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Introduction
Gaps between and within Gen-ius and Gen-ealogy

A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarzpaul

This issue of *Interstices: Journal of Architecture and Related Arts* provides another occasion to explore small and narrow spaces between apparently solid and secure structures; to pause and to expand openings for thought and practice in architecture and related arts. Interstices (*pl*. ĭn-tûr'stĭ-sēz', -sĭz) insert themselves, as man-made, articulated, and unobstructed spaces, into the elements of their surrounding structures. Despite their difference, they remain part of the fabric, as a crevice or crack is a structural part of the overall form of a wall or a rock, or an interval or rupture part of a network's flow of forces.

Seventeen years after the first issue of *Interstices*, it would be an overstatement to reiterate that an architectural culture in New Zealand scarcely exists. Nevertheless, its relationship with the exigencies of practice - to quote from the editorial of the first issue: "the restrictions of immediate commercial appeal" - remains largely unchanged. Such exigencies have also produced gaps in the publication of this journal, disrupting continuity, but also creating a void around which new co-operations could form. This broken lineage gives rise to questions of genealogy. As a way of writing history, genealogy can engage reflexively with the variability and contingency of values. Its defamiliarizing and performative procedures provide degrees of freedom, by exploring questions of subjectivity from alternative, self-critical perspectives. Genealogies, while never universal or external, can clear and open up spaces "by a sense for the possible, … i.e. for that which might be otherwise" (Saar, 2002: 237). By making room for potentiality, they can give new impetus to questions posed from diverse perspectives, or from different ways of looking at a problem. They can break, what David Owen calls, "aspectival captivity" and disclose extra-ordinary possibilities, purposes and values (2002: 227). Similarly, traversing interstices entails productive tensions capable of unsettling monolithic positions.

Inevitably, genealogy is bound up with questions of subjectivity, and, etymologically, is related to notions of genius. Giorgio Agamben provides an account of the subject-under-*Genius* where the subject is a field of tensions, generated by a dissonance between the "most intimate and personal" (p. 95) and a, potentially frightening, "most impersonal part … which surpasses and exceeds" the individual (p. 95). A subject's impersonal and pre-individual part does not simply precede individuation. It is not merely a past to be recalled through memory; it is always present as a still unidentified reality, "a zone of non-consciousness" (p. 96). This oscillation, between one's individual self and a power that cannot be owned, amounts to a potentiality of becoming, undoing and generation. From this perspective, writing or designing may entail distancing from Genius, rather than demonstrating genius. To "take possession of Genius, to constrain him to sign in his name, is necessarily destined to fail" (p. 96). To try to reduce Genius to a tolerable size, to act as if the encounter with Genius were a personal privilege, produces "tics and symptoms that are even more impersonal", or, effects that

are "laughable and fatuous" (p. 96). Ideas of individual genius, creativity and inspired personal achievement generated within Romanticist or Enlightenment traditions collide with Indigenous knowledge traditions. Despite many variations, the latter share a number of concepts in which all things are interdependent and related through a common genealogy. Becoming-embodied is a material manifestation of a lineage of a person or an object (*whakapapa* in Maori, or *gafa* in Samoan). The body is connective tissue to the gene-archaeological matter of ancestors, land, community, family (Refiti, 2005: 54). Depending on how they are engaged with, genius and genealogy can stand in complementary and oppositional relationships. In this issue we want to explore the gaps and fissures in all-embracing, genealogical accounts, and the splits and spillages in notions of genius, within architecture and art, practice and theory.

Thomas Mical's *Genius, Genus, Genealogy: Hejduk's Potential Angels* prefigures many aspects subsequent contributors engage with. Shuttling between Agamben's notion of genius and Nietzschean/Foucauldian ideas of genealogy, Mical sketches possible relations between etymologically closely related terms. Genius' potentiality and genealogy's contingency interlace to elucidate the individual subject-under-Genius, generic containers of genus, and the play of invisible forces and drives in genealogy. John Hejduk's angel figures, descending into iconic architectural masques in his later works, challenge the conventions of modern architecture-without-qualities. In an unseen space within the image, they fall from potentiality to contingency, move from architectural thought to image. Luc Deleu's imagery in *The Unadapted City* project is examined as a discursive undertaking in Guy Châtel's *Plan Obus* and *Vipcity, as From Father to Son*. *Vipcity* performs a critique of the contemporary city, questioning methods and aims of architecture and urbanism, but eschews questions of authorship. Thus, Le Corbusier's image evokes a hackneyed ideal of intellectual effort that professes to act as a lever on society, while jealously preserving its freedom. Châtel traces references to Modernism and Le Corbusier which position Deleu as descendant, and his work within a "cunning genealogy". Re-assembling pieces of Deleu's giant jigsaw, Châtel endeavours to discover what its genealogical references may hint at. Carl Douglas is similarly interested in the bonds of affirmation and denial that makers maintain with their precursors. In *Latecomers*, he pairs the writings of two theorists with the relationships of two latecomers in architecture to their predecessors. Bloom's *Anxiety of Influence* (1973) highlights aspects of Adolf Loos' relationship to Karl Friedrich Schinkel, and Browne's *Hydriotaphia* (1669) provides comment on genealogical connections between Hadrian and Augustus' mausoleums. The notion of influence can be deployed to establish intergenerational debt. However, as Douglas shows, the latecomer often thwarts this debt through its very acceptance; genealogy, rather than being passive inheritance, becomes actively antagonistic. Douglas juxtaposes architectural incidents, separated by centuries, with literary notions activated in other periods.

Desley Luscombe in *Constructing the Architect of the Italian Renaissance* closely examines the composition and iconography of two architectural frontispieces. Notions of genius and professionalism, which are intermingled in these allegorical representations, shifted the role of the architect in Italian Renaissance culture beyond that of a designer of buildings, by conferring on him a set of classical, ethical and moral values. His intellectual capacity to form architectural space and imagery congealed with ideas of individual genius, propagated by writers such

as Giorgio Vasari, to suggest that an architect was a remarkable citizen with responsibility for society's visual representations. Claims to genius and worth set architects apart from the mass of citizens. In the Romantic period, notions of individual artistic genius were further elaborated, as design was increasingly regarded as an individual act of creation, rather than a process of mimesis that re-combined pre-existing material. Helene Furján's *Signature Effects: John Soane and The Mark of Genius* examines the implications of this shift through the lens of Soane's work. Soane mobilized complex definitions of genius that had developed during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: aspects of innovation and form-finding; aesthetic theories of atmospherics, moods and effects; politics of aesthetics, culture and nation-state. Furján also reflects on the resonances the period's 'cult of genius' has with today. Despite an increasing theoretical association of 'genius' with processes based on creative codes, notions of individual genius seem to persist in the interest of contemporary architects' in 'signature effects'.

However, Mirjana Lozanovska argues that ideal images of master architects are never the real images of architects. As lenses through which architects are seen, they mediate architects' self-identity. In *Mistresses and Others: The 'body as subject' in (architectural) discourse*, Lozanovska explores the question of who can be an architect. Becoming an architect, today, involves confronting the vision of a transcendental and heroic master. How can those whose bodies are crossed by signs of the female, the black, the migrant, the working class, the peasant … stage themselves as provisional masters? Lozanovska brings questions of the master/non-master relationship to bear on Zaha Hadid's 1996 presentation of her work at The American University of Beirut.

In *Genius Loci*, Mark Jackson's interest in the body revolves around that which a body is unconscious of, those elements in Agamben's notion of genius that are not spiritual but, rather, unknown powers in our bodies – most personal and most impersonal, closest and most remote. By linking these aspects to two texts by Jacques Lacan, Jackson probes into the possibility of considering architecture's genius loci as a locus of the body's drives. The Lacanian notion of jouissance, understood as a structural place of preserving that is usually forbidden, may alert us to the locus of genius as the primordial, though uncanny, ground of architecture's *genius loci*. Likewise, Laurence Simmons combines selected philosophical perspectives of Kant, Agamben, and Kierkegaard to complicate theories of the subject as a unity with certain innate attributes. Reconsidering the concept of genius with respect to New Zealand painter Colin McCahon (1919-1987), Simmons performs, in *"I AM": Colin McCahon Genius or Apostle?*, a reading of works from McCahon's *Practical Religion* series, which draw upon the texts of The Letter of James. Simmons explores how these works navigate a course between the sacred and the profane, and how McCahon negotiates a position vis-à-vis the texts, which renders his identity as an author problematic.

In this issue of *Interstices* we are very proud to be able to present the first English translation, by Laurence Simmons, of Giorgio Agamben's 2004 essay *Genius*, the very text that provided many contributors with a common platform for their reflections on genius and genealogy.

In the non-refereed part of this issue several contributors bring a shared interest in psychoanalysis to their explorations of architecture and related arts. In *Dreamlikeness*, Steve Appel discusses Freud's dream theory and its potential for thinking about art, specifically with reference to two images by New Zealand artist Julie Firth. Michael Gunder provides, in *Planning's Contradicting Genius*, an insight into the dark side of planning

from a Lacanian point of view. Lucy Holmes, concerned with Lacanian psychoanalysis as well, finds in *The Passion of Ignorance* – also the title of her review of Dany Nobus and Malcolm Quinn's 2005 book *Knowing Nothing, Staying Stupid: Elements for a Psychoanalytic Epistemology* - an inspiring challenge and an antidote to contemporary tertiary institutions' rationalization of knowledge in terms of market values.

In his empathetic review of Roger Neich's 2001 book *Carved Histories: Rotorua Ngati Tarawhai Woodcarving*, Arapata Hakiwai stresses the importance of genealogy for an understanding of the art of Maori carving and its traditional and contemporary practices. Neich's book is successful partly because of its understanding of the context in which the carvings and carvers it discusses belong. A rather different application of genealogy unfolds in John Walsh's light hearted *Genius and Genealogy*, which considers the question of lineage in New Zealand architecture through the publications of three New Zealand architectural firms on the occasion of their fiftieth anniversary.

In *Indifference as a Subversive Strategy*, Leonhard Emmerling discusses Theodor W. Adorno's notion of indifference in the context of his Aesthetic Theory, and relates it to Andy Warhol's ostensible indifference towards the banal and the non-banal, and his almost capitalist production for the art market. In *landscape / inscape*, Tony Green's review of Emmerling's first curated exhibition in New Zealand, at the St Paul Street Gallery, he discusses the curatorial strategy, as well as the advantages and problems, of an outsider's perspective on New Zealand art.

Moana Nepia concludes this issue with *A Marriage of Convenience?*, an at times whimsical, at times serious review of the 2006 Royal New Zealand Ballet performance The Wedding. Based on a story by Witi Ihimaera, the performance was geared towards spectacle. Nepia argues this compromised the potential of Ihimaera's themes of cultural diversity and interaction, and thus the sense of the possible, the potential to imagine something better was also compromised.

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Refereed Papers

Genius, Genus, Genealogy: Hejduk's Potential Angels

Thomas Mical

Genius

In his essay on "Genius", Giorgio Agamben returns to an ancient model of genius, more specifically, the genius of the individual human subject. It replaces the Romanticist model (where genius is exclusively an indeterminate volatile imagination or eccentric performative madness) with a subtle personification of a near-continuous, but contingent "murmuring" within and beyond the body that houses the individual subject. Genius here is sometimes like a guiding proprioceptive sense integrated within the body, sometimes like a trace memory pressuring the body from outside:[1]

> If the life that is held in tension between 'I' and Genius, between the personal and the impersonal, is a poetic one, the feeling that Genius exceeds and overcomes us from every side is one of panic, the panic that something infinitely much greater than what we appear to be able to endure is happening to us (Agamben, 2006: 96).

The subject, under genius, is no longer the transparent Enlightenment subject under reason, but is returned to a perpetual dissonance between this watching invisible spirit and the uneventful ground of work and days. As such, the individual for Agamben is never still or complete, but clearly is rethought as a slowly oscillating "potentiality", whose genius is the "subtle body" that signifies indeterminacy, as Agamben explains:

> But this most intimate and personal of gods is also the most impersonal part of us, the personalization of that, within us, which surpasses and exceeds ourselves. "Genius is our life, in as much as it was not given origin by us, but gave us origin". If he seems to identify himself with us, it is only in order to reveal himself immediately afterwards as something more than ourselves, in order to show us that we ourselves are more and less than ourselves (Agamben, 2006: 95).

Since the potential of genius remains fugitive and invisible, the potential of Agamben's genius to inform architectural thought, as the manifestation of invisible desires, is both necessary and elusive. To ask the question of the promise of potentiality demands identifying the necessary minimal difference between genealogy and genius within the intentionality of design, between the epistemological foundation of (architectural) origins contra the poetic possibility of the *un*-representable moment, as accidental chance or event. The incomplete

1 The proprioceptive sense, defined by Sacks, following Sherrington, is "that continuous but unconscious sensory flow from the moveable parts of our body (muscles, tendons, joints), by which their position and tone and motion are continually monitored and adjusted, but in a way which is hidden from us because it is automatic and unconscious." (Sacks, 1985: 43).

"subject-under-genius" is thus a subtle crossing of above-below, of before-after, and most importantly, a crossing of the visible-invisible. The task of genius within contemporary architecture, following Agamben's claims, is to always remain potential, and the task of the architect, in the uneasy position of artist, is to always remain a subject "without content" (Agamben, 1994: 55).

This claimed content-less-ness of artists, and their differential works, realizes the nascent objecthood and autonomy of conventional Modern Architecture (-without-qualities) – as neuter, minimal, mute – pulling most works towards a *topos* of the generic. In response to this tendency, John Hejduk's enigmatic and speculative later works (specifically *Bovisa, Vladivostok*, and *Victims*) suggest invisible coercive possibilities within the immanence of late-Modernist life and form, resonant with Agamben's anachronistic model of genius. Within Hejduk's cryptic architectural tableaux sometimes occurs the peculiar figure of the angel, this most ancient avatar of genius and an anachronistic figure, which was almost abandoned within the visual languages of modernity. Hejduk's oeuvre, perhaps best reconsidered as a research project of associative imaginaries crossing signifier and signified, is helpful for refining the question of what is possible within the contingency of the image of architecture. Hejduk's angels are certainly in resonance with Agamben's later texts on genius and potential, as both thought-systems emerge from a questioning of the excesses of material facts and a search for that which grounds unpredictable yet definitive events.

