ouvéa* [the yacht delivered the bombs to New Zealand], then scuttling her in the Coral Sea, and finally spiriting them to safety in Tahiti.

A long line of human rights violations and oppressive acts was carried out against Kanak activists seeking independence starting with a political stand-off in 1984, a year before the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing.

Parties favouring independence came together that year under an umbrella known as the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) and began agitating for independence from France with a series of blockades and political demonstrations over the next four years.

Melanesian activism

Collectively, these indigenous Kanak (Melanesian) protests were known as *les événements*. The struggle echoed the current indigenous Papuan (Melanesian) activism in West Papua today with advocates seeking political justice, self-determination and ultimately independence from Indonesian colonial rule. The Greenpeace tragedy was one of several happening in the Pacific at the time, and this was really overshadowed by the Rongelap evacuation when the *Rainbow Warrior* crew ferried some 320 islanders, plagued by ill-health from

The French submarine *Rubis* in Pape'ete Harbour, believed to have spirited the Ouvea crew to safety.

the US atmospheric mega nuclear tests in the 1950s, from their home in the Marshall Islands to a new islet, Mejato, on Kwajalein Atoll.

Over the next few years, after the start of the Kanak uprising, New Caledonia suffered a series of bloody incidents because of hardline French neocolonial policies:

- The Hienghène massacre on 5 December 1984 when 10 unarmed Kanak political advocates were ambushed by heavily armed mixed-race French settlers on their way home to their village after a political meeting. (Charismatic Kanak independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou lost two brothers in that ambush when almost all the menfolk of the village of Tiendanite were gunned down in one deadly night.)
- The assassination of Kanak independence leader Eloï Machoro and his deputy, Marcel Nonaro, by French special forces snipers at dawn on 12 January 1985 during a siege of a farmhouse at Dogny, near la Foa.
- The infamous cave siege of the island of *Ouvéa* when French forces used a 'news media' helicopter as a ruse to attack 19 young militant Kanaks holding gendarmes hostage, killing most of them and allegedly torturing wounded captives to death. The 11th Shock Unit carried out this attack—the same unit (known then as the Service Action squad) to carry out Operation Satanic against the *Rainbow Warrior*.
- The human rights violations involved in this attack were exposed in

Rainbow Warrior **crew helping Rongelap islanders board the ship for one of four voyages relocating them to Mejato islet in May 1985.**

the 2012 docu-drama movie *Rebellion* by director Mathieu Kassovitz, based on a book by a hostage negotiator who believed he could have achieved a peaceful resolution.

- France had its problems in Vanuatu too. Founding Prime Minister Father Walter Lini's government expelled ambassador Henri Crepin-Leblond shortly before the election on 30 November 1987, accusing Paris of funding the opposition Union of Moderate Parties—a claim denied by the French.

- There were also riots in French Polynesia when young Tahitians set the capital ablaze with demands for an end to nuclear testing and to colonial rule. But these developments came a decade later in September 1995 after mounting tensions.

- Two years later, in December 1997, a French Polynesian journalist known for his liberal views, *Les Nouvelles de Tahiti* editor Jean-Pascal Couraud, known as 'JPK', disappeared and was believed to be assassinated by local presidential special ops militia.

Social scars

The social scars from these events affected France's standing in the Pacific for many years. While relations have dramatically improved since then, it still rankles with both many New Zealanders and Greenpeace campaigners that Paris has never given a full state apology.

Interviewed on *Democracy Now!* recently, *Rainbow Warrior* skipper Pete

Willcox, who is returning to New Zealand to skipper the ship for a tuna fishing campaign, criticised the failure of France to apologise for being 'caught red-handed' in state terrorism.

However, the American also delivered a strong warning about climate change – the main contemporary environmental issue. Explaining his more than three decades of campaigning, Willcox said:

> We know what climate change is doing. We're the richest country in the world. We can support, if you will, a drought.
>
> Countries like in East Africa and other places of the world, Bangladesh, where it's going to displace millions of people, can't deal with it. And it's coming.
>
> And it's only coming because we're not willing to change the way we produce energy, we make energy. We have the technology. We don't have the will. And that's just ridiculous. (*Rainbow Warrior 30 Years On*, 2015)[1]

Tailed by agents

In January 1987, a year after my book *Eyes of Fire* was first published—four months before the first Fiji military coup, I was arrested at gunpoint by French troops near the New Caledonian village of Canala.

The arrest followed a week of my being tailed by secret agents in Noumea. When I was handed over by the military to local gendarmes for interrogation, accusations of my being a 'spy' and questions over my book on the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing were made in the same breath.

However, after about four hours of questioning I was released. My report filed for *Islands Business International* at the time began:

DAVID ROBIE/EYES OF FIRE

French CRS special police confronting Kanak activists demanding independence in New Caledonia.

It began like something out of a B-grade police comedy. As the French say in New Caledonia, 'c'est le cinema'. But the funny side quickly turned sour. At first the French authorities gave me a two-hour grilling at Tontouta international airport. A police 'welcome squad' awaited me at the arrival lounge when I flew in to cover political developments … leading up to [the] referendum on independence and the military 'nomadisation' of Kanak villages in the *brousse* …

Then I was tailed constantly and kept under surveillance by security police in Noumea. Later, I was actually arrested by soildiers armed with automatic rifles, submachine-guns and bayonets near the eastern township of Canala and interrogated incommunicado for four hours … The deputy commander of [Canala *gendarmerie*] … accused me of taking unauthorised photographs of military installations, loosely using the word 'espionage' … Although calm, at one point [during the interrogation] I snapped, 'Is this a democracy?'

The officer replied , 'No, this is France …'

'Non … non ici c'est le Kanaky! [this is Kanaky]' interrupted Edmond Kawa [an FLNKS official with me]. The gendarme gave him a warning. (Robie, 1989, p. 261)[2]

The drama over my reporting of the militarisation of East Coast villages in an attempt by French authorities to harass and suppress supporters of Kanak independence was a reflection of the paranoia at the time, so aptly portrayed in the 2011 Mathieu Kassovitz-directed historical drama *Rebellion*.[3]

DAVID ROBIE/*EYES OF FIRE*

Charles Rara, Vanuatu's representative on board the Rainbow Warrior.

Then it seemed highly unlikely that in less than two decades nuclear testing would be finally abandoned in the South Pacific, and Tahiti's leading nuclear-free and pro-independence politician, Oscar Manutahi Temaru, would emerge as French Polynesia's new president four times and usher in a refreshing 'new order' with a commitment to pan-Pacific relations.

Although Tahitian independence is nominally off the agenda for the moment, far-reaching changes in the region are inevitable.

President Baldwin Lonsdale made some telling remarks about the *Rainbow Warrior* bombing in a welcome for the ship's namesake, *Rainbow Warrior III*, in Port Vila recently on her post-cyclone humanitarian mission.

He recalled how the Vanuatu government representative, the late Charles Rara, sent by founding Prime Minister Walter Lini on board the *Rainbow Warrior* to New Zealand, had been ashore on the night of the bombing. Rara was at the home of President Lonsdale at St John's Theological College in Auckland, where he was studying.

'When Charles got back to the ship that night, he found the *Rainbow Warrior* had been bombed, it had been destroyed,' President Lonsdale said.

'I think the main intention of the French [military] who carried out the bombing was because the Greenpeace movement was trying to bring about peace and justice among island nations.'

Rara shared a cabin with Portuguese-born Dutch photojournalist Fernando Pereira, who drowned while trying to recover his cameras when a second bomb destroyed the propeller shaft just behind his cabin.

DAVID ROBIE/EYES OF FIRE

Fernando Pereira and Rongelap Islander Bonemej Namwe ride ashore in the 'bum bum' runabout at Rongelap in May 1985. Born on Kwajalein, Namwe, was then aged 62 and had lived most of her life on Rongelap.

(Ironically, when the *Rainbow Warrior* was bombed, my passport also sank with the ship because I had forgotten to collect it from the safe in the ship's bridge. I recovered it later from Devonport Naval Base dry dock and it is now a prized memento.)

David Robie's bombed passport … it sank with the *Rainbow Warrior* **but was recovered later and restored.**

'Living reef'

After being awarded $8 million in compensation from France by the International Arbitration Tribunal, Greenpeace finally towed the *Rainbow Warrior* to Matauri Bay and scuttled her off Motutapere, in the Cavalli Islands, on 12 December 1987 to create a 'living reef'.

An earlier compensation deal for New Zealand mediated in 1986 by United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar awarded the Government $13 million (US$7 million)—the money was used for an anti-nuclear project fund and the Pacific Development and Conservation Trust.

The agreement was supposed to include an apology by France and deportation of jailed secret agents Alain Mafart and Dominique Prieur after they had served less than a year of their 10-year sentences for manslaughter and wilful damage of the bombed ship (downgraded from charges of murder, arson and conspiracy).

They were transferred from New Zealand to Hao Atoll in French Polynesia to serve three years in exile at a 'Club Med' style nuclear and military base.

But the bombing scandal didn't end there. The same day as the scuttling of the *Rainbow Warrior* in 1987, the French government told New Zealand that Major Mafart had a 'serious stomach complaint'. The French authorities repatriated him back to France in defiance of the terms of the United Nations agreement and protests from the David Lange government.

It was later claimed by the Tahitian newspaper *Les Nouvelles* that Mafart was smuggled out of Tahiti on a false passport hours before New Zealand was even told of the 'illness'. Mafart reportedly assumed the identity of a carpenter, Serge Quillan.

Captain Prieur was also repatriated back to France in May 1988 because she was pregnant. France ignored the protests by New Zealand and the secret agent pair were honoured, decorated and promoted in their homeland.

Supreme irony

It is a supreme irony that such an act of state terrorism should be rewarded in this age of a so-called 'war on terrorism'.

In 2005, their lawyer, Gerard Currie, tried to block footage of their guilty pleas in court—shown on closed circuit to journalists at the time but not previously seen publicly—from being broadcast by the Television New Zealand current affairs programme *Sunday*.

Losing the High Court ruling in May 2005, the two former agents appealed against the footage being broadcast. They failed and the footage was finally broadcast by Television New Zealand on 7 August 2006—almost two decades later.

They had lost any spurious claim to privacy over the act of terrorism by publishing their own memoirs—*Agent Secrète* (Prieur, 1995) and *Carnets Secrets* (Mafart, 1999). (See Robie, 2007, 2014, p. 271)

French secret agent Alain Mafart pleads guilty to reduced charges of manslaughter and wilful damage in November 1985 (courtroom CCTV footage).

Mafart recalled in his book how the international media were dumbfounded that the expected huge High Court trial had 'evaporated before their eyes', describing his courtroom experience:

> I had an impression of being a mutineer from the *Bounty* … but in this case the gallows would not be erected in the village square. Three courteous phrases were exchanged between [the judge] and our lawyers, the charges were read to us and the court asked us whether we pleaded guilty or not guilty. Our replies were clear: 'Guilty!' With that one word the trial was at an end. (Cited in Robie, 2014, p. 271).

