INTERSTICES

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THE ARTS OF SPINOZA
+ PACIFIC SPINOZA

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contents

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NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES

Individual authors have indicated in their bibliographies which editions/translations of Spinoza's works they have used, but citations have been standardised in accordance with the following abbreviations.

Abbreviations for Spinoza's works

CM = *Cogitata metaphysica* (Appendix containing metaphysical thoughts)

E = *Ethica* (Ethics)

Ep. = *Epistolae* (Letters)

G = *Opera*, by Spinoza (1925), edited by Carl Gebhardt, 4 volumes (Heidelberg: Carl Winter).

KV = *Korte Verhandeling van God de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand* (Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being)

TdIE = *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect)

TTP = *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (Theological-Political Treatise)

TP = *Tractatus Politicus* (Political Treatise)

Thus:

TdIE §29 refers to paragraph 29 of the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*.

KV 1.2 refers to part 1, chapter 2 of the *Korte Verhandeling*.

TTP, ch. 20 refers to chapter 20 of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.

TP, ch. 5, §4, refer to chapter 5, paragraph 4 of the *Tractatus Politicus*.

CM 2.6 refers to part 2, chapter 6, of the *Cogitata Metaphysica*.

Only where there is any ambiguity or where the author has preferred it, the equivalent reference to Carl Gebhardt's standard Latin edition of Spinoza's *Opera* has been provided. As per above, Gebhardt is indicated with a G; thus G3:241 refers to Gebhardt, volume 3, page 241.

Arabic numerals have been used throughout, to reduce errors in copyediting and typesetting design. For example, G3:241 has been used in preference to the more usual GIII/241, referring to Gebhardt, volume 3, page 241.

Abbreviations for the elements of the Ethics

A = Axiom

App = Appendix

C = Corollary

D = Demonstration / Proof

Def = Definition

DefAff = Definition of an Affect

GenDefAff = General Definition of the Affects at the end of Part 3

L = Lemma

P = Proposition

Pref = Preface

Post = Postulate

S = Scholium

Thus E2P40S2 refers to the Ethics, Part 2, Proposition 40, Scholium 2.

editorial / EU JIN CHUA

Introduction: The arts, architectures, affects, and ecologies of Spinoza in Aotearoa

In the course of working on this project, I realised there were a number of hesitancies or even skepticisms to overcome when dealing with a scholarly endeavour in Aotearoa New Zealand involving a long-ago philosopher from faraway Europe—Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677). Particularly so when addressing themes of art, architecture, urbanism, and the environment. In what follows I outline some of these hesitancies, suggesting that they're opportunities for generativeness rather than signs of barrenness. This will be my way of introducing this issue, which was co-edited with Farzaneh Haghighi, and which carries the considerations of many others who have similarly found generative potential in Spinoza's think-ing. I hope some of this addresses more general questions perhaps hovering in the mind of the presumed reader such as "why Spinoza now?" or "why Spinoza here?" or just plain "why Spinoza?" Since academic philo- sophy is not my bread-and-butter world—nor that of *Interstices*—such answers as I can provide here will necessarily entail directing the reader to other material, whether the papers in this issue or texts elsewhere. I try to address architecturally-inclined readers of *Interstices* in the section on architectural hesitancies, giving reasons for why Spinoza's thinking contains important resources for architecture.

The aesthetically-minded hesitancy

For readers of this journal it may be of interest to know that there remains a hesitancy over Spinoza's value for aesthetics, even amongst the philosoph-ically-minded. There's a school of thought in Spinoza studies that says this particular conjunction between philosopher and theme is fated to be an exercise in futility. This argument is most notoriously described in James Morrison's es-say "Why Spinoza Had No Aesthetics" (1989), which argues that Spinoza's system of thought is inhospitable to aesthetic reflection since it doesn't recognise artistic or creative endeavour as metaphysically distinct or worthy of note. Moreover, for Morrison, Spinoza seems to disparage as irrational those forms of cognition and perception associated with the arts—namely the sensory and the imaginative. Where Spinoza talks about beauty, it's to warn us against indulging in sensual pleasure (TdIE §4), or to argue that beauty is an entirely relative category capable of wrongfooting us if we imagine it to have any transcendent or intrinsic reality (E1App). When Spinoza does talk about the arts—e.g. in E4P45S where he says it's

helpful, in moderation, to refresh oneself by means of "decoration, music, sports, the theatre"—it seems he is only talking about the arts in an entirely incidental way (he's really talking about the principle of moderation). Such passages might seem to confirm the impression that Spinoza is an aesthetic killjoy, an ascetic rationalist "hostile towards art and beauty" (Morrison 1989: 359).

Today the scholarly climate is rather different in many quarters of Spinoza studies. When I first proposed "The Arts of Spinoza" as a possible theme for the "Interstices Under Construction Symposium", I wasn't aware, until I invited them to be keynote speakers, that Moira Gatens and Anthony Uhlmann had recently instigated a funded research project on a similar theme. Some of the work from their project has since been published in special issues of the journals *Textual Practice* (2019), and *Intellectual History Review* (2020). I'm grateful to Professors Gatens and Uhlmann for accepting my out-of-the-blue invitation to present their work at the symposium.

Neither was I aware that there were so many other scholars concurrently working on similar themes. In addition to new publications, I'm aware of at least two other recent similarly-themed conferences.[1] The subject of Spinoza and the arts seems to be incredibly fertile ground for current scholarship, suggesting there is indeed something untapped in Spinoza's thinking. This is one answer to the prod, "why Spinoza in *Interstices* now?"

Recent scholarship hinges on several key issues. Firstly, anachronism. Spinoza's philosophy emerged prior to modern eighteenth-century philosophical aesthetics, prior, that is, to Baumgarten and Kant. It preceded the modern way in which we in the West today tend to restrictively use the word "art" to describe a certain domain of human creative endeavour, and it preceded the modern use of the word "aesthetics" to mean the philosophy of art or of sensation and the sensible. A developing consensus in Spinoza studies identifies prolepsis as key to the modern misconception that he had no aesthetics: certain assumptions about art and aesthetics tend to be retroactively projected upon his seventeenth-century texts, which are then unsurprisingly found to be lacking because being tested against unsympathetic yardsticks from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Christopher Thomas's words, "Spinoza's philosophy has often been said to lack a theory of art, but statements on Spinoza's theory or lack of a theory of art have been made from the basis of modern aesthetic assumptions of what the form and content of a theory of art *ought* to look like" (2017: 20).

Anachronism begins with the basic issue of historical semantics and extends into the substantive issue of Spinoza's fundamental views. Historical semantics: the Latin word *ars* had a much broader meaning in Spinoza's time. *Ars*, for Spinoza, would have meant "skill", "craft", "technique", "ability", "ingenuity", "device", "cunning" or "proficiency", a range of meaning aslant to most contemporary uses of the word "art" or "arts" (Curley, 2016: 615; Gatens, 2015: 3). In early modern Europe pre-Baumgarten and pre-Kant, there wouldn't have been a tendency to assume, as today we might assume, that *ars* refers to a particular set of spiritually elevated and meaningfully ensouled creations made according to the free and purposive will of a self-professed human artist of particular genius, which are displayed or published in whatever venue is understood as operating within and given sanction by a putative *literati*, *cognoscenti*, or "art world".

The more substantive issue beyond historical semantics is that Spinoza's

philosophical views rule out many of the underlying premises above. Spinoza's doctrines preclude any understanding of "art" as being exclusively the domain of: (1) human beings; (2) classically sovereign individuals, let alone human geniuses;[2] (3) beauty, disinterested purposefulness, and teleological production; (4) a divinely inspired spirit, soul, or mind that issues controlling directives upon raw matter, extension, or body; and (5), the sensory, imaginative, and affective, conceived as faculties autonomous from intellect and transcendent reason. Among the principles in Spinoza that are subversive of these post-Idealist assumptions about art are his uncompromising naturalism, his propositions about "transindividuation" (a term Étienne Balibar [2020] develops via Simondon), his anti-teleologism, his necessitarianism, his mind-body parallelism, and his tripartite model of knowledge or cognition.

In Spinoza's thoroughgoing naturalism, there are no qualitative distinctions between human nature and nonhuman nature, since the laws by which the world operates are "always and everywhere the same" and all human actions must be considered exactly as we'd consider "lines, planes, and bodies" (E3Pref).

Under Spinoza's premises about transindividuation, my individual essence arises only by dint of the particular ways in which that essence is determined and modulated by other individuals, plus the particular ways in which I in turn determine and modulate other individuals—an apparent contradiction in terms, but only if one assumes that individual essence and external determination are antithetical, which Spinoza doesn't (see Balibar 2020).

In the tripartite model of knowledge (*cognitio*), Spinoza is simultaneously a denigrator of images, imagination, and the sensory—thus indeed a disdainer of the foundational materials of the arts, as per Morrison's view—*and* an affirmer of their primacy and elementality, thus arguably also an advocate of sorts for the power of art and the sensory, and for the need to properly understand the nature of the aesthetic (E2P40S2, E2P17S). Spinoza's picture of passionate images and fictions as being so powerful in human beings that we have to work hard to avoid being overmastered by them has the obverse effect of emphasising their electric and dangerous splendour, their inescapable role in our everyday lives and social formations.

In Spinoza's anti-teleologism… But I have to truncate further attempts at explication here and instead refer the reader to studies now available by Gatens, Uhlmann, Thomas, Davidson, Kerr, James, and others. From these new studies we glean a putative Spinozist theory of the imaginative arts as nothing more (and nothing less) than a complex outgrowth of the "necessity of nature's [i.e. God/Nature's] activity" (Thomas, 2018: 371) whereby complex bodies affect other complex bodies as part of their transindividual and non-teleological self-striving and self-perfection (a self-perfection that might also include political ends and effects, e.g. the strengthening or weakening of social bonds, the "self" understood as composite body politic).

In short, when we look to Spinoza, we discover an alternative aesthetics (if we can still call it that) derived from a time before the entrenchment of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions. This alternative aesthetics might be more congenial to our time than the latter or might at least give us more options (it puts the eighteenth-century option into historical perspective for example). This is what I understand Warren Montag (2020) to mean when he says that Spinoza represents

a "counter-aesthetics". But Montag gives us the "strong" version of the idea of an alternative: Spinoza, for him, isn't a harmless "option B" that augments the legacy of eighteenth-century aesthetics. Spinoza's ideas aren't supplemental but oppositional. One would no more use Spinoza to augment the premises of eighteenth-century European aesthetics than one would use a hammer to finish a construction made of modern plastic; there were hammers before plastic and they're better at smashing it.

Readers may find something familiar in this sketch of an aesthetics extrapolated from Spinoza: doesn't this sound a bit like Gilles Deleuze's aesthetics? My colleague Farzaneh Haghighi—co-editor, co-organiser, and cornerstone of this project—asked me: why not read Deleuze instead? Mentioning this feels worthwhile, since (1) this would count as a general hesitancy of the "why Spinoza in *Interstices*?" sort, and (2) I myself, like most students in the arts, first encountered Spinoza through continental rather than Anglo-American channels (as many of my references make obvious). I first read Spinoza to lessen my befuddlement about Deleuze and Nietzsche—a world-class case of inadvertently going from the frying pan into the fire, yet, as it turned out, obviously a helpful move. Spinoza's naturalism, for instance, and his account of the flow of all activity, human or otherwise, from a single substance, explained why Deleuze and Guattari's art theory (1994) didn't seem to resemble any other account of art I'd read up to that point. The peculiarities included the apparent absence of a qualitative distinction between human art and nonhuman nature; the stresses on acts of arranging, ordering, composing, affecting, framing and deframing rather than on semiotic or spiritual expressiveness.

So the first answer to "why not Deleuze?" is: why not, indeed? Second answer is: "yes, but…" Why not read Deleuze—yet we'd have to do so with acknowledgement that, although it's true that for those weaned on contemporary continental aesthetics (as may be the case with *Interstices* readers), Deleuze seems the preeminent intellectual descendant of Spinoza's and likewise Spinoza seems the preeminent ancestor of Deleuze's philosophy of immanence, their differences are neither negligible nor mutually reducible. Thus surely better to read Deleuze alongside Spinoza, rather than instead of. Deleuze's Spinozism has eccentric emphases that many Spinoza scholars still consider idiosyncratic and disputable. His reading of Spinoza through the lens of "expressionism" (1992) was initially so fascinating and illuminating because a curveball; yet many accounts of Deleuze continue to take expressionism as a given in Spinoza rather than as an interpretative emphasis. It even appears that, for certain Spinoza scholars, the ostensibly unassailable commitment to "immanence" isn't necessarily self-evident in the seventeenth-century texts, whereas this commitment is often presumed by those whose greatest familiarity or allegiance is with Deleuze's interpretations.[3] And although "the Spinoza of the affect" looms large for many—the popular version of Spinoza in which the concept of affect is foregrounded—some scholars have noted that this particular Spinoza may again be an artefact of the specific interpretative emphasis emanating from Vincennes-St.Denis.[4]

Conversely, many Deleuze scholars are understandably vexed when Deleuze is reduced to his Spinozism, not least since this would mean they are foot-soldiers twice over: scholarly foot-soldiers of a philosopher who was himself foot-soldier to an earlier philosopher, the latter of whom therefore claims conceptual and chronological primacy. See, for instance, Jones and Roffe who express their

bitterness about this by wilfully casting out Spinoza from their edited anthology, *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage*, each of whose chapters is devoted to all of Deleuze's major philosophical influences, *except* Spinoza and Bergson (2009: 3). They aren't wrong to the extent that, from the little I can tell, Deleuze's account of difference indeed goes beyond what we find in the letter of Spinoza.

My attempt at a reconciliatory tone in midst of this Deleuze-Spinoza minefield is to just say: those places where two philosophers are in agreement is as helpful as where they negate each other. Realising that Deleuze and Spinoza aren't the same person, yet also agree with each other on many points, should be taken as a low bar to clear. Why wouldn't we read the historical relation between Deleuze and Spinoza as dialectical rather than as identical or oppositional? Surely Deleuze's self-professed "buggering" of Spinoza could be taken as another way of describing a "dialectics of the positive" (Deleuze, 1995: 6; Macherey, 2011; Ruddick, 2008)?

In short, our theories of art are benefited by reading Spinoza alongside Deleuze without reducing the one philosopher to the other—though further work of parsing this won't be done here by me.[5] I direct the reader instead to articles in this volume that productively refer to Deleuze on Spinoza: e.g. Jonathan Lahey Dronsfield's account of his public readings of the *Ethics* performed as artwork, which becomes a spur for reflections about the affective nature of reading this book, as per Deleuze's remark (1995: 164–166) that there are at least two—in fact, three—parallel reading registers in the *Ethics*, e.g. the formidable geometric register, but also the more fiery and stirring undercurrent.

The architecturally-minded hesitancy

I hope these remarks above are taken as also relevant to architecture, that is, as equally an address to architecturally-minded hesitancies about Spinoza headlining *Interstices*—as far as architecture is understood to involve art, artistry, or artificing. However I can try to further crystallise this into three possible ways Spinoza might be architecturally helpful. Firstly, Spinoza's naturalisation of art objects would apply equally to architectural objects; likewise his precepts on transindividuality and univocity. The quick way of putting this: Spinoza helps us perceive every built artefact as continuous with the world, in fact individuated only because of this continuity—which would be a trivial point were it not that architectural modernism tended not to operate on this basis. Secondly, the concept of affect, which has proved so inexhaustibly fascinating for recent architectural theory, has one major source in Spinoza, as already mentioned. Affect's significance for architecture might, arguably, be more fully appreciated if these sources were more fully parsed. In fact, it's been argued that contemporary affect theory has often failed to fully absorb Spinoza's theses even when it claims to do so (Gatens, 2014). Thirdly, the social and political functions of architecture and design may find explanation or prospectus in Spinoza's social and political theory.

With regard to the first issue, I'd point to texts that have introduced to architectural theory words such as "flow", "field", "atmosphere", "indeterminacy", "open systems", "landscape urbanism", "topology", and similar.[6] These are keywords intended to propose new answers to old questions about what a building is and does, answers that undermine presumptions about the built object's autonomy. I'd suggest that Spinoza fits somewhere in these trends. Peg Rawes has written

that Spinoza gives us a picture of a kind of "'living' architecture or geometry [...] imbued with [...] nature's irreducible powers" (2012: 66). For Gökhan Kodalak, Spinoza compels us to ask, "What are the peculiar ecological enmeshments of a building? How does an architectural construct constitute its associated milieu?" (2018: 101, 106). These last quotes are really my way of truncating discussion by passing the buck to Professor Rawes and Dr. Kodalak, who have put more thought into these issues than I have—and also my way of thanking both for participating in this project; the latter has contributed a fascinating essay in the present volume deriving from doctoral research on Spinoza and architecture.

The second issue, the theory of affect, may be another way of restating the first. Saying that architecture is affective is to, once again, downgrade a building's ostensible autonomy and to instead emphasise its transversality, to promote the view that even the most bulwark-like building is nothing but the misty sum of its affective powers and capacities. To reverse this formulation: the powers and capacities of God/Nature are sometimes determined in such a way as to express themselves in the form of those concrete modifications called buildings.

Maybe my job here is to push the point—in hopes of further dispelling architecturally-minded hesitancies—that Spinoza's concept of affect is still stranger and more productive than contemporary architectural and affect theory has yet acknowledged. An account of Spinoza's model of affects might begin as follows: Affections (*affectio)*—not synonymous with affects (*affectus*), which follow secondarily—are modifications or states of God/Nature's attributes. I, a human being, am an affection in this sense; I'm a part of the world that's the world expressing itself in a particular way. But since I experience myself in time, I experience myself undergoing changes of state, transitions in the nature of my existence. These aren't necessarily "internal" states as against "external" states; Spinoza thwarts easy distinctions between subjective interiority versus objective exteriority. The most important point about changes of state, for Spinoza, is whether they increase or decrease the power of acting. Any change of state that increases or decreases power of acting—and only this kind of change—is called an affect.

But as in a flowchart, Spinoza asks: for any particular affect, are you or are you not the adequate cause of the affect? When I change state, this is usually owing to my being knocked about by the world; in such cases, I'm *not* the adequate cause of the change. However it's possible that my state-change arises from something in me that hasn't been (or cannot be) knocked about by the world; in such cases, I *am* the adequate cause. If my state-change arises totally from something unshakeable in me—if I am the adequate cause of my affect—then the change is called an action (*agere*) or active affect. If, on the other hand, my state-change is a bedevilment arising from constraints or knockings-about unrelated to my nature or essence—if I am not the adequate cause of my affect—then the change is called a passion (*passio*) or passive affect; in this case, I am, in a sense, suffering the change (*passio* is derived from *pati*, the Latin for "suffer"). For Spinoza, the vast majority of human affects are passive since they arise from our shakeability. This includes both "negative" *and* "positive" affects—anger, shame, and hatred, but also ordinary love, hope, and cheerfulness. Many affects that increase power of acting, e.g. the first flush of romantic love, nonetheless arise only by way of a bedevilling external cause, e.g. one's lover. Indeed most human life is suffered under affectual states of passivity since each of us is, after all, a tiny

and extinguishable speck in the larger scheme of things, buffeted about by the world's implacable forces (E4App6; TTP ch.16/G3:190-91). And, in order to cope, most of us live under the delusion that things are otherwise, that we're masters of our own states and fates. But the highest good of a human life is to try to move, if only ever partially, towards active affects and the conditions that make them possible—which in large part involves the relinquishing of those aforementioned delusions. It's only in doing this that we have the chance to become truly free. The extreme difficulty of this task is indicated by the peculiarity of the names Spinoza gives to those very few affects that are truly active, that are genuine indices of freedom properly arising out of the only things in us that can be understood as unshakeable (yet common to all): for example, the *amor Dei intellectualis* or intellectual love of God/Nature, and the untranslatable *acquiescentia,* which has connotations of self-contentment, stillness, peace of mind, and beatific acceptance of and submission to the nature of the world and one's finite place in it (Carlisle, 2017: 210-11; LeBuffe, 2009: 204-05). Finally, Spinoza argues that the highest good of a civil state is to create the social conditions that, as far as possible, permit lives to be lived in pursuit of these highest human goods.

I'm hoping that if aspects of this sound peculiar or unfamiliar, this might help dispel simplifications I encountered when mentioning the name Spinoza, that supposedly archaic and overly difficult philosopher out of whom nothing more can be wrung except for the point that everything is affective, for example architecture. The more pointed way of making my case is to say that it's worth reading Spinoza as a corrective to contemporary affect theory's frequent sin of profoundly vitiating the politics of affect. The keyword above is power. Affect, for Spinoza, is a diagnostics of power—it isn't simply a neutral matter of the metaphysics of form and relation. Yet the tendency, in some quarters, has been to turn it into the mere notion that everything (such as architecture) is relationally and affectively interconnected, and that nature consists of aesthetically interlaced morphogeneses and morpho-phenomena, end of story. Indeed much talk of affect gives us either the empty celebration of relationality and interconnectedness, or else the empty fetishisation of feelings and mere sensory cognition *simpliciter*. In such talk, as Sue Ruddick has noted, Spinoza's insistence on an "affective-evaluative coupling" falls away, i.e. we lose the political diagnostics necessarily embedded in Spinoza's non-Cartesian definition of affect as always weighted with ethical and political value (the volitionality of power and dysfunctions in power):

> If this affective-evaluative coupling falls away, politics is evacuated from Spinoza's framework, and the schema risks drifting towards one of two poles. At one extreme, in ignoring affect, one risks rendering Spinozism as a kind of complex systems theory [...] At the other extreme, if we celebrate the fullness of the capacity to be affected [...] the risk is a simple inversion of Descartes—a kind of "I feel therefore I am". In their distinct ways, both these approaches might be commended for celebrating life—one for its complexity and the other for the universal capacity to be affected—but the tools to change it remain underdeveloped at best. (2010: 27)

One area of architectural theory that seems particularly culpable in this regard is the trend that Zeynep Çelik Alexander has called architecture's "neo-naturalism". That is, the discipline's recent infatuation with concepts of dynamic emergence, complexity, flow, field, neural affect, neuroplasticity (plus corresponding technologies of data visualisation and parametric modelling). Architectural

neo-naturalism claims to be novel, but for Alexander, amounts to nothing more than depoliticised, free-marketeering formalism: "the world is rendered as an unbroken, uninterrupted field devoid of politics" (2014: 29). Alexander doesn't mention Spinoza, but he could well be indicted as the criminal mastermind here, since he is often recruited as precursor by contemporary affect theory—which Alexander does indeed ridicule for its view that dynamic self-organisation (autopoeisis! interconnection! relationality!) is enough to guarantee "emancipatory and creative politics" (2014: 28; quoting Papoulias and Callard). But this version of Spinoza is the vulgarised, vitiated version. To recover the properly emancipatory politics embedded in the naturalism—not just for historical accuracy but also for contemporary purposes—one might need to go back to the mastermind's original words, which often say more than what the followers draw out. Unfortunately I can't draw out any more myself: this will have to serve as another sketchy and polemical answer to the prod "why Spinoza in an architectural journal?" There's more work to be done if, as seems to be the case, architectural theory has recruited Spinoza in the name of its hollow neo-naturalism and neo-vitalism, often leaving unaddressed the politics of affect or indeed politics per se.

But this is also my way of seguing to the third architectural issue: architecture thinking politics through Spinoza. There's only room to offer a volley of further reading recommendations and associated thank yous. I thank Professors Beth Lord and Peg Rawes for participating in the Auckland symposium, and I refer the reader to Lord's work on Spinoza as thinker of economic and political inequality (2014, 2016)—which has been extended into a collaboration with Rawes on housing inequality (see their film *Equal by Design* which was screened in Auckland and is available at http://www.equalbydesign.co.uk/). The issue of housing is one place where the political rubber hits the architectural road. Spinoza, per Lord and Rawes, gives us resources for thinking about the design and planning professions as not just apolitical aesthetic practices, but as integral players in society's distributive apparatuses—apparatuses which either fairly parcel out the material conditions for the pursuit of freedom or else unfairly withhold or suppress the same (secure housing surely counts as such a material condition).

The ecological hesitancy

The invited paper here by Professor Ruddick, whom I likewise thank greatly for her contributions, comes from her ongoing work on Spinoza and climate crisis (2017, 2020). Ruddick brings us to the subject of Spinoza as ecological thinker. Ecologically minded readers may already know that Spinoza has a reputation as such. Yet this is another conjunction of philosopher and theme as fraught as the previous. The hesitancy about Spinoza and ecology is simply his apparent rubbishing of some of the most cherished tenets of modern environmentalism. Indeed, in the 1970s and '80s, a new breed of thinker known as the environmental ethicist enthusiastically pointed to Spinoza as a precursor, but Spinoza specialists replied with a "hang on, not so fast."