Potential

Is this therefore architecture's "genius", architecture's potential? In using Agamben's constructs to clarify Hejduk's later work, a distinction must be made between the contingent and the potential. Contingency lies closer to the bare life of work and days, closer to genealogy than genius. It is significant that Agamben describes contingency through the image of an angel:

> Know that Gabriel has two wings. The first, the one on the right, is purified. This wing is the sole and pure relation of Gabriel's Being-with-God. Then there is the left wing. This wing is grey; it has to do with a dark figure resembling the crimson colour of the moon at dawn or the peacock's claw. This shadowy figure is Gabriel's capacity to be, which has one side turned towards non-Being (since it is, as such, also a capacity not to be). If you consider Gabriel in his act of Being through God's Being, then his Being is said to be necessary, since under this aspect it cannot not be. But if you consider him in his right to existence in itself, this right is immediately to the same degree a right not to be, since such is the right of a being that does not have its capacity to be in itself (and that is, therefore, a capacity not to be) (Agamben, 1991: 271).

For Agamben, potential is always unrealised capacity – it is the lack that drives the production of a series, and that which is the visual 'missing matter' from each specific work of art. And as every work is like a prologue, a "broken cast" of another never realised, so will later works in turn "be the prologues or the moulds for other absent works, [and] represent only sketches or death masks"

(Agamben, 1993: 3). This phenomenology of appearance is of particular importance for exposing the function of Hejduk's works as a counter-memory of modern architecture.

Genealogy

Agamben situates a genius (always singular), which holds and exceeds the subjective body (again, always singular), as unique. Genius therefore has no visible genealogy, which, since Nietzsche, is a question of the differential relation between corporeality and epistemology.

Genealogy, after Nietzsche and Foucault, is not a tedious historical narrative of before and after, but traces the movement of descent (*Herkunft*) of invisible drives and forces, as it simultaneously proposes an emergence (*Entstehung*) of the suppressed, in and through the situated body. Neo-Nietzschean genealogy may appear to be the dissolution of the individual (as a body) into a series through language, where individual drives submerge into cultural manoeuvres. Yet, Blondel wisely warns "if genealogy is the discourse that consists in relating cultural phenomena back to the body, it only really achieves this as a result of a textual labour and movement, which are irreducible to the systematic unity of discourse" (1991: 258). Dissolving historical imperatives, this alternative Nietzschean promise of genealogy "disturbs what was previously immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself" (Foucault, 1977: 147). The elusive curvature of effects traced by this mode of genealogy "attaches itself to the body … it inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the debilitated and prostrate body of those whose ancestors committed errors" (147). The flesh of stones, the fabric of architecture, recurs as such a body. Vastly divergent architectural discourses all perform within their desired symbolic discourses (of power, truth, desire) where the series of visible works are configured as an (illusory) inevitability. Individual works of architecture always function to conceal and contain the Nietzschean invisible descent of past drives, as impulse or potential.

Hejduk's spatialised, mytho-poetic narratives demonstrate this difficult genealogical labour and movement. They reveal and expose what is latent or silenced, but necessary, within modern architecture and repeatedly stage the possibility of a haunting genealogical emergence, the liminal emergent event – which is also an artistic "moment of arising" for Foucault, "the principle and the singular law of an apparition" (148). Repressed apparitions, vaporous ethers, and angelic ciphers seek to remind us that the determinist perception and representation of the moment is the nagging problematic of utopian modernist space proper, and it is no surprise that such apparitions return to 'dwell' within Hejduk's singular prescient representations, as if all subjects-under-architecture lived like the ancients, "surrounded, in the invisible air, by wandering avengers who never forget the 'ancient contaminations' " (Cheatham n.d.: n.p.).

Hejduk's late works appear to illustrate Agamben's ancient model of the genius as the haunting limit-function of the incomplete and contingent subject:

> We need therefore to see the subject as a field of tensions, whose antithetical poles are Genius and 'I'. This field is covered by two joined but opposite forces, one that proceeds from the individual to the impersonal, and the other from the impersonal to the individual. These two forces live together, they intersect, they separate out, but they can neither free themselves completely one from the other, nor perfectly identify each with the other (Agamben, 2006: 96).

Genus

Whilst under the pull of an individual but impersonal genius, the individual is still like others, and thus always an instance of the tearing between individual *genius* and a collective *genus*. Agamben defines *genus* not simply as an empty "generic being" but as a reactive "original container (both in the active sense of that which holds together and gathers, and in the reflexive sense of that which holds itself together and is continuous) of the individuals who belong to it"(Agamben, 1994: 80). This genus is the muted concept of the individual without difference, without qualities, separated from genius. Prototypical and without temporality, the genus is soluble within the individuals forming a series or set, reflected in the monotony of modern architecture. The genus resists architectural speculation, when genus is type. The genus of architecture is a non-existent generic and vague category (approximating type) within genealogy, and as such can never be its object, which must always exhibit individual difference. Blondel notes that the object of Nietzschean genealogy is a precise exposure of (generic) "factors that allow grouping to take place while themselves remaining *hidden*" (1991: 250). These factors, including concealed values, drives, desires, and memories, are present but latent within monumental history, knowable only through their translation into the specific images, forms, and affects of architectural languages. This is why Nietzsche insisted:

> We knowers are unknown to ourselves, and for a good reason: how can we ever hope to find what we have never looked for? … The sad truth is that we remain necessarily strangers to ourselves, we don't understand our own substance, we must mistake ourselves; the axiom, 'Each man is farthest from himself' will hold for us to all eternity. Of ourselves we are not 'knowers' …" (Nietzsche, 1989: 149).

Under these criteria, the genealogy of architecture, after the writing degree zero of ascetic modernity, must be a genealogy of all that which is invisible behind and within the stated materiality of architecture, where furtive glances, imperfect gestures, and failed encounters equal or exceed schemas in significance. For Foucault, such a genealogy of apparitions is the foundation of a necessary and compulsive counter-memory, which, by definition, is neither metaphysical nor transcendent, but real and immanent. Hejduk's last projects can be read as such a 'counter-memory' of teleological modernism which accepts but tasks the grid of formalism, and works from the possibility of a visual emergence of the perceptible unknown, the murmuring of potentials, from the contingencies of the generic type (as angel, machine, landscape, or narrative) imagined as dissonant series, without origin or end.

Non-Origin

Between the contested historiographies of modern architecture and Hejduk's enigmatic 'refusal', where is it possible to begin with a Nietzschean genealogy of the unknown/unseen 'genius' of architecture? History, after Hegel, always demands an origin, yet Foucault offers "the origin lies at a place of inevitable loss, the point where the truth of things correspond to a truthful discourse, the site of a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost"(1977: 143). The origin is the thus the site of disappearance and descent whose insignificance, according to Nietzsche, increases with its knowledge: "…the more insight we possess into an origin the less significant does the origin appear" (1982: 46). The superficial tracing of an origin, retroactively misperceived as foundational truth, is actually a vanishing point in the search for the descending forces of genealogy: it is always provisional, like philosophical truths that perform as masks concealing further masks. In the extreme, to find the propulsion of meaning, "the genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin" (Foucault, 1977: 146). The fixed "origin", as described within narrative history structured as a genealogy of influence, is always untimely, always too early or too late, incomplete, provisional. Agamben concurs with these revisionist claims for the diminished epistemic truth of the origin within genealogy when he affirms "the origin itself can be neither fulfilled nor mastered"(1999: 155). For Agamben, the transient origin is always only a floating potentiality, not fact, in the present moment. His sustained exegesis of Walter Benjamin leads him to posit the origin as neither factual event nor mythical archetype, but one that acts, as for Benjamin, "as a vortex in the stream of becoming and that it manifests itself only through a double structure of restoration and incompleteness" (155). Note how Agamben, in refuting the myth of the integrative origin, duplicates this double structure of temporality between potentiality and contingency, (again) as the split future of the incomplete subject-under-genius:

> That is, man is a unique being in two phases, a being who is the result of the complicated dialectic between one side not (yet) singled out (*individuata*) and lived, and another side already marked by fate and by individual experience. But the part that is impersonal and not isolated (*individuata*) is not a chronological past which we have left behind once and for all (Agamben, 2006: 95).

The spectre of dialectic time, as the open, the empty, and the effervescent creates fission for the moment, as an existential throw of the dice, a choice between the genealogical tendency and the irruption of difference. Within this doublevalent structure of the potential subject, the genius itself becomes a double agent serving dual temporalities:

> … we are dealing with a single Genius that is however changeable, now white then dark, now wise then depraved. This means, and it is worth noting that it is not Genius who changes but our relationship with him, that from luminosity and clarity everything becomes opaque and dark. Our life principle, the companion who directs and makes our life pleasant, is suddenly transformed into a silent stowaway who shadow-like follows our every footstep and conspires in secret against us (Agamben, 2006: 98).

Following Agamben, the subject-under-genius and the spatial labour and movement of architecture (as art) evade and escape the determinism of the event as singular: the event is properly defined as both "projective past" and "future anterior", a condition described by Lacan as a history neither past definite nor present perfect, but a future anterior of what one will have been for what one is in the process of becoming (1977: 86). And both temporalities, as interval, are always a descent and a crossing beneath and behind any fixed origin.

Invisibles

And what results from this untimely, diminished, out-of-joint origin? Following Heidegger and Blanchot, "the origin of that which has no origin is the origin of the work of art" (Taylor, 1987: 246; see also Silverman 1994: 49-50). The work of architecture, when it is within art, is without origin, a working of non-knowledge. "To live with Genius means, … to live in the intimacy of an alien being, to keep oneself constantly in relation with a zone of non-consciousness" (Agamben, 2006: 96). As Nietzsche claimed, this non-knowledge is a necessary foundation of the body, which is the tantalizingly obscure object of (architectural) genealogy: "nothing … can be more incomplete than [one's] image of the totality of *drives* which constitute [a man's] being"; we "can scarcely name even the cruder ones: their number and strength, their ebb and flow, their play and counterplay among one another, and above all the laws of their *nutriment* remain wholly unknown" (Nietzsche, 1982: 118).

The phenomenology of art is formed from the obscure origin of the non-origin or, more specifically, the becoming visible of the invisible, because "it is the invisible, and it alone, that renders the visible real" (Marion, 1996: 4). Theologian Jean-Luc Marion shows how "the visible increases in direct proportion to the invisible … the more the invisible is increased, the more the visible is deepened" (5). Marion, in considering modern theology after phenomenology, adds a third dissonant operative term, *the unseen*, to this visual dialectic: the unseen, "only provisionally invisible, always exerts its demand for visibility in order to be made to irrupt"(25). And this categorical unseen is the volatile original non-origin of art, that which is condensed and displaced into the contingent image. The image is only an apparatus of capture; the space within images is fragile, ephemeral, finite, visible, presented otherwise. In a modern world increasingly closed to transcendence, Agamben turns to Hegel and claims that "art loosens itself from itself and moves into pure nothingness, suspended in a kind of diaphanous limbo between the no-longer-being and not-yet-being" (1994: 53).

Hejduk's Angels

> I cannot do a building without building a new repetoirof characters, of stories, of language, and it's all parallel. It's not just building per se, it's building worlds (Hejduk, in Shaprio 1991: 61).

From the 1984 IBA competition entry entitled *Berlin Masque/Victims*, and continuing through his later works, Hejduk slowly and deliberately fused litera-



Hejduk, "Crucified Angels", Bovisa, 1987

ture, poetry, and art into potential architecture, where architecture performs as a series of visible containers of the unseen. He once stated:

> When an architect is thinking, he's thinking architecture and his work is always architecture, whatever form it appears in. No area is more architectural than any other. My books, for instance, are architecture that you can build in your head. When the research succeeds, it can express the ineffable, which is ultimately translated as spirit. Imagine a drawing and a sentence taking shape at the same time (Hejduk, 1997: n.p.).

The recombinant alogic of his masques, their near-repetition and their transposition of differential animate and inorganic figures (iterated across categories) implements the prior multiplicity necessary for world-making. Calvino described each of our individual lives as a "combinatoria of experiences, information, books we have read, things imagined" (1993: 124). Encyclopaedic inventories of objects and styles, their potentiality allows for multiple recombinations.

By the late 1980's, John Hejduk's architectural speculations increasingly included the disturbing presence of diminished angelic figures within multiple architectural meditations. They do not overtly represent supernatural messengers or hang in ordered celestial harmonies, but often come into representation as entangled. Hejduk's works bear affinity with Blanchot's idea of language as composed of "angels with intertwined wings" (Blanchot, 1982: 195), in that he intertwines architecture's potentiality within contingent images. Hejduk's anachronistic angels are flattened into encyclopaedic, Tarot-like image-spaces appearing and disappearing. Cinematically, they are without progression and their blank diegetic space, outside of topography or history, remains constant.[2] The presence and persistence of these angels indicates that they are of significance, but a significance not immediately apparent. Only a patient questioning of appearance as such will reveal that "the always hidden becomes the always there" (Deamer,

2 These cinematic units of narrative analysis are assumed in the introduction of Hays, Hejduk's Chronotope

1996: 69). In the wake of modernity and the rise of "absence-of-god", or negative theology, these angels become the typology of the unrepresentable alterity of potentiality within contingent architecture. Following Agamben, - "an experience of potentiality as such is possible only if potentiality is always also the potential not to" (1999: 250) - architecture's contingency would be "something whose opposite could have happened in the very moment in which it happened" (Duns Scotus, in Agamben, 1999: 262).[3]

The discontinuous, but identically scaled, spatial logic of *Bovisa, Vladivostok*, and *Victims* is deliberately iconic and anti-perspectival – the occasional appearance of the descended angels marks the expulsion from the fullness of the theological vanishing point of the implicit rational subjective of perspective. Situated in response to real places, Hejduk's projects appear as clear and distinct grounded icons within an implicit invisible spatial continuum that is neither transcendent nor immanent. Hejduk's reiteration of angels within the persistent blank diegetic space of the masques can be read as the annunciation of that which lies before or behind representation, the angel's ancient function. However, Cacciari warns that annunciation does not involve the "becoming visible of the invisible, the translating-betraying of the invisible in and for the visually perceptible" but, rather, an opening for human beings to relate to the invisible - that "Invisible which the Angel safeguards precisely in the instant in which it is communicated through its forms" (Cacciari, 1994: 3).

Angels were always historically transcendent messengers; their displacement into the visible immanence of Hejduk's masque-spaces constitutes a fantasy as event, specifically one of reversal, turning, or troping. Hejduk makes this explicit as "when an angel penetrates a wall and becomes trapped in it, life and death implode at the moment and space and time fall into infinity" (Hejduk, 2002: n.p.). Echoing Agamben's subject-genius coupling, Hejduk's visual narratives repeatedly stage the descent and entanglement of the genius (guardian angel) into the body (architecture's material form) across these projects, blocked from ever achieving immanence and transcendence, always potential and contingency. As such, Hejduk's individual angels surface as wary ciphers, a visual 'almost nothing' that is over-determined and yet immobilised. In their entirety, they form a genus excluded from functionalist doctrine, and as a genus perform as evidence of a hidden or latent order.