Ironically, Mafart much later became a wildlife photographer, under the moniker Alain Mafart-Renodier, and filed his pictures through the Paris-based agency Bios with a New York office. Greenpeace US engaged an advertising agency to produce the 2015 environmental calendar illustrated with wildlife images.

As Greenpeace chronicler and photojournalist Pierre Gleizes describes it: 'Incredibly bad luck, out of millions, the agency bought one of Alain Mafart's pictures to illustrate a Greenpeace calendar. Fortunately, someone saw that before it got distributed. So Mafart got his fee, but 40,000 calendars were destroyed.' (Robie, 2015, p. 176-7).

The actual bomber recently outed himself and apologised to Greenpeace, the Pereira family and the people of New Zealand, describing the operation as a 'big, big failure'. Retired colonel Jean-Luc Kister, went public with simultaneous interviews with TVNZ's *Sunday* programme reporter John Hudson and French investigative journalist Edwy Plenel, publisher of Mediapart, admitting his role:

> Thirty years after the event, now that emotions have subsided and also with the distance I now have from my professional life, I thought it was the right time for me to express both my deepest regret and my apologies …

> For us it was just like using boxing gloves in order to crush a mosquito. It was a disproportionate operation, but we had to obey the order, we were soldiers. Many times I think about these things because, for me, I have an innocent death on my hands.

French nuclear swansong

France finally agreed to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty after a final swansong package of eight planned nuclear tests in 1996 to provide data for simulation computer software. [Two decades later, French President Francois Hollande visiting Tahiti in February 2016 admitted that Tahitian victims had a 'legitimate right' to compensation even if it was a long time coming.]

Such was the strength of international hostility and protests and riots in Pape'ete that Paris ended the programme prematurely after just six tests, and just a year after rioting destroyed the heart of the city. France officially ratified the treaty on 10 September 1996.

When Tahitians elected Oscar Temaru as their territorial president in 2004, he had already established the first nuclear-free municipality in the Pacific Islands as mayor of the Pape`ete airport suburb of Faa`a.

Having ousted the conservative incumbent for the previous two decades, Gaston Flosse—the man who gave Mafart and Prieur a hero's welcome to Tahiti—Temaru lost office just four months later.

He was reinstated to power in early 2005 after a byelection confirmed his overwhelming support. But since then Temaru has won and lost office twice more, most recently in 2013, and Flosse is fighting ongoing corruption charges.

Since the Temaru coalition first came to power, demands have increased for a full commission of inquiry to investigate new evidence of radiation exposure in the atmospheric nuclear tests in the Gambiers between 1966 and 1974.

'Contempt' for Polynesia

Altogether France detonated 193 of a total of 210 nuclear tests in the South Pacific, 46 of them dumping more than nine megatons of explosive energy in the atmosphere—42 over Moruroa and four over Fangataufa atolls.

The Green Party leader in Tahiti, Jacky Bryant, accused the French Defence Ministry of having 'contempt' for the people of Polynesia.

Replying to ministry denials in May 2005 claiming stringent safety and health precautions, he said: 'It's necessary to stop saying that the Tahitians don't understand anything about these kinds of questions—they must stop this kind of behaviour from another epoch.'

Bryant compared the French ministry's reaction with the secretive and arrogant approach of China and Russia.

However, Britain and the United States had reluctantly 'recognised the consequences of nuclear tests on the populations' in Australia, Christmas Island, the Marshall Islands and Rongelap.

In 2009, the French National Assembly finally passed nuclear care and compensation legislation, known as the Morin law after Defence Minister Hervé

Morin who initiated it. It has been consistently criticised as far too restrictive and of little real benefit to Polynesians.

In 2013, declassified French defence documents exposed that the nuclear tests were 'far more toxic' than had been previously acknowledged. *Le Parisien* reported that the papers 'lifted the lid on one of the biggest secrets of the French army'.

It said that the documents indicated that on 17 July 1974, a test had exposed the main island of Tahiti, and the nearby tourist resort isle of Bora Bora, to plutonium fallout 500 times greater than the maximum level.

US radiation fallout

This had been echoed almost two decades earlier than the French declassified documents when *The Washington Post* reported that US analysts had admitted that radiation fallout from their nuclear tests of the 1950s was 'limited'.

In fact, federal documents, according to *The Post* in the February 1994 article, had revealed that 'the post-explosion cloud of radioactive materials spread hundreds of [kilometres] beyond the limited area earlier described in the vast range of Pacific islands'.

Thousands of Marshall Islanders and 'some US troops' had probably been exposed to radiation, the documents suggested.

'One of the biggest crimes here is that the US government seemed to clearly know the extent of the fallout coming, but made no attempt to protect people from it," said Washington-based lawyer Jonathan Weisgall, author of *Operation Crossroads*, a book about the Marshall Islands nuclear tests.

The *Rainbow Warrior* bombing with the death of photographer Fernando Pereira was a callous tragedy. But the greater tragedy remains the horrendous legacy of the Pacific nuclear testing on the people of Rongelap and the Marshall Islands and French Polynesia.

The last voyage of the first *Rainbow Warrior*—right up until the bombing in Auckland three decades ago—left a lasting legacy for New Zealand and the future of activism.

* * *

WHEN the bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior* is set in its broader political context in the Pacific, it can be seen that this story was much more than a dramatic, and isolated, episode as most of the New Zealand media portrayed it. The *Eyes of Fire* microsite project by Little Island Press also demonstrates the significance of the continuing interpretation of these events for the future of New Zealand and its citizens—student journalists are looking back at the past but asking questions of relevance to the present from their perspective interrogating my colleagues and I who were involved in the Rongelap voyage. This is really important. In Hayley Becht's interview with me, I replied to a question about the impact of the bombing on New Zealand:

[As] a nation, this was a coming of age for us. I think we lost our innocence then. The idea that a friendly nation could commit an act of state terrorism against us, a small nation in the Southern Hemisphere and against a peaceful ship and against people who were trying to make a better world and trying to make a better environment—that shock was shared by everybody in the country for a long time. And there was a lot of hostility towards France. (Interview with author by Becht, 2015)

Although that hostility eased, especially after the halt to nuclear testing in 1996, there is still ongoing environmental fallout from both nuclear testing and climate change that makes it imperative that this sort of deeper journalism practice continues (Robie, 2014). As Murrow noted repeatedly during the project, a striking common factor involved in the *Rainbow Warrior* and the Rongelap experience was the lifelong legacy that bound the participants together as activists for the planet, whether it was through direct action such as through Greenpeace, or through journalism. We had all been changed profoundly by the experience.

Notes

1.   In an interview with Hayley Becht (2015) in the microsite project, I said: 'Climate change refugees and nuclear refiugees … there is a connection there … and it is going to be a major problem for the globe.' I spoke about parallels bnetween the Marshall Islands evacuations and the forced migration of the Polynesian people from Takuu Atoll in 2010 to Bougainville, described by some as the first 'climate change refugees'.

2.   As a Pacific affairs specialist, I encountered hostility from French officialdom over a number of years in the region, ranging from attacks in publications that carried my artticles, personal attacks from some other expatriate journalists with 'territorial' vested interest in the region, which eventually spilled over into a spat betweeen two Pacific news magazines, *Islands Business* and *Pacific Islands Monthly.* This saga was covered comprehensively by *The New Zealand Journalist* (Stoner, 1989). It also had an impact on my career as a journalism educator when I was appointed to head the French-funded regional journalism programme at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji in 1998 (Robie, 2004).

3.   Reportage in quality media in Australia was much better than in New Zealand. My report on the Hienghène massacre on 5 December 1984 when 10 unarmed Kanak activists were gunned down in cold blood was a major page lead in the World section of *The Australian*, while a similar report filed for Wellington's *Dominion* was buried as a single column on an inside page.

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Curation challenges and opportunities

Storify as a participatory reporting tool in a journalism school newsroom

Abstract: News curation tool Storify is a publication platform for journalism and news now used by diverse mainstream media, (including ABC News, The Times, Al Jazeera and The Washington Post), news wire services (Associated Press and Agence France-Presse), and news generators (the White House, United Nations and World Bank, to name a few) to curate and publish 'social stories' online. Within the journalism classroom, Storify is recognised as having value in enabling students to produce news stories based on social content while also challenging them to assess content, consider agendas and develop news consumption and storytelling skills (Mihailidis & Cohen, 2013; Thorsen, 2013; Sacco & Bossio, 2014). Its use raises issues that go to the heart of journalism ethics, including questions over repurposing of material, relationships to sources, use of non-elite or vulnerable voices, source selection and the need to check veracity. This requires educators to revisit the need for skill development in selection and verification of content. This article examines five lessons learned in the use of Storify in a journalism class newsroom as a tool to curate breaking news about the search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 and how these lessons have altered teaching practice.

Keywords: Australia, breaking news, ethics, journalism ethics, Malaysia, news agenda, news curation, social media, Storify, storytelling

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Introduction

WHEN comedian and actor Robin Williams took his own life on 11 August 2014, the news was first revealed by a sheriff's press release and tweeted within minutes by Henry K. Lee, a reporter with the San Francisco Chronicle (Carr, 2014). That statement was in turn retweeted more than 1600 times and prompted a further 7.3 million tweets referencing his death

within 24 hours (Newscomb, 2014). Williams' death was just one of dozens of major news stories broken or developed on social media in 2014. Twitter's new Reverb tool, which counts tweets per minute on topics, found 7.8 million tweets referencing #Ferguson, over nine days after the shooting of teenager Michael Brown in August; 476,000 tweets on the Glasgow Commonwealth Games on a single day in August, and 10.9 million tweets about footballer #Messi during the World Cup (https://twitter.com/twitterreverb). The conversation around news issues that takes place on Twitter, as well as on Facebook and other platforms such as Tumblr, Instagram and YouTube, has transformed the way news is reported by different media, whether it is the use of Facebook images in newspapers to Twitter feeds that run along the bottom of news programmes. It has also led to the emergence of social media curation tools that seek to collate, aggregate, collect or curate social conversations.

This article considers the use of one of these tools, Storify (Storify.com) to curate breaking news. Issues inherent in its journalistic use are considered through the experience of using Storify within a journalism class-based newsroom in covering the search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370, including its strengths and weaknesses as a teaching and reporting tool, and how it engages students in content selection and verification.