At issue is an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, Spinoza made pronouncements seemingly tailor-made for modern environmentalist sloganeering. "Man is a part of nature" is the talismanic phrase (TTP ch.4/G3:58; E4P2, *passim*). Man, moreover, is a tiny and insignificant part of nature, a mere "speck"

or "particle" (*particula;* TTP ch.16/G3:190-91). Not only are human beings continuous with nature (Spinoza's naturalism), but human beings aren't even qualitatively special in the larger scheme of things (Spinoza's Copernicanism or anti-human-exceptionalism). Could we take this apparent elevation of nature and corresponding demotion of human beings as grounds enough to call Spinoza an "environmentalist"? He seems to talk up nature more than he talks up human beings. More significantly, he apparently thinks that everything is one and interconnected (the famed monism) and that divinity is everywhere in nature (the purported pantheism). Surely he must be venerated as *paterfamilias* of all nature-lovers and treehuggers?

The sticking point is his apparent bashing of what we today call "animal rights". For Spinoza, a blanket proscription against killing animals is irrational. We could take Spinoza to just mean that sometimes we need to kill the bear that's about to maul us. But the more complex issue is Spinoza's equating of virtue with striving for self-advantage, and his conception of the inalienability of natural right. These aspects of his philosophy give rise to his unequivocal statement that it never makes sense to abase our own self-advantage by making a fetish of the supposedly preeminent "rights" or "intrinsic value" of animals:

> [...] the law against killing animals is based [...] on empty superstition [...] The rational principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us to establish a bond with men, but not with the lower animals [...] We have the same right against them that they have against us. Indeed, because the right of each one is defined by his virtue, *or* power, men have a far greater right against the lower animals than they have against men. Not that I deny that the lower animals have sensations. But I do deny that we are therefore not permitted to consider our own advantage, use them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient for us. (E4P37S1)

In fact, this stance extends beyond animals. More generally, the environmentalist's credo that all Nature has intrinsic value simply has no support in Spinoza. For more, I direct the reader to Lloyd (1980/2001) who was responsible for rebutting earlier claims (e.g. Naess, 1977/2001, Sessions, 1977) that Spinoza could easily be celebrated as granddaddy of "deep ecology", indeed as *avant la lettre* flag-carrier for "ecocentrism", i.e. the notion that Nature, having intrinsic value, should be endowed with rights, and that these values and rights should always be placed above our own.

This is how I'd put it: Spinoza was no ecocentrist because he realised that ecocentrism was blind-alley thinking. A simple thought-experiment illustrates the blind alley: We're told that there'll be winners as well as losers in climate change. Contra the idea of "saving" all of Nature by preventing anthropogenic climate change, in fact some parts of nonhuman nature—jellyfish, mosquitoes, warmth-loving algae—will likely thrive if global temperatures keep rising (Johnson, 2012). Now if I were really an "environmentalist" who truly cares for the "intrinsic value" of Nature, I'd have to care about the intrinsic rights of jellyfish (jellyfish are part of nonhuman nature).[7] Consequently I'd have to promote greater global warming, not less. I'd have to defer to the thriving of jellyfish at the expense of the thriving of humans. In this case, "ecocentrism" turns us into cheerleaders for, rather than preventers of, global warming.

If not ecocentrism, then is it, gulp, anthropocentrism that we find in Spinoza? Yes and no. As Lloyd pointed out, the thrust of Spinoza's ethics is that nonanthropocentric perception is wise, but nonanthropocentric ethics isn't. Only human-centred (anthropocentric) ethics makes sense for humans. Nonanthropocentric perception: I come to understand that human beings aren't the centre of the universe and that there are vastly more things in heaven and earth than dreamt of in my philosophy. Anthropocentric ethics: despite this and despite my best efforts to claim that my heart bleeds only for the Other, I still find that my wisest actions are always done, in the first instance, for advantage of myself and my purlieus.

The key thing here is Spinoza's still startling precept that a truly rational ethics can only be based on self-advantage and self-interest, never on self-mortification nor self-sacrifice. Morality, for Spinoza, is relative, meaning that, in order to not fall into the death spiral of self-mortification, it must be centred on the self-advantage of the creature or community claiming to be moral. "Intrinsic" or absolute morality, values, rights, etc., is an illusion. This is borne out by my *reductio ad absurdum* about jellyfish. We find ourselves advocating for *less* global warming at the expense of the jellyfish, mosquitoes, and algal blooms who would want more, and that's because climate-change ethics, for us humans, cannot help but be an ethics of human self-interest. Climate-change prevention measures are ultimately in the interests of preserving the specific environmental conditions that permit survival and flourishing of humans, not principally in the interests of nonhuman nature.[8] What appears to be advocacy of "ecocentrism"—privileging or "saving nature"—in fact turns out to be, in the first instance, anthropocentric.

Ruddick's theme—the composite body—tells us why Spinoza's endorsing of self-advantage isn't equivalent to the valorisation of selfishness or self-aggrandisement. Self-advantage, in Spinoza, is always social, that is, composite and compositely negotiated. The simple way to think about this is that my wellbeing is bound up with the wellbeing of others because, in Spinoza, sociality—the need for social enlargement and complementarity, as opposed to bulletproof self-sovereignty and individualism—is the law of all things (E4P18S/G2:222-23).

This principle expands what counts as self-advantage: since "self" is composite, my self-advantage includes looking after my friends so defined (and repudiating enemies). In Ruddick, there's a further expansion of self-advantage. Where Spinoza only wrote about human-to-human sociality and dismissed animals, Ruddick argues that the principle of socialised self-advantage shouldn't exclude the nonhuman; we'd do well to cultivate mutually beneficial human-nonhuman composites, not least in our cities.

More of what I understand of this: Spinoza transmogrifies the model whereby self-advantage is sought by sovereign individuals who pre-exist that seeking. Rather, the striving for self-advantage *is* the process of individuation. And since self-advantage is social and composite, so too is the individual who can thus only be simultaneously understood as transindividual. This leads, moreover, to the realisation that it's futile to ask whether Spinoza is ecocentrist or anthropocentrist. The distinction is false. The either-or logic of ecocentrism-vs-anthropocentrism makes no sense for Spinoza; one can't simply choose to be either on the side of human self-interest or on the side of Nature's interests, since the striving for human self-advantage is just a modal expression of God/Nature's own *conatus*.

Humans killing malarial mosquitoes for human survival is as much part of God/Nature's expression as our bolstering of bee populations that pollinate the plants that give us nutriment; human ethics merely consists in wisely handling both in service of self-advantage. Neither is intrinsically good nor bad; neither is exclusively altruistic-ecocentric nor selfish-anthropocentric. Per Balibar, "[t]he opposition of 'selfishness' and 'altruism'...never exists" in Spinoza (2020: 42)

I hope the truncated brevity of the above: (1) gives at least some explanation for Spinoza's scorning of "animal rights" (we care about the canary in the coalmine because *we* are in the coalmine, not because our hearts should bleed for the illusionary intrinsic value of nonhuman entities); (2) offers another answer to "why Spinoza now?" by rehearsing Spinoza's robust thinking about "ecology" (counterintuitively robust because his thinking runs against the grain of modern environmentalist pieties); and (3) puts into relief his inversion of conventional morality. Equating virtue with self-mortification remains orthodox to this day, yet Spinoza insisted on the opposite: virtue lies in the (social) seeking of self-advantage (E4P20, E4P24, E4P35C2). Thinking otherwise is thinking gone wrong.

Since I've only been able to sneak Spinoza's moral theory into a discussion of ecology, I direct the reader to Michael LeBuffe's work on this topic and send out the associated warmest thank yous to Professor LeBuffe for his contributions: his invited paper in this issue, on how states aid citizens in their transition to rationality, draws from his most recent book (2017).

The postcolonial hesitancy

The postcolonial hesitancy was the most pervasive hesitancy I encountered in Aotearoa New Zealand—entirely justifiable, unsurprising, yet also confounding. The objection had to do with the encroachment of a European philosopher upon non-European contexts (and not just any non-European context, but rather Aotearoa, with its violent colonial past, its fraught bicultural present, and its primacy nowadays as one of the world's intellectual centres for the project of decolonisation and Indigenous self-determination). It wasn't hard to detect, in the air, the bristling insinuation that Spinoza in Aotearoa was surely another instance of intellectual recolonisation. Strictly speaking, I can't deny this; it may be true that nobody really needs Spinoza here when there are many other intellectual resources better suited to local purpose, not least Indigenous ones.

I'll say something, though, about why I was initially confounded: Spinoza's "anomaly" or "dissonance"—his outsiderishness—is so patently obvious once one has read him that it hadn't even occurred to me to lump him in the category of thought-colonising European philosophers.[9] From my vantage point, equating a Spinoza conference with the thought-colonisation of Aotearoa by Europe was a bit like accusing a Martian of entrenching Earth ways of thinking.

Consider Spinoza's biography: He would likely have been "othered", that is, perceived as different, by his Northern European contemporaries in the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century: he was a Sephardic Jew who may have spoken accented Dutch. He was what we'd today think of as a second-generation immigrant from a "visible minority" family of under-assimilated immigrants. Spinoza's parents were exiles from Spain and Portugal, having been expelled from Iberia by inquisitorial anti-Semitism. His father spoke broken Dutch, and

he and siblings had to help their parents negotiate the cultural and linguistic difficulties arising from being culturally and linguistically foreign (a filial situation that second-generation immigrants will be familiar with to this day, as I myself attest). Leibniz, who met Spinoza in 1676, made a point of describing him as having "an olive-coloured complexion, with something Spanish in his face" (Nadler, 1999: 46-47, 155).

This outsider was, moreover, on the outside of the outside: Spinoza was excommunicated and banished, when in his early twenties, from his own Jewish community, possibly because of his precociously blasphemous views (the actual reason for excommunication is lost to history). For the rest of his life, he lived in rented rooms outside of every professed religion, at a time when it was dangerous to do so given that all Europe was a theocracy.

Spinoza, in short, was a maverick and a radical, and may have been perceived as a brown man by his contemporaries. The latter, admittedly, isn't in itself an argument to read Spinoza in Aotearoa (no more an argument than you should read me because I'm a "person of colour", to use a term anachronistic to Spinoza)—though, as I said, the biographical factoids give context to my initial double-take (I'd so absorbed the image of Spinoza as marked by outsiderishness rather than establishmentarianism). But the former, Spinoza's justified reputation as radical, leads to the more substantive question: is there anything in Spinoza's radicalism that might recommend and connect him to those interested in postcoloniality and decolonisation?

Yes: there are at least two points of connection. The first is slight but historically instructive. There's a passage in Spinoza that has been taken as emblematic of early modern philosophy's awareness of the European colonial project. This is a 1664 letter to a friend in which Spinoza describes a dream he once had about a "black, scabby Brazilian" (Ep. 17). Spinoza's intention was to temper his friend's claim that dreams predict the future and to illustrate instead how dreams are non-supernatural manifestations of bodily perturbations. But some contemporary readers have interpreted Spinoza's image of the "*Aethiops*" ("Black man") as symptomatic in a different way: as sign of Spinoza registering colonialism's historical reality. Further, what we'd think of today as Spinoza's casual racism ("black scabby Brazilian" is hardly a complimentary image of the racialised other) could be taken in two ways. Either we take it as forgivable because Spinoza wasn't exempt from attitudes of his day and it's incidental to his philosophy anyway. Or else we take it that Spinoza's philosophy is tainted by racism to its core and deserves wholesale rejection. Rosenthal (2005) offers a third approach: since all early modern texts were fissured by historical problematics that couldn't be resolved in their own time, what we can do instead is constellate them with our own historical moment in order to awaken their political power. Rosenthal's approach, in my reading, is akin to what Walter Benjamin called the "dialectical image" of history, or what some historians describe as the advantages of "presentism", i.e. the historian's best option is to interpret the past in strategically anachronistic ways that avoid, on the one hand, the Scylla of whiggishly celebrating the past's victories, and, on the other, the Charybdis of sanctimoniously condemning the past's politically incorrect indiscretions. When we take this third approach, we draw out the past's complexities and ambivalences rather than simplifying them. Thus do we recognise the symptomatic ambivalence of Spinoza's image of the black Brazilian: the backdrop of Spinoza's day-to-day life

was the European colonial project of unfreedom (he lived in the Dutch Republic, one of its founts), yet he was, at the time of his dream, formulating an unprecedented theory of human political freedom involving a rationale for emancipating all human beings, black Brazilian or otherwise (Rosenthal; Goetschel; Montag, 1999: 87-89; Gatens, 2009: 202-03).

This is the second, more substantive connection between Spinoza's radicalism and the contemporary project of decolonisation: Spinoza's ideas are a historically attested intellectual resource for what we now call decolonisation. Short version of this: Spinoza is a bifurcation point in Western political thought because, unlike Hobbes, he insists that the claudication of right in a social formation is an impossibility or unstable irrationality, not a constitutive fact of the civil state—meaning slavery, colonisation, and oppression are in nobody's interests. For more, I refer the reader to Nesbitt's work (2008) on Spinoza as origin of the idea of "universal emancipation" (others, even up to Hegel's time, found it difficult to posit such a thing), and on the attested connection between this idea and the Haitian Revolution. Since, according to Nesbitt, the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) marks the inauguration of decolonisation—as the only slave rebellion that resulted in a transition to self-government—his argument is that Spinoza stands at decolonisation's intellectual wellspring.

Again, I hope this gives further abbreviated clues to "why read Spinoza?". But, as I said, my position in light of the postcolonial hesitancy is: nobody *needs* to read Spinoza. I don't intend to overcome the postcolonial hesitancy by means of the above arguments; perhaps better to leave it in tension. This tension is already latent in the field of comparative philosophy: on the one hand, to say that any work on European philosophy in non-European contexts is a colonising imposition is to doom the project of comparative philosophy, which could after all be conceived, in Spinozist fashion, as the necessary discovery of fellow travellers rather than the raising of the ghosts of colonisers. (I haven't even mentioned that Spinoza has been interpreted as friend to Eastern and Buddhist thought.) Yet, on the other hand, to try to defend comparative philosophy in this way is to neglect the fact that history creates profound and unignorable asymmetries between the fellow travellers ostensibly being compared on equal footing.

It may in fact now be correct to perceive Spinoza as part of the European establishment. Though I hope it's clear why it was initially so confounding for me to encounter this insinuation (could such a singularly dissident figure really now be perceived as oppressor?), Spinoza himself tells us that a thing is known through its effects. In other words: follow the money. That is, this *Interstices* project was possible only because scarce institutional resources were thrown at yet another European thinker, possibly at the expense of neglected others. This is what my postcolonially hesitant colleagues meant; my counter-arguments (Spinoza was so anomalous that he may be labelled a colonising European only by technicality of having lived in Europe) can only go so far.

Nonetheless I again thank all sponsors and supporters of this project; their support wasn't misdirected. Saying that the postcolonial hesitancy must be left in unresolved tension is another way of saying it was incredibly generative. To my knowledge there's no other existing work that reads Spinoza in juxtaposition with Māori thought apart from the invited paper here by Carl Mika; my deepest thanks to Professor Mika for his total lack of hesitancy when participating in

this project (and see Mika, 2019, for more on the encounter between Indigenous and Western philosophies). Gratitude is similarly owed to others who put energies into the Pacific Spinoza symposium panel in Auckland—as speakers, Albert Refiti and Jacob Culbertson, and as hosts, Ngahuia Harrison, Beatriz Santiago Muñoz, Charlotte Huddleston, Balamohan Shingade, and Abby Cunnane. Sean Sturm and Stephen Turner are likewise Pacific Spinoza agents (see their essay in this issue) whom I need to further thank. I have learned enormous amounts from all the above.

Outline of this issue's contents

Carl Mika's "A Māori reflection on Spinoza's primordial" is one of three invited papers in this issue. Mika considers concepts such as ira ("the manifestation and persistence of a thing"), Papatūānuku (primordial substance) and whakaaro ("indebtedness to a primordial substance"), juxtaposing them against Spinoza's monism and rationalism. Sue Ruddick's "Common notions and composite collaborations: Thinking with Spinoza to design urban infrastructures for human and wild cohabitants" reflects on urban environments from the perspective of their more-than-human cohabitants, making us aware of cities themselves as synthesising and sustaining composite bodies. Michael LeBuffe's "Citizen and state in the philosophy of Spinoza" tackles a crux in Spinoza's political theory, namely Spinoza's ambiguous position on the fact that a state will inevitably be comprised of citizens who have not attained the kind of full rationality he describes as the highest good of human beings. What is society to do about this? Does Spinoza advocate cold-turkey methods (wrenching people away from their deeply cherished irrationalities and superstitions) or a gradualist-additive solution (gradually adding more adequate ideas to the inevitable store of inadequate ideas which are, at some level, never fully relinquished)? LeBuffe's discussion of this problem clarifies our understanding of the role of passions and the imagination (and recall that these latter concepts are, in turn, a crux for recruiting Spinoza for aesthetic thinking).

Following the issue's invited section are three reviewed papers. The first, "To see or be seen? The grounds of the place-based university" by Sean Sturm and Stephen Turner, investigates the confluence of knowledge, visibility and control in the context of the neo-liberal university, but from the perspective of what is occluded in its prevailing drive towards "transparency". Next, Gökhan Kodalak's "Spinoza's affective aesthetics: Art and architecture from the viewpoint of life" reflects on Spinoza's articulation of affective interactions, "plications", and morphogenetic processes, which he argues has considerable consequences for contemporary aesthetics. Jonathan Lahey Dronsfield's "What reading Spinoza's *Ethics* out loud brings to and takes from the text", offers a philosophical reflection on a public reading of the *Ethics*, inspired by Deleuze's account of Spinoza.

Concluding this special issue is a review by Paul James of Chris L. Smith's *Bare Architecture: A Schizoanalysis* (2017). Linking architecture to the schizoanalytic project of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, James notes in the text both a will to overturn phenomenological overtures in architecture and a desire to link the latter with alternative philosophical framings of the corporeal.

Conclusion: The historical hesitancy

There is one other hesitancy I suspect always hovers over Spinoza: he was *so* long ago, his painful lucubrations seem dry as dust, one may as well attempt to re-read the Rosetta Stone. Perhaps some of what I've said above illustrates Spinoza's contemporaneity, but I'd also like to apply peer pressure: there are probably more people interested in Spinoza now than any other time in history. It seems more true than ever that Spinoza is a philosopher of our time; toss a stone, hit a Spinozist (even in New Zealand). There is a "current flourishing of Spinoza studies all over the world" (Steenbakkers, 2018: 20). Carlisle and Melamed even suggest that the Spinoza resurgence constitutes a paradigm shift: "In many ways, Spinoza is now replacing Kant and Descartes as both the compass and the watershed of modern thought" (2020: 9). The recognition of Spinoza as a watershed owes something to Jonathan Israel's work (2001), the argument of which, supported by a vast range of historical documents, might be summarised as: Spinoza was the invisible demiurge of modernity since everyone had read him, yet he was so heretical that no-one could admit it. Perhaps this is one practical matter that explains the burgeoning of Spinoza: we can now all admit it. Meaning there's never been a better time to study Spinoza.

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ENDNOTES

1 See spinozaandculture.wordpress.com and www.westdenhaag.nl/exhibitions/19_10_Spinoza_and_the_Arts.

2 But see Uhlmann & Gatens (2020) on Spinoza's concept of *ingenium*.

3 Carlisle and Melamed point out it may be inaccurate and anachronistic to apply the term 'immanence' to Spinoza: "Spinoza may force us to reconceive divine transcendence, but he does not deny it. Indeed, the theological concepts of immanence and transcendence, considered as opposing terms, did not emerge until late in the eighteenth century" (2020: 9). But see Lærke (2017) who argues that the "Platonizing interpretation" of Spinoza, i.e. the reading of Spinoza as covertly transcendentalizing, is mistakenly based on a chimeric misreading of the concept of formal essence.

4 Peden suggests that Deleuze gave us "the Spinoza of the affect" (2008: 66).

5 My one suggestion is that Spinozist theories of art could take into greater account concepts of time, eternity, and perdurability; this is the path suggested by Deleuze and Guattari (1994) when they define art in terms of the perdurability of perceptions and affections. The concept of a "complex body" can cover many things (a human being, too, is a complex body), but Deleuze & Guattari suggest that what distinguishes an artwork *qua* complex body from other types of complex body has to do with how it endures in time and the nature of the content (affective) made perdurable.

6 Allen, 1997/2013; Boehme, 2005; Connolly, 2005; and Latour and Yaneva, 2008.

7 I capitalise "Nature" when caricaturing the view that such an entity exists monolithically; I use lower case when referring to nonhuman entities.

8 The "saving" of other communities—polar bears, frogs, corals, etc.—who share our evolutionary preference for these climatic conditions, is a collateral benefit, but should not be misrecognised as the ethical foundation. This might be understood in terms of Spinoza's principle of "common natures" (E4P29&D, E4P31C).

9 "Anomaly" is Negri's (1991) word; "dissonance" is Gatens and Lloyd's (1999: 1).

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SUE RUDDICK

Common notions and composite collaborations: Thinking with Spinoza to design urban infrastructures for human and wild cohabitants

"Animals are good to think with."

—adapted from Claude Levi-Strauss, *Totemism*, 1964: 89

In a 2007 video from BBC World, narrated by David Attenborough,[1] we see a crow adapting to the complex choreography of the modern city, using the rhythms of the city to bring together a food source it could not previously eat with a technology that was invented for other purposes. Viewed 1.7 million times on Youtube at time of writing, shared on sites from the UK to North America, Japan, and Australia, the video invites us to rethink the relationship between nature and culture, blurring the boundary between the urban and the wild, as the crow first learns that it can drop a nut (too hard to break with its beak) into ongoing traffic, using passing cars to crack it open. As the traffic proves too dangerous to navigate in the retrieval of the nut, the crow eventually learns, through a process of unclear duration, to drop the nut from a perch above a crosswalk and wait for the green crossing light to access the nut in safety. This inspiring, if all too infrequent, example of an interweaving of human technology, the rhythms of the city, and the ingenuity of urban wildlife, might provide us with a different way of imagining the city and the relationship between the urban and the wild.

It is also, we might argue, a contemporary expression of Spinoza's concepts of how the composite body is constituted through a common notion, a common notion that enables very different species—beings who are (to borrow from E2P13S) "of different natures"—to thrive in a collaborative context. Here the common notion exists in the functioning of the crosswalk—crows and cars are in common agreement about the usefulness of the crosswalk for their own different forms of thriving, and so constitute a composite, collaborative body.

Writing in the 1660s, Spinoza was explicit in his project of renaturing the human—"consider[ing] human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes and bodies" (E3Pref) and with this, dismantling the Cartesian view that the universe was divided into two substances, a divine realm

and an earthly existence, and dethroning humanity from its presumed hierarchical rule over nature—its position as "a kingdom within a kingdom" (E3Pref). But he was less clear about collaborations with non-human others. In thinking the composite body through the common notion, however, we can begin to think about an ethics of collaborations beyond the human—and derive a Spinoza for our time, a Spinoza beyond Spinoza. The common notion, for Spinoza, was an expression of the collaborative possibilities between beings, each coming to an adequate and active understanding of the others' capacities and operating in concert in a way that produced a sense of joy—an active rather than passive understanding. The task for Spinoza in arriving at a common notion was to know how to move from the passive experience of affect, the "sad passions" (which might even include love), to active joy. Affect, constituted passively, does not comprehend its cause adequately and ultimately limits the capacity to act. If an encounter is grasped passively—by happenstance and without reflection, we do not know how to reproduce a joyous encounter (or avoid a dangerous one). We are at the mercy of random encounters.

The common notion is a powerful concept for it undoes the idea of mind over matter—undoes the idea that emotions are something to be suppressed or overcome through reason. Active joy is itself a function of an adequate understanding of something, and this understanding enhances our capacity to act. The common notion emerges in the encounter with other beings, a practical kind of knowledge expressing a relationship between mind and body, a knowledge that necessarily involves the body. One must have an adequate knowledge of the nature of the body to understand this union adequately (E2P13S). It is through this knowledge that we become active: to become active is a state of becoming, not being; a social act, a co-production in our encounters with the world around us.

In the case of this assemblage of beings around a crosswalk, each of the participants in this choreography comes to an *active understanding* of the context. For the pedestrian, the crosswalk enables safe passage; for the driver of the car, the timing for free movement; for the crow, safe access to an otherwise inaccessible food source. But these are diverse beings with different ways of knowing—different manners of mind and body. The crosswalk assemblage is therefore also illustrative of a second concept that Spinoza offers us: the idea of the composite body. This is one of the few times that Spinoza (focused as intently as he was on the task of human freedom) explicitly addresses the relationship between beings who are of different natures.