The genus of Hejduk's angels function to "exscribe the unseen". This notion of exscription, as defined by Jean-Luc Nancy, is a potentiality: "by inscribing significations, we exscribe the presence of what withdraws from all significations, being itself (life, passion, matter)", and, "… the being of existence is not unrepresentable: it presents itself exscribed" (1993: 339). Marion defines the unseen as a special category of the invisible, of concealed Being, as the potential of the image: "the unseen admittedly falls under the jurisdiction of the invisible… it is able to transgress it precisely by becoming visible" (1996: 25). Here, Being, in the Heideggerian mode, is that which is outside but coupled with representation – the vacant spaces of the unseen, potential, invisible within Hejduk's masques. His drawn angels, captured into separate iconic postures, are pure potential, an annunciation of the "outside" of instrumental representation. Within atheological modernity, "the Angel has no proper place, but for this reason it is the necessary figure of the instant that brings to a standstill the arrow of time, that interrupts the continuum" (Cacciari, 1994:

3 Hejduk's potentiality deliberately falls outside of many of the conventions of architectural reproduction, clarifying their contested status as para-architecture, as ciphers and clues for a non-mimetic / angelic potential that is behind, beneath, and after what remains incomplete in the condensation of instrumental architectural space since modernity.

33). What is presented in Hejduk's masques is not medieval nostalgia but "the re-inscription of modernist opacity back into representation itself; it means the mask that figures a real that did not exist before its representation" (Hays, 1996: 11).

The angel, as the figure of exteriority, is anticipated in the influential opening of Rilke's *Duino Elegies* that illuminate Hejduk's angelic potential:

> Who, if I cried out, would hear me among the angels' hierarchies?
> and even if one of them pressed me suddenly against his heart:
> I would be consumed in that overwhelming existence.
> For beauty is nothing but the beginning of terror, which we are still
> just able to endure,
> and we are so awed because it serenely disdains to annihilate us.
> Every angel is terrifying.
> And so I hold myself back and swallow the call-note of my dark sobbing.
> Ah, whom can we ever turn to in our need?
> Not angels, not humans, and already the knowing animals are
> aware
> that we are not really at home in our interpreted world
> (Rilke, 1982: 151).

In describing a function of the angel in Rilke's poetry (equally applicable to Hedjuk's angels), Blanchot notes that the creative work "touches upon absence, upon the torments of the infinite; it reaches the empty depths of that which never begins or ends" because the image "constitutes a limit at the edge of the indefinite" (1982: 196-7,254). And Angels are always already this potentiality of the limit-experience for, as Cacciari notes, "their own tremendous presence is a sign of dis





Above: Hejduk, 'Angel Catcher', Bovisa, 1987

Left:
Hejduk, 'House of the Suicide', Bovisa, 1987 (where the "The Record Keeper of Hallucinations … reads the poems of Rilke to the point of obsession") 'which is not turned to us nor do we shed light on it' " (Blanchot, 1982: 139-40)

tance, of separation … instead of being the guardians of a threshold, here Angels appear to be unsurpassable demons of the limit" (Cacciari, 1994: 9,11).

The series of fallen angels in *Bovisa* are a narrative of loss, named 'The Angel Watcher', 'The Angel Catcher', 'The Crucified Angel', '(Angel) Autopsy', 'Angel Collector', and also the 'Via of the Crucified Angels'. Their fall is not a fall from transcendence into immanence, or from abstraction into the concrete, but a horizontal fall of the unseen into "murmuring images". In their fall, these Angels are transmuted in a manner similar to Blanchot's description of the reversal of art, of making the visible invisible in Rilke. In this "transformation of the visible into the invisible and of the invisible into the always more invisible" being un-revealed expresses an "access to the other side 'which is not turned to us nor do we shed light on it' " (Blanchot, 1982: 139-40).

Hejduk's symptomatic angels are excluded from the contingency of machinic modernism, but haunt its representations; the building-machines reciprocate by reverting to their prior medieval forms, perhaps to suture an imperceptible genealogical break. The materiality of architecture in Hejduk's medieval machines are drawn with precision, yet they are light, ungrounded; conversely, the angels caught in the images are irregular and earthbound. In the project *Vladivostok*, Hejduk noted "the air in Vladivostok is much thinner; the weather of Vladivostok is a vaporous, angelic time-space, … 'the space created at the moment of the event.' Anachronic, anatopic" (in Hays, 1996: 12). The masques and their angelic figures can be seen in this light as an emergence, an event, of the making visible of a real that was only a potentiality within the *corpus-genus* of modernism proper.

The hermetic genealogy of Hejduk's literary-architecture is a counter-memory drawn and descended from autonomous architectural (and literary) modernism in that it repeats and re-arranges its components in different ways. As counter-memory, it mutates modernism by re-actualising it "along different and multiple series" (Colwell, 1997: n.p.). Peggy Deamer notes the motivation of Hejduk's counter-memory: "in *Vladivostok* and the *Mask of Medusa*, the narrative presentation shows that, as in mythology and psychoanalysis, following after doesn't necessarily mean following from" (1996: 69).[4] The repeating event of the angel-machine coupling is both a "projective past" and "future anterior" whose limit oscillates between event and memory, potentiality and contingency. In Hejduk's diminished angels, the genius of architecture is but this poetic possibility of the unrepresentable event, contra origin.

Hejduk's Angel works, potentially outside architecture and opposed to generic modernism, expose that which is concealed but affects the body-in-space, using minimally differential relations between fantasy, figure, angels, and machines. By transposing the angel into modernity, Hejduk relies upon the icon of architectural masks and the opacity of emptied space in his attempt to re-familiarize what had been banished to the exteriority of modernist architectural thought and representation (Jameson, 1975: 52). The unique atmosphere conjured in Hejduk's masques, and the incidents of entangled and murmuring angels, entangle three registers of architectural thought - the unseen, formless alterity, the logic of construction – into architecture's murmuring potential.

4 For a brief Lacanian gloss on Hejduk, see Gavin Seeney, online, accessed 01 May 2006, http://us.geocities.com/atel-iermp/the_given.rtf: "…which brings up the whole problem of Hejduk and the presence of his two towers embedded within the Santiago complex). This phantasmatic surplus registers as well within the Lacanian orbit, as a screen (the Imaginary) onto which things are projected -- intuited as almost always monstrous things -- or, a form of psychic mechanism that signifies representation itself alongside or within the field of normative constructs typified by the complex of the Lacanian Symbolic. Within this perverse system the Real only ever appears as irruptive and/or uncanny episodes. As 'Other', and as such (disembodying 'the given'), the Real is automatically marginalised, problematised, and instrumentalised -- and the transcendental ego (subject/self) is, in turn, simply traumatised in its presence."

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Plan Obus and Vipcity, as from Father to Son

Guy Châtel

Installation with two high-tension pylons lying down for Initiatief 86, Ghent, 1986 Photo : Dominique Stroobant

The artist, architect and town planner, Luc Deleu, worked for more than ten years on the project, *The Unadapted City*,[2] a speculative urban-scale project articulated as a succession of spatial models. As each of these encloses the preceding ones, *Vipcity*, its last occurrence, represents the entire project. *The Unadapted City* has been shown in numerous exhibitions and described in three monographs.[3] If the impressive numbers of accompanying tables, diagrams, drawings and models testify to the enterprise's scale and complexity, this documentation doesn't fully succeed in revealing the project's nature or goals. Though the author himself provides for its chronicle through an abundance of explanatory notes, an impression remains that he is showing the pieces of a giant jigsaw devoid of an outline.

In fact, Deleu has become famous through his peculiar manner of showing things. His practice of what he termed "resistance architecture" (Davidts, 1999: middle verso of fold page 10) soon attracted the attention of the contemporary art world.[4] The piles of containers, the tumbled-down pylons and cranes, the manifestos and controversial proposals, and even his urban conversion projects, all had the capacity to involve the viewer.[5] His work did not seem to ask for analysis as much as it did for an audience, and often derived its meaning from the pleasure and effect of a gesture.[6]

ORBINO, Nauerna, 2002
Photo Luc Deleu

An earlier version of ticle was published as Car pour finir tout retourne à la mer – Vipcity ou la mise en scène d'une filiation (Châtel 2004), which was translated from the French by Michael Novy in February 2006.

2 Luc Deleu b.1944, founder of TOP office ("Turn On Planning"), Antwerp.

3 Deleu (1996); Theys (2001); Deleu (2002).

4 In this interview Deleu explains that he wants to resist the generally accepted notion that every practice of architecture must be instrumental and finally aimed at building. He states that the current separation between art and architecture is inopportune and reductive; that there is no reason why a work of architecture could not be an image or a discourse.

5 For an overall view of the work prior to The Unadapted City, see Deleu (1991).

6 See Bekaert (1991).

The Unadapted City started with such a gesture. The work was launched in 1995, following *Wien Usiebenpole*, the project for a linear city of 120,000 inhabitants on the *Donau Insel*.[7] On this occasion Deleu used the score of Strauss's *Blue Danube* to regulate the city's functional arrangement. Through the arbitrariness of this procedure, he drew attention to architecture's lack of instruments for the conception and regulation of urban facilities. *The Unadapted City*, in turn, aimed at studying and developing models for the deployment of such facilities which, for Deleu, are an essential element of habitat. Beyond their contribution to comfort and their organizational aptitude, he acknowledges their capacity to become part of our heritage in future years. Noting that the public space is under pressure from private interests, he intends to induce decision-makers to face their responsibilities by confronting them with his project's 'ethical stand'. Through his work with urban facilities, or equipment, he proposes to advance a renewal of Western societies' urban habitats. In initiating new strategies, Deleu seems to hope that the project will provide examples that may contribute to a critique of the aims of architecture and urbanism.[8]

7 For an account of this project, see Châtel (2001a: 43-47).

8 For all those claims, see Deleu (2002: 25).

9 See Châtel & Davidts (2003).



Wien Usiebenpole, eigenmächtiges Funktionsarrangement, 1994-96, digital drawing



Wien Usiebenpole, model, 1994-1995 Photo : SYB'L S.pictures

Deleu sets his ambition against the current aims of a discipline he considers to be too pragmatic and therefore impotent. He asserts that *The Unadapted City* is a work of 'conceptual urbanism', an autonomous theoretical venture.[9] Seen in this light however, it reveals some fragility. The postulates that supposedly underlie it are nowhere verified. The work cannot be said to grow out of its premises; it forges ahead regardless. Undeniably speculative in character, its desire to be exemplary predisposes it towards representation, and a performance that is elaborated through an abundance of references to Modernism and the oeuvre of Le Corbusier. While the project derives much of its meaning from this posture of a descendant, the work simultaneously bounces off its cross-references, continually gets carried way by its marginalia. Representation is constructed in the course of its enunciation, and hence the work is much more a discursive than a theoretical undertaking.

Rather than furnish the project with arguments that its author prefers to dispense with, I shall attempt to make sense of its cunning genealogical claims. These claims do not occur in properly referenced arguments but in the course of enunciation. For instance, the two most recent monographs about *The Unadapted City*, which were produced under Deleu's own control and can therefore be regarded as part of its documentary fund, contain a large number of photographs of Le Corbusier's work – without explanation. This essay is an attempt to discover what they hint at, by re-ordering the pieces of the jigsaw Deleu presents us with.

The Unadapted City proceeds in stages. It begins with ten panels that make up an atlas of urban facilities.[10] Each corresponds to a category of services and is a graphic transposition of quantitative data derived from the analysis of existing urban equipment. Their surface area grows, seemingly in response to population growth. But this is about a different form of exploration from reading. The large polychrome panels are nothing like the dry verbiage one would expect from such documents. Here, already, the image reigns supreme and the 'taxography' tends towards the iconic. The panel listing medical services brings to mind the play of light across the pale green walls of a hospital, while that listing culture and leisure activities evokes a criss-cross pattern of light beams.

10 The ten panels form a set shown for the first time in May 1996 at the Netherlands Architecture Institute (NAI) in Rotterdam. These documents were published in Deleu (1996). Since then, several of the panels have been revised.

11 DOS is the acronym for De Onaangepaste Stad, the Dutch name of The Unadapted City.



Luc Deleu & T.O.P. office, DOS '95 (La Ville Inadaptée) - Planche VIII - Culture & Divertissement, 1999, dessin digitalisé, © SABAM

The atlas relates the equipment programme to the number of inhabitants. Another document, the *DOS standard*,[11]graphically represents the proportional relation between the surface needed for this equipment programme and the housing area. Here, the equipment is presented in three columns according to its desired distribution. Deleu differentiates between structural, zoned and occasional allocations, depending on the impact that a type of service may have on the structure of its environment. The *DOS standard* is not only the end-product of data processing, it also constitutes an articulated and quantified programme of urban habitat - its generator.

D.O.S. '95 (The Unadapted City). Photo: Steven Van den Bergh





Top left: Junction Haarlem-Amsterdam 'Halfweg', a surface arrangement for a building development for 60.000 inhabitants, 1995

Top right: Housing Generator 2000, A surface arangement for a building development for 20.000 people/SA standard, 1997

Right: BING BONG, 1996

Bingbong (1996) should be regarded as a first draft of the spatial model of *The Unadapted City* – more an illustration, however, than a test of the generator. The urbanistic conception of this district for 6,800 inhabitants is based on *Usiebenpole*. Through the radical application of precepts such as the dictatorship of the sun, the segregation of traffic and the liberation of soil, the latter project was in full conformity with the town planning ideology of the 1930's. The entire habitat of the *Linear City* was installed in a sequence of 110 *Unités d'Habitation*,[12] with entwined infrastructure on several levels serving the *Inner Streets*. *Bingbong* offers a variant of this, but remains a simple mechanism for the occupation of space. Instead of repeating the



12 Le Corbusier, Housing unit of compatible size. Deleu uses the Unité of Marseilles, 1946-1952.

13 These are averages calculated from data relating to a large number of existing districts and towns. Also featured are calculations aimed at estimating the population of their hinterland.

architecture of the *Unité*, Deleu applies the term literally; the running metre of the *Unité* is put forward as a yardstick, one metre corresponding to the housing of 6.4 persons. The habitat is organized in buildings of various shapes, designed as extrusions from the *Unité's* cross-profile.

Subsequent development of the spatial model will be based on a gradual approach to urban complexity, where several thresholds are marked in response to rising population. The base level is the number of persons that the *Unité de Marseille* could reasonably house today, i.e. an average of 2.51 inhabitants for each of its 350 apartments, or a total of 878 persons. The second level is represented by the *Unité's* original population, i.e.1,600 persons. The next levels are the district, the local town and the regional city, for which *DOS* envisages respectively 9,500, 22,000 and 72,000 inhabitants.[13] The highest level, threshold for a truly urban situation, would be reached with a population of 192,000.