Understanding Storify

Storify is a social media curation tool that allows users to find, select, collate and contextualise social media posts, either by searching for posts by particular users, on particular themes, or from specific locations. It can be used as a 'live blog' tool, with curators selecting and republishing multiple perspectives on a breaking event such as an election, natural disaster or awards ceremony. It can be a way of collecting social media reactions to a particular occurrence, such as comments and YouTube videos posted after the death of actor Robin Williams. It can aid analysis of hashtag-driven topics on social media, such as the satirical response on Twitter to the reintroduction of knighthoods by Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott or track the spread of the hashtag #IllRideWithYou on different platforms after the Sydney siege in December 2014. Storify describes the benefits of its platform as enabling 'everyone (to be) a reporter' as well as being useful for extending the reach of events, preserving social discussions and capturing activity around memes (Storify, nd).

The use of Storify in the journalism classroom, while relatively new, has been the focus of limited study. Cochrane, Mulrennan, Sissons, Pamatatau and Barnes (2013) tested the use of Storify as a substitute for traditional essay-based journalism assessment, finding students engaged with material at a deeper level and that the process encouraged critical thinking and creativity. Wall (2014) used Storify as part of a pop-up newsroom operation designed to give students

access to a journalism-style mobile reporting option, but found students tended to discount the value of the tool, seeing the retweeting or aggregating material as something less than professional journalism (Wall, 2014).

A number of academics have proposed greater use of Storify as a tool within journalism schools. Robinson (2013) found Storify to be useful, and proposed that it be included as an essential part of the curriculum for journalism educators in the digital age, as part of what she sees as a shift between news as a finite, discrete product to news as a process (Robinson, 2013). Mihailidis and Cohen (2013) propose that journalism students—when forced to assess content, perspective and agendas—develop critical evaluation and analytical skills, while participating in local, national and global conversations. They argue that teaching students only about bias leads to cynicism, while placing student into learning environments in which they must engage in sifting through an abundance of sources builds appreciation of the diversity of online voices (Mihailidis & Cohen, 2013). At the same time, Bakker notes that a division remains between those journalism schools that have embraced the skills needed to use tools such as Storify, and those that still frown on those practices loosely collected under the term content curation. When discussing content curation with one journalism school, Bakker reports that a staff member believed the teaching of 'curation to journalists would be comparable to teaching pickpocketing at a police academy' (Bakker, 2014, p. 604).

Part of the disquiet about the practice of content curation, and its more automated cousin, content aggregation, derives from issues that go to the heart of traditional journalism ethics and modern time-limited practices. They include questions over repurposing of material, relationships to sources, ethics around the use of 'ordinary voices', questions over source selection and the need to check veracity—all while publishing at speed. These issues are discussed briefly here to provide additional context for the ethical practice and teaching of Storify.

Reuse and repurposing of material
Storify as a tool allows the curator to seek out material that has been used elsewhere on a wide range of social media platforms, including public Facebook pages, Twitter (with searches available for users, individual words, hashtags and geographic area), Instagram, Google Plus, YouTube, Flickr, Giphy.com (which features animated gifs), and Tumblr, among a growing list of source sites. There is also the ability to republish material directly from non-social media sites using a URL function. Users choose what to search for and then select and compile their Storify from these sources, with the option of including contextual paragraphs or commentary.

Whereas clear copyright practices are in place for the reuse of material in printed or traditional broadcast media, curation tools lack both the case law and

clear legal framework that might dictate what can and cannot be used and how material should be linked to the original creator. Storify's terms of service require the curator to have checked they have the rights to reuse material, link to other pages, or repost another party's words or images, but the interface does not require the curator to verify at the point of publication that this has taken place (Brewer, 2013), and it would be cumbersome if it were to do so. There is nothing that physically prevents a curator from reusing someone else's material at length, therefore and—as a Storify is embeddable—it is possible for that content to be replicated on another website. Martin (2015), while looking predominantly at aggregation rather than curation, notes it can often be depicted as 'bad practice' given that it both destabilises the status quo of traditional media while risking the exploitation of others' creative rights (Martin, 2015).

Relationship to sources

The Australian Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance code of ethics is clear about the relationship a journalist should have with his or her sources, requiring journalists to 'aim to attribute information to its source. Where a source seeks anonymity, do not agree without first considering the source's motives and any alternative attributable source. Where confidences are accepted, respect them in all circumstances' (Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance, nd). This relationship is well-established in the practices of traditional media, in which a source might be someone the journalist would speak to or hear (the shop owner you might interview after a fire, the councillor quoted at a public forum, the protester chanting at a rally and the occasional man on the street for colour). Where source material was taken from documents, it would be from a known or trusted company, source, authority or at least, of identifiable origin (Pavlik, 2000). Storify sources are less clearly defined, however. A Flickr user with a newsworthy photograph might be named and identified as the rights owner of the work or might go under a pseudonym or 'handle' with no identifiable contact details. A YouTube video might be put up by someone who has no right to publish the material in the first place, and who certainly cannot pass those rights to someone else. An anonymous Twitter user might make an emotional, powerful or amusing comment that appears to add value in the same way the man in the street's take would have in a traditional print story—yet there may be no easy way to assess their motivation. The murky nature of who owns the rights to what material, a lack of clarity about the weight that should be given to someone's statements, and the incredible abundance of freely expressed opinion on social media, can all prove to be highly tempting for curators to publish and be damned—and in doing so feel less obligated to honour relationships with sources than they might in a more traditional media publication role (Martin, 2015; Heinrich, 2011).

There are attempts to redefine journalistic ethical practice to address these issues. Where duty ethics and virtue ethics have strong legacies in ordinary source relations, Martin argues the ethical relationships shift when interacting with 'crowdsources', online communities and user groups: 'Here, sharing declaration, disclosure and debate are the new foundation of participation and audience loyalty' (Martin, 2015, p. 91). The procedures Martin recommends journalists take to care for their networked community sources include linking to original documents, allowing users to track the development of arguments and events, and engaging the community in the 'accuracy, depth and mutual benefit of their work' (Martin, 2015, p. 92). Storify, while not addressing all these points, does provide for links to original material, allows for events and conversations to evolve with a degree of transparency, and has functions that enable readers and sources to comment on and respond to the curated work.

Ethical use of ordinary voices

While it is unarguable that the social media and web pages curated in a Storify are from 'public' sources, it is equally true that many authors, tweeters or posters may assume their words would have very small or near-private audiences. As an example, a person (such as @sender) who responds directly to another on Twitter by tweeting a person's name (such as @recipient) at the beginning of a tweet limits the publicity of that tweet from public view. In the example "@recipient I hated the movie Jaws" that tweet would appear on @sender's profile page, as well as under @recipient's 'Mentions and Notifications' tab. It would appear only on the 'Home' timelines of those people who follow both @sender and @recipient. The tweet would not be obviously in the wider public arena, however (Twitter, nd).

Yet a Storify curator searching for the term 'Jaws' would see this tweet as part of the results that arose and could add it to their curation. This raises questions about whether the material should be classified as really public or part of a relatively private conversation. This question matters little when the commentary is on the merits of Jaws as a movie, however it is possible to see that a reply about whether someone has voted and how, or the casual disclosure of illicit activity, could have far greater implications in many places. In addition, the standard journalistic practice of right of reply is turned on its head when you take the quasi-public comments of an individual and reuse them without seeking permission: does right of reply exist when it is your own words?

A safeguard built in to Storify allows the curator to notify all people included in the Storify that they have been quoted (with the words 'You have been quoted in my Storify' and a shortened URL); however this remains optional for curators. There is also no compulsion for Storify users to remove or reframe comments that the original source would like deleted. This may be an important issue in the quoting of non-elite, unqualified, unauthorised or vulnerable voices.

Source selection

The rise of content curation has prompted a revival of the long-standing metaphor within journalism scholarship of 'Mr Gates,' the gatekeeping subeditor who selected topics in Manning White's 1950 study of content choice. Bakker (2014) argues this metaphor is of greater relevance today, with journalists doing more gatekeeping along with greater searching for, curating, moderating and editing of content, rather than their traditional role of producing original works (Bakker, 2014). Axel Bruns (2003) has likewise revisited the practice of gatekeeping, but describes a shift to 'gatewatching,' which includes news users organising the flood of available stories (Bruns, 2003). While Bruns' description was written before the advent of Storify, Thorsen (2013) applies the idea of gatewatching to real-time curation of news in live blogs, both a precursor and relative of Storify (Thorsen, 2013). Through live blogging, Thorensen argues, journalists are operationalising their curator role, harnessing multiple sources of information and engaging with audiences in the process.

Thurman and Walters (2012) also looked at live blogs and found that while journalists were able to work with 'usual suspects' who might frequently comment on a specific topic or report from a geographic area, curation provided the opportunity to extend coverage to voices not normally heard in news. These include 'insignificant' actors who might have funny, clever or pertinent things to add, and anonymous commentators whose perspective may develop or add to discussion (Thurman & Walters, 2012). This practice has been identified in Storify coverage in the Arab Spring (Stanoevska-Slabeva, Sacco, & Giardina, 2012; Sacco & Bossio, 2014) and London Riots (Guerrini, 2013), with ordinary citizens playing a significant role both creating and acting as sources in Storify coverage of fast-moving geopolitical events. Still, elite voices have been found to dominate social media coverage of events, particularly when reporters rely on 'trusted' sources, often authorities or other media members, over the reports from unknown ordinary actors. This was the case in reporter Andy Carvin's coverage of the Arab Spring on Twitter. Carvin's work prompted study given the sheer breadth of his coverage, estimated at more than 60,000 tweets over 10 months. While he relied strongly on institutional elites in his coverage of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, it was found that he built his use of alternative voices over time and approximately half his tweets on Egypt's revolution came from non-elite voices. (Hermida, Lewis, & Zamith, 2014).

While there is the potential, therefore, for Storify to allow a much greater diversity of sources beyond those in traditionally powerful roles (including government authorities, other media, academics or community leaders), these groups remain powerful online and it can be a challenge to move beyond traditional frames for stories (Mihailidis & Cohen, 2013; Sacco & Zhao, 2014; Sacco & Bossio, 2014).

Verification of sources

The social media world has no uniform rules for identification of users and sources. Facebook has recently changed its 'real name' policy to allow for real-life names that are not legal names (Cox, 2014) but remains vigilant against fake accounts. Twitter enables users to have aliases and even register parody accounts in other people's names, as do Instagram, Youtube and many others, while still requiring users to have a user profile. A third emerging group of social media sites are known as 'anonymous' social platforms, in which no user profile is required (Perez, 2014).

This lack of uniformity makes it difficult for a Storify curator to assess whether material posted on social media sites is by someone who might be in a position to know whether a statement made is true—whether, for example, a report of an explosion in Boston just as the 2013 Marathon was concluding really occurred.


Figure 1: Believed to be the first tweet of the Boston Marathon explosions in 2013 (Rogers, 2013)

In the absence of simple identification processes, Thurman and Walters (2012) found some journalists admitted not taking verification steps when quoting from social media, as the information was 'too small' to worry about going through a long exercise. At the same time, journalists believed curation tools meant they were able to provide depth of coverage and greater transparency (Thurman & Walters, 2012).