We in the twenty-first century are beginning to appreciate that even the human body itself is a composite individual composed of diverse natures, among other things comprised of 39 trillion bacterial cells and only 30 trillion human cells. We are a collaboration from our very beginnings. In nature, moreover, nothing exists but composites: we are not aggregated from simple bodies. There is "no pre-social state of nature from which previously isolated individuals could emerge" (Montag, 1998: xviii). Instead we are always already in a state of composition. Indeed, Spinoza suggests this in his correspondence with Oldenburg, in the discussion of the worm in the blood, arguing that our separation of things into parts and wholes is a matter of perspective, based on the extent to which we understand how things come to agree with one another (Ep. 32). The example of the crow at the crosswalk invites us to think of complex collaborations at the level of the composite body, a social body that dissolves any preconception about hard

distinctions between human and nature, nature and technology. And although Spinoza insists at many instances and in different ways that there is nothing more useful "to man [...] than man" (E4P18S), he does suggest that there is an advantage to humans in collaboration with beings of diverse natures: the greater your capacity to affect and be affected, the greater your power to act (E4P38).[2] This is evident in the ways we have come to understand more fully the evolution of our species: how, for instance, collaborations with beings of different natures (the coevolution of humans and dogs as hunting pairs, for example) combined different capacities to affect and be affected in ways advantageous to both.

In the crow-car-pedestrian-crosswalk, there is then a composite body wherein the crosswalk acts as a kind of prosthetic intermediary in the constitution of that body, conferring different kinds of advantages and different meanings to its varied participants. Here the crosswalk expresses a kind-of surplus code—an excess of meaning, with varied but nonetheless adequate understandings for the pedestrian and car whereby the crosswalk mediates or choreographs the flow of traffic in a way that both can move through the city effectively. For the crow, the crosswalk and the timing of the lights enable it to adapt a tool (the car) designed for one purpose to another, namely the crushing and safe retrieval of a nut that it could not crack open itself without the car and that it could not retrieve safely without the crosswalk. Seen this way, we understand the composite body truly as a composition of forces, made active through a choreography, expressing a multi-temporality and manifesting in a convergence—a node or coming together with no strictly defined border. In a Batesonian reading, the composite body is a pattern which connects (Bateson, 1979).

We might argue that—unlike the coevolutionary collaboration between dogs and humans—the mutual benefits in the crow-crosswalk are not immediately recognisable. This is not an obvious exchange; rather, as a species (I am speaking here of Western man), we are becoming increasingly aware of the previously unacknowledged benefits of non-human others, or "nature" in its popular conception, to the state of human health and even human existence. Here Spinoza's framework anticipates contemporary arguments supporting biodiversity. For Spinoza, the greater capacity that a body has to be affected, the greater the possibility for forming alliances (or common notions) with a variety of bodies that are external to it (E2P14). Although Spinoza is speaking here strictly of the human body, we might think this in relation to a composite body, or in this case an ecosystem. A complex ecosystem involving complex interdependencies between bodies exhibits greater capacity than a simple one. The more complex the ecosystem in its patterns of exchange, the greater its capacity. While we cannot, strictly speaking, accord an ecosystem a "mind" in this understanding of interdependencies, we can think of complex communicative systems at a more general level—in a Batesonian sense, a communicative web, or a Peircean sense of a sign system (a world composed of nothing but signs, or composed through signification), or, in the thinking of Maturana and Varela, a communicative system (Bateson, 1979; Peirce, 1907, 1982; Maturana and Varela, 1980).

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But why specifically should we care about reimagining urban natures? And why turn to Spinoza for an understanding of relations between humans and

non-human nature? Arguably Spinoza in his own time was more concerned about human freedom and equality. His insights on relations between humans and non-human nature are only fleeting. And as Genevieve Lloyd argued, "anyone who looks to the *Ethics* for a viable, coherent metaphysical system to ground a belief in the rights of the non-human will look in vain" (1980: 294).

In examining how Spinoza helps us to think through these aspects of our historical moment, we might note, firstly, that the notion of biodiversity might look somewhat different under a Spinozist lens. The idea of biodiversity as being significant for human health has now become part of mainstream opinion and settled science—whether we are thinking about its implications for food security, water quality, climate mitigation, or psychological wellbeing—and is endorsed by organisations like the United Nations (United Nations, 2019), the World Bank (Berthe et al., 2018) and the World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 2015), albeit somewhat narrowly conceived of through the idea of ecosystem services. Yet while we might be encouraged by this shift, we have to be careful that single-source instrumentalist valuations of aspects of the non-human world (e.g. trees produce oxygen and shade, green roofs reduce runoff) do not blind us to a much more complex picture of composite collaborations.

This more complex picture might consequently help us to rethink how to deal with habitat fragmentation. Habitat fragmentation is a leading cause of extinction: following the logic of the species area curve, the larger the area, the greater the species diversity; likewise, the smaller the fragment of habitat land, the more likely the species will suffer local extirpation and eventual extinction. And with urban areas projected to cover 60 per cent of the globe by 2060 (United Nations, 2017), urbanisation will continue to play a leading role in this. The expansion of cities will fragment wildlife habitats and interrupt migration routes—not only existing and long-established routes but also new migration routes necessitated by climate change.

We have to be able to think clearly about—and design for—those circumstances in which the composite body of an urban environment does *not* function well to benefit all parties. The crosswalk-adapted crow tells us, by way of Spinoza, that, in certain circumstances, urban nature can indeed comprise a mutually beneficial composite body in which animals have learnt how to match their "speeds and slownesses" alongside the speeds and slownesses of human beings (E2P13L1). But while crows are particularly adept as a synanthropic species—a species that benefits from living in close proximity to humans—not all animals are that adept. To put it another way, cities are a problem for most animals; humans have not designed them with animals in mind.

My current research is on the fate of wildlife in urban environments with particular attention to the design of urban infrastructures. The project area, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), is an excellent urban laboratory for the above questions pertaining to the relations between human cities and non-human nature. The GTA—the fourth largest city in North America—is home to around 4.18 million people and is one of the fastest growing urban regions in Canada, projected to absorb 60 per cent of the nation's population growth in the next twenty years (Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, 2005). It also happens to contain rich wildlife habitats sustained by the Great Lakes and an extensive local ravine system. It is, significantly, at the centre of a complex node of existing local and

global wildlife migration routes, including an emerging climate-change-induced migration route: as global temperatures increase, wildlife is moving northward at an estimated rate of 7 kilometres per year—very roughly—and these routes are interrupted by existing or anticipated urban and suburban development in the GTA.

Like it or not, the GTA already functions, well or badly, as a composite body, or as Deleuze (1992: 17) might say, a badly analysed composite. It is perhaps not surprising that the Toronto Wildlife Centre, the largest wildlife outreach, rescue, and rehabilitation centre in North America, fields approximately 12,000 hotline calls a year from urban residents encountering wildlife in distress, and takes into care (into its capture and release programs) somewhere in the range of 5,000 wild animals per year, which include roughly 300 distinct species. These animals have been injured in road accidents, caught in frozen ponds or on freeways, or subjected to whatever endless means for abuse and affliction is possible in heavily urbanised environments.

From an animal welfare point of view, this is an undesirable situation. From a Spinozist point of view, however, the GTA is not necessarily a dysfunctional composite body. Rather it is a composite body that functions perfectly well—it is just that it functions in the service of specific aspects of human urban life at the expense of non-human wildlife. But, if we agree that human health and planetary biodiversity are intimately intertwined, then our objectives to design cities to support human health must also take into consideration our wild cohabitants. Cities are a complex choreography involving the timing and spacing of different beings—this is what Spinoza means by a composite body—but by design or by default, most modern cities constitute a particular kind of composite time-space too often at odds with the rhythms of non-human ecologies (May and Thrift, 2001). The precise timings and spacings within an urban composite will vary depending on the local particularities of geography and animal ethology. Thus, the task is to develop a design language with multiple grammars that allow the composite body to be expressed in mutually empowering ways, that is able to organise time and space in way that is mutually enhancing for sets of different beings, in ways that are attentive to maximisation of mutually reinforcing benefits. This process involves a selective process of composition to create emancipatory assemblages (Ruddick, 2012, 2017).

Here it would be helpful to think also in terms of prosthetics. A city is a system of empowerments and limitations (as an occupant in a city, you are empowered or constrained depending on who and where you are, and when). Accordingly, every element of a city can be understood as a prosthetic instrument of empowerment or of constraint. To design a modern city is thus also to design a grammar of prosthetic instruments.

Elizabeth Grosz pushes thought in this direction in one of the earlier accounts to think bodies and cities through a Deleuzian lens, arguing that there is a "two-way interface" between bodies and cities "in a series of disparate flows, energies, events, or entities [...] in temporary alignment", comprising an assemblage of sorts (Grosz, 1992). To my mind while this reformulation pushes against classical-humanist notions of the city, it does not go quite far enough: the separation between the human and the urban is first defined and then combined—first things and then their interrelation. If, however, we think of the city as a

composite body from the outset, this distinction begins to collapse and the sequence inverts. Things (e.g. body and city) do not come together in a relationship in which they pre-exist, or rather, put more precisely, they *become differently* in relation—as any resident of a suburb who moves to a dense urban area understands immediately. Relationships constitute things, not in terms of their physicality *per se* but rather in the way these relations enhance or constrain capacity to act. Bodies (whether cells, humans, plants, freeways, cities, or regions), in this sense, are thought in terms of their capacities and the ways they "extend to the limits of their powers." This is not to imply, of course, that a "body" dissolves on leaving a "city" (as Grosz defines them), but rather we are constituted differently in and through our relations—to each other, to physical affordances, to wind and weather, and to how we share sites and spaces with a vast array of cohabitants. This view follows more closely a Spinozist conception of the composite body (E2L7S).

Modern cities, as currently constituted, tend to comprise prosthetic instruments that constrain some species of wildlife and support others in ways that are wholly unintended. We must think the semiosis of the city—the surplus code it expresses—from the point of view of a vast array of species, in terms of the different ways they read the landscape (Ruddick, 2017). Synanthropic species such as geese, rats, raccoons, or crows thrive in our cities not because we have designed spaces for them, or with them in mind, but because urban landscapes and affordances quite by chance mimic environments to which they are most suited, that enhance their capacities to act. Songbirds, on the other hand, face extirpation and even extinction, death by skyscraper, as they die yearly in the millions in their migration between northern and southern hemispheres. On genetically embedded flyways that pass through major cities, they collide with the phalanx of glass office towers and reflected landscapes that they are unable to read as obstacles.

In order to design a city that can encourage the thriving of a diverse urban wildlife (and not just human occupants), we must consciously think in terms of designing a series of prosthetics of empowerment that enables us to overcome the existing aspects of the modern city that intentionally or unintentionally have attempted to reinforce a human-nature divide. It is these prosthetics that have been one focus of my research, some emerging by design, some by accident, or rather unintended, each offering a different kind of grammar of the composite body.

By accident? Of course, the concept of accident is incompatible with Spinoza's thinking—there is always an efficient cause that produces an effect. In Spinoza, accidents are an illusion; an event appears to be an accident only because we are not fully cognisant of all contributing causes, and because we misguidedly compare this poorly understood event to an ideal that does not exist and find it to be lacking. But we might nonetheless be justified in speaking of *accidental urban composites* in the sense that quite often we have not designed the city with the view to enhancing urban natures, but rather have come to recognise only in hindsight the benefits for wildlife inherent in certain urban formations. The crosswalk has so far been my primary example of this: an element of the city that, by unplanned "accident", has benefited crows as well as human beings and which we recognise as such only after the fact. (We human designers of cities have tended to come to an understanding of how we share common notions with such non-human beings only *after* the initial encounter with them.) Two

examples in the Greater Toronto area may serve to further illustrate what I mean: the city's famous ravine system and the Leslie Street Spit, both of which may be understood as composite formations that "accidentally" benefited local wildlife.

Each city has its own contextual landscape that implicates non-human others in distinctly different ways. Toronto may be unique among major world cities in being built on a vast system of ravines (which has led to the depiction, in the popular imaginary, of Toronto as a city within a park). This ravine system was preserved quite as an afterthought. During two centuries of city-building, back when Toronto was spending large on infrastructure, the city filled in many minor branches of Toronto's ravines and channelled storm sewers through them. However, the urge to build over the ravines was quelled after an unprecedented hurricane, Hurricane Hazel, flooded Toronto in 1954 and caused eighty-one deaths. A regional conservation authority was created to manage the city's floodplains; legislation was drawn up to prohibit building on or along ravines because of their potentially unstable nature. This legislation led to the preservation of

Fig. 1 The Don Valley, one of Toronto's ravines, with Prince Edward Viaduct and the Don Valley Parkway [image from Flickr (https://www.flickr.com/photos/38693531@N08/4672897942), taken by Jess, 2010, Creative Commons licence (CC BY-SA 2.0), no changes made, used here for non-commercial purposes].

Fig. 2 Little Rouge Creek, one of the ravines in the Greater Toronto area, in Rouge National Urban Park [image from Wikimedia Commons (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rouge_NUP_Little_Rouge_Creek5.jpg), taken by Mykola Swarnyk, 2014, Creative Commons licence (CC BY-SA 4.0), no changes made, used here for non-commercial purposes].

the ravine system, the last remnants of a great forested area covering the region (Figures 1 and 2).[3] The ravines remain one of the few residual spaces that act as migration corridors for wildlife and are home to coyotes, deer, great horned owls, opossums, foxes, porcupines, minks, and beavers. Here the prosthetic is expressed predominantly, though not exclusively, through *conjunction* (to use a word from Deleuze and Guattari[4]): what we conventionally think of as the urban and the wild overlay one another, but in a relationship that must be constantly mediated—a conjunction within the composite body.

The Leslie Street Spit, essentially a man-made peninsula, was first constructed in 1959, intended as a breakwater for shipping traffic and to act as an extension of Toronto Harbour (Figure 3). When container trucking caused the role of the port to collapse, the Spit continued to grow due to the dumping of detritus from demolished buildings and from the excavations of subways, underground parking

Fig. 3 Tommy Thompson Park, Leslie Street Spit, Toronto [image from Flickr (shorturl.at/ajrRV), taken by Roozbeh Rokni, 2018, Creative Commons licence (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0), no changes made, used here for non-commercial purposes].

lots, and sub-ground levels of buildings. It is now largely a semi-wild parkland, Tommy Thompson Park, which over time has been colonised by local flora and fauna. A large portion of it is presently classified as an Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) and it is recognised as an Important Bird Area—a classification, as per an internationally agreed set of criteria, that means it is globally important for the conservation of bird populations, with over 300 species of birds using the Spit. This is again a case of an "accident", since naturalisation was never planned. But instead of a process of conjunction or overlaying of human occupancy on top of urban natures, as in the case of the ravine system, here we can think of the relation between the urban and the wild, in the Spit's initial phases at least, as operating in a process of *disjunction* or bifurcation that serves multiple uses. It is more the case here that the urban form bifurcates into areas for human occupancy on the one hand and areas for wildlife on the other. As the city grows up, the spit grows out.

At the same time, the naturalisation process is now actively managed by the Toronto Region Conservation Authority—thus the Spit is also in a conjunctive relationship with human processes. This takes the form of a complex spatial and temporal choreography. Dumping grounds for urban detritus are allocated along the eastern edge of the spit. Wildlife areas are inland from that edge and along its western side, including grasslands, marshes, and forested areas. Trucks move daily from Monday to Friday, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., transporting and depositing waste from urban construction (concrete, rubble, granite, etc.) that builds out the spit. On evenings and weekends, the spit is open to the public, with certain prohibitions (e.g. no dogs, in order to protect wildlife), meaning people can hike and bike through its landscape.

It is possible to think of other examples of the human-non-human composite acting in the urban realm at a more fine-grained level, for instance, the opportunistic colonisation of human structures by wildlife: peregrine falcons, say, taking up residence on hotel balconies, or swifts roosting by the hundreds in chimneys. The practical point here is to always first look for opportunities in urban design and planning for the mutual enhancement of both human and (selected) non-human life—especially where these might not be immediately and obviously apparent—and to amplify their potentials. Or to put another way: Spinoza's concepts of the common notion and the composite body are useful as diagnostic tools for design and planning.

To think—and design and plan—the urban as a composite body that supports its non-human cohabitants raises additional challenges, specifically around how we bound the spatiality and temporality of the object. Firstly, how are we to think—and delimit—its temporality, its rhythms? It is not just that we can see how the composite body expresses the convergence or syncopation of different timings (as in the coming-together of crow, crosswalk, and car) but that these temporalities themselves express the continuation or introduction of different kinds of durations. Urban nature as a composite body might involve, in part, wind and weather patterns that have persisted over thousands of years. Or it might involve evolutionary processes among species that express a continuation of life from inception, that express a species in continual becoming—a repetition-differentiation that persists not just in the thousand tiny acts that bring life from life but also (to further the idea of city as a composite body) in the larger connective tissues of the city. Here, in a manner similar to Spinoza's epistle about the worm in the blood (Ep. 32), we must become attentive to the myriad processes that compose and connect the city, that comprise its whole. This city as a vast weave of processes, whose imbrication in and significance to the whole we often are aware of only when they are absent or shift in intensity (for instance in a blackout or power outage). These are the processes that effectuate this composite, whether we are thinking of how rhythms of migration or hibernation are calibrated with the presence or absence of food on arrival or awakening, or how prosthetic technologies such as a crosswalk can serve as "common notions" that enable specific but mutual forms of thriving. Designing or planning the city with wildlife in mind is to make material these temporal problems.

Secondly, how do we—or must we?—draw spatial boundaries around the composite body? Where does it begin and end? Western ways of thinking are often seduced by the false certainty of geopolitical boundaries, but when we begin to think urban natures as a composite body in the Spinozist sense, such boundaries begin to dissolve. In Spinoza's thought, the composite body extends itself not to a predefined boundary but to the limits of its *powers* (Ruddick, 2008, 2016). Extension may be congruent with materiality, but this is a materiality that is constantly expressing itself in an infinite variation of modes, that is, in an infinite variation of bodies in becoming, in transformation, *going to the limits of their powers*. In a Deleuzian reading, for instance, one does not think of a forest as "bounded" by its edge, but rather as a forest that gradually peters out, going to the limit of its powers. As Deleuze notes:

> The edge of the forest is a limit. [Is] that the forest [...] defined by its outline? It's a limit of what? Is it a limit to the form of the forest? [No] It's a limit to the action of the forest [...] the forest that had so much power arrives at the

> limit of its power, it can no longer lie over the terrain, it thins out [...]. The forest is not defined by a form: it is defined by a power: power to make the trees continue up to the moment at which it can no longer do so. The only question that I have to ask of the forest is: what is your power? That is to say, how far will you go? (Deleuze, 1981, my translation).

This may be why, interestingly, Spinoza speaks a great deal of bodies and extension in the *Ethics*, but uses the term "space" rather sparingly. Space, for Spinoza, is a secondary function of *potentia* and *potestas*—the expression of the composition of forces. What then is the limit of the composite body? If we begin to think of our city, for instance, as partly composed through the migration patterns of birds whose vast routes span northern and southern hemispheres, then where are the beginnings and ends of our ethical responsibilities? And of our political alliances? Thinking of the city as a composite body causes us to question the juridico-political limits of our ethical responsibilities: how we respond in specific urban localities has implications for life far beyond our boundaries.

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To think the city as a composite body in Spinoza's terms is to become open to an awareness of the city as a composition of forces—a choreography of bodies that are constantly interweaving and overflowing imagined boundaries, struggles that are fought as much over time as space, the accommodation of the temporalities and spatialities of other life processes, other rhythms and cycles that would, without a recalibration, sync uneasily with the pacing and spacing of human requirements. It is to become aware of the city as a chronology fought over and fixed in concrete (such as the construction of freeways) and as a choreography enacted through legislation (the timing of dimming of city lights in spring to reduce collisions of migrating birds with tall buildings). It is to become aware of the deleterious effects that certain taken-for-granted features of urban life have on both humans and non-human cohabitants (noise and light pollution figure centrally here), and to design and plan accordingly. It is an invitation to think about collaborations beyond juridico-political boundaries and to begin to connect with creaturely processes very different from our own, yet sharing common notions whose potentials can be amplified by design. (If the "fatal confusion" of the west [McKibben, 2003] in thinking about time is to think of nature as stasis and humans as progress, then, in reimagining and redesigning the urban through the concept of the composite body, we are simply addressing the prosaic, pragmatic problem of coordination.)

Finally, to become open to the multiple durations of the composite body is, nowadays, to confront the challenge of extinction—what happens when (what we now understand as) parts of the composite die off? It is to confront the challenge of extinction along what Thom van Dooren calls its dull edge—the "slow unraveling of intimately entangled ways of life that begins long before the death of the last individual and continues to ripple forward long afterward, drawing in living beings in a range of different ways" (2014: 12). This challenge needs to be confronted through the design and planning of the prosthetics of an alternatively conceived city—an alternatively conceived composite body—that would enable the coordinated thriving of beings of different natures. Not just a challenge, but also an opportunity.

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ENDNOTES

1 www.youtube.com/watch?v=BGPGknpq3e0 .

2 "That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in more ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in more ways, is advantageous to man, and proportionately more advantageous as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected in more ways and of affecting other bodies in more ways." (E4P38)

3 Also see Mary Grunstra's map of the Toronto ravine system, which may be viewed at https://www.thestar.com/content/dam/thestar/life/homes/opinion/2018/09/28/consider-the-future-of-green-spaces-as-you-consider-your-vote/_2_green_map.jpg, or in Davies, et al. (2018).

4 The idea of "conjunction" in one well-known passage from Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*: "The tree imposes the verb 'to be,' but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, 'and... and...and...' This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb 'to be.'" (1987: 25).

MICHAEL LEBUFFE

Citizen and state in the philosophy of Spinoza

Suppose that an intellectualistic theory of human wellbeing is true; that is, that human beings are better off to the extent that they possess knowledge. Now suppose that the highest purpose of society is to make each human being in it as well off as possible. Finally, suppose that the vast majority of human beings in society possess, as their most important beliefs—beliefs that guide their lives—ideas that are among the least rational of all ideas. On the first supposition, such people are not thriving. Their lives are hardly characterised by knowledge at all. Here are two possible ways in which society might help them: it might, step-by-step, transform the relevant ideas, making them more and more rational until, finally, there are the most rational beliefs there could be in a given citizen. Alternatively, society might, while leaving the least rational beliefs untouched, cultivate *other* ideas—ideas that are rational—so that eventually these other ideas become motivationally as powerful as the original, irrational beliefs, which citizens finally discard only when they need them no longer. The first kind of transition may seem appealing on the face of it: it seems harmful, under the given theory of wellbeing, to be guided by maximally irrational beliefs and so better to get rid of them as soon as possible and to be guided by the most rational beliefs one can at a given moment. This might seem to be especially true for Spinoza, who holds versions of all of the background suppositions here and, in addition, famously insists that only very few people attain a significant level of wisdom. After all, for Spinoza, there is a question whether, following the second path to greater wisdom, many people will ever acquire sufficiently powerful rational ideas; they may never be able to set aside their powerful, irrational motivating beliefs.

I will argue here, however, that the first kind of transition is not open to Spinoza and that in fact he conceives of citizens' transition to reason primarily in the second way. Safety and cooperation are, for Spinoza, necessary means to knowledge of any degree. Only two kinds of human states reliably bring people not to threaten others and to cooperate: states in which our behaviour is guided by ideas of miracles, the least rational beliefs; and states in which our behaviour is guided by ideas of reason, the most rational beliefs.[1] Spinoza's convictions in psychology and political philosophy suggest that for ordinary people to lose imaginative religious ideas without yet having gained a sufficient degree of reason would be for them to lack any reliably social motive, that is, any motive to cooperate. Such

a change would cause ordinary people, and those who live with them, to lose the benefits of society altogether.

My thesis is ambitious, and risky, in that it characterises Spinoza's views as a whole, rather than through any particular work. In defending it, I will draw upon several different works and try to explain the connections between them. The first section here will explain the suppositions. The second will present textual evidence supporting the claim that Spinoza conceives of these two kinds of transition to greater rationality. The third section will set the conditions that Spinoza requires for peace in society together with his conception of how it is possible for citizens to meet those conditions. It will become apparent at the end of the third section, I hope, that Spinoza's convictions in psychology and politics imply that citizens should move to greater rationality primarily by means of opposing rather than transforming their harmful passions. Of course, it is one thing to show that Spinoza's views imply this conclusion and quite another to show that Spinoza himself draws it. A concluding section will present some slight evidence that he does so.