Brikabrak (1998) and *Dinkytown* (1998-99) are projects for districts of 9,500 inhabitants, based entirely on the *Bingbong* system. *Brikabrak* is the primitive model of *Dinkytown*, and both have a full place in *Octopus* (1999). The latter proposes a system of four crossing infrastructure lines, marking out the centre of a city whose linear districts could extend in eight different directions. But it does not extend beyond this knot where the *Brikabrak* and *Dinkytown* districts join, forming a local-sized town of 38,000.[14]

The numerical growth is obtained by doubling the population each time, earlier projects being incorporated into the new. Thus *Octopus*, in its turn, was destined to form an integral part of *Vipcity* (1999), which generates the infrastructure of an enormous housing development, whose 15,140 lots allow the population to be doubled again.[15] This brings the project up to the level of a regional city. The additional equipment necessitated by the population growth is installed alongside a monorail track, which connects with the *Octopus* centre.

14 The figure of Octopus is like the figure [#] – octopus or eight limbs. On two of its branches Brikabrak and Dinkytown are fixed. The population is 9500 + 9500 (for Brikabrak and Dinkytown) + 19000 on the knot figure itself (#): total 38000.

15 Each lot has 0.663 hectare, so that 0.663 hectare = 2.51 x 0.2643 ha. On the basis of an 'orbanistic' calculation, Deleu presents 0.2643 ha as the average land area available for individual housing. Thus the 0.663 ha lots represent the 'maximum luxury' that a family could have access to today. By drawing the boundaries in such a way as to suggest later division of the land, Deleu anticipates the calculations being very soon overtaken by the vertiginous growth in world population; he refers to the housing lot ironically as "decent". The concept of maximum luxury is the justification for the name Vipcity. Population redoubled results in (15,140 x 2.51) + 38.000 (original population of Octopus) = 76.000 inhabitants for Vipcity.



D.O.S. XXI - VIPCITY # 9 updated

D.O.S. XXI - Model Octopus, model t(scale 1:2000), 1999, 6 x 301 x 80 cm Photo : Steven van den Bergh

16 See Châtel (2001a: 52).

17 The publications show that before Vipcity was embarked on, that is, until Octopus, the plates and diagrams portraying these "clustered amenities" and "space arrangements" were virtually all the project had in terms of graphic documentation. For Vipcity there is the addition of plans, elevations and cross-sections.

The avowed aim of the systematic exploration carried out through successive spatial models, is none other than the gradual discovery of the capacity of functional arrangements to organize and modulate urban space. Yet *The Unadapted City* has the special feature of grasping the whole articulation of a project by its extremities, by its knowledge base or, more precisely, its statistical substructure; and by its outcome, that is to say, its morphology and shape. Both ends are determined in enunciation, fixed in accordance with a logic specific to them. The first is the product of detailed study; the second is placed there, like a courtroom exhibit hastily assembled from the debris of architecture's history. The project can thus be seen as a double systematic procedure, which follows two lines of action entirely controlled by deduction; two lines that the author then endeavours to cross with each other. In the limited space where they meet, the information is submitted to a stochastic equation, producing what Deleu called, in an unpublished notebook, a "spatial choreography".[16] We find this choreography in the documents entitled, "*clustering of the amenities*" or "*space arrangement*".[17] These are the scores that note the facts, events, accidents, figures and forms of functional arrangement: the architecture of *The Unadapted City*.

It is by force that Deleu brings the project back to the simplicity of a double deductive sequence: it is obtained by deliberate inversion of its ends and means. The spatial model of *The Unadapted City* is given in its entirety at the outset, its form



D.O.S. '98 - Model Dinkytown - ground arrrangement digital drawing, 1999

already crystallized. The project develops its discourse – and in fact reveals itself – after being assembled in this way. Deleu's stand is to concentrate on the functional, on the comfort and ease given to urban life by suitable equipment and good distribution of services, shops, places for work, leisure and rest. He overlooks the question of how fit these are as frameworks for interaction and exchange between the inhabitants, for the vitality of a human environment.

Every project is assumed to be carried out in terms of the virtuality that is the destination of its object. There is always a conceptualized anticipation in the act of architecture or urbanism. This anticipation is constituted by the expectation of its use, of its appropriation. In *The Unadapted City*, however, appropriation is not really anticipated but, rather, simulated. Inhabitants remain abstract, they count only in terms of their numbers. Moreover, a project responds to a demand, to a need or a lack. But the relationships that it sets up are of the order of the possible, not of the necessary. That contingency, specific to architecture and urbanism, is controlled by the notion of propriety. In other words, it is governed by judgement and tempered by suitability. Through the reversal that Deleu imposes on the project, contingency is circumscribed within the closed field delineated by the question of functional arrangement. It is a playground and a field for experience where his hand remains totally free. He alone lays down the rules and interprets them.

It is the compression of contingency, the neutralization of propriety and the underplaying of appropriation which justify the project's curious name. This city would be 'unadapted' because it is liberated from architecture's conventional straightjacket. One discovers that *The Unadapted City* is not so much the project of a city as that of an image of the city.

This image is given as a reminder of the symbolics of Modernism, the recapture of an emblematic linear city. By its allegiance to the deductive method it is directly related to the work of CIAM IV.[18] But this relationship turns out to be dialectical. Through its choreography of functional congestion, *The Unadapted City* presents itself as an antithesis to *The Functional City* that emerges from the doctrine of the *Charte d'Athènes*; the project is a critique of Modernism in terms of its own language.[19] What it might mean for our time, however, remains obscure.[20]

Since the launching of *Vipcity*, the project has undergone a remarkable change of tack. In spite of the fact that the additional housing is no longer correlated to the infrastructure, the latter still supports urban facilities and organizes public space. The monorail line is marked by huge office buildings hinting at the regular emplacement of the stations. The monumental alignment of these 'matching buildings'[21] punctuates the route slashed into the isotropic carpet of housing lots. The line cuts through an ominous allotment. Thus, eased of the disguise of an illusive urban unity, *The Unadapted City* can reveal its stubborn actuality. The effort of the project is now directed to the details of entwining the infrastructure, the collective facilities and the public space. An esplanade on several levels snakes along the infrastructural braid and seems to rebel against the stately dance of the tower blocks. Just as Le Corbusier's 1931-1939 *Plan Obus* for Algiers preserved the Kasbah's gradients, *Vipcity* spares the tract of the plots. But beyond their shared tolerance of a habitat's dissipation and conservatism, a comparison of *Vipcity* with *Plan Obus* reveals *The Unadapted City's* distinctive features.

18 See Van der Woud (1983: 66). He points out that the election of Cor van Eesteren as new chairman after CIAM III meant that the reliability of a rational approach was preferred to the visionary attitude of Le Corbusier and his supporters. In the Directives of CIAM IV, the new chairman calls this approach "the materialist deductive method" and, while opposing what he calls "idealistic induction", he legitimizes it by stating that it corresponds to the common will expressed at the first congress.

19 This is the conclusion reached in Châtel (2001a).

20 In Châtel (2001a: 46), I put forward the hypothesis that for Usiebenpole this critical value is determined by the project's anachronistic character. In a text going back to 1976, used as introduction, Koolhaas (1995) notes in respect of Bijlmermeer – a late example (end of the 1960s) of the most radical modernist urbanism – that "if architectural debate is an endless re-enactment of the son killing the father, then the Bijlmer presents a potential reversal of the oedipal formula, in which the father threatens the son. Instead of Team X attacking the mechanistic attitudes of CIAM for a fetishistic obsession with the objective and the quantifiable, through the Bijlmer, CIAM questions - from beyond the grave as it were - the equally fetishistic concern with the ineffable and the qualitative that characterizes its allegedly humanistic replacement" (Koolhaas 1995: 867).

Le Corbusier forged a symbolic representation of the feast and the disenchantment of modernity (see Tafuri, 1985). Although he regarded the Kasbah as an urbanistic masterpiece, he could not use it directly as a model. "The Kasbah can only remain what it is, outside time, outside modernity and indifferent to its fate" (20). It is the



VIPCITY under construction - page 3, digital drawing, 2001

converse of the syncopated experience of time and space written into the sinuous megastructures of *Plan Obus*. The cascading arabesques isolate and threaten the Kasbah. Quite the opposite of this dramatic assault on the hills of Fort *L'Empereur, Vipcity* displays all the resignation of mutually accepted defects. The braid and the allotment are at odds with each other, but constitute the conditions of their reciprocal existence. The choreography of *Vipcity* is staged in front of a disillusioned crowd of housing lots. What remains today of the city is little more than commodity or spectacle. The recreation of the towers is disciplined by the cadence of their funeral march, the linear structure is merely the city's skeleton, and the winding esplanade represents its dance of death. *The Unadapted City* is an allegory of the desperate combat waged by the contemporary city against its dislocation.

Despite the gulf between them, the formation of *Plan Obus* matches the Kasbah's amphitheatre by the transposition of its syncretic qualities. The eternal everyday of the Kasbah is sustained by a pact, an age-old agreement which allowed for the intensive inhabitation of this site. Its body was built up through accumulation,



One nautical mile amenities for 9500 inhabitants, 2000-2004 photomontage T.O.P. office



Le Corbusier Alger : Urbanisme 1930 © SABAM Belgium 2006.

piece by piece, a piling that enabled it to straddle this difficult gradient. The perennial accord is the very condition of its existence. But the Kasbah is not really unchanging; it carries on through incorporation, it is totalizing. Its organic integrity is not endangered by the mutation of its cells. Each can be replaced without corrupting the Kasbah's communal programme or morphology. It was on top of that complex but unified body that Le Corbusier threw out the structures of his *Plan Obus*. A totalitarian gesture, it conquers the territory and reshapes the landscape. But its bearing is to lend itself to habitat. Dwellings can be fitted into the gigantic rack of the megastructures without any other constraint than that of shelving. Form finds its expression in the length and movement of the course and is by no means affected by the detail of that use. However immense it may be, the difference here engaged is essentially causational. The Kasbah's morphology is effected by an awkward topography and by the federated determination of its inhabitants; that of the megastructures by the singular will to redraw the site's scenography, and by an extensive use of modern technology. The Kasbah's syncretism is ratified by the signature of Machinism.

The notion of the resilience of overall form, as discovered and actualized by *Plan Obus*, had considerable influence on post-CIAM architecture and urbanism. It enabled architects to rid themselves of their attachment to the specificity of the object, in favour of exploring the expressive force and organizing capacity of a support structure or shape established by accumulation and interconnection of a basic unit. Research in this direction dominated and reunified the architecture and urbanism of the second half of the 1960s. This was the period during which Deleu trained as an architect and began his professional career. Already at that time, he took positions that were at odds with canonical practice. His first exhibition, in 1970, was presented as an announcement of his departure from architecture.[22] One of the exhibits was a sheet of paper with four photographs of projects then considered as major references. Deleu had boldly crossed them out. In addition to two views of the Marseilles *Unité d'Habitation*, the collage showed Peter Cook's *Plug-in-City* and Moshe Safdie's *Habitat '67* for the Montreal World Fair.[23] Today, it is apparent that Deleu's work finds support in the sources he rejected at the time; the Unité is, for instance, an important influence for *The Unadapted City*. A repositioning, that provides for a connection of the Inner Streets to the system's public infrastructure, indeed seems to take all its measure from the intentionality determining this project.[24] As for *Plug-in-City* and *Habitat '67*, each in its own way is also a descendant of *Plan Obus*. By piling up prefabricated modules like bunches of grapes,[25] *Habitat '67* recalls the visual and interrelational complexity of the Kasbah. *Plug-in-City* is like an extensive mechanism conceived as a vine to which housing pods simply have to be hooked up.

21 These pairs of towers - one lying and the other standing - present a series of variants on the phenomenal configuration of the Barcelona Towers. In this regard see Châtel (1999 & 2001b). Through this arrangement, which relates to his series Lessons in scale and perspective, Deleu engages the building's formal characteristics in their relationship with the spectator.

22 "Luc Deleu leaves architecture in the vacuum for New Dimensions", Febr. 1970.

23 For a reproduction of this collage, see Deleu (2002: 33).

24 See Tafuri & Dal Co (1976: 344-45).

25 See Tafuri & Dal Co (1976: 388).

Deleu himself sees the acts of architecture and urbanism as making available a structure or support that can lend itself to distinctive appropriation. The array of the collective is seen as a condition and guarantee of individual completion. The advent of the city would then occur in the encounter between architecture's singular formal determination and the chorus of interpretative particular actions. In fact, this hypothesis is to be found throughout his work and serves as justification for the approach adopted in *The Unadapted City*. Deleu found a convincing representation of the concept in Le Corbusier's well-known sketch intended to demonstrate the freedom of habitat within the structures of *Plan Obus*.[26] But this drawing, whilst a statement of the intention to retain the diversity of habitat, seems to reduce communal life to cohabitation. Likewise, and equally far from providing any scheme that could lead to the creation of a community, the prototype *Habitat '67* puts forward an image of the richness and complexity of built structure, while *Plug-in-City* flaunts itself as a technological fantasy, carefully avoiding any involvement with societal questions. The analysis and the critique of the conditions under which building happens, and of its institutional and societal context, were nevertheless of much concern in those days. It was a time of resistance and reflection. The fact that this attitude produced no lasting results has been attributed to the inability of architects to carry this reflection to its conclusion, which would have meant questioning their own function and their fierce attachment to autonomy.[27] Among all the projects of that time, those which are still relevant today are those which stand out as having a radical approach. A project like Archizoom's *No Stop City:*



Collage, 1970

26 He made this an epigraph to Deleu (1990), an issue being entirely devoted to his work. Le Corbusier gave this drawing the ironic caption: "Every architect will make the house he wants, just imagine!"

27 See Tafuri & Dal Co (1976: 390).

> does not make a decisive break with what went before – the modern city – but extrapolates it, intensifies it, accelerates it. The Radicals bring future time closer ... and propose a rear vision that forces one to look at what exists so as to operate its critique. The 'project' work amounts to giving explicit form to an invisible reality: to invent or imagine the world that is already there (Rouillard, 1994: 432).