Despite the risk that journalists will incorporate material without checking the source of information or its accuracy, Storify has in its design some elements that allow the reader to identify clearly where items of information originate, and thus apply some of their own critical analysis as to its veracity. As Sacco and Zhao (2014) note, the format of Storify achieves three of the five pillars of objectivity outlined by Delforce (1985). The pillar 'tell everything, hide nothing' is served through the link-back function of Storify content to its original

source. The pillar 'be neutral' is enabled through Storify's ability to collate a broad range of voices. And the pillar 'journalism as an ethic' is made easier through the transparent visual delineation on a published Storify between what is information gleaned from a source and what is authorial intervention or context (Sacco & Zhao, 2014).

Using Storify in a journalism classroom

To illustrate how some of the issues identified in Storify and similar curation practices can be explored in teaching journalism, a case study is presented of how the tool is used by a daily journalism website operated by an Australian university, with particular focus on the coverage of the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370.

ECU Daily is the online student journalism and broadcasting publication for Edith Cowan University—a convergence journalism site that combines the work of undergraduate journalists and broadcasters with that of postgraduate broadcasting students. While most articles are text-based, students are required to demonstrate alternative storytelling techniques such as the use of infographics, slideshows, audio packages, traditional video and mobile video as part of their publication portfolio. Working on the premise of learning through doing, two classes of students write, edit and produce 20-30 stories a week, including promoting stories through social media platforms, predominantly Facebook and Twitter.

Storify has been a part of the newsroom since its inception, with students using the tool to collate and curate social media stories, usually on breaking news events. The tool has been incorporated as it provides students with an authentic and accessible participatory journalism experience, allowing them to create social stories just as they would within a mainstream newsroom—or even ahead of publications that lack the knowledge and tools to capture social media commentary. Since July 2013, students in the newsroom have Storified events including the September 2013 Australian Federal election, reactions to the death of Mick Jagger's girlfriend on the eve of the Rolling Stones Perth concert (later cancelled), football finals, and social media reaction to comments by Australian Treasurer Joe Hockey that 'poor people don't drive cars'. Students are required to produce at least one Storify over the semester.

In March 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 disappeared. En route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing, the plane carrying 239 passengers and crew last made contact with Subang Air Traffic Control in the early hours of March 8 (Malaysian Airlines, 2014). Searches in the subsequent days focused on the area around its last known position, with the search field gradually expanding to the point where on March 16, Malaysian Airlines described searching land and sea surrounding 11 countries in the region (Malaysian Airlines, 2014). On March 17, in response

to new information, it was announced that Australia would lead the search in an alternative area in the Indian Ocean, and on March 20, two objects were spotted, described by Prime Minister Tony Abbott as 'new and credible information' that could be connected to the MH370 (Hurst, Farrell, & Branigan, 2014).

ECU Daily's newsroom reporters posted their first MH370 Storify on March 20 announcing the new search area. The Storify, entitled 'Has Australia Found MH370', drew on multiple sources to report the Prime Minister's comments, the results of an Australian Maritime Safety Authority press conference on the spotted objects, images released from that conference, a list of the countries and planes involved in the search, a map of the search area and tweets from media outlets and non-elite sources (https://storify.com/ECUNews/has-australia-found-mh370). Media organisations and reporters quoted in the Storify included America's ABC News, New Zealand's News Talk ZB, CNN, Britain's *The Telegraph*, *Sydney Morning Herald*, Agence France-Presse, *Wall Street Journal Asia*, David Wright (a reporter for America's ABC News who was on board one of the search planes) and Australian aviation reporter Ben Sandilands. In addition, non-elite social media users were quoted, predominantly making comments about the impact on families and their hopes for a swift resolution, as well as one user who remarked that:

robert rand
@randb176

These australian politicians should be fired if this is wrong information about the #MH370 It is very unrespectfull for the family #ad

10:13 PM - 19 Mar 2014

Figure 2: A social media comment included in ECU Daily's initial Storify on MH370.

The first Storify was compiled over approximately eight hours, and received more than 10,000 views within the first two days. The associated Twitter feed of images and links to the Storify was viewed more than 100,000 times in the first week. Over the next week, an additional three Storifys were published (available at https://storify.com/ECUNews), some featuring more than 100 individual tweets, images, videos and other social sources—tracking events as they occurred. Students were rostered to take over coverage in four or five-hour stints. While editorial approval was needed before they published a new

Storify, students were empowered to update each live Storify throughout the day, giving them responsibility for sourcing and curating the material. Coverage ceased after a week when it became apparent that the search was not likely to yield immediate results. Poor weather had impacted on the ability of planes to reach the search area, which reduced the amount of new material that could be reported. While there was an abundance of social media commentary by users, this was also of declining usefulness as there were few new facts to add to the story and the vacuum was filled with growing speculation. From an editorial perspective, there were declining numbers of viewers to each new Storify, so the decision was made to replace Storify reporting with traditional coverage that would resume only when there was something to report.

The reasons for using Storify as the primary reporting tool for covering MH370 were simple and are described here, as they may be relevant to other newsroom situations.

1. News was breaking quickly. Particularly on March 20, the day two potential objects were identified in the Indian Ocean, there were numerous updates that needed to be made to the story, including the Prime Minister's press conference, an Australian Maritime Safety Authority press conference, the dispatch of planes and their return. Storify allowed all these changes to be recorded in one frequently updated story.

2. There was an international audience as well as international sources. This meant that there was 24-hour social media reaction that could refresh the story as people around the world woke and responded to news. A geographically dispersed audience also reduced the barrier to readership that might exist in a purely Western Australian or Australian story; to a local reader ECU Daily might be just a student journalism publication but to an international reader it was another legitimate source of news and information.

3. Our reporters were not easily able to access key locations in the story, but this was also true of most other news organisations. Storify can be particularly useful in cases where reporters need to rely heavily on social media sources—as has been seen in uprisings in the Middle East and subsequent Twitter reporting. In this case, student reporters could not access the search zone but neither could anyone other than a few reporters given access to search ships and planes. Major press conferences were streamed, so students were not disadvantaged by barriers to reporting live, such as having to travel from university to the conference location.

4. There was an opportunity to add value beyond that given in the 24-hour news. Despite the large number of media outlets covering the story, there was significant sameness in the images, angles and information provided.

By seeking out small details that might not be otherwise covered by major broadcast or print reporters, students were able to add value to the total coverage.

Lessons learned

Five key lessons were learned through our experience in reporting MH370 using Storify, as a result of the intense environment and the exposure of inexperienced reporters to a breaking story. Chief among these was the importance of selecting quality content from a variety of sources. Students were encouraged to seek information widely but as the amount of new information declined, so too did the quality of coverage and more commentary rather than factual information featured in the stories. As an example, on the first two days of the search, there were many tweets incorporated from journalists reporting in Malaysia and Beijing on the families there, but this declined as some of those families travelled to Australia and media focus shifted to Perth. Similarly, social media posts by local reporters became less useful over time as the search was cancelled on several days and outlets were left to report the same, limited information. At times, media outlet social media posts were reduced to reporters taking photographs of reporters or interviewing colleagues. This lack of 'new news' required students to look further afield for commentary and sources that were relevant and useful to readers.

A second lesson was the importance of sensitivity in the use and reuse of social media commentary, particularly given that many families were angry and grieving. A large number of Chinese families of people on flight MH370 travelled to Perth in the days after the search shifted to the Indian Ocean, and this opened another avenue for coverage, though a difficult one. Despite reminding students to take care when dealing with people who might be grieving, not all students understood what might be too offensive or unprofessional to include in their Storify coverage. In a couple of instances, students were advised against using tweets that suggested the plane had been found, that the plane had been hijacked, or that the plane had been abducted by aliens; none of these could be verified and the editorial team was wary of either raising hopes or adding to the emotional pain of families through flippant coverage.

Another incident highlights the importance of addressing with students the tone and nature of their Storify coverage, which can adopt some of the informality of social media. At one stage, an unfortunate hashtag that featured in a tweet added by a student to an MH370 Storify was inadvertently included in the social media promotion of ECU Daily's report. Storify has a function that incorporates hashtags into its notification message, which is sent to those sources who have been quoted. Normally, notifications are published on Twitter naming sources in the Storify, with the words 'You have been quoted in my Storify'. These notifications can include

Figure 3: Sky News Australia tweets a photograph of the media pack in Perth.

key hashtags used in the stream, such as #MH370. In this case, the student curating the stream was not aware that they had included a tweet in the Storify with the hashtag #WhereIsTheFuckingPlane, which appeared for half an hour in ECU Daily's Twitter feed before being noticed and deleted. The immediate lesson here was for students to be more wary of allowing the tool to automatically send out notifications without checking first for inappropriate comments.

The need for verification turned out to be less of an issue than might have been the case in other breaking news stories, given that the main action was taking place offshore in the search zone and was reported back to the media

through controlled press conferences and issued statements. This reduced the risk of repeating false news from a self-identified witness but still required students to consider the authenticity of second-hand reports. Rather than quote a social media user who was quoting an authority, therefore, students were encouraged to find the original source and report that instead. In a story where breaking news is occurring and there are multiple potential witnesses, a new protocol has been developed for ECU Daily based on the work of the Center for News Literacy at Stony Brook University. Called 'I'M VAIN', the process uses the mnemonic to remind students that:

1. Independent sources are better than self-interested sources.
2. Multiple sources are better than a single source.
3. Sources who verify are better than sources who assert.
4. Authoritative/informed sources are better than uninformed sources.
5. Named sources are better than unnamed sources. (Klurfield & Schneider, 2014)

Maximising speed while retaining the quality of coverage was another challenge that emerged in the use of Storify and it became apparent that it was best to have students familiar with the tool driving the coverage, as they were able to do this fast enough to be competitive. Students new to Storify, who might have had ample time learning the ropes when covering a slower story such as the Oscar Awards red carpet, could not be afforded additional time or support when there were hundreds of competing organisations also covering the same material. Students who were quick Storifyers could cover a press conference or publish material online at the same pace as any major news organisation—some were able to publish mere seconds after statements were made at press conferences. The standard practice was for student reporters to tweet the conference as it went, capturing as much as possible on Twitter, then curate these tweets at a later point into the Storify of the day. The lesson here was that it would have been preferable to have a wider pool of competent Storify users in advance of the story breaking, to reduce the time needed to coach students in its use. The same is true for news organisations, however, and some mainstream journalists were simply not able to report as quickly on social media as a fast student curator. ECU Daily students are now introduced to Storify at the earliest opportunity to avoid this problem recurring.