1. The suppositions

Although all his works are complex—and the *Theological-Political Treatise* (TTP) in particular offers views of reason, religion, and the state that challenge readers to find a consistent position—I think that there is relatively clear and straightforward evidence that he maintains versions of the suppositions consistently throughout his writings. In the early *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* (TdIE), Spinoza associates his own happiness with a nature characterised by understanding and then goes on to say that the purpose of society is to bring as many people as possible to such a nature:

> I aim, therefore, at this end: to acquire such a nature and to strive that many others might acquire it with me. It is for my happiness that I work so that many others will understand in the same way that I do, so that their intellects and desires unite harmoniously with my intellect and desire. So that this might happen, it is necessary to understand as much about nature as is necessary for the attainment of such a nature, and, next, to form a society of the desired kind, so that as many people as possible, as easily and securely as possible, may attain it. (TdIE §14 / G2:8-9)[2]

Similar views may be found in the *Ethics*, where Spinoza's intellectualism is most fully developed. Although the *Ethics* focuses on individuals for the most part, a similar conception of the common good may be found there, at E4P54S, which also shows evidence of the role of religion as a first step toward a life guided by reason. As I understand that step, it is a step away from danger, fear, and chaos and into safety and cooperation. So, of particular importance to me is Spinoza's conviction that the religious are easily led, whereas those guided by other passions, especially anger and hatred, are not:

> No wonder, then, that the prophets, who cared about the common good and not that of the select few, commended humility, repentance, and reverence so much. Really, those who are subject to these affects can be led much more easily than others, so that in the end they can live under the guidance of reason, that is, they can be free and enjoy the life of the blessed. (E4P54S)

Finally, Spinoza defends freedoms of speech and thought in Chapter 20 of the TTP on the grounds that they promote rationality:

> It is not, I say, the end of the State to change men from rational beings into beasts or automata, but the opposite, that their mind and body may perform their functions safely and that they may use this same reason freely, and that they should not quarrel in hatred, anger, or deceit, or hold unkind feelings toward one another. The end of the state, therefore, is really freedom. (TTP, ch. 20 / G3:241)

The TTP, as I have mentioned, is notoriously difficult to interpret. Some of what Spinoza writes in the TTP suggests that a life of religion may be just as good as a life of reason. Moreover, in several places, both in the TTP and in the *Political Treatise* (see, for example, the final paragraphs of Chapter 1 of the latter), Spinoza writes that the end of the state is security and convenience; there, freedom is not mentioned. The passages about the life of religion being as good as the life of reason present a problem too detailed to address here, and it may well be in the end that they simply aren't consistent with other passages that suggest that the life of reason is what we aim at for all citizens. I do not think, however, that the other group of aforementioned passages, passages about the end of the state, pose a deep problem for finding a consistent position in Spinoza. Spinoza holds that the state brings cooperation and security, which are necessary for bringing as many people as possible to the greatest degree of rationality possible. So, the state's immediate end is security, but that security has a further purpose: the greater rationality of its citizens, or, what amounts to the same thing for Spinoza, their freedom.[3] These views are clearest perhaps in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Chapter 5 of the *Political Treatise*, where, by referring to the lives of subjects in different states, Spinoza distinguishes between states that bring security, but not the further end of reason to their citizens, and states that bring genuine peace:

> A state whose subjects do not take up arms because they are terrified is better said to be not at war than to have peace. For peace is not the absence of war but is a virtue that arises from strength of mind [...] When I say, then, that the best rule is that where men pass life harmoniously, I understand human life, which is defined not merely by the circulation of blood and other things common to all animals, but most of all, by reason, the true virtue and life of the mind. (TP, ch. 5, §4-5 / G3:296)

2. The two kinds of transition

I will argue that Spinoza conceives of an ordinary citizen's transition to greater rationality as one that occurs in one rather than another of two ways. In order to show the relevance of the issue, I will now introduce several passages from Spinoza's account, in the *Ethics* Part 5, of what we can do to manage the passions. He defends accounts of both sorts of transition there. My claim about political states, then, is that, of two kinds of transition that Spinoza regards as possible for a given mind, he only finds one appropriate for the ideas that guide most citizens.

The first kind of transition is one on which a given, irrational idea is made more highly rational. Spinoza conceives of some passions as more harmful than others, and they typically motivate behaviour as well, so a passion will be a good example of such an irrationality: we can overcome hate, which is both an inadequate

idea and a harmful passion, by coming to know the passion itself more clearly. Spinoza defends the possibility of such understanding at E5P2-P5, at one point recommending without qualification that we should try to understand our passions in this way:

> We should work especially hard, in order to know each affect clearly and distinctly, insofar as it can be done, so that thereby the mind may be determined from an affect to thinking those things that it perceives clearly and distinctly and in which it may be completely content; and also so that the affect may be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts. (E5P4S)

In the case of hatred, the final step is notable. Hatred is sadness accompanied by the thought of an external cause (E3P13S). A critical step in making the idea that is hatred clearer is to separate it from that thought and so to transform it.

The second kind of transition is a transformation of the mind, but not of the passion in question. In this case, the mind cultivates another idea, which is more powerful than the passion in question. It does not improve the passion, but, insofar as the new idea is rational, the mind itself does become more rational as a result. In terms of practice, the better ideas, when they are more powerful than the passions that they oppose, determine the person's behaviour. Spinoza introduces this second kind of transition at E5P8-10 and offers a clear account of them at E5P10S, where he recommends cultivation of the rational affects of nobility and tenacity:

> So that we may always have this rule of reason ready when it is needed, we should think and meditate often about common human wrongs and how and in what way they may best be driven away by nobility. (E5P10S)
>
> We should think about tenacity in the same way in order to set aside fear; that is, we should recount in detail and frequently imagine the common dangers of life, and how, by presence of mind and by strength of character they may best be avoided and overcome. (E5P10S)

In these cases, Spinoza does not suggest that we will be able to understand or transform our anger or our fear. Sometimes we will not. Even then, however, he argues that we can cultivate stronger motives, which despite these powerful passions can motivate us.

This, then, is a second way of overcoming highly powerful, irrational motives. In some cases we might understand and so transform the passion. In other cases, we might cultivate a different, more powerful motive while leaving the passion itself untouched. The second way leaves some highly irrational ideas intact, which is why it is not as good as the first way. Spinoza acknowledges this point at the beginning of the scholium:

> The best thing, therefore, that we can do while we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects is to conceive of [...] sure maxims of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them continually to particular cases we frequently meet in life, so that our imagination will be affected by them extensively, and they will always be at hand to us. (E5P10S)

While it does not transform our harmful passions, the second method nevertheless makes us better. It gives our rational motives more power.

3. The irrational and the rational in society

The final pieces of background for the thesis, drawn from the *Ethics* and the TTP, set up the conditions for transitions in society. As I understand Spinoza, the initial problem that society—and that includes religion as well as government—must redress is one of a lack of cooperation. Although reason guides those who are led by it to cooperate, very few are led by reason. Most of us are motivated by passions and, outside of society, passions push us in different directions, can draw us into conflict, and, even when they do not, prevent us from enjoying the benefits of cooperation.

Spinoza presents the problem in these terms in both the *Ethics* and the TTP.

> If men lived under the guidance of reason, each might hold [the right of nature] without any harm to another (by P35C1). However because they are vulnerable to affects (by P4C), which far surpass human power, or virtue (by P6), they are often drawn in different directions (by P33) and oppose one another (P34) even while they stand in need of each other's aid (by P35S). (E4P37S2)

> It is far from true that everyone can always be led under the guidance of reason alone. For each is drawn by his own delight, and the mind is so often filled with avarice, ambition, envy, anger and so on that no place remains for reason. (TTP, ch. 16 / G3:193)

In both places, this presentation of the problem is part of his account of the social contract whereby he suggests that society mitigates this problem:

> [...] if we consider that without mutual aid men must live most wretchedly and without any cultivation of reason, we shall see very clearly that to live, not only securely, but very well, men had to agree in having one purpose. So they brought it about that they would have collectively the natural right each one had to all things. It would no longer be determined according to the force and appetite of each one, but according to the power and will of everyone together. (TTP, ch. 16 / G3:191)

In other words, some degree of reason motivates anyone to want to escape the problem of living a brutish, warring life in a state of nature. Societies are thus formed for mutual benefit.

It is not plausible, though, to suggest that people simply live according to the guidance of reason; most of us cannot. So the above passages really only give half the picture.

I think the preface to the TTP hints at a fuller solution. Spinoza suggests there that although reason is sufficient for avoiding the worst harms of passion, it is not necessary. Something else can do the job, namely whatever involves a kind of "fixed plan" of living:

> If men could manage all their things by a fixed plan, or if fortune always favored them, no one would be held by superstition. Often, though, they are driven into such difficulties that they are capable of producing no plan and usually they desire the uncertain goods of fortune; vacillate miserably between hope and fear; and so have a great tendency to believe anything whatever. The mind, when it is in doubt, is easily pushed this way or that

> way, and, all the more easily when it is hung up, shaken by hope and fear. (TTP, Pref. / G3:5)

Religion is just such a fixed plan. It is a kind of belief that provides steady motivation of a sort that is more powerful, at least, than most passions, and so allows those who are guided by it to enjoy the benefits of society. Reason, of course, also serves as a fixed plan for those who follow it: the truths of reason do not vary. Religion, though, need not itself be rational, so long as it provides a strong motive.

Spinoza takes religion to be based upon powerful ideas of imagination and particularly those that give rise to devotion and wonder:

> I have shown that scripture does not teach things through their proximate causes but only describes things in the order and in those phrases by which it can most move men and especially commoners to devotion. For this reason it speaks of God and things quite improperly, because undoubtedly its aim is not to convince reason but to affect and occupy men's fancy and imagination. For if scripture described the ravaging of some state in the way customary of political historians, this would do nothing to move the common people. On the other hand, it will move them the most if, as it customarily does, it embellishes everything poetically and refers it to God. (TTP, ch. 6 / G3:91)

> There is no doubt that all things that are described in scripture happened naturally but that nevertheless they are attributed to God because it is not for scripture, as we have already shown, to teach things through natural causes. Rather it is to describe those things that deeply occupy the imagination and this in the method and style which best serves to enhance wonder at things and consequently to impress devotion in the spirits of common people. (TTP, ch. 6 / G3:90)

> He is unique. That this also is absolutely required for supreme devotion, wonder, and love towards God is beyond doubt. For devotion, wonder, and love arise from the excellence of one above the rest. (TTP, ch. 14 / G3:177)

All of these ideas are ideas of the unique. Chapter 6 of the TTP, the source of the first two passages, is Spinoza's account of miracles, unique events in nature. Although Spinoza denies that there are miracles, he nevertheless takes belief in miracles to be a foundation of religious belief. Religious belief is characteristically devotion and wonder, and those passions arise from the idea of a unique thing. Similarly, I think, Spinoza defends imaginative monotheism in these terms in Chapter 14. Belief in a single god is a more powerful idea than beliefs in several gods. There, also, he refers to devotion and wonder.

Turning to the *Ethics*, we can see that these ideas—ideas of the unique—do provide strong motives and that they do so in very nearly the same way that reason does. At E3P52 and its scholium, Spinoza discusses such ideas. There he refers to the psychology of association to argue that a mind that has the idea of a unique thing associates the thing with nothing else and, therefore, is unlikely to move to some different object in the way it does with other ideas. So ideas of the unique stay robustly conscious and powerful in the mind:

> If we have previously seen an object together with others, or we imagine it

> has nothing but what is common to many things, we shall not consider it so long as one that we imagine to have something unique.
>
> Dem.: As soon as we imagine an object that we have seen with others, we immediately remember it and the others (by 2P18 and see also P18S). Thus we move from consideration of the one immediately to the consideration of the other. And the same reasoning applies to an object that we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many things. For we suppose in doing this, that we consider nothing in this object that we have not seen before in others. However, when we suppose that we imagine something unique, which we have never seen before, we are saying nothing but that when the mind considers that object, it has no other thing in it, by which it can be moved from the consideration of this object to the consideration of it. So it is determined to consider it alone. Therefore, if we have previously, etc. (E3P52)

In the proposition's scholium, Spinoza goes on to introduce wonder and devotion as ideas of the unique. This shows, I think, why he takes ideas of miracles to have the power that they do. Of course the etymological relation between wonder (*admiratio*) and miracle (*miraculum*) is clear in Latin, making the association more natural. In English, we might call Spinoza's miracles "wonders" in order to secure the same effect:

> This affection of the Mind, or this imagination of a singular thing [*rei singularis imaginatio*], insofar as it is alone in the Mind, is called 'wonder' (*admiratio*) [...] if we wonder at the prudence, diligence, etc., of a man we love, the love will thereby be greater, and this love joined to wonder or veneration we call 'devotion' (*devotio*). (E3P52S)

Reason, although for a very different reason, is psychologically similar to the idea of a unique thing. Unique things are always present to mind because the mind associates them with nothing else and so cannot move on from them. Ideas of reason are present to mind because they are ideas of properties common to all things, so that whatever it is that we experience, we continue to have, as part of that experience, ideas of reason:

> Affects that arise from or are intensified by reason are, if we take account of time, more powerful than those that are related to singular things that we consider to be absent.
>
> Dem.: We consider a thing to be absent not because of the affect by means of which we imagine it, but because of this, that our body is affected by another affect that precludes the thing's existence (2P17). Therefore an affect which is related [*refertur*] to a thing that we consider to be absent is not of such a nature that it surpasses the rest of a man's actions and power (see 4P6); but, to the contrary, its nature is such that it can be checked in some way by those affections that preclude the existence of its external cause (4P9). An affect, however, that arises from reason, is related necessarily to the common properties of things (see the definition of reason in 2P40S2), which we always regard as present [*quas semper contemplamur ut praesentes*] (for there can be nothing that precludes their present existence) and which we always imagine in the same way (2P38). Therefore, such an affect will always remain the same, and consequently (A1), affects that

> are opposed to it and that are not reinforced [*foventur*] by their external causes, must adapt themselves more and more to it, until they are no longer opposed. To that extent, an affect that arises from reason is more powerful. (E5P7)

It is in virtue of the fact that ideas of unique things stay present to mind that they are particularly powerful ideas. The same is true of ideas of reason. That is why, in the TTP, Spinoza takes religion to be a motivational force comparable to reason. I think that he considers religious ideas that give rise to devotion to have a force comparable to tenacity and nobility. Like these active affects, powerful religious ideas, even if they are not themselves adequate ideas, can help us to resist the motivational power of fear, hatred, and anger and to act instead in ways that are good for ourselves and others.

4. Theism and the second kind of transition

Finally we are in a position to see why the first kind of transition cannot work. Without a fixed plan, some kind of motivation strong enough to prevent us from being susceptible to easy changes of mind, we will lose the benefits of society and may fall into conflict.

Ideas of religion are extremely irrational. Ideas of reason are ideas of what is true everywhere and at all times, but ideas of the unique are the other extreme. They are ideas of what is true just once, violations of natural law. And of course, they are false: there are no miracles. Because Spinoza takes knowledge to hold intrinsic value, it is *pro tanto* harmful to have such irrational ideas. Other things being equal, a person is better off without them: as we have seen, Spinoza takes the second method for attaining greater rationality to be the second-best method as well. Other things are not equal, however. A person without religious ideas who has not yet attained powerful ideas of reason is susceptible to changeable and harmful passions. Any gain to an individual from the loss of these highly irrational ideas would be offset by the new dangers, and of course such a person is an unpredictable threat to others in society.

So change to the passion of the sort that Spinoza recommends at E5P4S is not the way to change imaginative religious behaviour in a society, at least not in the first instance. It is better to follow the recommendations of E5P10S and to cultivate rational motives such as nobility and tenacity. Such ideas may be strong enough motives eventually, in some citizens, to allow them safely to gain the additional benefit of dispensing with imaginative religious beliefs altogether. In many—perhaps most—citizens, I think, Spinoza considers the two sorts of beliefs to run in train, recommending the same kinds of actions, but providing very different sorts of motives for those actions.

This is the conclusion that Spinoza's psychology recommends. Whether there is textual evidence suggesting that he himself arrives at this conclusion is a different issue. I think that there is some.

First, there is the point that for Spinoza genuine religion—as opposed to superstition—recommends the same actions that reason recommends in society. I think that it would not necessarily have to do so if he conceived of the transition from religious motivation to rational motivation as one that starts with the

abandonment of religion. We might imagine a society with a kind of division of labour reminiscent of that of the *Republic*, in which many people are guided to do certain kinds of beneficial work from some kinds of ideas and in which other are guided to other kinds of beneficial work from others.

Spinoza's society is not like that. The religious majority and the rational few behave in society in the same way, and religion and reason recommend the same sorts of behaviour. Indeed, at TTP, Chapter 4, Spinoza takes genuine religion to be an interpretation of the common notions and the knowledge of God that we all have: "For the love of God arises from the knowledge of him; the knowledge of him, however must be drawn from common notions certain and known through themselves" (G3:61). The common notions, however, just are ideas of reason. So, although it motivates behaviour through the power of highly imaginative ideas, genuine religion recommends the same sorts of behaviour that reason does. This kind of agreement would seem to be a condition for a steady acquisition of ideas of reason in citizens who at the same time maintain their religious beliefs. If religion and reason recommended different behaviours, such people would be conflicted and so lack a fixed plan, something that Spinoza wants to avoid.

A second possible source of evidence may be found in Spinoza's insistence on a belief in God, which is prominent in the TTP (particularly in the tenets of universal faith of Chapter 14) and is strongly suggested also in some of his correspondence with Oldenburg. There, where he is pressed on the question of whether necessitarianism leads to atheism, Spinoza does not acknowledge any kind of good action that arises from a source other than the belief in God:

> The inevitable necessity of things destroys neither divine nor human laws. For the moral lessons themselves, whether they are accepted either in form of law or as judgments from God himself, are nevertheless divine and salutary. (Ep. 75, 1676)

He seems to conceive of citizens either as following the imaginative conception of God or as following the philosopher's conception, but Spinoza does not even contemplate a citizen that followed neither.

Of course, Spinoza might have all sorts of rhetorical and political reasons not to say that one might permissibly not believe in God at all. An insistence that the second sort of transition alone is appropriate in society, however, suggests that Spinoza has a basis in his philosophical convictions for this view: to be a good citizen, one must always be motivated either by a belief in the unique imaginative God of the monotheistic religions or by genuine knowledge of God. On the first sort of transition, citizens might lose their strong motivating belief in an imaginative prince-like god as a first step, just as they detach their passion from an external object as a first step at E5P4S. Then, they would only attain a new strong belief in the God of Part 1 of the *Ethics*, as a final step. Atheism would in such a case be large and dangerous middle ground, and atheists would be a threat to themselves and others.[4]

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ENDNOTES

1 Perhaps there is a third: a state where the government rules by fear.

2 Translations here are my own. I draw from the original Dutch passages in the standard Gebhardt edition of Spinoza (Spinoza, 1925/1972).

3 Spinoza identifies blessedness with understanding at E5P36, E5P36S, and, most clearly perhaps, at E5P42. He defines 'freedom' (*libertas*) at E1Def7 in terms of action as a total cause, a notion that, in turn he associates with the possession of knowledge at E3Def2 and E3P1.

4 This paper draws upon Michael LeBuffe, *Spinoza on Reason*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. It presents, in a condensed and, it is hoped, widely accessible form, arguments from chapters 2 and 4 of that work. Versions of this paper were presented at the North American Spinoza Society meeting at Chicago in 2016 and the *Interstices Under-Construction Symposium* conference on Spinoza in Auckland in 2017. Thanks to those audiences and especially to Ericka Tucker and Eu Jin Chua.

CARL MIKA

A Māori reflection on Spinoza's primordial

Māori philosophy is at an exciting point as it looks to other sources for inspiration. In this paper, I refer to some key Māori concepts and terms I have worked with in the past and bring them into discussion with Spinoza's notion of primordial substance in mind. Some Māori terms such as ira (the manifestation and persistence of a thing), whakaaro (indebtedness to a primordial substance) and Papatūānuku (primordial substance) are relevant here.

Approaches to cross-cultural philosophising—a foreword

There are ethical issues to consider before leaping into conversation with a Western philosopher. Firstly, there is something to be said for keeping Western philosophers at a distance, thereby prioritising the discussion as a Māori one. However, it is debatable whether simply bypassing Western theories is sustainable given their ongoing presence in academic contexts. Further, there is something a bit subversive—or at least playful—in working with a ground of thought that comes from the West, but which is largely accepted in Māori scholarship as colonising. In this paper I pursue the latter precisely because working playfully with difficult thinkers from other cultural philosophies may be useful for Māori. Whether we strictly follow the ideas of the Western writer, or use them as a springboard for some of our own thinking is also important to consider (Mika, 2013: 23). Do we stand in service to the ideas of others, or is there a more nuanced relationship at play between Western and Māori thinkers?

The position I argue is that staying within the conceptual and material grounds of existence is an important existential and ontological ethic for the Indigenous self (Mika, 2017: 13), no less than the scholar. In other words, we need to stay firmly within the generative plane of existence that our first ancestral entities provide. The point of this article is to negotiate both styles as a Māori philosopher who wishes to attend to the immanence of those primordial entities, whilst acknowledging that much good can come from 'throwing oneself outward' towards divergent scholars. Spinoza is a renowned philosopher in Western traditions who nevertheless resonates with Māori thought at critical points, while diverging at others. Coinciding with a Māori perspective, he can be seen to examine the phenomenon of existing within the substance of the All whilst thinking it.

As such, I propose to carefully engage with him in a way that reflects the reality of Māori cross-cultural discussion (Mika, 2014b: 24)—not necessarily directed by or in full commitment to him, but in respectful dialogue with him. Like Spinoza, I advocate that one can think something *and* abide within the All, but indicate that there are key points where Māori—either through the subtlety of the Māori language or simply through a difference in concepts—diverge from Spinoza. Hence, there is a mercuriality involved in engaging with Spinoza and a certain volatility for me as a Māori philosopher because, although he may be more sympathetic than, say, many of the classic Greek thinkers, I still have to contend with him as having particular boundaries that do not correspond with my own. He resonates with the early German Romantic poet and philosopher Novalis, for instance, because they both propose that divinity resides within things in the world (Beiser, 2002: 419). As in my thinking with Novalis, though, in my Spinoza-Māori encounter I don't set out just to give comparisons as such between Māori thought and Spinoza's, but to also be productive in my development of Māori notions of the primordial.

Spinoza and Māori primordiality

For Māori, philosophy starts frequently with acknowledging the ground of the All—what Spinoza calls "God" or "nature". Spinoza clearly thought a rational approach to this foundational substance was of such importance that he made some enemies among his own, with inflammatory comments such as:

> [...] he, who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and endeavours, like a scholar, to comprehend the things in nature and not, like a fool, to wonder at them, is everywhere regarded and proclaimed as a heretic and an impious man by those whom the multitude reverence as interpreters of nature and the gods. (1894: 69)

Spinoza treads a difficult line between establishing the *apparent* irrationalism of being within the All on the one hand, and the reason associated with coming to know this fact on the other. But in some respects, use of terminology is extremely important here; Spinoza does not ascribe "irrationality" to immanence, but to an inability to construct knowledge on the basis of affect. Distance from the world—which may result in knowledge—is not possible because we all relate through primordial substance. But his insistence that the All is immanent puts him at odds with many of his contemporaries. Proposing something other than the dominant discourse is also a poignant issue for the Māori scholar. By this, I don't simply mean that it is a fraught issue to be proposing something counter to what the West declares, but also against what Māori commonly declare. Philosophy is especially inclined to critique dominant ways of talking about things, and although it sits quietly in the backdrop of Māori academia, it nevertheless arises as a problem for empirical work—for example, where scientific thinking, broadly conceived, keeps demanding our philosophical attention. Thus, the aim of Māori philosophy is to ruffle established ways of talking about things. Alongside others' ideas, the self is disturbed in that process, because Māori metaphysics is so bound up with the presence of Western thought (Mika, 2017: 13). This thinking about the primordial is uncomfortable for most of us because it challenges how we represent things.

So much for the antagonism that any of us might face in relation to fundamental propositions or unpopular first principles, but what of God itself? Māori, of course, have a number of names for the phenomenon that Spinoza referred to—including, since colonisation, the name "God", which is problematic for a number of Māori because of its relationship with Judaeo-Christianity. But it is here that I really want to focus for this paper, because Spinoza wants us to conceive of primordial substance as giving rise to all things. It is precisely Spinoza's *sustained* emphasis on God as it exists *as* things in the world that sparks my own interest. Nature is a whole, existing necessarily, which for Spinoza means that it exists without cause. This proposition opens up a complication for Māori thought in the sense that its translation into the Māori context has major consequences. One immediately relevant entity here is Papatūānuku. It is currently entitized to mean Earth Mother, and this entitizing in itself is not a problem for Spinoza, but it becomes a detrimental concept if we think of Papatūānuku as material in the conventional, physical sense. Papatūānuku is matter itself, but, interestingly for the Māori thinker, it can be interpreted as being "beyond cause". The term "matter", having taken on coat-upon-coat of static property and cause, is inappropriate for what we are discussing. Māori theologian and philosopher Māori Marsden (2003: 22) has noted—with different terminology to that of Spinoza's—that Papatūānuku is endless and uncaused. While Papatūānuku or primordial substance takes up breadth and length, this does not rule out Papatūānuku as an existential ground. However, these two attributes are the same in Māori philosophy.