All that remains in *Plan Obus* by way of eloquence and relevance to the present time is due to the shift in viewpoint brought about by its radical moves. *The Unadapted City* is close to Italy's *architettura radicale* to the extent that it performs a savage extrapolation from phenomena detected in reality, but torn from their context and looked at from the new perspective of an autonomous project. *Vipcity* is just like *No Stop City*, potentially infinite and isotropic. Like *No Stop City*, it turns utopia upside down, replacing an imagined finality by the projection of an 'image'. It is the radicalized image of a devious present, slyly hiding beneath the bubbling of the everyday, seemingly waiting for this one occasion to loom up.[28]

28 For this idea of utopia being overturned, see Rouillard (1994: 432).

The last two monographs on Deleu's project seem aimed at reframing it in concrete terms. In *La ville inadaptée/Luc Deleu* (Theys, 2001), the project is presented against a background of site photographs, references to Le Corbusier's work and images of navigation. *Luc Deleu – Urbi et Orbi* (Deleu, 2002) contains about fifteen full-page photographs of Chandigarh today. It is clear that they must serve as imported context, illustrating the informal and apparently chaotic use of equipment and land. The pictures of the housing sectors connote the idea that the city comes to life through the interpretative adoption of its structures. But the exact role of the views of the Capitol, such as that of *La fosse de la considération* (the Trench of Consideration), is more enigmatic.

Chandigarh building market, Photo : Luc Deleu, © SABAM

Chandigarh, Capitol, the trench of consideration Photo : Luc Deleu - © SABAM

29 Apartment for Charles de Beistégui, Paris, 1930-31.

30 Le Corbusier (1970). In this text he refers to himself as "Père Corbu."

Tafuri associates the Capitol's "listening chambers" with the poetics of the "unappeased desires" evoked in the open-air room of Le Corbusier's Beistégui apartment on the Champs Elysées (Tafuri, 1985: 11).[29] In that "room surrounded by empty space" … "where one can see only fragments of the town's horizon", he sees "the last refuge, ruled by the silence and the wide"(11). It is a place "of programmed isolation" that "breaks with any ordinary accord"(11). This silence, which remains "mercilessly separated from the theoretical landscape to which he entrusts his own social messages"(11), will give way to the din of *Plan Obus*. But it is the same desire, here turned into unrestrained appetite, that strikes it with the seal of alienation. The unification promised by Modernism would remain unattainable. The breach opened by the antithesis of "perfect rest" and "frenzied celebration" is endorsed by the disenchantment modelled in the oxymoron of *Vipcity*.

As a project, *The Unadapted City* revisits architecture's recent history, recounting its memories of illusion and disappointment. It reflects on its condition, speculates on its task and destiny. It is in this sense that Le Corbusier's work serves as a mirror. But, already now, the features of the work merge with those of the author. The specular image seems to outline an ideal of ambition and perseverance; that of an intellectual activity that claims to act as a lever on society while at the same time jealously preserving its independence. However eminent the model may be, it is bound to be a mirage. If the poetics of isolation endeavour to reforge architecture from the inside, they also stand for abandonment. By envisioning architecture as introspection they are liable to detach it from this world. By digging into it in search of depth they threaten to leave it empty.

In his spiritual testimony, which betrays a large measure of bitterness, "Father Corbu"[30] reminds us in a profession of faith that "nothing is transmissible but

thought, nobility of the fruit of our labours" (Le Corbusier, 1970: 172). The poetics of isolation dazzle us with their corollary: they designate 'work' as one of the last places where the transmission of meaning can be understood as reciprocal:

> Life comes through men, or else men come through life. In this way all kinds of effects arise. Look at the surface of the water ... Look also at all the sky-blue filled with the good that man will have done ..., for in the end, it all comes back to the sea ... (Le Corbusier 1970: 168).

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Latecomers

Carl Douglas

Authorship and authority, originality and influence are genealogical concerns, arising in the relationship between a maker and his or her precursors. Genealogy is concerned with lineage. It maps relations through time, tracking propagation and inheritance, and establishing inter-generational debts.

How many accounts of poets, artists and architects are prefaced with an introduction which seeks to unveil sources, get the inside scoop on the various depths of plagiarism of which the maker is guilty, and draw out a tally of debts to be paid? These debts have often, in the past, been explained by the mechanism of influence. Influence is the extent to which one's work is attributable to another, can even be seen as belonging properly to that other. If one is influenced, he or she is no longer strictly an origin. The claim to originality and authorship breaks down if a work can be shown to originate in some precursor.

Agamben describes genius as "the personalization of that, within us, which surpasses and exceeds ourselves" (Agamben, 2006: 95). It is this condition of being exceeded within oneself that is considered here. This paper introduces two theorists of lateness in order to build a picture of the latecomer, one who follows on and risks being overshadowed or overwhelmed by those who have gone before, surpassed externally and exceeded internally.

Clearing Space

Harold Bloom, in his *Anxiety of Influence* (1973), develops a theory of poetry as essentially constituted in the relationship between a poet and that poet's predecessors. Strong poets, argues Bloom, "wrestle with their strong precursors," in order to "clear imaginative space" in which they can work (Bloom, 1973: 5). It is this, he contends, that defines a poet's strength.

The argument he builds seeks to "de-idealize" the notion of influence. Influence, historically, was an ethereal fluid flowing down from the stars and affecting a person's character and destiny.[1] As it is used today, it retains this sense of flow and ascendancy - someone is influenced more or less against his or her conscious will. Influence is not entered into so much as it is come under. Bloom sees this as an inadequate view of the relationship between poets, and proceeds to develop a more complex critical vocabulary for influence.[2] Influence is not to be taken as a smooth and inscrutable subconscious transfer of techniques or tropes, but as a fraught, sometimes painful, and above all, anxiety-inducing relationship: "What strong poet desires the realisation that he has failed to create himself?" (5).

1 OED, 'influence'

2 Bloom explains that a genealogical view of the relationship between the precursor and the latecomer predates the modern concept of in-fluence: "We remember how for so many centuries, from the sons of Homer to the sons of Ben Jonson, poetic influence had been described as a filial relationship, and then we see that poetic *influence*, rather than *sonship*, is another product of the Enlightenment, another aspect of the Cartesaian dualism" (Bloom 1973: 26).

In *The Anxiety of Influence* Bloom describes six 'revisionary movements' or 'revisionary ratios'.[3] These correspond to the various ways in which he perceives latecomer poets clearing space in which to work by deferring their precursors. For example, in the revisionary ratio, which Bloom calls *Clinamen*, the latecomer poet constructs a poem which makes the precursor appear to have missed in his or her aim. The precursor is taken to have been moving correctly up to a point; it is at this point that the later poet diverges, and in this swerving away, it is implied that the latecomer is correcting a failure on the part of the precursor. This 'act of creative correction' is a repression of the precursor.[4]

In the revisionary ratio *Daemonization*:

> "the later poet opens himself to what he believes to be a power in the parent-poem that does not belong to the parent proper, but to a range of being just beyond that precursor. He does this, in his poem, by so stationing its relation to the parent-poem as to generalise away the uniqueness of the earlier work" (15).

In one of Bloom's examples, William Collins attributes the power of Milton's poems to Fear, understood as an autonomous spiritual power. When Collins then proceeds to open up his work to this force, this *daemon*, he is able to claim a kind of ascendancy over Milton: "a daemonic vision in which the Great Original remains great but loses his originality, yielding it to the world of the numinous" (101). In this way, too, the precursor is repressed, and a space in which to work is made.

Bloom is careful to emphasise that influence is not a failure of genius, nor the ascendancy of genealogy: it is not a mark of poetic weakness, or a faltering of talent, nor the subsumption of the individual. On the contrary, the struggle to make space for oneself with respect to one's predecessors is a necessary part of one's constitution as a poet. The anxiety of influence or indebtedness arises from the process of self-appropriation.

Contending with the Precursor

Let us briefly consider, in Bloom's terms, the relationship between a specific latecomer architect and one of his significant precursors, in order to observe this kind of repression at work in an architectural rather than a poetic context. At the close of his essay "Architecture (1910)" (Loos, 1985: 104-109), in which he formulates his theory of the essential alienation of the modern architect, Adolf Loos offers the following stellar commendation of Schinkel:

> But every time the minor architects who use ornament move architecture away from its grand model, a great architect is at hand to guide them back to antiquity. Fischer von Erlach in the south, Schluter in the north, were justifiably the great masters of the eighteenth century. And at the threshold to the nineteenth century stood Schinkel. We have forgotten him. May the light of this towering figure shine upon our forthcoming generation of architects! (109).

3 In *Clinamen*, "A poet swerves away from his precursor … as a corrective movement in his own poem".

In *Tessera*, "A poet antithetically 'completes' his precursor, by so reading the parent-poem as to retain its terms but to mean them in another sense".

In *Kenosis*, "The later poet, apparently emptying himself of his own afflatus, his imaginative godhood, seems to humble himself while actually de-flating his precursor".

In *Daemonization*, "The later poet opens himself to what he believes to be a power in the parent poem that does not belong to the parent proper, but to a range of being just beyond that precursor".

In *Askesis*, the poet "yields up part of his own human and imaginative endowment, so as to separate himself from others, including the precursor".

In *Apophrades*, the poet opens his poem to the precursor widely, "and the uncanny effect … makes it seem to us … as though the later poet himself had written the precursor's characteristic work" (Bloom 1973: 14-16).

4 Bloom's theory of influence is heavily Freudian, particularly in its emphasis on repression and the family romance: "Freud's investigations of the mechanisms of defense and their ambivalent functionings provide the clearest ana-logues I have found for the revisionary ratios that govern intra-poetic relations" (Bloom 1973: 8).

Schinkel is commended as a guide, a kind of lighthouse pointing away from himself. Loos invokes him to shine forward onto the following generation, and praises Schinkel for indicating a return path, like von Erlach and Schluter, to the 'grand model' of Classical antiquity. Loos is deeply concerned to establish a lineage. He authorises his own production by demonstrating that it takes place within a specific genealogy. However, it is only in appearance that this appeal to genealogy is self-deprecating. Just a little earlier in "Architecture (1910)", prior to this monumental figuring of Schinkel as an illuminating tower, Loos remarks on the potency of the Classical, which appears as an autonomous cultural force:

> Our culture is based on the knowledge of the all-surpassing grandeur of classical antiquity. We have adopted the technique of thinking and feeling from the Romans. We have inherited our social conscience and the discipline of our souls from the Romans ... Ever since humanity sensed the greatness of classical antiquity, one common thought has unified all great architects. They think: the way I build is the same as the way the Romans would have built (108).

The true power of great architects, Loos implies, derives from the amorphous potency of Roman Classicism, the "one common thought" of European architecture. In this way, Loos, the latecomer, disarms Schinkel, his direct precursor (and perhaps the one with whom his entire career can be seen to be directly concerned), and places him safely on a pedestal to serve as a lamp for the inexperienced. According to Loos, Schinkel's greatness, his potency, lies precisely in the extent to which he channels the historical 'force' of classicism. Loos mythologizes a genealogy for Schinkel in such a way as to clear space to become an individual. In Loos' backhanded compliment, Schinkel's greatness is deferred, and identified as originating elsewhere. Bloom might identify this 'elsewhere' as the Classical *daemon*, and the kind of deferral taking place here an instance of *Daemonization*.

Prompted by Bloom, we might re-conceive this apparently harmonious relationship as a struggle in which Loos is attempting to clear a space to practice in. Loos emphasises a relationship of essence between himself and Schinkel, in which petty differences in detail of execution are unimportant. What matters, he insists, is the shared *daemon* rather than any particularities of style. To what extent is this a mis-representation of the relationship? Bloom says that latecomer poets proceed by 'misreading' their precursors. To what extent is Loos misreading Schinkel? Loos defers Schinkel; he puts him away and elevates him on a pedestal. If we squint sceptically for a moment at this deferral, we might see it appear as a significant repression of Schinkel's presence in Loos' work. Might it be possible to ask whether some of Loos' most personal moments are in fact the moments when he is someone else? Agamben suggests that genius is precisely such a chiastic moment, a moment when "this most intimate and personal of gods is also the most impersonal part of us" (Agamben, 2006: 95).

We might go on to ask whether the strength of Loos' work is in fact the invention of the very *daemon* he claims to be channelling. In favour of this possibility is that it is far from clear that the absence of ornament held the same significance for Schinkel as it did for Loos. It is more likely that, for Schinkel, the absence of ornament was a marker of rurality, even a kind of poverty, while for Loos it signified classical urbanity and civilisation.

In "Architecture (1910)", Loos aligns the purification of modern architecture with Classicism. He observes:

> It is no coincidence that the Romans were incapable of inventing a new column order, or a new ornament. For they had already progressed so far. They had taken all that knowledge from the Greeks and had adapted it to their needs. The Greeks were individualists. Every building had to have its own profile, its own ornamentation. But the Romans considered things socially. The Greeks squandered their inventiveness on the orders; the Romans wasted theirs on the plan. And he who can solve the great plan does not think of new mouldings (108).

Loos sees the Romans' disregard for ornament as an advancement over the Greeks. He argues that the time has come to move even closer to the Roman ideal. Not only should the production of new ornament be ceased by civilised people, but what ornament remains should be actively stripped off. Ornament may continue in the country, amongst the non-urbane - the farmer and the shoemaker are less civilised in Loos' terms, and taking ornamentation from them would amount to something like parental cruelty. The Romans' progressiveness is their urbanity, characterised by their disinterest in ornament. It is this force of Roman progressiveness that Schinkel is taken to be a herald for. The primary symptom of possession by this particular *daemon* is, according to Loos, the removal of ornament. For Loos, his shared ground with Schinkel is the act of stripping away decoration in the service of civility.

It is doubtful that Schinkel marks increased civility with reduced ornament. According to Schinkel's own account, he begins to design with geometric shapes, manipulates them as masses, and then articulates them according to the impression they are required to make.[5] Distinctions in formality and consequence are indicated by an increased consideration of ornament. His large, civil buildings, and especially his designs for the aristocracy, develop rich ornamental schemes: the figures standing around on the roof and above the portico of the Schauspielhaus; the colour, depth and detail of the Altes Museum's facade. The sparest of his buildings are those with rural or informal connotations: they are farm houses, pavilions, garden retreats for aristocrats seeking an alternative to their more formal houses. This collection of arcadian buildings does not warrant the additional social emphasis supplied by ornament.[6] Minimalism, in Schinkel, is more likely to be a state of deliberate underdevelopment; Loos alone elevated the removal of ornament to an historical principle.

On the other hand, there may be a very direct contact with his predecessor in Loos' most personal. His apparently idiosyncratic scheme for Lina Loos' bedroom, in which the interior is shaped by draping and spilling fabric and furs from the walls and the bed, can be seen as a version of Schinkel's tented guest bedroom for the Schloss Charlottenhof, in which the interior is draped with striped fabric which also forms a canopy for the bed. In each case, the interior connotes the exterior, the place of tents and bears. In the same way, the careful and characteristic niche arrangement used by Loos, could be seen to be a revision of Schinkel's niches, which similarly establish interior lines of sight towards the outside.[7] In fact, some typical elements of Loos' work, which we may be inclined to consider signatory marks - the things we look for in order to recognise Loos in his work - may be the points at which he is most closely Schinkel's disciple.