Lastly, the coverage illustrated that student reporters needed to take all opportunities to add value to coverage. Our publication lacked the complex relationships and requirements facing corporate reporters and this emerged as a positive opportunity. A reporter from Channel 7, for example, may be reluctant out of a sense of brand loyalty to quote the comments of a reporter from Channel 9, just as newspapers are disinclined to reference or refer to competing publications. Our students faced none of these conflicts and were instead able to source material and

refer to it whenever it was deemed relevant, whether that was an Indian journalist on Twitter whose primary audience was on the subcontinent or an American reporter embedded on the search planes. Again, while television journalists concentrate reporting on those things that are visually interesting, students took the opportunity to add value by going line by line through press statements from the Australian Maritime Search Agency to see what additional material they could add to coverage. If a location in the middle of the Indian Ocean was described, for example, students were able to find out what the weather was like there at that moment using sites such as passageweather.com, or what ships were in the area using vesselfinder.com. The additional information was often minor but useful for an audience hungry for any new detail. This lesson has been learned for other stories and ECU Daily now incorporates additional fact boxes, infographics and explainers where possible to add to major news stories.

Conclusion

Curation as a reporting tool remains problematic in many ways, for media organisations and working journalists as well as for the educators preparing the next generation of reporters. In the world of curated reporting, the clearly defined guidelines that determine ownership and use of content, the relationship with and verification of sources, the protection of ordinary or vulnerable voices, and the choice of source material have blurred. For educators, therefore, Storify proves to be both a challenge and an opportunity—a challenge as it requires re-examination of core principles of ethical journalism practice and redefinition of boundaries, and an opportunity as it is a tool that has the potential to allow student journalists to perform authentic participatory reporting tasks and compete with working reporters to report social stories.

The search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 is provided as a case study for how Storify can be used in a student journalism newsroom to engage students in the production of social media stories on a breaking news issue, using Storify as a tool to build a large international audience. Through the use of Storify five main lessons were identified that were used to inform the use of the tool in future classes.

Firstly, it was found that issues such as content selection had to be addressed early and in consultation with students, as some needed assistance in searching widely for sources and information and help in adding value when factual details were scarce. The need to encourage sensitivity was a second issue that emerged, given that grieving families were anxious for information and that some social media posts—while funny, interesting or pert—could either raise hopes unfairly or be flippant in the face of grief. Verification, while not a significant issue for this story, remained something that was discussed with students, who were encouraged to find first-hand social media sources rather than people who

were merely retweeting others. In a situation where the information was not so scarce, nor tightly controlled through press conferences and statements, greater engagement with students on verification processes would be recommended. Speed was found to be a competitive advantage in covering the story, given the large number of other outlets similarly reporting on events. In many cases, the fastest students were able to report as quickly or faster than other outlets on things such as streamed press conferences. To avoid students taking too long to get up to speed with the Storify tool, it would have been ideal to have trained more students in its use before the story broke—a lesson that has been adopted in later semesters. Finally, value-adding to stories is another lesson adopted and incorporated in later coverage. In a fast-breaking, highly competitive story, in which readers are hungry for information, it was found that extending coverage with even minor details or additional background was valuable for the audience.

These lessons have been incorporated in the operation of the student newsroom and Storify remains a cornerstone tool used in the production of ECU Daily. Students in other journalism courses are now being exposed to its usefulness and educated in the issues that arise in its use.

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Improving HIV and STI responses through media and community engagement

Abstract: HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) and other sexually trans-mitted infections (STIs) in Western Australia are at their highest in 20 years. In response to this worrying escalation and the public need for accurate and balanced information about these diseases, the journalism department at Edith Cowan University, in partnership with the WA AIDS Council (WAAC), deve-loped a pilot project that consisted of a series of media training and education programmes to enable WAAC staff to share information and stories with the media on HIV and STIs in a more confident and proactive way. The project offers a model framework for media and community engagement that can be applied to a broader range of health promotion and disease prevention issues.

Keywords: AIDS, Australia, health communications, health promotion, HIV, media training, STIs

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Introduction

ROYAL Perth Hospital Department of Immunology physician David No-lan reported in 2013 that the diagnosis rate for HIV was higher in Western Australia than it was in the 1980s and that, since 2005, there has been a steady rise. The 2013 figures were the highest on record but the diagnosis rate has since shown no sign of slowing. These increases are attributed to a number of factors, such as migration, travel, online forums facilitating sexual encounters, but also because of a rise in heterosexual men and women being diagnosed. HIV is still spreading in WA communities and needs to be addressed together with the increase in sexually transmitted infections (STIs) (Gartner, 2013).

Figures from the Australia Bureau of Statistics also show that WA has among the highest rates of chlamydia and gonorrhea in the country, second only to the Northern Territory (ABS, 2013). Youth Affairs Council Executive Officer Craig Comrie said: 'Sexual health should be as important to people in the community as mental health. The reality is the statistics show one in five

young people experience mental health concerns. One in five young people in WA have chlamydia. One area of concern is the fly-in, fly-out workers in WA who travel to Bali during their working breaks' (Comrie, 2013) but other changes that have been linked with the rise in STIs include the use of online dating (Bateson, Weisberg, McCaffery and Luscombe (2012), and a reported decline in safe sex practices (O'Leary, 2015).

Despite the increasing spread of HIV and STIs in WA communities, media coverage of this important health issues remains patchy and sensationalist. Yet academic debate over the past 25 years shows the media has an important role to play. Ratzan (1993) argued that despite differing views on the precise role of the media in reporting HIV, there was broad agreement on the fact that the media are an important and influential source of health and medical information, and that they shape public understandings of, and responses to, the current epidemic. 'The media have enormous potential to help stop the spread of AIDS if they could inform the public continuously and accurately about the true nature and scope of HIV risks around the world' (Ratzan, 1993, p. 256). He stressed in the early 1990s that journalists should rise above the epidemic of complacency, stigma, and denial to uncover solutions for slowing HIV infection in the most devastated areas of the world. 'Effective health communication is our primary and most potent weapon in preventing the spread of AIDS. Until a vaccine or cure for HIV infection is discovered, communication is all we have' (Ratzan, 1993, p. 257).

The United Nations programme on HIV/AIDS stressed the pivotal role that media play in preventing HIV through educating people about HIV. In the UN-AIDS publication, *The Media and HIV/AIDS: Making a Difference*, it states that without an immediate cure or vaccine, then education is the best vaccine against the disease and encourages engagement with the media (UNAIDS, 2004).

Swain (2005) argued that the media, particularly journalists, exercise a significant influence in moulding public opinions and attitudes towards the disease and that much of society's understanding of the disease, including who it affects and its future possibilities, comes from the media (Swain, 2005, p. 258). Yet, coverage of HIV in many parts of the world has been erratic and often journalists frame the epidemic as an emergency rather than a lasting concern. Also, news analysis frequently fails to recognise socio-economic contexts that made it more difficult for some to avoid infection such as poverty, disempowerment, and inequalities (Swain, 2005, p. 259).

Research on media coverage of HIV shows that if effectively used, the media can lessen the fear and stigma that are the biggest obstacles to seeking information and treatment (Cullen 2000, p209). However, there has been a disproportionate emphasis in the media on reporting HIV infection rates with little in-depth analysis of the disease or informational content (Cullen, 2000, 2006, 2010). While the language and tone of HIV stories show more sensitivity to people living with

HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), Cullen (2014) argues there is a need to widen coverage and report HIV as a story with medical, political, social, economic, cultural, religious and relationship aspects. Engaging PLWHA to share their stories is particularly important in the delivery and clarification of health messages (Cullen & Callaghan, 2010). This last point is supported by the Australian government's national strategy on HIV, which stresses the need to ensure the continuous involvement of PLWHA as key partners in prevention education (Australian Government Department of Health and Aging: Sixth National HIV Strategy 2010-2013).

In an attempt to foster improved and responsible media reporting on HIV and STIs which will allow for better understanding and response to these diseases, the journalism department at Edith Cowan University, in collaboration with the WAAC, developed a pilot project entitled *Beyond the Red Ribbon* that provided both media education and training programmes for more than 40 staff at WAAC. The project drew on the successful 'Mindframe' initiative that has resulted in significant improvements in the reporting on mental health and suicide (Mindframe, 2014).

Key to the success of this project was a partnership approach linking community and media in the development and delivery of effective health messages. Such an approach is in line with international, national and state government policy guidelines. For example, the WA government's model of care implementation from 2010-2014 endorsed a partnership approach to the overall management of HIV and highlights the importance of education and research institutions in this work. ECU's collaborative partnership with WAAC was intended to be a practical example of this policy in practice as better educated journalists, and more stories and shared experiences on HIV and STIs, should impact on the public's knowledge and response. By providing community organisations such as WAAC with the skills and knowledge necessary to produce and deliver more effective media messages, and building bridges between these grassroots groups and media organisations who deliver the messages, the project aimed to bring about improved awareness and knowledge of HIV and STIs among the public. More broadly, this partnership project also wanted to investigate and pilot a model or framework of community and media engagement which could improve awareness and responses to HIV and STIs in Western Australia that could also have broader applicability to a range of health and disease prevention issues.

Methodology

The media education programme (MEP) had two main components. The first involved engaging with WAAC staff to broaden understanding of how the media operates, and secondly, developing their skills so they competently and confidently share their stories and experiences more effectively in the media.

Phase 1: Two media education seminars with WAAC staff

Phase 2: Three media training workshops for WAAC staff

The second phase also involved the design of a media kit, which was distributed to each participant. The content for the media kit was based on feedback gathered from face-to-face interviews with WAAC project participants and qualitative interviews with the Executive Team responsible for the delivery and implementation of the Mindframe National Media Initiative based at the Hunter Institute of Mental Health in Newcastle, NSW.

In each media training session, the group was asked to assist in defining the strengths and weaknesses as they saw them of different kinds of media engagement—both with traditional media and in their extensive practice and use of emerging or social media. This information then provided the basis for the training, to ensure examples, strategies and recommendations were targeted and related to authentic media queries or topics.

In addition, the trainers used a modified version of the continuous improvement 'plan-do-check–act' model as a framework for the training. The continuous improvement model is recognised as being useful when developing a set of processes that can be repeated or when taking an action that should be evaluated. While participants were not explicitly told this process was underpinning facilitator questions, they were taken through the steps throughout the training as they considered different media options.

As an example, participants were asked to develop some principles that might govern their media response to a controversial topic, such as what they might say to a teenager wanting needles for steroid use. This process represented the 'plan' phase of continuous improvement. Once they had discussed their media messages and strategy in relation to the topic, they were asked to articulate their positions in the same way that they would in an interview—the 'do' phase. The results of the interview were then opened to the group for discussion, allowing the interviewee to discuss how they felt about the process and the messages that they were trying to deliver. This 'check' phase was particularly useful as messages that sounded appropriate during planning could sometimes be garbled or confused when participants had to articulate them in an interview setting. Through the 'check' discussion, messages were refined and original principles were tested. Each cycle concluded with a new, improved set of messages and principles for media engagement as part of the 'act' phase, with participants made more aware of the need to develop their communication skills as circumstances changed.