When I envisage this primordiality, I can only approximate it through thinking about myself as a colonised being alongside it; I can't think of it from an entirely traditional Māori perspective. I can make declarations about it, but it would be disingenuous of me not to acknowledge that I am making those declarations through an outline of cause and effect, and a drive to represent the properties of a thing. Spinoza was aware of this danger. Thus, I envisage myself as a colonised speaker on this theme, talking *about* Papatūānuku as if I am separate from it. This is a colonised undertaking because Māori prior to colonisation would have been much more focused than I can be on actually presenting infinitude through various mediums, rather than being encouraged to *re*present it, despite my attempts at presenting Papatūānuku as a decolonising project. Strangely, when I try to imagine the full extent of Papatūānuku, I can only envisage it as a sort of formal patterning, where I am implicated as a thing emerging from it even as I make those declarations on it. Perhaps, then, Papatūānuku is a very real form within my thinking. Where Spinoza would say that the attributes thought and extension are to be considered distinct yet the same (in that they are constituted by the infinite substance—see Fullerton, 1894: 14), Māori could argue that whakaaro—which is loosely translated as "thought" —is in itself simultaneously extension. Their similitude is unsurprising; whakaaro is as much material as conceptual (Mika, 2017: 13), in much the same way as Papatūānuku is. In our genealogy, whakaaro is noted as an entity and thus is an extensional embodiment of Papatūānuku.

It is useful at this point to indicate a huge difference between "to think" and the Māori term for that English verb (or for "thought" if we are using the noun). "Whakaaro" might be translated as "to think", but it points to an entirely different world. Admittedly, it is probably the closest term in Māori that conveys

something of "to think". But it comprises the two words "whaka" and "aro", which do not meet up with "to think" on their own. There is a difference in "density" between "whakaaro" and "to think". "Aro" is a material orientation towards other things in the world, in the sense that all things are one (Mika, 2014a). It is often taken to mean the field in front of the self that can sense things, but it also indicates a mutual engagement between things such that they are unified consistent with such terms as "ako" (teach/learn) (Thrupp & Mika, 2012: 210). In short, they are manifestations of the primordial substance. This eternal engagement with each other derives from the prefix "whaka". There are a number of interesting possibilities with this prefix, because it is nearly always defined as "to cause". Of course, because we live in a highly teleological age, the assumption is that "to cause" is of a particular type which does not correspond with Māori thought. But this mutual engagement has always already occurred, not *because* of Papatūānuku but through its embeddedness within all things in the world. To that extent, "whaka" closely resembles Spinoza's immanent cause, which advocates for a view of God as without cause, completely within the world. Of course, this is incredibly difficult to describe using academic terminology, as Novalis and his group, for example, were also aware, which is why they used poetic discourse—it retains the unity of things in the world as a focus.

To try to describe the extremely dense nature of Māori causation, which runs counter to everything colonised discourse tells us, we have to give long, drawn-out explanations. Amazingly, though, just that one Māori term is enough to convey this complexity, especially if there is a background critique going on that tries to prevail against its colonised and commonsense definition. Perhaps the most frequently used concept that uses the term "whaka" is "whakapapa". "Whakapapa" is nearly always translated as "genealogy", but just as its counterpart "whakaaro" is something different to the English "to think", so "whakapapa" differs from "genealogy". The reader will see, again, that I am less concerned about the meaning given to a term and more with how it sits as a materiality. "Whakapapa" may well include something of "genealogy, but it is far more oriented towards the All than that. It may instead refer to a phenomenon of infinite substance-manifestations. By that I mean whakapapa is the always-already immersion within the infinite substance (see for example Mika, 2017: 13). All things in a Māori worldview have a genealogy-plus-All; all things are manifestations of a togetherness with Papatūānuku. Indeed the "Papa" in whakapapa is an abbreviation of Papatūānuku. Primordiality is thus fundamental to whakapapa. Rather than being a first designator of other, subsequent entities, Papatūānuku is both first and simultaneous. Conversely, given that all things share in her, all things are first and simultaneous (Mika, 2017: 13). Senghor argues similarly that African indigenous philosophy emphasises the materiality of things as indications of the All (2010: 479). In Māori thought, as I have noted, this All, in turn, comprises its things. This apparently-first-but-simultaneous phenomenon reflects a Māori view of time as collapsed and presents a difficulty for anyone who wants to adequately express te reo Māori, with its spiritual and material impact, in modern academic convention (for example, see Mika & Southey, 2018: 6).

I have argued elsewhere that, in Māori thought, this phenomenon of the self's encounter with the limits of a thing because of its relationship with Papatūānuku can be conceived through the term "ira" (Mika, 2015: 93-94). Commonly defined as "essence", "ira", I argued, deals with the unknowability of things in the world

but, more importantly, is the drive of the self to come to terms with his or her limits of knowledge in relation to it. It is "over there!"—a meaning of "ira", used in an exclamatory sense. With "ira", we strive to speculate on the unknowability of a thing due to the fact it is part of the All, thus ensuring it remains mysterious. Spinoza's notion of *conatus*, which depicts the pursuit of a thing for its further perfection in relation to God, is somewhat different, despite also reading broadly from the notion of "essence". Especially in colonised times, the retention of mystery and uncertainty is important as an existential characteristic of the Māori self. Papatūānuku brings to the fore the uncertainty of the self's relationship with the thing, which is in fact an embodiment of Papatūānuku. One uncertain thing encounters another. Our genetic relationship—"ira" is often glossed as "gene"—is less important in "ira" than that passion of the human self to run up against the limits of his or her knowledge. It is at this point that "ira" diverges from *conatus*, for although "ira" can "take [...] pleasure in its own enhanced power of understanding" (Ravven, 2013: 234), the mind itself is bound up in its inability to know a thing—keeping in mind that the thing is unknowable due to its immediate embodiment of the All.

This raises the question of Spinoza's denouncement of "foolish wonder", referred to earlier. Spinoza believes that a transcendent God encourages a silly belief, where we are at the whim of miracles and so forth. Incidentally, here is a marked difference between Spinoza and Novalis—Novalis paradoxically advocates for a primordial substance that the world is within, but also transcends. But in Māori philosophising, there may be less of a difference between what may be thought of as a Spinozan "foolish wonder" and its more valid relative, affective wonder. The term for wonder in Māori, "mīharo", connotes both at once: a sense of inertia in the face of something magnificent that simultaneously constitutes the self (and hence provides the movement as a necessary component of affective wonder). Wonder—which is the enactment of the thoroughly constitutive All, to the extent that we are helpless in the face of it—is a crucial aspect of our philosophy. It brings us to realise, for instance, that even though we might have proven God exists through steps in our reasoning, as Spinoza reputedly did, that very phenomenon of reason takes place within the phenomena of "drive" or "predisposition", which are in turn manifestations of the All, as all things are. We are acting within provability's domain. We are forced to discern and to switch off emotion; however, that tinge never disappears. The reasoning we have employed is dependent on infinite contingencies, and I reiterate here that Māori philosophy may be more intent on exploring the speculative outcomes of not knowing in relation to grasping any particular contingency at any point than dominant Western philosophy. It then happens that these contingencies constitute the proven phenomenon, to the extent that our means of proving it—reason—is not particularly reasonable or reasoned. The drives we have sought to extinguish in favour of the intellect—emotion, the spiritual, the recognition of the non-human worlds and so on—persist throughout the method and outcome of reason.

The drive towards nature or primordial substance that "whakapapa" ordains comes to the fore in the way we are predisposed towards our relations—other things in the world besides humans—which is encapsulated in both "whakaaro" and the exclamatory drive of "ira". This intuitive orientation, as I have already outlined, is not a definitive one. For Māori, as for Spinoza's affect, it calls for that first non-rational intuition that Māori often talk about, even though they may

perhaps go on to discuss rationally. It is always implicated with the colonising lens, the grappling with which, I suggest, also brings about a weird kind of satisfaction of mind because it adds to the uncertainty of knowledge generally. If I encounter a phenomenon—for instance, "mountain", in itself it is beyond my complete knowing because it is pervaded by the All. Here, we diverge from Spinoza because for him the mountain cannot be infused with the All; it is instead an *aspect* of the All. For Spinoza there must be a distinction between substance and its modes because, otherwise, the mountain would be the All, and the All would be the mountain (and thus wouldn't be the All any longer). Wonder for Spinoza depends on difference between, say, myself and the mountain, where for Māori the "mīharo" I noted before constitutes myself *as* the other thing in its totality, together with its (and my) constitution by the All. Thus, as Māori we can represent the mountain using a quick and easy template of "mountain-ness", but that is different to grasping the entirety of the mountain. When I add colonisation to the mix, then the calling of the phenomenon a "mountain" rather than "maunga", the fact (perhaps) of its European name, its manifestation within a colonised soil, and so on, are all complicating features to knowing it in its entirety. Colonisation has an element of thrill to it because it imposes further limits on what is already beyond us, but it also further inclines us towards or within the object or idea being considered.

Conclusion

For Māori, passions and agency may be the same. They are both constitutive of and by Papatūānuku, no one more than the other. Because Māori have always thought that things outside us are in fact part of us, then what goes on without, happens within and vice versa. This is illustrated in Raerino's (1999: 73) belief that one never talks about a mountain as if separate, but as if he or she were in direct relation with it. It is also partially illustrated in the recent decision (see for instance Davison, 2017) where the Whanganui river was given personhood in law and in the unity acknowledged between that river and the iwi (tribal) members. Whilst it is easy to state this, it is much harder to find the language to reflect its integrity and gravitas. I alluded to the Early German Romantic poet and philosopher, Novalis, earlier on, and I conclude by declaring one of the many similarities between him and Spinoza. I am acutely aware that they held the metaphysical in not just their propositions about the world but also within the *way* they framed those propositions. I suspect that there is much to be learned from their example for those Pākehā who become squeamish at the mention of metaphysics. Māori have not yet succumbed to making the topic of metaphysics off-limits—but the challenge lies for all of us in retaining it in our academic writing. There are several reasons for this abandonment which are outside the pragmatics of this paper but I can summarise by noting that Spinoza does not have to limit our own thinking on the way in which an object can be perceived in relation to the whole. Instead, he can act with other provocations to stoke the fires of thought that encourage Māori to consider what is basically imponderable. It is this process, I suggest, that Spinoza brings to the fore and challenges us with; the Spinozan retention of the metaphysical is itself a manifestation of Papatūānuku, and the importance of that, Spinozan or otherwise, should thus take precedence in Māori thought and expression.

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SEAN STURM AND STEPHEN TURNER

To see or be seen? The grounds of a place-based university

Prophecy

Spinoza, as the Dutch Ambassador to New Zealand, Rob Zaagman, reminded us in his welcome to the Arts of Spinoza + Pacific Spinoza, Interstices Under Construction Symposium held in Auckland in May 2017, radically undercut received wisdom, orthodox religion, and the political status quo. In the spirit of this radical Spinoza, we ask after the grounds of knowledge in the place now known as "the University of Auckland" (or Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau). We take as our starting point the *literal* grounds of our University, which not only provided the site for the symposium's discussion about Spinoza and the Pacific, but which also establishes the parameters of what counts as knowledge through the grounding provided by its faculties, schools, and disciplines. We ask about the University's provenance, about the grounds it has secured for its functions—teaching, research, and service—and about the "built pedagogy" of its architecture and environs (Sturm & Turner, 2011). To do so, we read into the University the history of its own construction, in order to get at the grounds of university-based knowledge more generally.[1] The remit that Spinoza gives us to do so is partly supported by the University of Auckland's own aspiration to world excellence, which makes it a university just like any other aspiring world-excellent university, one which can stand in for the university in general, for the "idea of the university" today (Newman, 1996; Jaspers, 1959; Habermas, 1987). Indeed, the world-excellent university opens itself to the generic drive of all-inclusive or "transcendental capitalism" (de Cauter, 2002: 273). We argue that the optics of a Spinozan radical enlightenment enables us to ask after the grounds of knowledge, to ask what the university makes visible, and what, at the same time, is occluded by this visibility.

In "The Tyranny of Transparency", Marilyn Strathern argues that, in the university today, "visibility as a conduit for knowledge is elided with visibility as an instrument for control" (2000: 309). But the university is not simply a producer of knowledge, it is also an instrument of its control, one that establishes what can be known and how it comes to be known (Foucault, 1981: 94-95). The apparatus of the university, to borrow Gilles Deleuze's (1992) description of Foucault's *dispositif* (apparatus), is an "optical machine": it is "made of lines of light [...] distributing the visible and the invisible, giving rise to objects which are dependent

on it for their existence, and causing them to disappear" (160). In turn, this optical machine constructs "regimes of enunciation" (160), determining who can speak and what can be said within its panoptical ambit. This is to say that certain "lines of force [...] act as go-betweens between seeing and saying and vice versa, acting as arrows which continually cross between words and things, constantly waging war between them" (160). To adapt Deleuze and Félix Guattari's distinction from *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), visibility thus becomes the "majoritarian" (given, normative) discourse, and invisibility the "minoritarian" (created, singular) discourse. Of course, who constitutes the "major" and the "minor" and how they speak in a settler-indigenous situation altogether depend on the time and place the question is posed and by whom. In the case of the University of Auckland, Deleuze's idiosyncratic reading of Spinoza's "optical geometry" (1997: 142) in "Spinoza and the three 'Ethics'" suggests to us a way to construct the settler imagination and its relation to a Māori place as a matter of movement. What moves in this place and, importantly, what moves us as denizens of this place are the more-than-human bodies that make up the "composite body" of the University of Auckland (Spinoza, 1992: 74; see Ruddick, 2017).

Fig. 1 Sean Sturm (2017). Old Government House and lawn from the grove of oaks planted for the 1869 visit of Prince Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh [Photograph].

To ask after the grounds of the University is to respond to its more-than-human—and more-than-present—elements and to reconstruct, on that basis, a "common notion" (Spinoza, 1992: 89) of our inhabitation that constitutes its ground and the true grounds of knowledge. This enterprise, this "working on the ground" (Deleuze, 1992: 159), demands a certain prophetic procedure. We suggest, as a first step, actually walking the grounds of the university, touching its older standing structures, and thinking and talking about what it is that the newer ones have displaced.[2] This process mirrors the Situationist *dérive* (drift), but is motivated less by "being drawn by the attractions of the terrain" (Debord, 2006: 8) than by opening up to the less-than-visible indigenous presence of the place. It might enable us to understand the operation of the tohu (signs) of the place by exploring their effects and affects (Deleuze, 1997)—their immediacy, or "firstness" (Peirce, 1974).[3]

Before we describe that prophetic procedure, we acknowledge another prophecy that marks the University as a Māori place—one signalled in the welcome to the Spinoza symposium by Michael Steedman from Ngāti Porou (one of the tāngata whenua, or peoples with customary authority, of the region). Rehearsing an ancestral tauparapara (incantation), he talked about the enduring need for spiritual connection to the land and a matakite (prophecy) by the seer Titai that foretold the coming of Europeans to Aotearoa/New Zealand and their landing at Tāmaki Makaurau/Auckland. The signs of their coming—namely, their sail as nautilus shell drifting in on the northerly wind and their flagstaff as carved post—constituted a prophecy that would in time transform the place of the tāngata whenua:

> *He aha te hau e wawara mai?*
> *He tiu! He raki!*
> *Nana i a mai te pupu tarakihi ki uta*
> *E tikina atu e au te kotiu,*
> *Koia te pou whakairo*
> *Ka tu ki Waitemata*
> *I aku wai te rangi e!*
>
> *What is the breeze which gently hither blows?*
> *It is a wind of the north-west and north*
> *Which drifts hither the shell of the nautilus.*
> *Were I to bring hitherward from the north-west*
> *The ornamental post*
> *To stand here in Waitemata*
> *Fulfilled would be my vision, e!* (Stone, 2001: 185–86)

But the bringing of Enlightenment, which was explicit in the mission of Captain Cook (Sahlins, 1995: 10–11) and implicit in the machinations of the Antipodean settlers who arrived in his wake, was at the same time a darkening of indigenous peoples' worlds. It created the now all-too-familiar racial chiaroscuro of light and shadow, good and bad, reason and unreason, scientific and superstitious knowledge.

However, it is possible—contra Spinoza's critique of prophecy in the *Theological-Political Treatise* (2007)—to be drawn into the shadowlands of enlightened knowledge through a kind of prophecy by signs, a second sight that sees through the territorialising of place by the architectonics of cartography, cadastral and statistical survey, and systems of "accountability" that dominate the design and operation of social institutions like the university today (Carter, 1987; Hoskin, 1996; Shore & Wright, 2000). Such an encounter with that fundament (Papatūānuku, or Earth Mother), as Carl Mika (2017) remarked at the symposium, is imbued with uncertainty. Indeed, the knowledge of prophecy is coloured by uncertainty, ignorance, and existential dread. Such knowledge is described by Spinoza (2007) in terms of the Hebrew word for spirit, *ruagh,* which means wind, variously conceived as life-breath, courage, capacity, sentiment, or indeed "the quarters of the world (because of the winds that blow from them), and also the sides of anything which look towards those quarters" (20–21). Taken in the context of Tāmaki Makaurau/Auckland, Spinoza's *natura naturans* (nature naturing; Spinoza, 1992: 52) could be read as the winds of change bringing colonising settlers to an indigenous place, or hau, the breath of life that Māori see as an enduring vitality that makes itself felt in the lands and waters of a place like

the University of Auckland campus—but also through its absence in architecture like the University's Owen G. Glenn Business building (see Sturm & Turner, 2011).

We propose a prophetic procedure that attends to the domain of the University of Auckland campus demarcated by the Albert Barracks wall. We ask why and how this structure exists, and what it tells us about "what happened here" and the grounds of local knowledge. We contend that the ongoing presence of the Barracks wall unsettles the grounds of university knowledge in this place, making of it a whenua tautohetohe (Mead, 1997), a contested territory.[4] First, let us allow the historical archive to speak to how the campus came into being.

Circumscription

On 18 September 1840, 3000 acres on the Tāmaki Isthmus, where the North Island (then "New Ulster") narrows to a few kilometres in width, was ceded or sold to Her Majesty's Government by Te Kawau (ariki tauaroa, or paramount chief), his son Reweti, Tinana, and Horo (rangatira, or chiefs) of Ngāti Whātua-o-Ōrākei for an advance of six pounds—and some tobacco.[5] The Governor, Captain William Hobson, had claimed "Autea" [Aotea] a week prior in a letter to his Chief Magistrate, William Symonds (F. & S. Mathew, 1940: 182–183). The signing of what the settlers took to be a provisional deed of sale was solemnised by toasts to the Queen, boat races and the raising of a flagstaff into which was cut the date and the name "Auckland" (Mathew 1940: 191)—named after the then Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland. On 20 October 1840, the parties signed the final Deed of Purchase for the isthmus (in total, Ngāti Whātua-o-Ōrākei received cash and goods worth £281, with a second payment of £60 in 1842). On 14 November 1840, having surveyed the isthmus, Surveyor-General Felton Mathew submitted his town plan for approval (F. & S. Mathew, 1940: 196).



Fig. 2 Felton Mathew (1842). Plan of the town of Auckland, New Ulster, the capital of the colony of New Zealand [Map, Sir George Grey Special Collections, Auckland Libraries].

"Cobweb" Mathew planned the town of Auckland as a series of concentric circular streets radiating out from a circus on the elevated site of Albert Hill (Rangipuke), taking its cue from the circular volcanic plateau on which it sits and the volcanoes which define Auckland's landscape (Mathew, 1940: 197; see Brand, 2011). Although the plan (see Figure 2), probably based on that by John Nash for Regent's Park and Regent Street (Brand, 2011; Douglas, 2015; cf. Hamer, 1990), was approved by Governor William Hobson, it was never fully enacted, perhaps because of a shortage of surveyors or, indeed, a lack of political will to invest in such a grand design.

Fig. 3 George Pulman (1863). Pulman's register map of the city of Auckland [Map, Sir George Grey Special Collections, Auckland Libraries].

Fig. 4 Edward Ashworth (1842–1843). Government House, Auckland: NW view [Watercolour, Alexander Turnbull Library].

With the exception of two quadrants skirting one side of the field that became Albert Park and the precincts of Government House, Auckland was reduced to a grid that was creased by the gully that divided it, and down which flowed the "Queen Street River" (known then to Māori as Waihorotiu and later as the Ligar Canal) on the western border of what eventually became the main street of Auckland (see Figure 3 and Douglas, 2015). It ranged around a fortified barracks, rather than a circus, in an uncanny echo of the Pukerangi pā (village) that once occupied the site (Bulmer, 1994, citing Graham, 1980).

The first Government House at Auckland was a sixteen-room wooden structure prefabricated in London and modelled on that built in 1821 to house Napoleon on Saint Helena, Longwood House. It was imported in 1841 by Governor Hobson and erected on Waterloo Quadrant on a gently sloping tract of land to the northeast of the Albert Barracks. When it burned down in June 1848 during the governorship of George Gray, it was replaced with a larger Italianate house, again wooden but designed to look like stone (see inset in Figure 3, and Figure 4). Once the seat of

Government was relocated to Wellington in 1865, it became the northern residence for the Governor and official guests like Prince Alfred the Duke of Edinburgh and Queen Elizabeth II (McLean, 2006). In 1969, it was absorbed by the University of Auckland and became known as Old Government House. It now houses the Staff Club and is planned to become home to the Faculty of Law.



Fig. 5 Unknown (c. 1860–1870s). Government House, Auckland [Photograph, Alexander Turnbull Library].

These extant documents make Albert Hill the centre of the new town of, capital for a time (1841–1865) of, the new Colony of New Zealand. Located on an existing elevated settlement (Rangipuke), the unsurveyed site is first overwritten by the Town Plan, then cleared for the Albert Barracks, then occupied by the first Government House and its levelled surrounds. A precinct—literally, "encirclement" in Latin—is as good a word as any for the bounded space of the would-be Government's House, behind which snakes the military barracks wall in a circle that would accommodate, enclose, and protect the small settler population from the tāngata whenua beyond. From the outset, then, the imagined threat of conflict underlay the settlers' governance of the territory, which would expand through land confiscation to the rest of Auckland, the North Island, and ultimately the whole country—the move of the University's Faculty of Law to this building that has been mooted in the University's building programme parallels these acts of circumscription upon which the law is founded. Beyond the cartography of town plans based on British models, the rationale of national law—before the 'nation' existed as such—required surveyors to establish the bounded plots of sections, suburbs, parks, farms, and roads. Governance thus hinged on the sovereign determination of property and its administration, which in turn founded the basis of law and suffrage in the new country. In this way, what Giselle Byrnes calls the "calligraphy of colonisation" (2001: 77) formalised the topography (literally, "land-writing")—via survey chains and theodolites—that enabled surveyors to measure and thereby create plots. The "ratio" of the chain (66 feet or 100 links in length, with an acre being 10 square chains) quite literally supplied the rationale for settlement and a law of circumscription.

Dr John Johnson, Colonial Surgeon, painted accounts of what David Filer (1999) has referred to as "life on the frontier" from the signing of the Treaty of the Waitangi onward. This watercolour sketch from the last year of his life shows a parade of the 58th (Rutlandshire) Regiment of Foot at the Albert Barracks before Lieutenant-General Sir George Charles D'Aguilar, in the presence of a phlegmatic audience of tāngata whenua. The regiment was deployed in New Zealand from 1845–1859 and was commanded from 1851–1864 by General Edward Buckley Wynyard, who gave his name to the Auckland landmarks of Wynyard Wharf, Street, and, later, Quarter.

Fig. 6 John Johnson (1848). New barracks, Auckland, 1848 [Watercolour, Auckland War Memorial Museum].