5 See "Karl Friedrich Schinkel" (2003).

6 This group of buildings includes the *Lusthaus*, the Neuer Pavilion at Schloss Charlottenburg, and the garden buildings of Schloss Gleinicke and Schloss Charlottenhof. The most direct comparison can be made between Schloss Gleinicke, and the informal Casino in its grounds.

7 These niches are analysed by Beatriz Colomina (1994: 233-281). The clearest comparison is between the niche in the Garden Room of the Neuer Pavilion, and the *Zimmer der Dame*, Moller House.

This inversion of the personal and impersonal, of the traces of the desired self and the ingested Other is the same as that found in Agamben's account of genius. Loos' production of himself as an individual, including the genealogy which he posits for himself, is an eluding of his precursor, an attempt to avoid acknowledging what is not simply a debt to Schinkel, but Schinkel's presence in Loos's identity.

The Domain of the Remainder

These considerations imply a spatiality which can be further developed by reference to another, earlier theorist of the latecomer.

Sir Thomas Browne (1605-1682), English doctor and man of letters, is no longer widely read, perhaps because of the dense style of his prose. His heavy use of historical, theological and Classical allusion can render him opaque to a modern reader. In *Hydriotaphia, or Urne-Burial* (1669), an antiquarian text regarding the discovery of a number of burial urns in Norfolk, his writing is ceaselessly referential and laden with irony, elaborate rhythms, and catachresis. Browne is concerned principally with the relationship between the material world (of bodies, matter and material productions), and the various registers of the immaterial (the imaginary, the spiritual, the conceptual). From considering how the human subject is constituted at this intersection arises a concern for the precision of the vague, the necessary relationship between uncertainty and vagueness.[8] Although 'lateness' (as a theme, an operating principle and a subject position) can be traced in other of Browne's writings, it is *Hydriotaphia* in which it is addressed explicitly.

In 1658, in a field in Old Walsingham in Norfolk, a cache of between forty and fifty burial urns was uncovered, a metre below the surface, in sandy soil. The urns typically contained about a kilogram of ashes, bone fragments and other miscellaneous materials.

Having described the urns and speculated at length about their origins,[9] Browne turns to a meditation on the lateness of the present. He writes: "Tis too late to be ambitious. The great mutations of the world are acted, or time may be too short for our designs" (Browne, 1669: 26). In the opening scene of the essay, we are just too late to witness the urns' interment:

> When the general pyre was out, and the last valediction over, men took a lasting adieu of their interred friends, little expecting the curiosity of future ages should comment upon their ashes; and having no old experience of the duration of their relicks, held no opinion of such after-considerations (i).

Having arrived too late to witness, the latecomer knows only echoes and impressions, after-images that fade away, and traces which require inference or interpretation. Too late to observe the scene ourselves, we must admit Browne as a witness.

The world is thus conceived as the domain of the remainder, where the contents of the world are left behind to be encountered by the latecomer. Primary amongst

Engraving of the Old Walsingham urns.

8 Perhaps because of his often strangely inconclusive tone and recondite subject matter, literary criticism of Browne has often talked as if he were primarily a stylist and that his subject matter is really only a premise for stylistic exercises.

"To the nineteenth century, the fifth chapter showed how Browne, fired with the nobility to which his subject was allied, could abandon his modest scholarly purpose and a pedestrian scholarly style to seize upon the poetic possibilities of mortality, transforming what had started out as an antiquary's report into a work of undeniable, if baffling, greatness. This view of Browne as an artist in spite of himself has been exorcised by modern criticism" (Nathanson, 1967: 12). Along with the argument that Browne is only a stylist, I discard the view that he does not present a theory. I contend that the consistency of his concepts is theoretical.

the characteristics of the remainder in *Hydriotaphia* is the tendency towards dispersal. Browne composes a litany of dispersing and degenerating materials: clay crumbles into the ground, silverwork turns into "small tinsel parcels", bones and ashes are found "half mortared unto the sand and sides of the urn" with grass roots "wreathed about", liquors have "incrassated into jellies", wood has transmuted into charcoal, thin brass plates are found melted amongst the bones, and the tiny iron pins found in some urns decayed rapidly, "exposed unto the piercing atoms of air, in the space of a few months, they begin to spot and betray their green entrails" (13). This concern with decay spills over from the urns into the rest of *Hydriotaphia*. Every material thing is in a state of gratuitous decomposition. Browne discusses mingling of the ashes of relatives, the practice of grinding up mummies for use as balm, the plundering of graves, the coagulation of fatty deposits in graves into a kind of soap, and the amount of ash into which a human body can be reduced, as well as the fading of gravestones and the collapse of monuments. In this way, Browne makes explicit the logic of death implicit in genealogy.

Associated with material failure is the problem of semantic failure. Signifiers are shown to repeatedly fail; inscriptions and engravings last no longer than the material on which they are engraved, "Gravestones tell truth scarce forty years" (26). With respect to those who have left nameless tombs and urns, Browne writes:

> "Had they made as good provision for their names, as they have for their relicks, they had not so grossly erred in the art of perpetuation. But to subsist in bones, and be but pyramidally extant is a fallacy in duration" (25).

Arbitrarily is subsistence in memory achieved: "Who can but pity the founder of the pyramids? Herostratus lives that burnt the temple of Diana, he is almost lost that built it. Time hath spared the epitaph of Adrian's horse, confounded that of himself" (26). Semantic subsistence cannot be assured by appealing to material permanence; significance does not survive the material failure of the signifier.

For Browne, the material world is a dense field of detritus consisting of items which have failed to signify, fragments of bodies and matter that have been left behind by precursors.

This world is a domain shared amongst latecomers, and between precursors and latecomers. However, the communal genealogical detritus is not shared because of its meaningfulness, but rather for its failure to retain meaning. Within this apparently pessimistic perspective, Browne retains a distinctly utopian streak. He writes:

> We have enough to do to make up ourselves from present and passed times, and the whole stage of things scarce serveth for our instruction. A complete piece of virtue must be made up from the Centos of all ages, as all the beauties of Greece could make but one handsome Venus (ii-iii).

The latecomer, alienated, displaced and threatened with dispersal, sets about constructing self and context. A 'cento' is a literary composition assembled from

9 *Hydriotaphia* is undoubtedly of importance in the history of archaeology, for his methodical description and thoughtful conjecture. At the time, speculation regarding British history prior to the Roman occupation was vague. The urns themselves are no longer extant, but an engraving of them (Figure 1) has been used to classify them as Anglo-Saxon rather than Roman, as Browne suggested.

scraps and quotes of other writers, deriving its name from the Latin word for a patchwork garment.[10] The temporal world is a place of partial values, and the present does not have a monopoly on virtue or beauty. Therefore, in the domain of the remainder, it is necessary to assemble a "complete piece of virtue" from wherever it may be found, past or present, in the manner of Zeuxis making a portrait of Hera by selecting and composing the best features of a number of women.

Browne's description of the latecomer's need to construct a place proper to him or herself in the domain of the remainder is directly analogous to Bloom's "clearing space", and so is Bloom's "self-appropriation" to Browne's "making up ourselves". Browne makes the failing material world the scene in which genealogical relationships are negotiated, and in which individuality must be attained through an act of resistance against the precursor.

In *Hydriotaphia*, with its dominant figure of the urn, this movement of individuation takes on an explicitly spatial sense. The urn represents at once the various framings or encasings of the human body, and the failure of bodies to cohere and signify. One of Browne's more curious pronouncements in *Hydriotaphia* is a description of bodies: "Circles and right lines limit and close all bodies, and the mortal right-lined circle [the character of death] must conclude and shut up all" (26). For Browne, what constitutes something as a body, is delimitation and closure; that is to say, a body must be an interior, demarcated by a line which separates it off from the outside. As Browne puts it, this delimitation and closure is a function of geometry.

Auctoritas

Browne may also be evoking deliberately the Vitruvian figure of man's body framed by circle and square.[11] In the Vitruvian figure of the body, centrally pinned and stretched, the body receives passively, or attains by strenuous effort the geometric closure necessary for constitution as a body. This figure was a demonstration of *ratio* – not simply a relationship, or a kind of proportionality, but a force of coherence. Indra Kagis McEwen writes in her analysis of Vitruvius: "Bodies were wholes whose wholeness as qualified matter was, above all, a question of coherence. The agent of coherence – in the body of the world and in all the bodies in it – was *ratio*" (McEwen, 2003: 55-56).

Ratio is closely associated with authorship via the concept of *auctoritas*. An *auctor* is one who increases, augments, or magnifies. According to J.J. Pollitt, an *auctor* "had the power to bring something into existence and/or ensure that its existence continued" (in McEwen, 2003: 34). Bringing something into existence is a matter of making it cohere. There could be no wholeness without coherence, and therefore no wholeness without *ratio.* An *auctor* supplied *ratio*. *Auctor* is the root of the word and idea 'author' and, similarly, *auctoritas* is the root of the word and idea 'authority'. Originally, according to McEwen, *auctoritas* was a kind of security offered by an *auctor* in underwriting some action for another party (e.g., a lawyer offered *auctoritas* as a service). McEwen argues that it was this kind of service Vitruvius provided to Caesar Augustus in his *De Architectura*, when he offered the Emperor his knowledge of how architecture established authority. In this light,

10 OED, 'cento'

11 Browne was familiar with Vitruvius, explicitly citing him elsewhere. However, Browne also appears to be referencing the Platonic symbol of two circles intersecting at right angles to form a three-dimensional hieroglyph, which appears from one angle as a cross and from another as the letter *theta*, symbol of *thanatos*, death. For Browne, death and architecture have this in common: they bring finality and limit. It would perhaps not be out of place to suggest that Browne considers architecture to be a deathly case.

Vitruvius wrote in order to position architecture as the privileged art of imperial *auctoritas*. An architectural *auctor* manipulated *ratio* in order to provide *auctoritas*.

Importantly, authority, *auctoritas*, simply did not exist without instantiation, without a coherent body to demonstrate it. Buildings, cohering as bodies through *ratio*, were authorities, rather than simply expressing or referring to *authority*. "Strictly speaking, public buildings did not 'represent' power any more than a dispatch 'represented' a victory" (McEwen, 2003: 36). In the same way that there was no victory without a dispatch announcing it, there was no power without physical interventions announcing it in the public sphere.

One such intervention was Augustus' Mausoleum, the largest and one of the first buildings he commissioned as the first Emperor of Rome (completed by 23BC). It consisted of a circular base, some 87m in diameter, on which earth was mounded as a hill and planted with trees. From among the trees rose a central drum, topped again with earth and foliage, and a statue of the Emperor, with a total height of about 44m. Faced in marble, it stood next to the Tiber in a configuration which included the *Ara Pacis* and the *Horologium Augustae*. Two obelisks outside, engraved with the *Res Gestae*, enumerated the Imperial accomplishments. The Mausoleum was a receptacle into which the family was collected, or from which they could be excluded. Emperors down to Nerva were included, but Augustus' daughter and granddaughter were excluded. The tomb served to authorise the family tree.

Prior to Augustus's Mausoleum, the Romans had very rarely constructed round tombs. The Emperor's undertaking, however, seems to have prompted a flurry of circular tomb-building. The Mausoleum served as a model for the new Empire's architecture – it was offered as a model, an architectural authority. Penelope Davies argues that Augustus' Mausoleum was deliberately multivalent, incorporating a broad scope of reference. In particular, she considers it to refer to the circular labyrinthine tomb of Alexander the Great, the Mausoleum of Halicarnassos, and the Pharos lighthouse, as well as Etruscan tumuli, Roman trophies, and Egyptian pyramids.[12] This multivalence seems to imply a condensing of historical and cosmic significance in the person of the Emperor. The Mausoleum incorporates its references in the truest sense of the word 'incorporate'. It draws them together into a coherent body. In Vitruvian terms, the tomb is made coherent by *ratio*, and is therefore an instance of *auctoritas*.

Among the circular constructions which took Augustus' Mausoleum as a model, the most significant is perhaps the Mausoleum of Emperor Hadrian, (completed 139AD). Like its model, Hadrian's Mausoleum rises as a drum above the Tiber. The square base is 85m on a side and the drum, mostly concrete and surmounted by a gigantic statue of Hadrian riding in a chariot, rose to over 50m. A bridge, the *Pons Aelius*, approaches the tomb from across the river. This revision of Augustus' Mausoleum shows the importance for Imperial Roman architecture of magnificence, which entails in particular the practice of out-doing what has gone before.[13]

The new Mausoleum would have been quite clearly understood as a public statement of Hadrian's belonging in the Imperial line (perhaps particularly important for one adopted into the Antonine succession). By closely following Augustus' model,

12 See Davies, *Death and the Emperor* (2000).

13 "*Auctoritas* in buildings is a concomitant, variously, of increased spending, of greater richness of materials, of grander spaces, of heightened contrast in the light and shadow of a peristyle, of bigger columns and more of them" (McEwen, 2003: 37-38).



Current state of Augustus' Mausoleum and reconstructions after Gatti and Cordingley/Richmond.

Hadrian demonstrates that he is well-founded. In adopting Augustus as a precursor, Hadrian publicly confirmed the greatness of the present with relation to the past by outdoing him, while also authorising himself by reinforcing the connection.

Conflict between Hadrian (as a latecomer) and Augustus (as his precursor) can perhaps also be traced in their different uses of circularity. While the Mausoleum is nearly Augustus' only circular building, Hadrian was responsible for a great many others. His most famous circular construction is of course the Pantheon, whose importance in architectural history belies how little is understood about its significance. Hadrian's Villa at Tivoli is also home to a large number of circular spaces: the famous Island Enclosure, sunken and moated; the Circular Hall, a massive internal drum; a number of semi-circular triclinea; the Inverse-Curved Hall, which was to prove influential for the Baroque sense of formal plasticity; and the Park Rotunda, a curious domed structure in the grounds of the Villa.

14 It is noteworthy that, if Hadrian and Augustus are architects, they may be so in a different sense to Loos and Schinkel. However, what is of primary importance here is that in both cases a genealogical conflict is played out in an architectural scene. Into the chronological distance between these two exemplary relationships (Loos/Schinkel and Hadrian/Augustus) should be read a desire to test the range of applicability of a conception of lateness, rather than an assertion of its universality.



Hadrian's Mausoleum with Baroque additions removed, and reconstruction after Eisner

Apart from the triclinea, uses for these spaces remain highly uncertain. It has been variously suggested, for example, that the Park Rotunda was a tomb for Hadrian's dead lover, a cool store, or a proof-of-concept for the Pantheon itself. What is most noticeable is that there is not a single conceptual picture which can make sense of these spaces. It is as if it is a formal game over which Hadrian presides.