Specific challenges

Five specific challenges for WAAC were identified through the training sessions, which are recorded here as they may be applicable to a number of similar or related health promotion organisations.

Challenge one: Increasing use of non-traditional media sources to reach key markets

WAAC reported that while they still received occasional calls from mainstream media outlets, this level of contact had declined over time as the relative news-worthiness of HIV had decreased. There was also additional 'competition' in the sexual health advisory space as other groups provided media comment on STIs, transmission rates and sexual practices. While WAAC did engage in pro-active contact with news media, senior members of the team found journalists were usually disinterested in stories that promoted general health information or which had an educational focus. Mainstream coverage had tended to be con-fined to particular events, such as its annual STYLEAID fundraising fashion event or World AIDS Day.

The organisation had recognised it needed to use non-traditional media sources to reach key markets, particularly younger people, so had developed multiple Facebook pages, a Twitter account, Instagram accounts, and a presence on Tumblr. This fragmentation of the media focus meant that more time was required to prepare messages and update each channel (which frequently had a narrow, specific audience, limiting leveraging of content). The time-consuming nature of new media engagement was a key driver in WAAC seeking media advice, as it had become impractical for external communications control to rest in the hands of a few senior team members given the number of different messages and channels WAAC now felt it needed to address.

Challenge two: Diversifying of voices within an organisation that can speak to media groups.

With the decision to devolve the communications role and empower a larger group to speak on behalf of the organisation, WAAC faced other challenges. One of these related to the number of part-time and casual or volunteer staff within the organisation. The leadership team at WAAC sought to encourage a wide group of people to be able to respond to any media queries and had empowered them to produce their own media content through non-traditional channels. Many of the team were comfortable with this approach, and some had experience in working with journalists or in publishing content in other contexts. The level of experience—and of comfort in representing the organisa-tion—varied significantly, however.

Mock interview scenarios, in which WAAC interviewees were put through moderate to difficult questioning by the trainers in the role of a journalist, found that initial confidence in answering queries could evaporate if questions became contentious. While the sessions had been initiated with the intention of developing staff confidence in talking to the media, the mock interviews had, at times, the opposite effect. A lesson for trainers out of these sessions was that exposing staff members to challenging interviews could be counterproductive if it undermined the willingness of participants to put training into practice out of fear of making a mistake.

Challenge three: Matching messages to specific markets that are 'at risk' without alienating them

An important principle of WAAC's engagement with its constituency is a commitment to providing non-judgemental advice and support. Its mission includes reducing 'social, legal and policy barriers which prevent access to health information' and in training sessions WAAC staff frequently stressed the importance of providing advice without stigmatising people or behaviour. This in turn presents a challenge for WAAC in delivering messages that address risky or unsafe practices. On a number of occasions, staff noted that they tried to balance the need to raise awareness of the dangers in, say, male sexual intercourse without condoms, with the belief that taking a critical stance on this practice could make it less likely for a person to attend a WAAC clinic for advice.

This is a critical distinction for a health promotion group such as WAAC, and distinguishes them from some other services that might, for example, be able to harness admonishing messages like 'stop smoking' or 'lose weight' that are memorable for their clarity and simplicity. Instead, WAAC's messaging tended to be nuanced or even equivocal on whether someone 'should' or 'should not' do something that carried a risk. On the one hand this meant messages were less likely to be perceived as criticism by key audiences but on the other hand allowed for misinterpretation.

Challenge four: Developing messaging that fully encapsulate WAAC positions, when these positions can sometimes be deliberately flexible

As noted earlier, the continuous improvement framework used to structure discussions around messages allowed participants in the group to focus on different scenarios and plan the messages they might choose to disseminate if asked about various topics. The option of self-testing of HIV was selected as one potential scenario for discussion, in part because its novelty increased the relative newsworthiness of the topic. At the time of the first media session, there were a number of stories that had been published by the medical community that raised concerns about self-testing, including a relatively high risk of false positive results, estimated to occur in 1 to 2 per cent of tests (RACGP, 2015). The group was asked to develop the WAAC position on self-testing, to determine what messages might be given to a journalist were they to call and ask 'Is this a good idea?' This prompted considerable discussion, with several potential positions emerging: that self-testing could be convenient; that self-testing could be an important tool in increasing awareness of HIV status; that self-testing raised the risk someone might receive a false-positive result; that self-testing was risky if someone reacted badly to a positive result delivered without the advice, support and context provided in a clinic.

Each of these positions is valid and the views were held to greater or lesser degrees by different WAAC staff. This lack of consensus highlights the difficulty

in devolving responsibility for representing the organisation to a broad group of people who might be called on to deliver a cohesive organisational position in response to a media query.

Challenge five: Measuring the effectiveness of new media outreach

As noted, the use of non-traditional media was considered by WAAC as the best option for speaking directly to its different constituencies—many of them hard to reach through mass media publications. A Tumblr page addressed issues and topics of interest to gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender teenagers, for example. An Instagram stream targeted travellers who were anticipating travelling overseas with the intention of having sex while a Facebook page spoke directly to men who had sex with men but who might not specifically identify as homosexual.

Given the relatively niche audiences addressed through these channels, it emerged that WAAC struggled to identify what media outreach was most effective in engaging audiences and what was not delivering an appropriate 'return' on the time or funds invested. The use of popular metrics such as 'likes' on Facebook were also not particularly useful; given the sensitive and personal nature of many of the areas, WAAC recognised there was a strong disinclination for some people who might be within a target audience to publicly acknowledge a site on sexual practices with a 'like'.

This particular challenge was not successfully resolved in the training sessions, however a number of options for better evaluation of effort were discussed. These included asking people at the point of clinic attendance what WAAC sites or channels they had seen and what messages they remembered, and greater use of analytical measures that count impressions of social content and reach rather than retweets, likes or active sharing.

Outcomes to date

The pilot project was immediately translated into policy as it had been identified as a vital component of the WAAC's revised media and communications strategy. Andrew Burry, chief executive officer of the WAAC, said the feedback from the participants had been overwhelmingly positive and appreciative. 'Learning what to do when a journalist calls, how to conduct interviews and how to maintain contacts afterwards has been really invaluable in getting essential information out to a variety of communities,' he said.

Moreover, the project will be offered to other state-based AIDS Councils throughout Australia via the Australian Federation of AIDS Organizations. The Australian Society for HIV Medicine (ASHM) asked Cullen to deliver media training workshops for 134 AIDS community leaders from 22 developing countries before and after the World AIDS Congress in Melbourne in July 2014. These

workshops offered another opportunity to disseminate information about the project as well as gather information about how the model could be used or adapted for different contexts such as in developing nations. The project broadly addressed the national strategic research priority of promoting population health and wellbeing, helping to build resilient communities and helping Australians achieve physical, mental and social wellbeing.

More specifically, using feedback from the participants on the content and delivery of both the media education and training programme, the project:

- Improved understanding of how the media works on the part of grass roots community organisations such as WAAC;
- Improved skills on the part of grass roots community advocates such as WAAC in handling and exploiting print, broadcast and social media to disseminate their key messages. This is a pilot project, and it is the intention to offer the resources and education programs nationally to AIDS organisations throughout Australia to improve relationships with media on a national scale;
- The project has provided a framework to develop a broader model for community/media engagement that can be applied to other health and disease prevention issues;
- Improved dissemination of stories and experiences of people living with HIV/Aids and STIs which are key ingredients for effective health communications as they put a 'human face' on these diseases;
- The framework of community and media engagement which underpinned the media education program has broader applicability for other health promotion/disease prevention initiatives beyond HIV/STIs.

This last point sets the scene for another potential stage of the project—namely the training of health personnel working in other health promotion areas such as diabetes and heart disease. As a start, the plan is to approach the WA Health Department and share what was achieved with staff at the WA AIDS Council, hoping they will adopt the 'media training approach' that will incorporate lessons learnt from this pilot project.

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Photograph: John Miller

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REVIEWS

DR DAVID ROBIE is editor of Pacific Journalism Review.

Merdeka: Media and the case for Papuan civil resistance

Merdeka and the Morning Star: Civil resistance in West Papua, by Jason MacLeod. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 2015. 284 pp. ISBN 978-0-7022-5376-8

FIVE years ago the Pacific Media Centre and Pacific Media Watch published a 'state of media freedom report'—the first such documentation in the Pacific region—and the most devastating section was about West Papua (Perrottet & Robie, 2011, 2012). The harrowing account of human rights violations and abuses of freedom of speech by the Indonesian military and security forces eclipsed comparable reports from the Pacific, including Fiji which was at the time a *cause célèbre* for free press champions.

The theme of this report echoed many articles I have written over the years highlighting the 'black' or 'blind spot' demonstrated by New Zealand media neglect of covering West Papua and the self-determination cause (see Robie, 2011). Since then much has changed.

A New Zealand journalist, Paul Bensemann, went undercover to West Papua in 2013 and reported on accusations over New Zealand 'aid that kills' in the region (Bensemann, 2014). This was followed up in 2015 by both Māori Television's *Native Affairs* reporter Adrian Stevanon (with researcher Karen Abplanalp)—the first NZ TV crew to visit West Papua in a half century (MTS, 2015)—and Radio New Zealand's Johnny Blades and Koroi Hawkins (RNZ, 2015) taking up the challenge of President Joko Widowo's controversial pledge to 'open up' West Papua to the world's media. But the rest of the New Zealand media has remained unmoved.

It is thus refreshing and timely to welcome Australian educator, journalist, organiser and researcher Jason MacLeod's new book, *Merdeka and the*

Morning Star: Civil resistance in West Papua, based on his doctoral thesis and 14 years of research in the region. This is essential reading for journalists, civil society activists and policymakers concerned over West Papua and a peaceful future for the Pacific.

It recounts five decades of Indonesian oppression, but it is also a comprehensive analysis of hopes and possibilities for the future.

Ironically, 2011—the year of the Pacific media freedom report on Papua—heralded a dramatic growth of citizen journalism and social media exposure of the West Papuan cause on the global stage. Since then, international media and public interest has grown sharply—even if it remains muted in New Zealand—leading to the historic inclusion of West Papua as an observer with the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) in the Solomon Islands in 2015.

Although I was highly critical of Fiji and Papua New Guinea on my media blog *Café Pacific* over their 'betrayal' of the Melanesian cause at the time, inspired leadership by host Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare in Honiara ultimately proved decisive (Robie, 2015).

As MacLeod recounts, faced with intransigence by the Jakarta government, Papuan leaders 'escalated tactics':

> On the last day of the Third Papuan People's Congress—a three-day gathering of unarmed resistance groups in October 2011—Papuan leaders formed the NFRWP (National Federal Republic of West Papua) and declared independence. The response from the security forces was swift and brutal. About an hour after the congress concluded, the security forces opened fire. Three Papuans were shot dead. Two were fatally stabbed. Three hundred people were arrested and beaten. Six leaders were jailed, charged with treason. The police—who shot, stabbed, beat and tortured people—received warning letters (p. 155).