No doubt, the rebuilt Government House, panopticon-like in its stately and forbidding survey of its surrounds, was read as a sign of the country-to-come. Its linearity, squareness, and stone construction appear at odds with the rolling landscape cleared for its establishment. Architecturally out-sized and out of place, as even settler critics of the Italianate design observed at the time (Sinclair & McNaughton, 1983), its military activities, distinguished royal guests, and social and recreational events all worked to establish and secure a new mode of panoptical inhabitation. The building can be seen to have its eye on the local population, but, equally, the tāngata whenua have set their eyes on it and are fully attendant to the signifying work of settlement that it performs—hence the way in which the volcanic mound of Maungawhau/Mt Eden, once a pā of Te Wai-o-Hua (the iwi [tribe] defeated by Ngāti Whātua-o-Ōrākei in the mid-18th century), looms over it. Their lawful—or "lore"-ful (Barclay, 2005: 202)—gaze contests the grounding of the building, despite the 'legal' transaction that afforded settlers this foothold. Government House can be taken as a sign of things to come, as the property regime of encroaching settlement, and the agents and equipment of survey and militia that supported it, resulted in further contestation of land throughout the country (Belich, 2015) and spawned the defiant movements of Māori prophets—from Te Ua Haumēne (Pai Mārire/Hauhau), Te Whiti-o-Rongomai (at Parihaka), Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki (Ringatū) to Rua Tapunui Kenana (at Maungapohatu) (Elsmore, 1989). The prophets were led by the existential dread occasioned by the settler spectacle to situate the spread of settlement in stories of regeneration of the peoples now calling themselves "Māori" (see Binney, 1999). In the context of signs that were read in both new and older terms of place—across the short settler history and the longer indigenous occupation—the law that Government House signifies and enacts quite literally a matter of where you stand, or sit … with the past in front of you.



Fig. 7 Author unknown (1866). Plan shewing the locality of the old Military Barracks [Map, Sir George Grey Special Collections, Auckland Libraries].

The Albert Barracks was built between 1846 and 1852 to supplement Fort Britomart and to reassure the Auckland population after Hone Heke's 'rebellion' led to the Flagstaff War (1845–1846) in the Bay of Islands. It was soon to house more than 500 troops. George Graham of the Royal Engineers supervised the construction of a 1300-metre wall to enclose the 22 acres (8.9 ha) of the barracks and a number of buildings, including a magazine, a hospital, and a commissariat. Most were built by the more than 100 Māori stonemasons and builders from volcanic basalt blocks brought from the nearby Mt Eden Quarry (Sinclair & McNaughton, 1983). Graham later claimed that the fortification of the barracks wasn't necessary but would prevent the subdivision of the hill and allow the area to become a park in a time of peace.

Fig. 8 J. D. Richardson (1860s). Inside Albert Barracks [Photograph, Sir George Grey Special Collections, Auckland Libraries].

The Barracks was sent two Russian guns captured in the Crimea (see Figure 8): one is now at the Akarana Yacht Club in Auckland; the other, at the Waiouru Army Museum, while other military artefacts remain in Albert Park today. It was customary in the design of barracks from the 1830s to 1850s to centre on a parade ground for drills and punishments, but also leisure activities (Douet, 1998). To this end, in 1856 the parade ground was levelled and manicured by the military cricket club in preparation for cricket season (see Figure 9) (Clough, et al. 2003).

The Barracks was largely abandoned after the colonial capital was shifted to Wellington in 1865. The buildings and most of the wall were

Fig. 9 Author unknown (1869). Cricket match at Albert Barracks, Auckland, 1869 [Photograph, Alexander Turnbull Library].

demolished in 1870–1871 and the stone reused elsewhere, including in the construction of the local jail at Mt Eden (Coates, 1990; Clough, et al. 2003). 85 metres of the wall remain, dividing the old "100 Sector" of the University from the newer "300 Sector" and General Library.

Fig. 10 Sean Sturm (2017). Barracks wall as seen from the University General Library side of the wall [Photograph].

Walking the Barracks wall today (see Figure 10), we sense the complete circle it once formed. It is such acts of circumscription that establish settlers' claim to lawful presence. The instruments of survey and governance not only created a clearing, but also brought the sense of threat (threatening, but more importantly, being threatened) that gives the law its military foundation and produces, in sequence, a para-military, police, and prisons. Faced with questions of a constitutional nature, settlers (Pākehā [non-Māori New Zealanders] and migrants) today will tend to draw the same circle of fear and imagine a conflict that ultimately springs from their disavowal of other and older modes of inhabitation—and of Māori law/lore as "first law" (Mikaere, 2011: 14). In the case of the Government House precinct, given their fidelity to the settled site *as is*, it takes something akin to a leap of faith—a prophet-like act of imagination, indeed—for them to encounter the place beyond the flat circle of the Barracks wall's inscription.

Circumspection

However, the panoptics of such circumscription obscures a shadow discourse, or *scotoptics,* that hides invisible "lines of flight", of "subjectivation" and "fracture" (Deleuze, 1992: 161). What moves and moves us in this place as we walk exceeds what is visible to the eye—although, thanks to John Johnson's painting (Figure 6), we can imagine that everything that takes and has taken place here is beheld, like the soldiers in the group portrait (Figure 9), by tāngata (peoples) and whenua (land). We can sense, as Carl Mika claimed in his probing of the mystery of ground (Papatūānuku) at the Spinoza symposium (2017), that even a tree may be "infused with the all". So may the trees dedicated to Prince Albert in the grounds of Government House (see Figure 1) be seen as bearing witness to the processes of settlement that led to the building of Government House and the installation of the colonial government. And thanks to Deleuze's (1997) reading of Spinoza's semiotics in the *Ethics*, we can see the signs of the place at work by exploring their effects and affects. We can read structures that express the place as "scalar" signs (scalar because they express the state of something at a moment in time). Scalar signs such as indices, icons, and symbols produce effects that are variously sensible ("indicative"), logical ("abstractive"), moral ("imperative"), or hermeneutic ("interpretive") (Deleuze, 1997: 138–140). Government House, for example, is altogether solid, upstanding, and progressive, a symbol of the early Colony and the University of New Zealand. But we can also read the structures as "vectorial" signs (vectorial because they express the change in something over time). Vectorial signs produce affects that are variously "augmentative", "diminutive", or "ambiguous", generating a play of light and dark (or joy and sadness, for Spinoza) that constitutes "degrees of chiaroscuro" (Deleuze, 1997: 140–141). The ClockTower, for example (see Figure 1), is a *pou whakairo* (ornamental post) that drills into history and proliferates the affects of settlement, just as the raising of the flagstaff at Tāmaki must have done for Māori, for whom it was the fulfilment of the ambivalent prophecy of the coming of Pākehā. To be alert to such signs represents a kind of second sight—which is really a matter of seeing oneself or other things as other to the place, or better, of being seen by the place and its peoples as other. Seen this way, settlers and their history are "broken" (Turner, 2002): they are unsettled and their history is unfounded in the place. Nonetheless, their unsettlement signals the possibility of "lines of flight" (disappearances) that occasion "lines of fracture" or "subjectivation" such as ruptures in time and/or space or new forms of becoming (Deleuze, 1992: 161).[6] To be moved by ground in a Māori place is thus to be beheld by tāngata and whenua.

Fig. 11 Sean Sturm (2017). Michael Parekowhai's *Kapa Haka* (2008), from the Old Government House side of the Barracks wall [Photograph].

When we walk the grounds of the campus in the shadow of the wall, we are called to circumspection. To come upon Michael Parekowhai's security guard in the ironic pose of the modern Māori warrior is to become aware of the Barracks wall and the University's General Library looming above it.[7] The circumscription of the wall initialises the settler presence and secures the ground for the expansion of settler institutions and their archive. But the Library is not the only repository of knowledge in this place, nor the only means by which it is secured. And what the security guard—Māori, as is not untypical in New

Zealand—might be securing remains obscure. The figure is a troubling transversal of the University's optics, an unsettling sign that might stand for the University as a site of knowledge and apparatus of control (and for its teachers as disciplinarians), or for Māori as both agents of settler securitisation and Māori circumspection.[8] Altogether, it represents a composite body. For Spinoza (1992: 74, 88), bodies moving or being moved in concert can resonate to form "composite bodies", of which "common notions" can be formed (as in when, for Deleuze [1997: 143], an "associative chain" becomes an "automatic chain"). The "human body" is one example of a composite body about which we form common notions; the "University of Auckland" is another—which implies that a body can be composed of human and more-than-human bodies (it's common knowledge today that the human body is composed of human elements allied with flora and often fauna). Susan Ruddick, in her keynote presentation at the symposium, went further. She took this capacity to be affected as indicative of ecological alliances at work between human and more-than-human bodies. Seen this way, the "composite body" of the University campus might be considered a "composition of forces" (Ruddick, 2017: 125), in other words, a body both tangible and intangible, human and others, that encompasses institution, archive, statue—and the ground on which they stand. A "common notion" of the University campus alert to its "degrees of chiaroscuro" (Deleuze, 1997: 141), to its lights and shadows, would thus have to encompass, extend, and even excavate its ground.



Fig. 12 Local Time (2014). Te Wai Ariki [Map]. *Argos Aotearoa*, 1, 5.

Three pā occupied Rangipuke at different times: Tangihanga Pukeā was situated on Rerenga-ora-iti (later Fort Britomart); Te Reuroa, near the present day High Court; and Pukerangi, in the north-western corner of Albert Park (Auckland City, 2009: 26). As the Local Time collective write,

> *All had ready access to the natural spring Te Wai Ariki (chiefly waters) located in what are now the grounds of the University of Auckland Faculty of Law. In*

> *the waterways from which Te Wai Ariki springs lived the taniwha [water spirit] Horotiu, after whom the stream that ran down present-day Queen Street and flowed into the bay Horotiu (later Commercial Bay) was named […] its waters and taniwha now move under the streets of the CBD.* (Local Time, 2014: 4)

The series of pā and the fort that underlie the University of Auckland campus might seem alike in their military function and their elevated survey of the surrounding lands, but the fort enacts circumscription, whereas the pā enact circumspection. The pā access the sacred subterranean spring, Te Wai Ariki, that is overseen by its *taniwha*, Horotiu (see Figure 12). Taniwha, as laid down by ancient tohunga (priests), are tohu (signs) and natural forces, guardians and dangers, that anchor and sustain a local community (Marsden, 2003: 19). Given the interdependence of pā residents and the spring, the taniwha calls for circumspection, an ethics of care towards its life-giving waters (the sewer canal later laid over its outlet in what is now Queen Street signifies a total ignorance of *this* knowledge [Douglas, 2015: 58]). All that happens in the place is beheld by, and beholden to, the taniwha, the agent and principle of uncertain ground, that looked on as the place was apparently transformed by the arrival of settlers, militia, government, and universities. Among other things, what this shadow discourse discloses is that the university occupies a transcendental-colonial-Māori place, a territory that is palimpsestic and contested, a whenua tautohetohe (Mead, 1997: 235). A common notion of this uncommon composition moves beyond the enlightened optics centred on the visible; it requires that the uncertainty of its less visible ground be attended to (as Philip Armstrong [2011] does when he hears the rumblings of Rūaumoko in the earthquake-torn landscape of Christchurch). To do so might enable settlers to seek a solidarity grounded in their relative ignorance and to approach the grounds of (this) place with an uncertainty that would enable the real encounters and alliances otherwise foreclosed by their self-circumscription. Such encounters and alliances might also reveal that the university too is more than it seems, which it must be if it is to be a "pluriversity" (cf. De Sousa Santos, 2009): a place of possibilities, upbuilding, and practical wisdom; a *wānanga* (place of learning) and not just another placeless neoliberal university that produces nothing but certain and circumscribed knowledge.

Fig. 13 Sean Sturm (2017). Te Wai Ariki spring outlet, University of Auckland Faculty of Law carpark [Photograph].

Thus, one way in which we as scholars can ask after the ground rules of our university—or perhaps of any university in an indigenous place—is to ask after the ground on which it sits. Ours is sited on a former colonial fort, Albert Barracks, and on the site of a number of former indigenous pā. The Barracks wall conspicuously bisects the campus; the Te Wai Ariki stream that sustained the pā issues inconspicuously via a tap in the carpark of the Faculty of Law (see Figure 13). But seeing the university, as it were, in view of the place in which it sits and of everything that has happened there means more than reading the place as a historical palimpsest; it means seeing the correspondences between its military history and the paramilitary nature of management in the "university of excellence" (Readings, 1996: 11; see Hoskin, Macve, & Stone, 2006), and between its enterprise and that of militant colonialism and neo-colonialism (Chatterjee & Maira, 2014). Moreover, it is to see it as an "uncommon commons" (Turner,

2013: 26), an eruption of place in the generic "non-place" (Augé, 1995) of the transcendental "university of excellence" (Readings, 1996: 11). And that uncommon commons might even presage an Oceanic "undercommons", to borrow a term from Harney & Moten (2013; see Hau'ofa, 1993), shared by indigenous peoples across the Pacific, but not necessarily by non-indigenous peoples—though they might otherwise "share" the same place. Such is the hope that an ethic of care toward the place and its peoples holds out—a fidelity to what moves and to being moved—such that we scholars tautoko (affirm) the whakatauki "toitū te whenua; toitū te tangata" (as the land endures, so do the people).

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ENDNOTES

1 For Jacques Derrida's reading of the university in terms of the physical grounds of Cornell University, see "The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils" (Derrida, 1983).

2 For other examples of psychogeographical critical university studies, see Beyes & Michels (2014) and Richardson (2014).

3 Compare Deleuze (1986: 98–99) on firstness.

4 According to Mead, the concept of *whenua tautohetohe*, or "debateable lands" on the shared boundary between the lands of *iwi* (tribes), "allows for dynamic political and social relations between neighbouring tribes and reflects the ebb and flow of *iwi* politics" (1997: 236), unlike the fixed boundary of surveyed lands.

5 The deed comprised a wedge of land running along the Waitematā foreshore from Hobson Bay to the Whau creek and inland to Maungawhau (Mt Eden). For the vexed status of the Deed of Sale of the Tāmaki isthmus, see Stone (2001: 261–262) and Waitangi Tribunal (1987).

6 Deleuze and Guattari's term *lignes de fuite* is often translated "lines of flight", but strictly speaking it denotes the lines that converge on a vanishing point in linear perspective. *Fuite* literally means "escape", "leak" or "disappearing into the distance" (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: xvi).

7 The title of Parekowhai's sculpture, *Kapa Haka* (literally, "line-dance"), draws an ironic link between the ritualised gestures of Māori performing arts and a common pose of security guards in New Zealand, many of whom are of Māori descent.

8 It is a little-known fact that the University of Auckland was the recipient of endowments of land confiscated from several North Island iwi, in particular, Ngāti Awa and Tainui, as Linda Mead (later Linda Tuhiwai-Smith) documents in her PhD thesis *Nga aho o te kakahu matauranga* (Mead, 1996: 96, citing Sinclair & McNaughton, 1983: 30).

GÖKHAN KODALAK

Spinoza's affective aesthetics: Art and architecture from the viewpoint of life

There is a peculiar aesthetic undercurrent traversing Baruch Spinoza's philosophy, harbouring untapped potentials and far-reaching implications for contemporary discussions on aesthetics.[1] The relationship between aesthetics and Spinoza's philosophy, however, has been nothing but a huge missed encounter, resulting in the publication of only a few books and a handful of articles for more than three and a half centuries.[2] This begs the question: is there, despite our persistent negligence, much more to the relationship of Spinoza and aesthetics than first meets the eye? I will argue that there might be. For once Spinoza's philosophy as a whole, ranging from his philosophical and political treatises to his private letters and unfinished manuscripts, is read between the lines, latent seeds of a peculiar aesthetic theory become visible—an aesthetic theory that moves beyond subjective and objective approaches that have come to dominate the field, and rather grounds itself on affective interactions and morphogenetic processes. That is, although Spinoza did not work on an *independent* theory of art and architecture built upon *conventional* aesthetic values, he developed, and grounded his philosophy on, a highly elaborate logic of affective operations, from which all aesthetic interactions *immanently* arise, *including* creative and experiential activities of art and architecture. A subterranean journey through Spinoza's affective aesthetics constitutes the subject matter of this paper, which interweaves subtle aesthetic hints buried deep within his philosophical archive, while unfolding relevant ramifications of these promising discoveries in relation to confluent artistic and architectural approaches for the current aesthetic discourse.[3]

I. Implicating affectivities

In Spinoza's philosophy, modalities of existence (*modus*)—whether humans, animals, artworks, or architectural constructs—are all constituted by an immanent process of substantial individuation, which gives them their singular capacities, potencies, and rhythms. So, morphogenetic individuation of artistic and architectural modalities, that is, their coming into being, begins with a process of implication—as in plicating inwards, as in enfolding substantial forces of life. This is the initial voyage when artists and architects encounter an affective continuum beneath everyday forms, confront constitutive forces underlying

extensive environments, and expose themselves to this chaotic dimension, to this turbulent undercurrent. In Spinoza's terminology, this process deals with substantial affectivities (*substantiae affectiones*), that is, how substantial forces of life (Being) are translated into everyday forms and events (beings) (E1D5).[4] What is peculiar to Spinoza's approach is that formative potencies of cosmos (*Natura naturans*) are immanent to their formed expressions (*Natura naturata*) (E1P29S, KV 1.8–9). Which is to say, substantial affectivities that individuate everyday modalities are not situated above or beyond cosmos, do not transcend individual artworks or architectural buildings, but subsist in each and every process of individuation, like magmatic flows underlying tectonic mountains (KV 2.26, TP 2.2). Cézanne, who obsessively painted Mont Sainte-Victoire again and again in a series of oil paintings for more than twenty years at the turn of the twentieth century, shares Spinoza's morphogenetic concern, when he defines his obsession in this mountain as follows: "Look at Sainte-Victoire there. What élan… These masses were made of fire, and fire is in them still" (quoted in Gasquet, 1991: 82–83). This is the aesthetic vision that accompanies each process of implication, the vision that does not only see a mountain's extensive contours, colours, and forms, but more importantly, recognises what caused that mountain to be, and what still flows beneath its unbending posture.

At the beginning of each aesthetic implication, an encounter takes place; artists and architects come across substantial affectivities or tangled forces of life. This encounter is not initiated by a brush, a pen, or an instrument; it is anterior to the first sketch, the first line, the first melody. What initiates it, rather, is an overwhelming confrontation with formative forces before they have assumed their actual forms. Yet why is this confrontation overwhelming? For it does not take place in zones of comfort, but in underground passages. For it does not rely on ready-made experiences of actual forms, but grounds itself on elusive experiences of substantial affectivities. In conceptual confluence with Spinoza, Olga Rozanova, the early twentieth-century abstract painter and theorist, explains this initial process elegantly: "How does the world reveal itself to us? How does our soul reflect the world? In order to reflect, it is necessary to perceive.... The artist's primary aspiration to create arises from this confrontation with nature" (1976: 103). And László Moholy-Nagy, the Bauhaus artist and architect, shares this intuitive trajectory, when he argues that architecture is not construction of buildings "from visible, measurable, and well-proportioned volumes;" rather, "real spatial experience rests…on the often invisible play of forces," that is, "space creation is an interweaving of the parts of space, which are anchored, for the most part, in clearly traceable relations extending in all directions as a fluctuating play of forces," rendering architecture "the medium of space-creating relations" (1947: 62). Does not Moholy-Nagy refer to what Spinoza calls substantial affectivities and formative forces of life, when he talks about "fluctuating play of forces" and "space-creating relations" in architecture? In a way, he does. For artists and architects are peculiar personae who find their own way to dive deep and witness subterranean affectivities beneath extensive landscapes and final forms, who endure extreme pressures and come back up from the fiery depths, with ringing eardrums, bloodshot eyes, and singular sears of their own. Yet it is also important to recognize that aesthetic implication is not a unilateral process, in which all forms of agency are consolidated within artists, architects, namely, within conventional subjects. For affectivities also express their presence in this encounter as formative events, as play of forces surrounding singularities of attraction and

bifurcation. Affectivities strike artists and architects, not with their beauty or ugliness, but with their magnitude, radiance, and potence. And the humble role of artists and architects at this initial stage is nothing but to take notice, to affirm that aesthetic production does not begin with their subjective invention, but with a laborious discovery of substantial forces of life.

But on its own, an encounter with substantial affectivities means nothing, if it is not supplemented with a selective gesture. Despite its onto-epistemological focus, Spinoza called his *magnum opus* the *Ethics*, for what interested him was to make conceivable new ways of being and thinking, insofar as this conception makes way for a new *ethos* of surfing and curating one's own encounters in life. This means, at its core, *Ethics* is an exploration about how to harness substantial affectivities from everyday encounters, and select empowering compositions over weakening ones (E4Pref). This is Spinoza's ethico-aesthetic journey, in which the art of living and the life of art tend to become two expressions of one and the same reality.[5] In other words, Spinoza's ethics of curating one's own life runs parallel to his aesthetics of curating the life of artistic and architectural modalities. But how does this curation, this selective gesture function? Once artists and architects come to notice substantial affectivities, they start supplementing their discovery with activities of vigilance and selection; they recognize different levels of magnitude and luminescence, capture them according to their radiance, enfold them according to their intensities, and channel them according to their potence (*potentia*) towards the genesis of their aesthetic production.[6] Paul Klee, the modernist abstract painter, addresses a shared problem with Spinoza, when he defines this relationship as follows: "Our pounding heart drives us down, deep down to the source of all," but "what springs from this source…must be taken seriously only if it unites with the proper creative means to form a work of art" (Klee, 1966: 51). Subterranean encounters are incorporated into aesthetic productions only if they can be captured via creative selections. And for this reason, artists and architects capture topological curvatures underlying topographical landscapes; they take in subsisting forces of life; they channel radiant affectivities to pass through their alembic. All to prepare the generative conditions of their artwork-in-the-making. All to affirm the blending of the art of living and the life of art.

But who are these artists; who are these architects? Are they autonomous subjects or privileged authors, who command substantial affectivities from above, and create aesthetic artifacts with their omnipotent will? They are not, in Spinoza's aesthetics. For Spinoza argues that individuals, whether artists or architects, are not discrete, self-contained subjects, but entangled modalities that expand and contract via dynamic interactions within a distributed network of affective agencies. That is, if two or more modalities come to share compatible rhythms of existence, they might as well constitute a novel collective modality with emergent capacities of its own (E2P13Def). This means that an artist or an architect is never a solitary subject, but an enmeshed multiplicity, made of human bodies and minds, painting brushes and drawing pens, canvases and blueprints, artist studios and architectural offices, cultural inputs and economic exchanges, and all the common habits, specific discourses, and singular techniques emerging out of these interactions. Spinoza's philosophy neither endows aesthetic authors sacred roles and transcendent thrones, nor professes the death of the author by reactively rushing to the opposite pole, but presents nuanced ways of distributing agency and authorship within dynamic milieus.[7] This conception implies

that the author of an aesthetic production is not a human subject; it is not an entity, but an affective activity: a distributed network of aesthetic agencies and substantial affectivities, an entangled event evolving through the interaction of artists, architects, and all the actors that come to affect and be affected by this creative process. From Spinoza's peculiar lens, all modalities are aesthetic authors, albeit with different capabilities.

II. Complicating affections

As substantial affectivities are implicated into aesthetic production, another process emerges *en route*, a process of complication—as in plicating together, as in folding affectivities into complex compositions. In Spinoza's terminology, this process deals with modal affections (*affectio*). Modal affections are trans-individual encounters, in which the activity of an affecting modality, an external cause, is enveloped by and transcribed in the affected modality as an affective trace (E2P16). During this process, artists and architects complicate substantial affectivities by expressing them via modal affections. Through their creative exchange with canvases, constructs, and rhythms in the making, they orchestrate artistic sensations, architectural formations, and musical compositions. This is the stage of transmuting subterranean forces into terrestrial relations, the stage of expressing topological dynamics via topographical gestures, the stage of going back and forth between immaterial relations and material expressions.

At this stage, artists and architects transform the vitality of their initial encounters into aesthetic affections expressible within their specific medium. Yet there is a danger here, the danger of complicating via reduction rather than contraction. If the vitality of substantial affectivities is reduced while being translated into lines and colours, into sounds and rhythms, into forms and materials, then the artwork suffers, loses its intensity, becomes weakened. Reduction comes in many guises, diluting the intensity of aesthetic production. Imitative techniques may reduce artworks to derivative copies; symbolic representations may subordinate them into carriers of meanings external to their mode of existence; seductive clichés may curb their exuberance by channelling them towards paths already taken. According to Spinoza, moving beyond inadequate comprehension and reduction can only be attained via contemplating substantial affectivities, immanently, by contracting and expressing them in modal affections (E5P36). Artists and architects always run the risk of limiting substantial forces of life with weakening transformations, whereas their primary pursuit is to contract affectivities without depriving them of their singular intensity. John Cage, the experimental composer and music theorist, shares this insight of expressive contraction, as he argues that the musician's role is to "give up the desire to control sound," so as to "set about discovering means to let sounds be themselves rather than vehicles for man-made theories or expressions of human sentiments," which is an affirmation of sounds in their substantial intensity, and hence, "an affirmation of life" (Cage, 1961: 10–12). This is the latent *ethos* underlying processes of complication from the viewpoint of Spinoza's aesthetics: an affective transformation that, rather than reducing and subjugating life forces, affirms and contracts them.