If Hadrian's circular spaces seem gratuitous, this could be passed off as a changing Roman taste in favour of formal pluralism, but I believe this misses the point. Hadrian's use of circular form is the absolute antithesis of Augustus'. Where Augustus uses it as a receptacle in which to gather significance, Hadrian disperses its significance almost completely. Hadrian unpicks the *ratio* of Augustus' Mausoleum, and this should be understood as a strategic weakening of the precursor. Hadrian fragments the consistency of Augustus' architectural body in order to constitute his own, in order to succeed Augustus, not simply follow him in time.[14]

Return

To whom is architecture properly attributable? To whom can it be returned or restored?

Traditionally, architectural history and criticism has sought to return architecture to the architect as its individual origin. The very notion of an individual - one who cannot be divided or internally separated – almost precludes being 'under the influence'. Influence is an inflowing; to be a descendant, follower, or disciple, is not merely to be overshadowed by a precursor, but to be laid open to, and potentially flooded by, that precursor.

Bloom's insight with respect to poetic influence is that this laying-open does not escape the latecomer's attention. On the contrary, it is a source of anxiety: that one's work is not one's own, that one is too late to be original, that in coming after the precursor one is doomed to be influenced. To become an origin, to make without precedent, it is necessary not to be influenced, not to be a mere descendant, follower, or disciple. The precursors, the poetic parents, must be set to one side. Bloom's thesis is that this setting-aside occurs both in, and by means of, poetic construction.

Bloom's theory of influence is pertinent to architectural construction. Architecture, too, can be the scene and means of setting aside precursors (warding them off, evading them, escaping them). Rather than thinking of architecture simply as constructive or productive, architecture can be imagined as a wrestling with a precursor, a setting-aside of one's architectural parents. In this antagonism, architecture itself is not a side-effect. On the contrary, architectural acts themselves are the offensive and defensive movements of individuation. Two specific instances of are Loos' deferential disenfranchising of Schinkel, and Hadrian's dilution of Augustus.

Ideas of lateness, failure, and the exhaustion of the present also emerge in a reading of Browne. Bloom and Browne present parallel conceptions of the world as the domain of the remainder, the state of struggle with respect to this inheritance, and

the motivating anxiety which accompanies lateness. For Browne, the anxiety of inheritance is closely associated with the anxiety of material failure (dispersal and degeneration). The two anxieties are so tightly bonded, or entangled, that it is difficult to tell them apart, to ascertain whether one is an allegory of the other.

In order to open the full register of architecture, it is necessary to dispose of uncritical presumptions about the relation between an architect and his or her precursors. There is a need for a more antagonistic reading of architectural genealogy, which recognises identities rather than individuals, identities which are not contained within individuals but which pass through them and provide a ground against which the individual is resolved.

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Current state of Augustus's Mausoleum and reconstructions after Gatti and Cordingley/ Richmond. (Carl Douglas)

Hadrian's Mausoleum with Baroque additions removed, and reconstruction after Eisner. (Carl Douglas)

Constructing the Architect
of the Italian Renaissance

Desley Luscombe

Many Renaissance treatises on architecture included an allegorical frontispiece that portrayed both the discipline and the purveyor of architecture as having attributes that were social, ethical and moral in purpose. While Alberti in his *De re aedificatoria* reinforced the importance of *virtus* for citizenry, these illustrations join the concept of *virtus* with that of *disegno* in the architect's attributes.[1] Allegorical frontispieces took an understanding of the architect beyond the role of designer of buildings. As a model citizen with responsibility for the visual representations of a governed society, he was represented as capable of forming architectural space and imagery, designed and organised by a programme of *invenzione* that inscribed political intent able to be read in the context of the court.[2] Biographical texts, written in the same period, emulated the representation of the architect in the allegorical illustrations and presented, through the adoption of key terms, an explanation of individual genius. This paper examines the participation of architectural treatises in establishing the ethical and moral values that were instrumental in figuring the architect as a professional ideal, an ideal, which in turn informed understandings of genius, or in the Latin, *ingenium*, in individuals.

The re-emergence, during the Italian Renaissance, of the term 'architect' from antiquity (Latin *architector* or Italian *architetto*) influenced interpretations of the architect's function.[3] These interpretations were also influenced by the increasingly popular illustrated printed books that, in their frontispieces, gave a visible explanation of the architect's role in social governance. Such visualisations depended on the development of meaning through the narrative structure of allegory. Allegorical meanings developed both independently, in each component of the illustration, and in the combination of signifiers and compositional clues, to contribute to its narrative of meaning (cf. Martin, 1994: 320-365). To examine characteristics of sixteenth century concepts of the architect, this paper focuses on two frontispieces. The first is from Cosimo Bartoli's translation of Leon Battista Alberti's *De re aedificatoria* (1550 and 1989),[4] and the second is from Daniele Barbaro's commentary and translation of Vitruvius' *De architectura* (1556, 1567 and 1997).[5]

What brings these two texts together is that both translators, rather than being architects, were part of the structures of political governance in their cities. Of particular interest in this context are the social virtues attributed to *disegno* in the figure of the architect which, significantly, cross from notions of ideal type to reflections of individual worth. Hence, they announce an interconnection between architecture and the social that is located in the origin of modern formations of the architectural.

To examine characteristics of individual worth or *ingenium*, two of the lives from Giorgio Vasari's *Le vite de' più eccellenti pittori, scultori e architettori* (first printed

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1 See Glossary (Alberti 1988).

2 *Invenzione* were narratives explaining how specific allegorical figures and symbols developed political meaning and could be judged as relevant to their locale and purpose.

3 For a history of the re-emergence of the term "architect", see Pevsner (1942: 549-562), Hollingsworth (1984), Vagnetti (1980).

4 This edition held the title *L'architettura di Leonbattista Alberti, tradotta in lingua fiorentina da Cosimo Bartoli, Gentilhuomo, & Academico Fiorentino.*

5 This edition was titled *I deci libri dell'architettura di M. Vitruvio tradutti et commentati da monsignor Barbaro eletto Patriarca d'Aquileggia*, printed in the volgare during 1556.

in 1550 by the Florentine printer Lorenzo Torrentino, and then in 1568 by the Giunti printing house) will serve as points of reference. A study of the social virtues, developed in association with frontispieces, will show how these same virtues were considered in the individual. Such correlations would indicate that individual architects were represented as *exemplars* of citizenry – examples of the idealised or model citizen – within a notion of the social that was ordered and structured for political purposes.[6]

The attributes of disegno as having the virtues of Minerva and Flora for Cosimo Bartoli and Giorgio Vasari's "Architect".

The frontispiece of Bartoli's translation *L'architettura* was designed by Vasari to an *invenzione* by Bartoli.[7] Bartoli and Vasari were members of the socio-politically distinctive Florentine court of Cosimo I de'Medici (1519-1574). Bartoli's *invenzione*, reinforced through Vasari's design for the frontispiece, brings together the components of an idealised understanding of the architect contextualised by the Florentine court life of Cosimo I de'Medici (Bartoli, 1567: fol. 22-26r).[8] In order to delimit the argument, the focus will be on the figures of *Minerva* and *Flora*, the prominent allegorical figures of the frontispiece.[9] The reasons why specific virtues were assigned to the architect, and why his capacity of *disegno* was emphasized, can be gleaned from the illustrations' narratives and their combination of particular elements.



Vasari's original sketch

6 By social I do not mean society as an aggregate of people. Rather the concept includes all forms of social interchange and the boundaries that distinguish the organization of these interchanges.

7 Vasari's original drawing is found at the Uffizi, Gabinetto Disegni e Stampe (V, 47a).

8 Charles Davis has recognised that Bartoli wrote an explanation of the *invenzione* of the frontispiece in *Ragionamenti accademici* Davis (1980: 127-99). Although, the dating of the Ragionamenti is 1567, Bryce suggests that it was during the early 1550s that Bartoli recast the Dante lectures he had given during the 1540s and which were later printed as the *Ragionamenti* Bryce (1983: 71).

9 For a full analysis of the frontispiece see Luscombe (2004).

10 Gli antichi finsono che nascesse puramente dal cervello di Giove, senza essersi egli congiunto, ò con Iunone ò con altro: & la intesono per la virtu intellettiva volendo mostrare, che dal Profondo segreto della sapienzia di Dio, nascesse ogni sapienza, & ogni intelletto puro, & separato da ogni terrena feccia, ò spurcizia, dentro a gli animi de gli huomini.

In Bartoli's *invenzione*, *Minerva*, the personification on the left of the aedicule, is described as the *Wisdom* of pure intellect. Bartoli explains:

> the Ancients supposed that she was born purely from the brain of Jove, without having copulated, either with Juno or with another; and they intended her for intellectual virtue wanting to demonstrate that from the deep secret of God's wisdom, is born all wisdom, and each pure intellect, and separated from every earthly dreg, or filth, in the souls of men (Bartoli, 1567: fol. 23^{v}).[10]

However, Bartoli also had the figure portraying the characteristics of *Prudenza*, the practical intellect of *disegno*, through her military attire and her attributes of physical valour. The concept of *disegno* encapsulated the capacity to represent the city, in all its forms, as a corporeal representation of governance corresponding to a metaphysical ideal. For Bartoli, the notion that art and architecture coexisted in two worlds, the divine and the corporeal, paralleled the notion that architectural creativity, although reflecting Divine creativity, derived from the architect's power to transform the *idea*, through *disegno*, into the social space of architecture. The architect's productivity was a physical enactment of the transference of beauty from an abstract principle to matter. For Bartoli, *Minerva's* attributes were essential in defining architecture as a higher order of intellectual activity related to civic governance.

Giorgio Vasari and Cosimo Bartoli, Fontispiece

Bartoli continues his *invenzione* to describe and explain the personification of *Flora*, placed opposite *Minerva*. It is through *Flora* that the physical making of architecture is placed in dialogue with the virtues of intellectual capacity. Like *Minerva*, Bartoli imbues *Flora* with attributes of physical valour and action. But he also brings her into play to symbolise the city of Florence (Bartoli, 1567: fol. 24)[v] and to invoke her metaphysical *persona Primavera*. This is consistent with more traditional interpretations of *Flora*, where *Primavera* combines the physical attributes of spring's regeneration and the blossoming of flowers, as in the famous Sandro Botticelli painting *Primavera* (c. 1482). Even though painted approximately seventy years prior to the frontispiece, the painting's symbolism would have been well known to Bartoli and Vasari as it was housed in the Medici collection in Florence.[11]

In the frontispiece, *Flora* has all the sensual attributes of worldly experience in the craft of making, whereas *Minerva* represents the Wisdom of the intellect that is distinct from, but still guided by, phenomenal experiences. Sensual and intellectual attributes are articulated in the image of the aedicule framing the personifications. In combination, *Flora* and *Minerva* describe the architect's capacity for *disegno*, bringing together concepts defining architecture as real form and as *idea*, and rendering his art invaluable to political governance of the city.[12] *Disegno*, through drawing organised by geometry and proportion, transposed an image of ideal things into the real world – as architectural shapes. In a similar manner, through the combination of *Minerva* and *Flora*, Bartoli recognised the necessity for the intellect to be able to understand the sensible for what it is, in its state of transformation of an *idea*, while being located in the political structures of the city. Bartoli's vision is that these concepts are made useful to their specific social setting through the architect's understanding of purpose: his civic role.

Piero de'Medici's (1416-1469) *imprese* of the falcon and ring is placed below *Minerva*. Piero was the last direct heir of Cosimo de'Medici (1389-1464), the *Pater Patriae* of the lineage who was politically without blemish. Cosimo I de'Medici was related to Piero through his mother, and Piero's *imprese* provided a legitimacy that Cosimo needed to assert in claiming the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany. Cosimo I's own *imprese* of the tortoise and sail is placed below *Flora* in a position reinforcing his importance. These two arms of the Medici lineage culminate in the figure of *Immortalità* sitting in the pediment of the aedicule, holding the double-forked laurel, *imprese* of Cosimo I de'Medici, signifying the bringing together of the two strands of the family's genealogy. Furthermore, *Immortalità* forms an axis with the image of the river-god Arno below, surrounded by the many achievements in Florentine arts, framed symbolically by the aedicule signifying its architectural achievements. By depicting *Minerva* and *Flora* in this context, illustrating the power of the architect to enact politically relevant *disegno* for the Medici court, the frontispiece locates the architect as central to the requirement to form tangible representations of social governance in the city. The frontispiece to this 1550 edition of Alberti's text locates an affirmation of the role of the architect to represent, specifically for Florentine society, the important aspects of court culture and its hierarchy of power.

11 Wind's interpretation of Botticelli's image suggests that in the painting *Primavera* is in the act of transforming from one state of being to another. In Botticelli's painting, she is depicted fleeing *Chastity* (*Chloris*) and changing into *Beauty* (*Flora*) by the impact of *Passion* in the character of Zephyr, Wind (1958: 105).

12 For his explanation of idea see Panofsky (c1968). See also Summers analysis of *disegno* in sixteenth-century Florence which calls attention to the attitudes of Federico Zuccaro who formulated the importance of this concept for architecture (1987: 298ff).

The attributes of disegno as the embodiment of practical intellectual habit in Daniele Barbaro and Andrea Palladio's "Architect"

Andrea Palladio's design for Daniele Barbaro's frontispiece to *I deci libri dell'architettura di M. Vitruvio* used a triumphal arch to locate allegorical personifications and the title of the book. The *invenzione* for the design probably derives from Barbaro's *proemio* or foreword to the text. Building on the interpretation of the virtues associated with *disegno* in Bartoli and Vasari's 1550 frontispiece, my focus on Barbaro and Palladio's frontispiece will be on the two personifications in the niche of the triumphal arch.

When the figures are seen in relation to Barbaro's *proemio*, the qualities of *Scienza* described in the text become evident in the personification with attributes of *Temperànza*, in the left niche. The qualities of *Intelletto* can be seen in the figure on the right that includes attributes of *Prudenza*.[13] This separation of virtues is distinctive when compared to those found in Bartoli's frontispiece, as the personifications articulate a more rigorously consistent division of attributes. Of the other five personifications of the Barbaro frontispiece, the four across the attic level of the arch represent the *quadrivium* of the arts: *Geometria*, *Musica*, *Astrologia* and *Aritmetica*. The central figure is a representation of the virtue of rational wisdom in the figure of *Sapiènza*.[14]

3 In past interpretations of the frontispiece, the figure in the left niche has been attributed the name of either *Theory* or *Astrology*. The figure on the right has been interpreted as *Practice, Experientia* or *Prudenza*, Frascari (1988: 15-27), Angelini (1999), and Miotto (1999: 233-243).

14 I disagree with Miotto's interpretation of these as 'Rhetoric,' 'Music,' 'Arithmetic,' and 'Geometry.' See Luscombe (2004).