The killing of protesters at the congress—reported widely internationally by mobile phone, Facebook, YouTube and activist emailing lists—stirred anger among Papuans, both at home and abroad, and shocked international supporters. *PMC Online* reported the outrage at the time with embedded footage even though the killings were largely ignored by the New Zealand media (PMC Online, 2011).

According to MacLeod, the attack by the Indonesian forces on unarmed Papuans and an earlier occupation of the provincial parliament in June 2010 'were also evidence that the social media revolution had well and truly arrived in West Papua'.

MacLeod contrasts these events with the Biak massacre in July 1998 when the Indonesian military opened fire on activists who had been protesting for days, raising the Morning Star and singing songs of independence, when more than 100 people were killed, raped or tortured (Peacock, 2013). A leader, Filep Karma, was jailed for 15 years for raising the free Papuan flag.

'It took weeks and months for the news to get out,' notes MacLeod. 'Even

now we do not have a comprehensive forensic account of what happened' in spite of the Elsham Papua investigation (1999) and 'Bloody Biak' report. After the October 2011 shootings and reprisals, 'the news was instantaneous, even though no international journalists were present' (p. 155)

MacLeod refers to the 'surprising announcement' by President Widodo that foreign journalists would become free to visit West Papua, but qualifies this with the observation: 'As long as the Indonesian government values propaganda over a free press, the battle for open access to West Papua will be ongoing.' He notes that the Surat Jalam system through which police and intelligence services monitor foreign visitors remains in force (p. 156).

The main thrust of MacLeod's book is making a case for nonviolent civil resistance by Papuans and their international supporters, saying that the armed struggle has achieved little, whereas some significant gains have been made by mass mobilisation and civil disobedience.

The book is divided into six chapters as well as a prologue, epilogue and postscript (updating the struggle) with a 'Now we take our message to the world' theme. Chapter one outlines the research framework and methodology, two examines the historical and political dynamics of the conflict, three offers alternative visions of *merdeka*—freedom and what it means for West Papua, four looks at civil resistance, five outlines the transition from armed to unarmed resistance, while chapter

six provides a framework for 'nonviolent liberation'.

In the final chapter, MacLeod highlights successful campaigns of nonviolent resistance ranging between localised struggles like the Freeport mineworkers strikes in 2007 and 2011 and the unified push for membership of the MSG that is 'accelerating the internationalisation of the struggle' (p. 192). Some specific examples he cites are:
- Papua Land of Peace campaign for inter-communal harmony and peaceful dialogue.
- Hand Back Otsus (failed special autonomy status) campaign.
- The devastating Freeport-McMoRan mine strikes and the Tongoi Papua campaign.
- Public declaration of independence in October 2011.
- The campaign to become members of the MSG.

The author also highlights the successful Mama-Mama campaign by women traders to secure their own marketplace in the heart of Jayapura, and the shutdown of BHP Billiton's planned Gag Island mine by environmentalists, indigenous and human rights campaigners. Ongoing actions to release political prisoners in West Papua and to support open media access also get strong support in this book.

MacLeod also points out the reality of how civil resistance threatens vested interests and is highly critical of a narrow view of 'economic development' as imposed by Jakarta without consultation with the Papuans.

It undermines Jakarta's legitimacy, and imposes heightened economic and political costs on the Indonesian state. Newfound international interest is starting to provoke greater political attention from Jakarta. It is also clear that solutions focused solely on economics will not fix the problem just as economic progress has not quelled the clamour for independence in Kanaky (New Caledonia) (p. 193).

While conceding that conditions are currently not favourable for a fully independent West Papua, MacLeod presents an argument for greater people's mobilisation and the growth of citizen media that could still achieve much. Papuans need to emphasise their ethnic distinctiveness 'without falling prey to narrow ethno-nationalism'. He points out that while the international system of states is 'far from unraveling', after independence in East Timor, Kosovo, South Sudan and the breakdown of Syria and Iraq, some post-colonial boundaries are perhaps more shaky than they used to be.

So, while an independent West Papua appears highly unlikely, it would be presumptuous to think it will never happen (p. 232).

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Seymour Hersh—behind the man and the muckraker myths

Seymour Hersh: Scoop Artist, by Robert Miraldi. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2013, 415pp. ISBN 978-1-61234-475-1

A FTER winning acclaim for his depiction of yellow press icon Charles Edward Russell, award-winning journalist and academic Robert Miraldi examines the legacy of another mythical investigative reporter and obsessive 'muckracker'. His biography of the chameleon-like and elusive Seymour Hersh employs the same formidable forensic skills his subject is renowned for, but to dig into the one topic Hersh is genuinely uncomfortable discussing.

From his initial coverage of My Lai through to his work on Abu Grahib, Hersh's career has seen him reach the highest pinnacles of journalism, while also causing the kind of controversy and polarisation which would have destroyed the reputations of lesser mortals.

Yet Miraldi not only admirably copes with his refusal to directly discuss the details of his craft, he also overcomes his general reluctance to be interviewed at all. Embarking on a meticulous attempt to assemble the story behind the stories which helped define the administrations of those Hersh remains implacably opposed to as well as those he admired, *Scoop Artist* isn't so much a profile of the contrarian reporter, but a production analysis of his process and journalistic practice.

This not only confronts the distressing subject matter at the centre of much of his reportage, it also exposes the disturbing professional flaws and personal weaknesses in the reporter himself.

Following stints with *Chicago Tribune's* City News Bureau and Associated Press, Hersh was catapaulted into the spotlight after securing an interview with Lieutenant William 'Rusty' Calley

while the indicted officer was stationed at Fort Benning.

Like many of the other misconceptions surrounding his reporting, Hersh's exclusive wasn't because he was the first to break the story about what happened in Quang Ngai province in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. After receiving a tip-off from an anti-war activist about the charges Calley faced, it was his gumshoe persistence and, at times, lack of concern at impersonating an officer that allowed him to eventually ingratiate himself with a man who would go on to be convicted of personally shooting Vietnamese children.

The ethics of the methods he used to pursue Calley are rightly overshadowed by the resulting furore. Without Hersh's dogged persistence and willingness to act on information provided by individuals who hoped the resulting publicity would compromise America's involvement in South East Asia, the Army's initial press release might have been ignored by everyone except a few minor outlets.

However, his 1969 exposé also contained elements which would become trademarks of his subsequent career; and a far cry from at least some of the requirements he initially encountered as a cub reporter.

Hersh never explains precisely what Calley told him over bourbon and steaks and what he was able to cull from other sources. He didn't travel to Vietnam until 1971 and unlike other reporters, failed to interview the survivors of the massacre at Sơn Mỹ.

The kudos and monetary rewards he received as his coverage began to be picked up nationally, especially by the likes of *The New York Times*, allowed him to create history as well as report it.

However, Miraldi never stoops to character assassination and like 'King Sy' at his best, lets the information he's gathered through countless interviews and a comprehensive dissection of Hersh's prolific writing speak for itself.

Although your feelings about the ultimate scoop artist will be shaped by how closely you identify with his compulsive challenging of official narratives, Miraldi's triumphs mean it will be impossible to discuss the man and the myths surrounding him without referring to this text.

Dr PHILIP CASS is reviews editor for Pacific Journalism Review.

# The realities of authoritarian media in China

Media Commercialisation and Authoritarian Rule in China, Daniela Stockman. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012. XXII+338pp. ISBN 978-1-107-01844-0

CHINA can no longer be called Communist. It is an authoritarian state in which a party that likes to call itself Communist maintains a firm grip on the country.

However much the party and the corrupt party princelings enjoy the benefits of capitalism (and let us be frank that it is a distinctively 19th century robber baron style of capitalism), the government uses methods of media control that have not changed since Mao took power in 1959. Censorship has always been part of the regime, but Mao and his direct successors were always clever enough to give the masses a chance to let off steam now and then through such projects as the Hundred Flowers campaign and the Democracy Wall movement.

Once enough steam had been released, the lid was screwed firmly back down. Real protest, such as the Tiananmen Square protests, were ruthlessly crushed.

Daniela Stockman argues that the current regime uses the same policies through what appears at first to be privately owned, non-government media. Her view is that it is precisely the non-government media which are the best tool for reinforcing the party line. Because people have learned not to trust party propaganda they prefer to read non-government newspapers, thinking they are more free.

As I discovered while doing research for this book, many other authoritarian states have followed a strategy similar to China's by introducing market forces into previously tightly controlled state media. When I started this project I was convinced that the introduction of such market forces had diversified and liberalised the Chinese media. My initial plan was to examine how commercial liberalisation of the media could contribute to political liberalisation and possibly democratisation; but the more data I gathered, the more evidence I found that

the reverse was the case: while market forces brought about greater space for news reporting, this space turned out to the advantage of the regime, under the condition that institutions tighten the leash on the media when necessary. Overall, the balance between liberalisation and control promoted regime stability rather than diluted it. (p. xv)

As happens in many parts of the world, the private press may be free, but it knows where the red lines are and rarely, if ever, crosses them. (The press in the United Arab Emirates, for instance, provides an excellent comparison with the Chinese situation). All the government has to do is to feed its line to the non-government press and people will think they are receiving an independent view. The government simply allows the press more leeway to report on matters that do not challenge its authority.

Meanwhile, the press can be allowed to gripe about matters that do not charge the party's authority and create an illusion of greater freedom.

The government, however, also plays some fairly dangerous games. It manipulates public feelings on international matters, especially towards Japan and the United States. The latter country is seen as China's main super power rival in the Pacific, so it can be criticised, but at the same time many Chinese in the capital and special economic zones who are familiar with the material output of American capitalism, see it as something to be envied.

Japan has been the target for fierce, even violent, nationalist sentiment because of its refusal to apologise for its invasion of China and the countless war crimes committed between 1937 and 1945. This rage, however, can also boil over into anti-government sentiment, so it is always controlled. Those who remember the devastation caused by the Cultural Revolution have no wish to see mobs of violent hooligans let loose again.

With Mao conveniently turned into a demi-God, the Cultural Revolution buried as deeply as the Tiananmen Square massacre and President Xi Jinping busy creating his own cult of personality, any claims by the current regime to have inherited the mantle of the Great Helmsman have little legitimacy. Nationalism, on the other hand, may provide a handy substitute for party loyalty, as long as it is carefully controlled.

However, as Stockman points out, popular nationalism, as opposed to government ordained sentiment, may contain elements of anti-government sentiment, especially with regard to foreign relations.

Thus the media, although supposedly independent and free, operates within unstated, but definite boundaries. Precisely because they appear to be free, the non-government press in fact provides legitimacy to government politics and control.

Daniela Stockman's work is highly recommended to those interested in China and its media and to those with a general interests in what happens when a Communist regime appears, at least outwardly, to have adopted capitalism.