During aesthetic complication, contracting and transforming substantial affectivities run parallel to experiments in constructing and composing modal affections. Composing modal affections on a specific artistic medium is the

moment when the infinite speed of substantial affectivities finds a characteristic rhythm in finitude. Only by framing an acquired portion of chaos, by marking a partial multiplicity of substantial affectivities, works of art and architecture can contract the infinite, immanently, in a finite composition. This composition amounts to an aesthetic artefact's singular potence, characteristic rhythm, or *conatus* in Spinoza's words, which constitutes its mode of existence, affective capacities, and what its body can and cannot do in everyday relations (E2P13, E3P6–7). Artists and architects compose artworks and architectural constructs by way of framing their web of affective interactions. During this act of framing, however, a new danger arises, the danger of assuming the frame of composition an absolute limit that confines affections, rather than a permeable interface that catalyses contracted forces to open themselves up from within. For Spinoza, the characteristic rhythm or conative potence of an individual modality does not amount to, as is sometimes interpreted, an inward-looking mechanism foregrounding self-preservation and conservative autonomy. Rather, conative potence means the capability of an individual modality to open itself up to outside forces, affect and be affected by its environment, endure internal fluctuations and surf external oscillations, while at the same time acting and persisting in its own dynamic mode of being.[8] Spinoza's memorable remark, that "nobody as yet has determined the limits of the body's capabilities: that is, nobody as yet has learned from experience what the body can and cannot do" can be interpreted, not only as a frontal attack against mental supremacy over bodily experience, but also as a novel way of envisioning bodily capabilities in affective and conative terms (E3P2S). We cannot know what the body of an aesthetic artefact can and cannot do, because its infinite capacities are actualized in finitude only through affective interactions with other bodies. Accordingly, an individual artwork or architectural construct cannot be limited with pre-given properties or reduced to fixed modes of behaviour—despite how much effort goes into these activities of limiting and fixing—because its capacities, tendencies, and affects will unfold only through trans-individual interactions on the fly. This means that each interaction with a work of art or architecture harbours the potential to unravel emergent capabilities beyond our initial predictions. Cedric Price, the eccentric architect of postwar England, addresses a shared problem with Spinoza, when he argues for "calculated uncertainty" in architecture, which means affirming and augmenting affective openness of spatial interactions, rather than limiting and controlling them.[9] Calculated, because there is, indeed, a finite frame of composition. Yet what is calculated is uncertainty; what is composed is openness of affective interactions; what is pursued is rendering open-ended relations as generative and empowering as possible. For Spinoza, this affective experimentation constitutes our ethico-aesthetic journey in life: pushing the limits of our power always to new heights, opening up to as many affective relations as possible, and rendering these affections, to the best of our capability, empowering interactions for all the parties involved (E5P39–40).

The agency of an artwork-in-the-making makes itself felt to its artist the most during the process of complication. For an artwork is not a passive surface that registers the transcendent imposition of an artist's will, nor is an architectural construct a neutral container shaped by the autarchic order of an architect's pre-conceived plan. At every turn during the process of composition, an artwork-in-the-making renders unforeseen trajectories visible, develops deflecting resistances to certain approaches, reveals enticing tendencies for certain others.

Francis Bacon, the painter of affectively charged raw imagery, argues that each painting "has a life completely of its own," and adds: "In the way I work, I don't in fact know very often, what the paint will do, and it does many things, which are very much better, than I could make it do" (Sylvester, 1987: 17). This gesture reminds us, once again, that aesthetic production is a developmental field charged with a myriad of intersecting agencies. And in this sense, Spinoza's ontology is pan-affective in composition, acknowledging the agency of each and every modality and affirming their equal share in existing, acting, affecting, and making a difference. This means artworks or architectural constructs are no longer devoid of agency; no longer mere reflections of cultural conventions; no longer mere receptacles mirroring their creators' subjective intentions. From Spinoza's aesthetic lens, artworks and architectural modalities are all singularly "alive, albeit in different degrees" (E2P13S).

III. Explicating affects

As modal affections are complicated, yet another process of aesthetic production emerges, the process of explication—as in plicating outwards, as in unfolding. This is the time when artworks and architectural constructs stand up on their own, present new sensations in expanded magnitude, and turn life back in on itself. In Spinoza's lexicon, aesthetic explication deals with affects (*affectus*). Affects translate modal affections, or affective traces of external causes, into a passage of power, into a modification of one's existence (E3D3). That is, affects are empowering or weakening transitions that result from modal encounters; they are what come to traverse interacting parties during the expressive unpacking of aesthetic experience. At this crucial point, we need to be careful not to confuse affects with feelings or emotions in the conventional sense of these terms. Rather, affects are unfolded expressions and explicated intensities of life penetrating our bodies and minds, which we only subsequently translate in the form of feelings. Affects are immanent modifications in our modes of being and acting, as we come face to face with a painting that overwhelms us, with a musical piece that takes us over, with a literary text that cracks our skull open, with an architectural building that astounds us.

Explication process begins, as soon as aesthetic artefacts come to attain their singular modes of existence. A painting comes to life, an architectural construct emerges into space, with complicated affections composed into lines and colours or forms and materials, as these artefacts start unfolding substantial affectivities enveloped in their newly constituted body through affects and sensations. As works of art and architecture come to interact with their audience, with us, a myriad of affections surge forward, a selection of which infiltrate our body and mind, affecting us, altering our power of existence, modifying our rhythm of life. This is how activities of affecting and being affected bring together processes of aesthetic production and aesthetic reception. Once we come face to face with aesthetic artefacts that perform an intensive explication, we witness an unfamiliar affect taking hold of our body, sending shock waves through our senses, twisting our nerves from within, showing us a sudden flash of what lies beneath. What is curious about this affective impact is that it is not limited to a single moment. Affects have their untimely dimension of their own; artworks and architectural constructs produce ever-changing affects at different times, in different places, in interaction with different individual and collective modalities (E4P9–10). This

means that once works of art and architecture come to life, they no longer rely on their initial producers or immediate audience for their indefinite existence. From then on, they continue to express and unfold ever new affects. Artworks and architectural constructs are monuments, neither to their conceivers, nor to their perceivers, but to affective activity of life itself.

During aesthetic explication, the frame thrown over substantial affectivities is deframed once again; artworks and architectural constructs present their affective potence back to excessive forces of life; aesthetic interaction blends into life expressing and expanding its own affective repertoire. In Spinoza's words, auto-affectivity of life by way of modal explication is called beatitude (*beatitudo*) (E5P35–36). Beatitude has nothing to do with beauty in its conventional sense, as beatitude does not emerge from subjective judgements or objective qualities as beauty is believed to do (Ep. 54). Rather, beatitude is an affective procedure; it is the expression of explicated affects becoming one with their substantial affectivities; the journey of infinite multiplicities passing through finite modalities and reaching back to their substantial infinity. Artworks and architectural constructs participate in beatitude, in ecstatic expansion of life, insofar as they render sensible affectivities hitherto insensible, make visible forces previously invisible, make experienceable spatial relations that were formerly inexperienceable. With each explication of unforeseen affects, and sensations unheard of in their emergent intensity, life expands; works of art and architecture bring forth new ways of being; affective capacities of life are enriched. What aesthetic explication achieves, as Virginia Woolf the modernist writer subtly puts, is to "saturate every atom," that is, "to put practically everything in; yet to saturate," so as to return forces of life more vigorously back to life itself.[10] This is the primary struggle of aesthetic production: how to harness imperceptible forces from substantial affectivities; how to extract modal affections from infinite fluctuations; how to convert these affections into intensified affects; how to compose these affects into aesthetic constructs; and how to make these constructs instigate affective journeys of beatitude, by expressing and intensifying the superabundance of life itself.

Implication of substantial affectivities, complication of modal affections, explication of expressive affects.[11] Enduring an overwhelming exposure, constituting a complex composure, orchestrating an explosive release. For centuries now, scholars and commentators have pointed out that Spinoza does not pay attention to conventional aesthetics from the viewpoint of subjects or objects.[12] And I am willing to grant that this is largely right. But what they have overlooked are latent seeds of a different aesthetic theory that moves not only beyond aesthetic judgements made by ready-made mental faculties of autonomous subjects, but also beyond aesthetic values found inherent to essential qualities of independent objects. Spinoza's aesthetic theory, rather, grounds itself on affective interactions immanent to and distributed within the interlacing of substantial and modal fields, which includes the agencies of both subject-based and object-based actors, yet is irreducible to one, or the other, or even both together. This is an aesthetic theory grounded on what goes in-between dimensions, processes, agencies, and milieus; an aesthetic theory of relationality, interactivity, and affectivity. Spinoza's philosophy potentiates affective aesthetics, not from the viewpoint of subjects or objects, but, in his subtle words, *sub specie aeternitatis*; that is, aesthetics from the viewpoint of life (E4P38, E5P29–36).[13]

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ENDNOTES

1 For English translations, I will use, and modify as necessary, the works of Samuel Shirley and Edwin Curley (Spinoza, 2002) (Spinoza, 1985, 2016), while referring to *Lexicon Spinozanum* by Boscherini for close reading of Latin terms (Boscherini, 1970).

2 For the limited scholarship on Spinoza's aesthetics, see, for starters: Schlerath (1920), Mignini (1981), Rice (1996), and Gatens (2015). See also the chapters on art and architecture in Beth Lord's edited books (2015 and 2018). Finally, Deleuze's peculiar aesthetic theory that operates via dual conceptions of percepts and affects (as in *What is philosophy?*, 1994) or affections and affects (in his books on Spinoza, 1988 and 1990) can be deemed to largely flourish on Spinoza's affective grounds (while partially drawing from Nietzschean aesthetics, phenomenological trajectories like that of Maldiney, and his own singular tendencies). So, although Deleuze already connected certain dots and laid some of the groundwork for unpacking Spinoza's aesthetics for which I am grateful, what I construct in this paper, in the form of a tripartite affective system (implicating substantial affectivities, complicating affections, and explicating affects) is not based on Deleuze's dual constructions or any other previous scholarship on Spinoza's aesthetics (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994).

3 For the sake of a concise introduction to Spinoza's aesthetics, this paper focuses less on operational singularity of each aesthetic field (albeit implicitly laying the groundwork for this future analysis), and more on how *art* and *architecture* constitute a *single continuum* when it comes to affective processes of aesthetic construction and perception.

4 In E1D5 Spinoza says: "By modality, I mean substantial affectivities [*substantiae affectiones*], or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself." This notion, *substantiae affectiones*, is highly overlooked in Spinoza scholarship: it is usually translated either as "modifications of substance" (as in Elwes), or "affections of substance" (as in Curley and Shirley), and reduced to being equivalent to modalities. Yet, while trying to establish the primary distinction between substance and modalities, Spinoza is making a further conceptual gesture here. He defines substantial affectivities not as modalities themselves in the modal dimension, but as the self-causation of substance [*causa sui*], as expressed in the modal dimension. That is, substantial affectivities are substance affecting itself, which also equates, by way of immanent causation, to modalities. So, substantial affectivities as self-causation and self-affectivity of substance (1), is formally distinct from yet immanently expressed by and as modal existence (2). Hence, developing substantial affectivity as a *full-fledged concept* grounded on this subtle distinction promises interesting insights into Spinoza's latent aesthetics. For this reason, I am translating *substantiae affectiones*, as substantial affectivities deliberately, for "affections of substance," "modifications of substance," and "substantial affections" can be very confusing to readers who are not well versed in Spinoza's philosophy, and might be easily mixed up with "modal affections," which refer to efficient causes and inter-individual relations, as will be defined in the next section. Therefore, distinguishing *substantial affectivities* from *modal affections* is a task as crucial as distinguishing *modal affections* from *affects*. By doing so, we arrive at the curious trilogy of affectivities, affections, and affects.

5 To see the development of this argument about the art of living (*ars vivendi*) being Spinoza's aesthetic motor, see Gatens (2015) and Mignini (1981).

6 Spinoza concept of potence (*potentia*) corresponds to the definition of a modality by what it can do, or set of potentialities that define an entity's capability of action and modification (*potentia agendi*, or *vis existendi*).

7 For the modern evolution of discussions on authorship, see for starters: Benjamin (1970), Barthes (1977), Foucault (1984), and Certeau (1988).

8 See Wolfson for how Spinoza expands the meaning of conatus to all human and nonhuman modalities while previously, from Stoicism to Hobbes, it was only reserved for humans and animals (Wolfson, 1969: 195-201). And see Deleuze for an interpretation that does justice to Spinoza's dynamic conception of conatus (Deleuze, 1990: 230–31; 1988: 98–102).

9 Cedric Price articulates his concept of calculated uncertainty at the concluding remarks of a speech called "Has the architectural profession a future?" that he gave at AA, London, in 1975: "What worries me is that our profession doesn't like the idea of uncertainty. If something is uncertain, they call it crisis and panic... Now unless architecture realizes that calculated uncertainty is one of the great generators of what it should be doing in the future, then I think the profession has no future. But I think, architecture has one. Thank you." To witness the epitome of Price's approach to architecture, see his Fun Palace project (1963-74), which explores how architecture can not only undergo, but also instigate constant change with the help of user potentiation and cybernetic intelligence (Price & Littlewood, 1968).

10 This entry is from Woolf's diaries, dated "Wednesday, November 28th, 1928" (Woolf, 1980: 209-210). In his aesthetic discussions, Deleuze likes to often refer to this passage as well, as part of his idiosyncratic strategy of revealing how artists are as intuitive of affective operations as philosophers, albeit with unique sensitivities of their own.

11 The conceptual triad of implication-complication-explication addresses the problems of ontological individuation and the relationship of Being and beings, which has a long history of evolution in Western philosophy before Spinoza radicalized it in his own work. The latent seeds of these concepts lie in the Neoplatonic problem of emanation of the One and participation of the many, developed by Plotinus, and published by his student Porphyry in *Enneads* (ca. 270). Following this trajectory, Boethius applied the terms *comprehendere* and *complectiri* to unity and eternity of Being in *Consolation of Philosophy (De consolatione philosophiae,* 523 A.D.), which are in turn subordinately unfolded as plurality and temporality of beings. In the following centuries, Boethius's commentators developed his conceptual couple of *complicatio-explicatio*, culminating in the rigorous teachings of Ecole de Chartres in the twelfth century. Inheriting this conceptual mechanism of folding from the school of Chartres but channeling it away from emanation towards immanence, Nicholas of Cusa argued in Bk. II, Ch.3 of *On learned ignorance (De docta ignorantia,* 1440) that "God is the enfolding of all things in that all things are in him; and he is the unfolding of all things in that he is in all things." Finally, bringing together a variety of sources from Neoplatonism and Cartesianism to radical Abrahamic and Scholastic traditions, Spinoza pushed this relationship to its own limit by grounding it on absolute immanence. With Spinoza's radical gesture, which was most rigorously uncovered and developed by Gilles Deleuze, the successive and hierarchical emanation of Neoplatonism gave way to adequate expression and immediate co-presence of three movements: modal beings, while remaining in substance, implicate (imply, involve) and explicate (explain, express) substance, and substance, while remaining in itself, complicate (comprehend, contain) modal beings (TTP, ch. 4). By focusing on the conceptual triad of implication-complication-explication, this paper argues that Spinoza's conception of ontological individuation runs parallel to his conception of aesthetic individuation. For more information on this conceptual triad, see Plotinus (1989), Boethius (2008), Cusa (2001), Deleuze (1988: 68-69).

12 See especially how Morrison (1989), based on his rationalist reading, goes as far as declaring that Spinoza cannot have an aesthetic theory, as he is not interested in subjective intentions and judgements.

13 *Sub specie aeternitatis* is usually translated in Spinoza scholarship as "from the viewpoint of eternity." What Spinoza means with this term, however, is to see things from the viewpoint of substantial forces of life, or which amounts to the same thing, from the viewpoint of how things are immanently generated, from the viewpoint of life. And by "life" here, in the title, and in the entire text, I follow Spinoza's definition from *Metaphysical thoughts*, in which he equates life both to conative potence of each modality and to the substantial continuity of God or Nature itself: "So we understand by life, the force through which things persevere in their own being," and "because that force is different from the things themselves, we say properly that things themselves have life," and hence: "So they speak best who call God life.... God is life, and is not distinguished from life...." (CM 2.6 / G1:260).

JONATHAN LAHEY DRONSFIELD

What reading Spinoza's *Ethics* out loud brings to and takes from the text

> "The relationship of bodies is didactic, they must learn, learn each other; such a relationship is also established (I would even say indissolubly so) through the voice." [Jacques Roubaud, *The Great Fire of London*]
>
> "To speak with the words of others... that's what I'd like." [Jean Eustache, *The Mother and the Whore*]

0.

Spinoza Lector. In May 2017 I read Spinoza's *Ethics* out loud in public in a gallery space over a period of 24 hours. Or rather, I read the transcript of the previous such reading of *Ethics*, including all the discussion it generated, which was itself a reading of the first time Spinoza's *Ethics* was read out and discussed over a period of 24 hours.[1] I call such events performative readings. They form part of a "book to come", *The Swerve of Freedom After Spinoza* (Dronsfield, 2015a). In what follows I offer a philosophical justification for the readings and outline the philosophical stakes of the project, together with the motivation for doing the readings.

I.

"One dreams of Spinoza's *Ethics* read by Alain Cuny." Why? Because the voice dramatises the concept. So Deleuze (2006a, 326). It seems that concepts can be acted as something like characters, "rhythmic characters" as Deleuze puts it, because their interaction with other concepts can be dramatised. One of the main concepts of Spinoza's *Ethics* is of course the affect. In what sense can the concept of affect be dramatised?

In a number of texts across his career, Deleuze sought to show that breaking through the surface of the *Ethics*, disrupting it, fracturing it, is another *Ethics*. This "second *Ethics*" affects the reader. The *Ethics* may be the discourse of the concept of affect, but at the same time it is a discourse which itself affects. The force of this second ethics is to be found, according to Deleuze, in one of the specific components of the *Ethics*, its scholia. The task is not to work out how the scholia fit into the overall conceptual development; they don't (Deleuze, 1995b; 165). If all the other component parts—definitions, explications, axioms, postulates, propositions, proofs, corollaries, lemmata, prefaces, appendices—form the discourse of the concept, then the scholia disrupt that discursive flow, dynamise it, intensify it, slow it down or speed it up, turn and de-turn it. They are the site of

the text's affective moments. And their action is undercurrent and subterranean: Deleuze's favourite dimension because you cannot see it coming, and before you know it, it is everywhere the ungrounding of what you can see. The rhizome, the stratigraphic, the scholium. And such is the role played by the scholia that by the time we reach the final part of the *Ethics*, Part V, titled "Of the power of the intellect, or of human freedom", the geometric method of the previous four parts, one of exposition, has transformed into a geometric method of invention. Part V is, in short, the "third *Ethics*" of the *Ethics*.

Now, not only does Deleuze argue that there are two (or three) *Ethics* in the *Ethics*, he also, though less insistently, contends that a "double reading" of the *Ethics* is possible, one which he calls an "affective reading". The term "affective reading" occurs, to my knowledge, only once in Deleuze's many writings on Spinoza:

> There is a double reading of Spinoza: on the one hand, a systematic reading in pursuit of the general idea and the unity of the parts, but on the other hand and at the same time, the affective reading [*la lecture affective*], without an idea of the whole, where one is carried along or set down, put in motion or at rest, shaken or calmed according to the velocity of this or that part. (1988: 129)

So, two *Ethics* in the *Ethics*, and two ways of reading the *Ethics*, where the latter pair are not reducible to or equatable with the former. There would appear to be a determinate relation between them, and it is the scholia that dramatise that relation. It would seem that if the reader of the *Ethics* can be affected in his or her reading of it, then the scholia play a leading role in effecting the affective charge of the text. This is what enables Deleuze to say that a non-philosopher can encounter the *Ethics* in such a way that they receive an "immediate" or "sudden" illumination. Of what? Pleasure for instance (Shirley's translation of the Latin *Laetitia*). But we must put into question the temporality implied by Deleuze here. The scholia may be the principal site of philosophy's relation to non-philosophers, they may be the *Ethics*' direct address to "anyone" to read it, whether philosophers or no (Deleuze, 1995a: 139–40), but this directness ought not to be equated with immediacy.

II.

Laetitia or pleasure (joy in Curley's translation), is one of the three primary or primitive affects in the *Ethics*, along with *tristitia* or pain ("sadness" in Curley's translation), and *cupiditas* or desire. The primary affects of pleasure and pain are introduced in E3P11. They emanate from chance encounters, encounters with bodies external to us, they form compositions with other bodies, we passively undergo such encounters, and our affections transition passively, to greater perfection if pleasure, lesser if pain. Greater perfection here means a power of activity. But we also experience active transitions, to states of greater or lesser activity. Affects, then, can be reactions or actions. In either case, the affects in question are not simply or solely bodily. The transitionings involve ideas. An affect is a relation of body to mind. But Spinoza is not a dualist. Mind and body are essentially the same. Thus, there cannot be a causal relation between them. The body does not determine what the mind thinks (E3P2). The relation is characterised in terms of adequacy and inadequacy, and relation is itself an idea inadequate

to the "one", the "one and the same thing" that mind and body are (Spinoza, 1982: E2P7S and E3P2S). The mind is an idea of body, and what the mind thinks will adequate or not adequate to the body. If affects are produced by external causes then the mind will be passive with respect to them. We can be led astray by how affects act upon the mind. We can be ignorant of the causes of our affections. We can be unknowing of why we desire the way we do. We are vulnerable to affection. Imagination as an act of mind is inadequate and can lead us into error.

But we must hear inadequacy, vulnerability, even error, without value, or accept as a task the need to think them positively. We are felicitously vulnerable to the erotic. Imagination is an inadequate but necessary form of knowledge. It is possible to have images of things which do not correspond to the external object (E2P47S), but this can be a resource and an enrichment of the mind. Reason is adequate ideas. Reason can bring us to an understanding of our passions, those things with respect to which we are otherwise passive, such that we can have an active and adequate relation to them, where adequacy implies that we are not slaves to our passions. Equally, the passions can lead the mind to have ideas it would otherwise not have, can give it powers of activity it would otherwise not have, can reveal transitions of the body of which we would otherwise not be aware; moreover, to an awareness of how those transitions, powers and passions are themselves constitutive of thought. Indeed, the mind would have no notion of transition, and thus of change, and difference between adequation and inadequation, without the affective body.

Presentness of body, if there is such a thing, is given by affect. But affect is also what divides self-presence. Affects can as well be produced by the action of mind in reason. Transitions to reason are not separations from or the renunciation of affect. Affect is involved in all forms of thought. Thus, affect cannot be reduced to immediacy, or predicated as speed over slowness. And affective reading cannot be reduced to immediacy (as is supposed, for instance, by Dan Smith [2008: 2].)

III.

There is at least one other instance of Deleuze invoking the notion of "affective reading", when he says that the close-up in Eisenstein gives such a reading. The close-up is "both a type of image and a component of all images" (1986: 87). It is not that with the close-up one sees more closely, it is that a leap is effected; the difference is qualitative not quantitative. It is intensive. The temptation, or the presupposition, is to think this as immediacy. Intensivity is not immediacy. What is intensified is the relation of part to whole. The close-up is not partial, not a part of a greater whole, it is the affective relation to the whole, where the affect is expressed as a whole. Deleuze compares scholia to snapshots: "photographs suddenly taken, freezing the progress in temporary immobility" (1992: 349). If, as Deleuze maintains, the scholia are therefore shown not to correspond to the proposition, or what is given in the proof of the proposition, it is because the discussion is halted, and the concept under discussion seen to work less familiarly. The scholia defamiliarise what is common, and reveal the common otherwise. We should understand this not as immediacy, but as a spacing in time.

IV.

At the end of E2P49S Spinoza says that from his account "can be drawn many excellent lessons, most useful and necessary to know" and that these will "partly be disclosed in what is to follow". If the scholia are lessons to be drawn from what has been demonstrated in the proofs, then they do not repeat what is demonstrated, they double it. They prove it again, as if for the first time. They enjoy a relative independence from what they double. Both ostensive and expressive of a first-person Spinozan "I". Could we go as far as to say more comprehensible, perhaps even more didactic? If so, they rely on examples drawn from lessons of life. The Latin *scholium* comes from the Greek *σχόλιον*, *scholion*, itself derived from *σχολή* (school) in the sense of band, troop, company, a multitude to whom lessons might be given. But thereby do scholia run a risk. In making understood to a greater number that which is otherwise proved geometrically, that is with rigour and precision, the risk run by scholia is what Martin Heidegger (2012: 97) calls "massiveness", one of the ways in which modern humanities' abandonment of being is covered over.

The sense of *σχολή* that Heidegger is alluding to is that of time, leisure time or free time, in which those with no practical imperative to do otherwise might spend in gaining wisdom—for instance in discussion or disputation, or in speculative inquiry. The question of speed is imperative here. If the *Ethics* can be read as a composition—of speeds, of slownesses, of differential rhythm—then the way in which the scholia rhythm the text, give time to the text and make time within it, cannot be separated from the time to learn from what it says. If, then, the scholia are lessons of life, they are abstractions from, but not separate from, its practical necessities, ways of giving time in the flow of life. Scholia are ways of giving time in the reading of the text, a time which is not reducible to the linear causal one of reason's demonstrations. Thus, in the reading of them out loud, one must give the scholia time to create a time, a time in which to think whether and to what extent Spinoza affirms practical joy, for instance, as the outcome of his theoretical method.

How, then, is the *Ethics* to be read out loud if an affective reading of it is to be given? If a reading out loud of the *Ethics* that Deleuze dreams of is to do justice to it, then the scholia might need to be read in such a way as to allow them their disruptive force; or it could be a reading which would dramatise the concept such as to show the affect upon it of the scholia, or one which accords the scholia a different tone, one of "underneathness". Or maybe the drama occurs only in the final act. Or perhaps it would be a rendering of the scholia only. Read on their own the scholia would be "Spinoza's anti-*Bible*" (Deleuze, 1997: 146).

V.

Paul Saenger (1997: 13) points out that ancient texts could not but be uttered out loud if they were to be understood, for their words were not separated, they were written as *scriptura continua*, continuous and uninterrupted. It was in the written Latin of the central Middle Ages that the orthographical practice of word separation came to be the norm, and with word separation came silent reading. For Peter Kivy (2006: 18) silent reading is not an ontological break with reading aloud, it is a "logical step" into another kind of performance of the text, but no

less a performance for that. Kivy argues that all silent reading is performance art, that silent readings are performance art works, that silent readers are performing artists. But Kivy is eliding the necessity of word separation with reading. Texts in their being uttered out loud were not being read in the same way that we might say that we read a book out loud, they were being made into texts. To utter out loud a text written with words not separated was not to perform the text, it was to make it readable. In order to be comprehended, texts written as *scriptura continua* had to be made to sound out loud, to work out the rhythming and disjoining, the articulation and disambiguating of the writing. And in order to be made to sound out loud they needed to be spaced.

The necessity of spatialising text was such that the words had first to be separated from the paper in order to be separated from each other, and at the same time made audible, made public, public to oneself, in order that they could then be uttered internally and said silently. For the "eyes only" to read, the words had first to be made available to the ear. Reading-to-oneself as a silent practice may have followed on from reading out loud, but that sounding of the text is not the same as reading it. Silent reading can be much quicker than reading aloud, for Kivy because it comes closer to the speed of human thought. In her review essay of Kivy's book, Susan L. Feagin (2008: 94) points out that this is because human thought "can do its cognitive job" without knowing or worrying about how the words should or would sound or be pronounced. But anyone who has seen Billie Whitelaw or Lisa Dwan performing Samuel Beckett's *Not I* will know that texts can be spoken aloud more quickly than they can be read silently or even thought. Moreover, no-one could do a "cognitive job" on *Not I* without wondering how the words sound.

It does not necessarily follow that those who perform or vocalise the text, and act precisely those things that enhance the reading, grasp cognitively what is being said. Whilst agreeing with Feagin's objection to Kivy, that he fails to appreciate the distinction between reading silently and performing silently, we object to her privileging cognition over the material sounding and spacing of words, and we do so precisely through something she herself appeals to in her critique: "affective flexibility".

VI.

To read performatively out loud is to read with the affective flexibility produced by the combination of bodies. To read performatively out loud is to read subject to and subject of the affectivity of there being another body in combination with one's own. And that body can be one's own. To read performatively out loud is to read with another body with which to combine sensuously in the acts of reading and listening. And that audience can be oneself. In its reading out loud, the self is the sound of a voice which separates one from oneself. Conjoined with and disjoined from one's own body under the condition of affect. One's voice has the capacity to affect oneself:

> For the human body is composed of very many individual bodies of different nature, and so it can be affected by one and the same body in many different ways. (E3P17S)

From this, Spinoza adduces what he calls the vacillation of emotion, correlative with the relation doubt has to imagination. But is there not a vacillation internal

to the *concept* of emotion? We feel, then we doubt, whether that be because we are subject to a conflicting emotion, or because the intellect intervenes in order to make itself adequate to the feeling. To this extent we may wonder whether it is possible, temporally, ever to be affected by just a single emotion. We argue here that one's own body can be both the internal and external affective cause upon itself and be both a direct and indirect affective cause to itself. One such way is through the voice and hearing oneself speak: hearing oneself say something for reasons which are unclear to one, and that one may even disagree with; hearing oneself say something "unintentional", yet for which one must accept responsibility.

Why is it that if one is reading out loud the words of another it becomes difficult to listen to the meaning of what one reads? The experience of reading the text of another differs from that of reading one's own text. But can that difference be explained simply by the fact that one has written what one reads, or that one knows what one has written before reading it? One's own written words can sound unrecognisable when one hears them read out loud. Even one's ownmost, one's most intimate written words, if read out loud by another, can sound as if written by another. One's ownmost written words can seem foreign if one hears them read out loud even by the very addressee of them. When in the closing sequence of Michelangelo Antonioni's *La Notte* Lidia (Jeanne Moreau) reads aloud to Giovanni (Marcello Mastroianni) a love letter, he asks who wrote it. You did, she says. He takes his having written the letter as proof that he loves her. She takes his not remembering that he wrote it as evidence that he does not.

To try and listen to what one is saying when one reads out loud is not the same as to try and listen to what one is reading when one reads out loud. To try and listen to what one is reading is to try and understand it at the same time as speaking it. If one is reading out loud to another then one might be aware of the tone and the rhythm of the words one reads, but this would be in tension with, if not at the expense of, the meaning of those words. But how could one adjudge how to read apart from what it is one reads, is one not reading the words in order that they become better able to be understood? In reading out loud and at the same time trying to understand the meaning of what one reads, it is as if something of my own body withdraws. If I am to understand what I have read then I must follow this other in me, I must go after the other in me. I must separate myself from my own voice in order to hear it. It is as if I must participate in the collective act of listening to me.

VII.

To understand what Deleuze (2006a: 326) means by the "dramatization of the concept", we must look elsewhere than in the one-page text in which he says it and turn to his early work (2004 and 2006b). Dramatisation is a method derived from Nietzsche, specifically Nietzsche's insight that concepts are symptoms of forces without which they could not be thought. To dramatise a concept would be to draw out and make sensible the plural forces acting upon it. To dramatise a concept would be to make explicit those otherwise unseen, unheard forces in terms of their spatio-temporal dynamisms. This involves interpreting and evaluating the differential relation between the forces at work operating on the concept in the one or the text putting it to use, where the one or the text are

to be understood not psychologically, but perspectivally, as complexes of spaces and times. If as we have discussed the concept is rhythmed by the text which presents it then the actor makes these movements audible in space and time (Deleuze, 2006a: 326).

Do we want to hear Spinoza's words acted, or would we rather hear them simply read aloud, spoken, declaimed? The risk of acting them is that they be interpreted and thus overdetermined as to their truth: each time different. The danger of declamation is that the truth of the text is presupposed and thus essentialised: each time the same. Between the identity of the one doing the representing, and the resemblance of what is being represented, what is needed is the creation of a non-representational space of thought with which to encounter Spinoza's words. And that space can be achieved by treating the text as something like a composition or an architecture, formations and ecologies of space organising the movement of flows and intensities.

If the reading out loud of a text is to be the production of a space of thought, if one is to set up at least the possibility of understanding what one reads aloud, and of being affected by it, then one must overcome a servility to the text, and rather than wait for the text to speak, or expect it to, become its master in order to make it speak. No, not to "make" a text speak, but to let it speak. Letting be is not a passivity in the face of what one reads, it is not a servile imitation or simple repetition of the text, it is to allow to appear what one reads, by giving what one reads an appearance, a face, by giving voice to it. When I speak of a performative reading, I do not intend by that term to imply that the text is acted, still less interpreted. I mean that the problem of which the text treats is performed, and in the case of the text in question, Spinoza's *Ethics*, this requires that the lines are read out under the condition of affect, in the same way that when one speaks to another one does so through one's face.

We have set out how for Spinoza thought can never be separated from body, and how body is never without affect. Consonant with Deleuze, a new concept of affect would be nothing if it did not afford us not just a new understanding of affect, but a new perception of it. A new understanding of affect is not possible separate from a new perception of it. And if we are talking about affect, then a new perception of affect would bring with it an entire conceptual-perceptual affective space within which it is perceived. At the same time, it is not enough to assert this, but to demonstrate it in terms of its effects. Or rather, to hold the words open for such demonstration, to incarnate them, to ex-posit them. Hence the decision in *Spinoza Lector* to read out loud not just Spinoza's *Ethics*, but the entire discussion generated by each previous reading. This in the hope of setting up a space of thought in which the drama of thinking could be seen to be taking place.

It is a question of responsibility. Simply to read the text reliant on what it has to state about affect as a concept would be an irresponsible reading, it would be to presume in advance that the concept needs only its abstract theoretical presentation, and not an actual affective exposition in order to be understood. Hence the call for participants in the reading to "de-abstract and actualise" Spinoza's concepts under what Lyotard (1991, xvii) calls "the responsibility of mouths and eyes of the flesh". The question of whether actualising a concept means dramatising it in the manner of a drama is one that can only be answered in the vocalising of it: in the vocalisation both of the question and of the concept the question is

addressed to. And the answer will be multiple and equivocal in the sense that there will be more than one voice incarnated. A concept is both differential in itself, subject to and of multiple forces; and differentiated in its actualisation, set in relation to other concepts. A creative reading would need to perform both; a performative reading would need to create both.

Thus, part of the motivation for *Spinoza Lector* is to unfold the question whether an affective reading can be achieved performatively. Performative reading is the performance of a problem rather than discussion of or about that problem. One can discourse on the question of what an affective reading is; or one can put into question what it is to read affectively by performing the problem. The question of what an affective reading is, is best approached, we argue, through discussing it under the condition of being affected in the reading. To the objection that what is being talked about here is an affected reading, we say that all reading is affected, that there has never been a reading which is not under the condition of one affect or another.

The necessity of an affective reading out loud of Spinoza's *Ethics* of the sort that I have set out might be said to draw support from something Spinoza himself says: "Nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow" (E1P36). It is not enough simply to state or assert what follows. One must demonstrate what follows not just theoretically in terms of a proof, but practically in terms of its effects. Warren Montag (1999: 3) is right to say that these two activities "depending upon circumstances, do not necessarily coincide". It is in the non-coincidence that a risk emerges. With respect to the question of an affective reading, the risk is that in reading Spinoza in such a way as to draw out the affectivity of the scholia (or any other part of the text), the reason which may produce ideas adequate to what an affective reading is will not be given the time or space to do its work. The economy of the affections could become such as to denude reason of its chance to reveal ideas with which to make sense of the affects we seek to accentuate. But this risk is at once a chance and becomes a necessary risk if we wish to know what effects follow from the affections of the body. We would not know of what the mind is capable unless we were to test the limits of the body.

VIII.

There is another reason why if one is to encounter a text under both aspects of a double reading it is not sufficient simply to read a text out loud word-for-word. For there are words which are given by any text to be read out differently than how they are written, according to the way they are subject to the manners of the time in which they are uttered. Such words are to be found in the margin. Spinoza discusses this when treating of words which, innocent in the mouths of "writers of old", came to have an obscene sense "when vice and intemperance were rife":

> There was no need to alter Scripture on this account, but in concession to the weak-mindedness of the common people they introduced the custom in public readings of substituting more acceptable words for sexual intercourse and excrement, as are marked in the marginal notes. (TTP ch. 9, §18 = 2002, 487)

On the one hand we might take this to be an unnecessary and unwanted paternalism (we need no persuading of Spinoza's ambivalence towards "the common

people"), which raises the unanswerable question "who decides?" But we could also take it as an understanding on Spinoza's part of the materiality of the letter of the word, and that such materiality is as much a matter of its reading as it is of its writing. And again, we may say that the marginalisation of certain words deemed unacceptable by the manners of the time, in favour of what is written in the margin, is another form of spacing, and a space of thought.

IX.

According to Deleuze, Spinoza is a paradox because in his method he is "the most philosophical of philosophers", yet in how he goes beyond method "the one who more than any other addresses nonphilosophers". And what is meant here by "non-philosophical understanding" is affect. The reader is affected by the intensity of the *Ethics'* non-philosophical address:

> absolutely anyone can read Spinoza, and be very moved, or see things quite differently afterward, even if they can hardly understand Spinoza's concepts. (Deleuze, 1995b: 165–166)

An affective reading of Spinoza could begin anywhere within the *Ethics* without an idea of the whole. In order to test this proposition the decision was made to read Spinoza's *Ethics* over a period of 24 hours, in a public gallery space which anyone could enter or re-enter at any time. The resultant transcripts (published as books, Dronsfield, 2017a and 2017b) attest to the fact that chance encounters and wanderings in and participation of passers-by and non-philosophers in both the reading and discussion all took place.

Another motivation for doing the performative reading was to ascertain whether the two folds of a "double reading", discursive and affective, could be enfolded by one and the same reading, whether one could intensify the other. How else to unfold seriously the question that unless the reader appreciates both ways of reading Spinoza, then they have not read him. On the one hand, the whole is not possible without an affective reading, without in this case the turnings and de-turnings of the discursive and the temporal spacing within it that the scholia are. On the other, someone without an idea of the whole can be affected by the close-up of the scholia such that they gain an impression of the whole. Reading performatively not just Spinoza's *Ethics* out loud, but the discussion generated by the previous reading too, in turn produces more discussion, in other words further disputation, doubt, disorder, chaos, clarity—all good conditions for the emergence of the intellect. It is a space of thought both discursive and affective. But it is important to stress that its being durational over a period of 24 hours makes it extremely difficult to tell where, if at all, the dividing line falls between the discourse and affect, between mind and body. There is a gap, but that gap is not fixed, nor decided in advance of the event of reading. This is another aspect of performativity—to effect a gap, to hold open that gap, and to tense the self by it. It is this gap that is productively exploited by Moira Gatens (2014) and Pierre Macherey (1996) with what they have to say about joy in Spinoza (and Deleuze), in particular "joyful deliberation" and "joyful passions" respectively.

X.

We might say that an affective reading (of, say, a book, for example Spinoza's *Ethics*) is one which opens up a way to assist the subject in attaining subjectivity, an exposure which would open a way for the subject to understand the passions to which she finds herself subject, a way which would enable her to achieve what we might say is the double-genitivity of subjectivity, whereby the subject becomes both subject to and subject of her passions. We find an example of just such an affective reading of Spinoza in Judith Butler, in how she is first exposed to philosophy, as a young teenager taking refuge from the terror of family in the basement of the home and by chance encountering Spinoza's *Ethics*:

> My emotions were surely rioting, and I turned to Spinoza to find out whether knowing what they were and what purpose they served would help me learn how to live them in some more manageable way. (2004: 235)

We do not know, she does not say, whether Butler reads Spinoza to herself silently, or out loud.

XI.

As is well known, *Ethics* was not published in Spinoza's lifetime, and when it did appear it did so anonymously. Indeed, having distributed the manuscript to a small number of friends, his readers, Spinoza stopped a translation of it into Dutch from being made, in the belief that it was only the fact that it existed in Latin that prevented it from being banned. Then can we say that the scholia are Spinoza's way of appending his signature to the text? After all, we find there a use of the first-person pronoun which appeals to experience, lessons of life, and to the doing of living. If Spinoza is concerned with what follows on one from the other in the order of things, then we might take the scholia as subtle syncopation of lines of thought. And we might say of Spinoza that with the scholia he sought to let quietly resonate the human voice in philosophy. A reintroduction of the human voice into philosophy and philosophy to the human voice: silently contra Descartes. For Spinoza not to sign his work is an autobiographical repression of his signature. As the site of the subjectification of the concept, where the affective is drawn out in its disruptive and productive effects upon the concept, we might say that the scholia are where, in a text which nowhere mentions the voice, and which discusses sound only in the scholia or appendices, Spinoza's voice may be heard, a voice without a name, a writing which sounds the voice in order to make room for a name which could not be written. Would it be going too far to suggest that the scholia are the affective dramatisation of the conatus of the proper name "Spinoza"?

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ENDNOTES

1 *Spinoza Lector* has been performed in: *No-One Knows What a Body Can Do?* curated by Kathrin and Sarah Oberrauch, Lanserhaus, Eppan, Italy, 27.05.2017-25.06.2017; *Pharmakon: Whitch Culture? A Performative Conference*, Kaai Theater Studios, Brussels, Belgium, 28.11.2014-30.11.2014; Raum N Gallery, Berlin, in *Justifiable Version of Events: Catastrophe*, curated by the Jan Van Eyck Academie Alumni Association, 21.07.2014-26.07.2014. For more on *Spinoza Lector* see Dronsfield 2013 and 2015b.

review / PAUL JAMES

Chris L. Smith *Bare Architecture: A Schizoanalysis*

Bloomsbury Academic, 2017



Bare Architecture: A Schizoanalysis by University of Sydney academic Dr. Chris L. Smith will be of particular interest to those engaged with connections between Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's philosophy and architecture. Smith's study opens up ways of thinking about architecture as both a profession and as a subject within humanistic research. He places emphasis on the way that architecture engages with the communicative space of culture, drawing out its links to philosophy, art, literature, and medicine. During a period marked by increasing pragmatism in research generated within the discipline of architecture, this book is noteworthy for resisting any simple-minded utility. The key contributions of the book will probably prove to be Smith's formulation of the category of "Bare Architecture," and his impressive commentary on symptomatology.

In his foreword Smith states that the book is a work of schizoanalysis. While he does provide a brief description of what schizoanalysis is, it is too succinct to be useful for readers less familiar with Deleuze and Guattari's theory. Familiarity with the processes and objectives of schizoanalysis is necessary to discern the logic governing both Smith's mode of writing, and the organisation of the book. The inclusion of stream-of-consciousness writing and highly fragmented arguments in the early stages of the book may baffle readers without this knowledge. Architectural students, in particular, will find Smith's book more accessible if they consult an explicative account of schizoanalysis prior to trying to process his text. *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Literature* by Ian Buchanan, Tim Matts and Aidan Tynan (2015) would serve this role admirably.

The research approach of the book will divide readers. Readers familiar with schizoanalysis will likely gain pleasure from Smith's strategic combination of stream-of-consciousness prose, authoritative descriptions of Deleuzian arguments, and sensitive descriptions of case studies, due to the novel insights into the transcendental consciousness that they provide. Readers less familiar with Deleuze, who are looking for an explicative academic text that explicitly states the utility of Deleuzian concepts to those engaged with the production of architecture may be alienated by the post-modern mode of writing. I encourage readers in the latter group to persist with the book as the highly stylised writing of the early book is toned down as the text progresses. The majority of the text is written in a relatively conventional academic manner with linear arguments

explicated through the examination of architectural case studies.

The book doesn't seek to provide a tool kit for applying Deleuzian concepts to generate architectural designs. For those whose primary interest is architecture, the value of the book may lay in the shifts it forms in their understanding of architectural case studies. For those primarily interested in philosophy, the application of architecture as a lens may activate insights into the political and social potential of Deleuze's thought, which may be less evident when considered in relationship to other areas of culture. Smith's interpretation of Deleuze's analysis of medicine, through the lens of the praxis of architecture, provides a key example of this productive contribution of the book. Smith's engagement with philosophy isn't limited to Deleuze; with agility he threads his arguments amongst the networks of thinkers associated with post-structuralist, post-modern and psychoanalytical theory.

A key contribution of Smith's study is the development of his concept of "Bare Architecture". This concept is elaborated in nuanced ways through intricate interpretations of examples. Gathering his obscure definitions together provides the category of "Bare Architecture" with an amorphous form, without over-determining it. Smith acknowledges the origin of his concept of Bare Architecture, stating that it was derived from Giorgio Agamben's expression "bare life" (xvi). For Smith "Bare Architecture" occurs during the raw experience of how architecture locates us within a place and a position, and simultaneously generates an experience of losing and destabilising of our sense of self (5). Later in the book he declares:

> What is at stake in the project of *bare architecture* is the passing of the subject as we know it and a resuscitation of the forces of the asubjective impersonal. Of making our literature, art and architecture itself breathe, eat, speak, shit and fuck, spit, sing, stammer, stutter and spasm. Making it, itself, intensive. Alive and incorporeal. A prosthesis-heart that throbs. (61).

Smith's engagement with terms associated with the erotic and the scatological are mobilised within his critique of what he views as the sanitised accounts, of the architectural phenomenologists. The polemical force of Smith's "Bare Architecture" is illustrated through a series of case studies that emphasise the erotic in predictable and less predictable places. Case studies enlisted to illustrate the erotic are: Göteborg sauna and Zumthor's Serpentine pavilion. The corporeal is related to Darden's Oxygen house, while the Mémorial des Martyrs de la Deportation is aligned with the impersonal. Smith generously builds bridges for his readers. Strategically he includes a summary of Deleuze's interpretation of Bacon's paintings, to draw a pathway for the reader to follow his extension of Deleuze's arguments to include architectural examples. Smith embraces Zumthor (the golden light of architectural phenomenology) to parasitically insert a Deleuzian sensibility into the discursive ground formed by architectural phenomenologists' ruminations on affect.

As a researcher engaged with the philosophy of phenomenology, I find Smith's critique of the architectural phenomenologists the least convincing part of his otherwise excellent study. His critique seems glib at times: "Their accounts can have us thinking that the world is a very genteel place indeed. That our most intense pleasure come from handrails or door-handles (53)." Additionally Smith notes; "The body parts the architectural phenomenologist's focus is upon too, are

as quaint as the architectural intensities to which they respond (53)." While Smith does bring to presence the latent sexual dimensions within his experience of case studies he is not immune from the charms of handrails; "We swim to the tower because it is empty without us. A ladder always yearns to be climbed. A handrail always desires to be held (xv)." The relationship between architectural phenomenology and post-modern theory, including Smith's own, is more ambiguous and complex than he acknowledges. He also needed to be more self-reflexive of the marked resemblance between his detailed descriptions of his haptic experiences of case studies and the interpretive tropes of the architectural phenomenologists.

Smith appears to have lapsed into the intellectual fashion for trivialising the political objectives of the phenomenologists. There is a tendency to characterise the tradition as fuzzy apolitical commentary on spatial affects rather than a means to challenge reductive representations of complex reality. I have in mind here Edmund Husserl's critique of the mathematisation of reality and the way that phenomenology was framed by Jan Patočka to guide political dissidents resisting totalitarianism within the Communist Bloc. Smith's critique of the architectural phenomenologists would have been strengthened had he acknowledged both the gaps and continuities between the arguments of the philosophers associated with phenomenology and their translation by key architectural phenomenologists. Dalibor Vesely, for example, was attentive to the political significance of Patočka's philosophy, when he adapted it to issues associated with architecture. Acknowledging the political significance of phenomenology (particularly in France and Eastern Europe) would have exposed a less polite, more politically charged legacy of phenomenology that has a closer relationship to the political investment in the erotic and the scatological of Smith's "Bare Architecture" than he admits.

Unsurprisingly given Smith's ongoing research interest in the relationship between architecture and biomedicine the chapter titled "Symptomatology" is one of the most convincing in the book. Within this section he draws out the nuanced relationship between architecture and medicine. For Deleuzian academics I imagine that Smith's unfolding of the significance of symptomatology to architecture will prove to have the most impact. This chapter may also prove to be of most interest to postgraduate students engaged in design research, as the utility of Deleuze's arguments become most evident in this section. Smith's critique of the value of pragmatism underpinning architectural research was also most clearly stated in this chapter.

Smith draws on symptomatology to challenge the diagnostic tendency deployed in the training of architects: he problematised the normative assumption that it is the architects' role to locate and anticipate problems, and subsequently to design solutions for them. Symptomatology, he contends, prioritises the interpretation of signs over causal thinking (107). This constitutes a challenge to the ethical role often associated with architecture and awards additional resonance to the political significance of the "a subjective impersonal" that he attributes to his category of "Bare Architecture". The utility of Deleuze's theory to architecture was most clearly expressed in relationship to symptomatology:

An architecture posited as symptomatology might engage with immediacy of the present by exploring and experimenting within the world and its 'symptoms'. This architecture would express new ways of thinking about life and experiment

with novel ways of living. Such an architecture might operate not as a backdrop or stage-set to life but rather would be *implicated* in life itself (108, abridged).

Bare Architecture: A Schizoanalysis makes a valuable contribution to architectural theory and Deleuzian studies. Smith has provided useful tools for reflecting on the limitations of pragmatism and the naturalised ethical values that underpin diagnostic approaches to architecture.

bios

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colophon



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