Noted:

DR DAVID ROBIE is editor of Pacific Journalism Review

RSF cheekily climbing the barricades

Saving Independent Journalism: 30 Years Defending Media (39pp); **Hostile Climate of Environmental Journalists** (27pp). 2015. Paris, France: Reporters Without Borders.

THIRTY years ago, Reporters Sans Frontières began its global campaign for the protection of journalists and against propaganda as a fledgling NGO in the southern French city of Montpellier.

Better known in the Anglophone world as Reporters Without Borders, RSF declares in the editorial of this milestone publication that it has been 'cheekily climbing the barricades, boldly waving freedom's banner, proclaiming the virtues of journalism, supporting heroes, dispensing safety equipment, funding resistance and applying pressure in the palaces where the laws are written' (p. 3).

Three decades on and the now Paris-based agency has matured into a 'big little NGO'. It has consultative status with the United Nations, UNESCO, Council of Europe and the Independent Organisation of La Francophonie. *Saving Independent Journalism* recounts RSF's growth and many high points of its media freedom campaigns.

The agency communicates in English, French, Spanish, Arabic and

Farsi daily and frequently uses Russian and Chinese as well.

It has correspondents in 130 countries—including Australia, New Zealand and five Pacific countries, eight autonomous national sections and bureau in 12 cities around the world. Two more are in the pipeline for Hong Kong and Sao Paulo.

The agency has made many submissions and interventions over press freedom in the South Pacific, notably about Fiji during eight years of military dictatorship from 2006-2014.

Among countless media people RSF has defended are Hla Hla Win, a young woman Burmese journalist sentenced to 27 years in prison for interviewing Buddhist monks during the 2007 'Saffron Revolution'; Mexican publisher Jesús Lemus Barajas of *El Tiempo* newspaper who disappeared while investigating a drug cartel (he was found in jail on trumped up charges and three of his lawyers were murdered); Saudi blogger Raïf Badawi who was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1000 lashes over a charge of apostasy and award-winning Chinese journalist Gao Yu, who has been imprisoned since 2014 for sending a copy of an internal Community Party memo to a foreign news organisation.

RSF secretary general Christophe Deloire argues: 'Whether totalitarian … violent or soft, information control is taking unprecedented forms that free citizens must oppose with all their strength.' He also offers a strong message for supporters.

The second RSF title reviewed here is very timely, coinciding with the COP21 climate summit in Paris. *Hostile Climate for Environmental Journalists* has investigated threats to freedom of information about the environment rather than risks to the environment itself:

"The [3000] journalists accredited to COP21 [were] in no danger (except the danger of pressure from lobbyists) but the same cannot be said of many of their colleagues, who are often exposed to terrible dangers."

The report shows that at least 10 journalists covering environmental issues were murdered between 2010 (the last RSF report) and 2015—three fifths of them in the Asia-Pacific region: Cambodia (2), India (2), Indonesia (2), Philippines (2) and Russia (2).

As well as documenting the murder with impunity cases, the report highlights the case of eight 'green journalists in red zones' in Algeria, India, Italy, Liberia, Maldives, Russia and Vietnam.

RSF cites gagging by countries such as China, Ecuador and Canada and notes that many environmental journalists are forming associations with the aim of improving the quality of their stories and protecting their members in the field.—*DR DAVID ROBIE is the editor of Pacific Journalism Review.*

Detailed Article 19 reference

THIS weighty volume sets out to trace the development of the concepts of rights to freedom of expression and information on the world stage.

In particular, it sets out to show how this has happened within the framework and institutions of the United Nations and how concepts of those freedoms and those rights have been argued, debated and refined over the years.

New technologies, new opportunities for engagement with the media and technologies by the massive shifts in global political alignments and the end of the Cold War have all affected how people viewed these rights. Protecting them and providing a guide to how those rights can be interpreted has been the function of the United Nations.

Fundamental to this was Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights, which, along with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provided a basic outline that would allow for refinement, reinterpretation and re-thinking about what those rights mean.

Article 19 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights says:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

As the authors point out, many of the rights ascribed to humanity in the period after 1945 conflicted with national laws and institutions, not to mention very deeply rooted cultural barriers and many countries see them as just so much Western flummery. After all, why bother to listen to your citizens when it is simply more convenient to kill them?

And what happens when you simultaneously try to banish racism or other forms of discrimination and try to enact or at least create declarations to this effect? At what point does honest debate about a sensitive issue become racism?

These issues have been debated at

length in a variety of international fora and it is the strength of this book that it considers, in detail that will satisfy most readers, the way in which laws, attitudes and responses to these issues have been framed and re-framed within the responsible United Nations bodies, even down to lists of how individual countries voted on critical decisions.

The authors are critical of the UN for being slow to adapt to the challenges posed by new technologies, particularly the internet, and draws unfavourable comparisons with the work of the European Union and the Council of Europe in this area.

For lawmakers, journalists, members of NGOs and civil society organisations, governments and public servants dealing with the rights of freedom of expression and information, *The United Nations and Freedom of Expression and Information* contains much that will be instructive.

In conclusion, could I just note that this book has one of the worst covers I have ever seen on an academic book? What on earth did CUP think they were doing? This book is already specialised enough to deter the casual reader. Did the publishers hope that some miserable hand drawn doodles would frighten off the rest of the readers? Academic books have enough trouble fighting for notice in the marketplace. A little help—and thought—from the publishers would not go astray.—*Dr PHILIP CASS is reviews editor of Pacific Journalism Review.*

A valuable newsroom resource

Pacific Way: Auckland's Pasifika Community Diaspora Media, Michael Neilson. Auckland, Pacific Media Centre/AUT, 2015. 72pp. ISBN 978-1-927184-35-6

PACIFIC WAY: Auckland's Pasifika Community Diaspora Media is the first comprehensive survey of the Pasifika diaspora media in Auckland. The author and researcher, Michael Neilson, has done a great job in capturing this important media landscape in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

The monograph, published by the Pacific Media Centre as number 5 in the *Pacific Journalism Monograph* series, provides the most recent and up-to-date statistics about Pasifika population and diaspora, while also touching on the history of the arrival of Pacific communities to New Zealand, dating back to the 1860s. It also provides statistics on the number of Pasifika journalists in New Zealand, which identify them as the smallest grouping in this profession after Māori. These numbers paint a picture of why it is important that there are outlets serving Pasifika diaspora communities.

The monograph also explores the misrepresentation of Pasifika in mainstream media and how detrimental this can be to the younger generation, who only see negative stories about their own communities, many of them related to crime. When discussing racial hostility in New Zealand against Pasifika communities, it is of course,

about the importance of Pasifika media.

Pacific Way is written in a style that will make it accessible to everyone, from high school students to academics. As the first publication of its kind it will most probably become a valuable source for students and newsrooms all around New Zealand and the Pacific. The Pasifika media in Auckland is a dynamic and evolving industry and this report will be the first of many to delve into Auckland's Pasifika diaspora media community.—*MARI DUNLOP is a freelance journalist specialising in Māori affairs.*

absolutely necessary to reference the Dawn Raids in the 1970s. Neilson quotes Spoonley who noted that 'media, in repeating rather than challenging a highly inaccurate public image, have seriously contributed to inter-group hostility and helped produce a blanket, anti-Pacific Islander feeling among Pakeha.' Neilson's coverage of the Dawn Raids is succinct, but still focuses a spotlight on the injustices of the raids and how the mainstream media has continued since then to poorly serve Pasifika communities.

One weakness of the monograph is that it does not provide enough recent evidence of how this is happening in today's mainstream media. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a lot of misrepresentation of minorities in the mainstream media, but the presentation of empirical data would add more weight to arguments

Call for articles and commentaries:
Journalism education In Asia-Pacific

Edition editor: Dr Philip Cass (Unitec)

Managing editor: Professor David Robie (AUT-Pacific Media Centre)

Frontline editor: Professor Wendy Bacon (ACIJ)

Reviews editor: Dr Philip Cass (Unitec)

The Fourth World Journalism Congress (WJEC) conference is being held at Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand, July 14-16, along with a JERAA/Pacific Media Centre/Media Educators Pacific day-long pre-conference on July 13. Papers are being sought for a special themed edition of *PJR* based on these and related issues, with a special focus on the Asia-Pacific region, including but not restricted to:

- Journalism education and informed citizenry
- Journalism education in Asia
- Journalism education in the South Pacific
- Asia-Pacific journalism models/case studies
- Political economy of media education
- Journalism education, freedom and independence
- Independent student media case studies
- Research trends in Asia-Pacific journalism
- 21st century ethical issues in journalism
- Teaching journalism for mobile (multiple) platforms
- De-westernising journalism education

The above list is a guideline and other related topics will also be considered Papers not presented at the WJEC conference or pre-conference can also be submitted. The journal has an unthemed section and other papers related to journalism studies, and journalism education, theory and practice will also be considered. *Pacific Journalism Review* is the only journalism journal from Australasia indexed by SCOPUS.

The double blind peer-reviewed journal has five main sections: Research articles, Commentaries, Frontline (journalism-as-research), Forum and Reviews. The APA-based style guide is at: www.pjreview.info/style-guide

Submissions: pjreview@aut.ac.nz | Deadline: August 20, 2016

Notes for contributors

Pacific Journalism Review, founded at the University of Papua New Guinea in 1994, is a peer-reviewed journal covering media issues and communication in the South Pacific, Asia-Pacific, Australia and New Zealand. It is now published by the Pacific Media Centre, AUT University, and has links with the University of the South Pacific. While one objective is research into Pacific journalism theory and practice, the journal is also expanding its interest into new areas of research and inquiry that reflect the broader impact of contemporary media practice and education.

A particular focus will be on the cultural politics of the media, including the following issues—new media and social movements, indigenous cultures in the age of globalisation, the politics of tourism and development, the role of the media and the formation of national identity and the cultural influence of New Zealand as a branch of the global economy within the Pacific region. It also has a special interest in environmental and development studies in the media and communication—and vernacular media in the region.

Main sections:
• *Research:* Academic research and analysis papers (up to 6000 words)

• *Commentary:* Industry insights, developments and practice (1500-3000 words)
• *Frontline*: Reflective journalism research (up to 6000 words)
• *Reviews:* Books, films, online developments, multimedia (800-1500 words).
• *Noted:* 300-350 words.
• *Forum:* Letters, brief commentaries (up to 800 words)

Submission of papers:
Within the editorial scope of the journal, we invite the submission of original papers, commentaries and reviews. Submissions are reviewed by the editor, or editorial committee. Submissions are double blind peer refereed.

Editorial deadline for next issue:
August 20, 2016. Submissions should be emailed to the managing editor,
Professor David Robie:
pjreview@aut.ac.nz
School of Communication Studies
AUT University

Style: Use *APA (American Psychological Association) Style* for author-date system of referencing. See style guide at **www.pjreview.inf**