Frontispice, Andrea Palladio and Daniele Barbaro, I deci libri dell' architectura di M. Vitruvio tradutti et commentati da monsignor Barbaro eletto Patriarca d'Aquileggia, *Venezia: Marcolini, 1556, Montreal, Centre Canadien d'Architecture/ Canadian Centre for Architecture*

15 La prima e nominata Scienza, che habito è di conclusione per vera & necessaria prova.

In his *proemio* to the first book of Vitruvius, Barbaro introduced the term *habitus* to explain the workings of the intellect. The term *habitus* has an Aristotelian source and refers to the actions emanating "from an acquired perfect state or condition" (Calabi and Morachiello, 1987: 231). Barbaro followed Benedetto Varchi's *Due lezzioni* for his use of the term and separated habits stemming from "necessary truth ... composed of the proof of the thing proven", from those emanating from "contingent truth" that are dependent on will. Both writers place art within the category of contingent truth (Barbaro, 1556: 6; 1567: 2-3). Varchi had correlated the human soul with a notion of Reason, which was then divided into distinctive categories of particular reason and universal reason. Within his understanding of universal reason, he separated inferior reason from superior reason – associating the habit of science with superior reason and the habit of art with inferior reason, because art culminated in making whereas science was culmination in knowledge. Art was thus the lowest habit of human reason (cf. Summers, 1987: 276ff; Mendelsohn, 1982: 6-9). Nevertheless, Barbaro suggested a link between *Architettura* and "necessary truth" related to higher categories of reason, due to its reliance on *Geometria*, *Aritmetica* and the other sciences of the *quadrivium*. Further, Barbaro argued that *Architettura* was synonymous with rhetoric, a higher habit of Reason (Barbaro in Vitruvius, 1567: 36).

The personifications of *Scienza* and *Intelletto* were developed by Barbaro to make Vitruvius' Roman first-century BCE text relevant to sixteenth-century Italian contexts and concerns with intellect and reason. *Scienza*, on the left, incorporates attributes of *Temperànza* and is represented as a gaunt old woman clothed in full robes with her head covered. *Scienza* is looking upward and raises opened compasses high in her left hand. This directional orientation suggests an association with the *quadrivium* on the attic level. Vincenzo Fontana claims that in an earlier manuscript, *Libro detto delle quattro porte*, Barbaro had suggested that *Aritmetica*, *Musica*, *Geometria* and *Astrologia* as the *quadrivium* constituted the four doorways to knowledge (Fontana, 1985: 39-72). The *quadrivium* was, indeed, fundamental to divisions of knowledge in *Architettura*. For Barbaro, as for Varchi, *Scienza* was associated with "necessary truth" and the rational logic of proof in its subject, as distinct from the contingencies of phenomena. Barbaro notes in his *proemio* that *Scienza* "is a conclusion acquired through true and necessary proof" (in Vitruvius, 1556: 6).[15] *Scienza* provides Barbaro with a link between Architecture and "necessary truth" through her gaze toward *Geometria* and *Aritmetica*.

Temperànza's association with the figure of *Scienza*, as a virtue of the architect, suggested a need to possess objective rationality in order to restrain acts of personal licence. The set of compasses *Scienza* is holding symbolise the architect's comprehension, through their use, of the principles of geometry and mathematics, which enable him to form judgments about his art. In this context, *Temperànza* warns the architect that he should not presume that all of his discoveries will necessarily reflect philosophic principles related to the rational logic of proofs. Consistent with Alberti, Barbaro believed that the architect should lead an active political life and work for the benefit of the whole of society. For Barbaro, the architect's *Temperànza* is an attribute that allows him to recognise principles. Through *disegno*, it leads to an appreciation that architecture reflects principle and *idea*. Rational wisdom, in this case, is associated with practical reasoning. Truth, for the architect, is about making distinct, through his combination of *Intelletto* with *Prudenza*, ideas of practical reasoning.

The figure in the right hand niche is *Intelletto*. In his *proemio* Barbaro noted that *Intelletto*, while also about principles and proofs, "retains the name of the power of the soul where it is found" (in Vitruvius, 1556: 6).[16] *Intelletto* is portrayed as a fully clothed young woman looking downward, with the back of her head forming a second face, that of an old man.[17] Her youthful face gazes into an armillary sphere she holds, whereas the face of the old man gazes toward the edge of the frontispiece. This Janus like configuration goes back to older representations of *Prudenza* whose youthful face, traditionally often portrayed as looking into a mirror, symbolised self-knowledge and virtue, while her old face represented the wisdom gained through historical distance. The mirror is replaced in Barbaro and Palladio's representation of *Intelletto* by a *speculum nature* (mirror of nature) in an armillary sphere. This suggests that in Barbaro's conceptualisation of the architect, *Intelletto* inferred the self-knowledge of *Natura* and principles of natural cause.[18] Annarita Angelini suggests that the motif of the downward and upward gazes of *Intelletto's* faces and its source in *Prudenza* give each figure the double meaning of universal theory and earth bound action (Angelini, 1999: 18ff; see also Miotto, 1999: 233-243). Characterised in this way, *Intelletto* reflects the two-fold ability of the architect to build buildings and to conceptualise natural philosophy through his practices.[19] For Barbaro, *Intelletto* calls attention to the differences between, as well as interrelatedness of, causes or first principles in the context of their operational use, through the architect's capacity for *disegno*, in the service of men.[20] Unlike in Bartoli's frontispiece, where *Flora's* attributes illustrate the transformation of the idea through the act of making and the architect's *disegno*, Barbaro reinforces *disegno* by associating it with the self-knowledge and principles of *Natura*. Thus, by placing *Scienza* opposite *Intelletto* to emphasize the primary role of the concept of *disegno* for the architect, Barbaro combines the requirement of rational principles and those of social good in the practices of the architect.

The classical framing of the frontispiece to Barbaro's translation and commentary with a triumphal arch setting is unmistakably based on an earlier sketch by Palladio for his competition entry for the Rialto Bridge project of 1554.[21] The illustration's technique, with its orthographic projection, reflects Barbaro's conception of *Architettura* as the highest of the arts. It depicts the power of the architect's capacity for *disegno* as it moves from *idea* to real form in its measurable precision and accurate portrayal of geometric proportion. Barbaro's allusion to the importance of the orthographic projection to disegno is further reinforced by the figure of *Sapienza*, or rational wisdom. She holds a measuring rod, pointing at the appreciable accuracy of a drawing of the triumphal arch. The manifestation of *Sapienza* in *Architettura* conferred to the architect the virtue of judgment, informed by intellectual wisdom and knowledge, alongside the agility of *Scienza* and *Intelletto.*

In defining the architect's attributes as a social figure in the context of sixteenth century thinking, Cosimo Bartoli and Daniele Barbaro elaborated the architect's intellect as ideal action, in the formulation of propositions for real form. Both writers saw the ideal architect as actively engaged in political life, working for the good of society. Through a capacity for *disegno* and the ability to make – structuring building campaigns to create social space through architecture – the architect was idealised as a type. When we compare the characteristics of the ideal 'architect' emerging in these representations with those in biographical texts, it

16 La seconda è detta Intelletto, che è habito de i principij, & delle prove, & ritiene il nome della potenza dell'anima, della quale egli si truova … .

17 Both Frascari (1988) and Miotto (1999) have considered the figure as 'Prudence' because of her two faces.

18 Cf. Frascari (1988: 22) suggestion of a possible source being the tarot card set by Andrea Mantegna where his representation of *Prudencia* holds a *speculum* showing her reflection.

19 For discussion of the Aristotelian interpretation of *Prudenza* and *Intelletto*, Summers (1987: 273ff).

20 Barbaro in Vitruvius (1556: 6). La seconda è detta Intelletto, che è habito de i principij, & delle prove, & ritiene il nome della potenza dell'anima, della quale egli si truova: la onde è nominato, Intelletto.

21 See Burns (1973), Gioseffi (1973) and Calabi (1987) for their discussion of the competition entry.



Andrea Palladio, Rialto Bridge PRoject, Ink drawing, Museo Civico, Vicenca

will become apparent that attributes referring to social functions in the former are used in the latter to signify individual worth. As a result, some individual architects were conceived, distinct from their artistic practices, as model citizens, within a conception of a society ordered and structured for political purpose.

22 Vasari's involvement with the establishment of the *Academic del Disegno*, and his discussion of *disegno* in his technical preface provide a context for his advocacy of the central role of the architect. See discussion Rubin (1995: 234ff.).

The attributes of genius (ingenium) in Vasari's *Vite*.

Vasari's *Le vite de' più eccellenti pittori, scultori e architettori* established the value of individual architects' works based on a correspondence with the virtues of the idealised architect.[22] Rather than relying on the structure of allegorical divisions found in the frontispieces, Vasari explained through individual examples how virtuous acts, or the culmination of virtues in the individual, could determine beauty in art and achieve in real form what he called divine or natural perfection. In examining the attributes of *Minerva* as rational wisdom and *Scienza* informed by *Temperànza* for their similarity to descriptions in Vasari's writing, I will focus on his account of the lives of Michelangelo and Brunelleschi.

In a similar manner to Bartoli and Barbaro, an essential component of Vasari's concept of the architect's worth is his belief that architecture develops in the intellect as a mediated transference of *idea* to real form. Consistent with the concept of *disegno* in the frontispieces, Vasari distinguished architecture from the manual skills

gained through the experience of repetitive manual practices, to characterize it as a higher form of knowledge. Like Bartoli, Vasari saw the architect's intellect aligned with rational wisdom (*Minerva*) informed by *Prudenza*. Barbaro's more Aristotelian understanding of the architect had presented *Scienza* as an attribute distinct from practical intellect (*Intelletto* informed by *Prudenza*), whereas Bartoli and Vasari both suggested that it is the practical intellect of the architect that is his highest virtue. For Bartoli, Vasari, and Barbaro, *Prudenza* was an intellectual habit that emanated from a pre-disposed moral virtue in the good citizen, resulting in an individual architect's ability to realise "natural philosophy in practice" (Summers, 1987: 275). However, it was only Barbaro who valued *Scienza* as qualifying a distinct form of an architect's intellectual practice, his comprehension of the power of principle.

Vasari continuously made references to Michelangelo's honour and moral prudence. To establish consistency between the notions of individual and idealised Architect, he employed Michelangelo's appeal that the architect should have his compasses in his eyes, a metaphor for grasping Divine order through the intellect.[23] In a statement that resembles Cosimo Bartoli's *invenzione*, Vasari wrote about Michelangelo:

> It is known that when he wanted to extract *Minerva* from the head of *Jove* it was necessary for him to use Vulcan's hammer ... he said that it was necessary to hold one's intruments in the eye and not in the hand because it is the hands that work but the eye that judges: and this is the method he used in architecture as well (Vasari, 1996: 773-774; 1568: 109).[24]

This connection between the mind and the eye are the requirements of *disegno* in Bartoli's notion of the architect. Vasari constructs Michelangelo as the genius architect who is able to be the living incarnation of the *idea* of *Minerva*.

Continuing, Vasari reinforces a notion in Bartoli and Barbaro's concept of the architect, namely, that genius cannot simply reside in an act of contemplation and study but that, for the architect, it requires an active and informed engagement with the decorum expected of public figures, through *Prudenza* and *Temperànza*. Reinforcing Barbaro's association between *Scienza* and *Temperànza*, Vasari writes about Michelangelo's individual mannerisms, "He greatly loved human beauty for the sake of imitation in art ... for without this imitation no perfect work can be done; but not with lascivious and disgraceful thoughts as he proved by his way of life, which was very frugal" (Vasari, 1996: 739; 1568: 112).[25] Here, Vasari associates notions of "necessary truth", a quality of *Scienza* found in the idealised architect through "imitation", with *Temperànza* in individual architects.

Vasari conflated, as did Bartoli, the distinct notions of rational intellect (*Scienza*) and practical intellect (*Intelletto*). Separating them from the notion of making, he was able to argue that specific experiences in practice and life had lead to the development of *ingegno* in the architect. Mirroring the concept of *disegno* in art, this transformation of character through experience for Vasari turned into a measure of recognising worth in architecture, as well as in an individual architect's character; an emblem in the architect's life as well as in his work.

23 Clements (1961: 31) has discovered four texts testifying that Michelangelo's saying had a meaning commonly understood in Florence.

24 Vasari (1996: 773-774; 1568: 109)…si conosce, che quando e` voleva cavar Minerva dalla testa di Giove, ci bisognava il Martello di Vulcano: imperò egli usò le sue figure e farle di 9 & di 10 & di 12 teste, non cercando altro che col metterle tutte insieme ci fussi una certa concordanza di gratia nel tutto, che non lo fa naturale, dicendo che bisoganava avere le seste negli occhi, & non in mano, perche le mani operano, et l'occhio giudica: che tale modo tenne ancora nell'architettura.

25 Vasari (1996: 739; 1568: 112) Amò grandemente le bellezze umane per la imitazione dell'arte, per potere scierre il bello dal bello, ché senza questa imitazione non si può far cosa perfetta: ma non in pensieri lascivi e disonesti, che l'ha mostro nel modo del viver suo, che è stato parchissimo.

In his account of the life of Brunelleschi, for example, Vasari argued that, even though Brunelleschi was not a man of letters, he was able to achieve greatness because of his ability for mathematics, together with a great deal of practice and experience. However, Vasari then continued that it was only after Brunelleschi became a man of letters that he was able to create a building which, "in its very artifice, you cannot imagine more beautiful, nor more magnificent Architecture" (1996: 354; 1568: 187).[26] Vasari's use of a transformation in Brunelleschi's development as an architect to promote recognition of the value of his work parallels Bartoli's understanding of *Flora's* attributes.

26 Vasari (1996: 354; 1568: 187) In tanto artifizioso, che non si può imaginar piu bella, ne piu magnifica Architettura.

These virtues were not only used to define the architect as a model citizen with responsibility for the visual representations of a governed society. They were also used to assert an understanding of individual genius, which indicates a desire to consolidate diverging perceptions of social order within the city's representation as a governed society. Each occasion used to display the good citizenry of individual architects, through recognition of moral and ethical virtues in their practices, served to reinforce the formation of a collective abstract and ideal type that could transform into the notion of a profession.

Later transformations of this idealised type of social figure into the notion of a profession could be easily achieved. Thus, the moral and ethical virtues used to idealise the figure of the architect, distinctively understood in Italy as a profession, came to be synonymous with descriptions of the individuals taking part in this profession's practices. In this context, Vasari's claims for determining genius and worth amongst specific architects not only set them apart from the mass of citizens but raised their status as *exempla* for good citizenry.

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Signature Effects:
John Soane and The Mark of Genius

Helene Furján

> But let the sacred Genius of the night
> Such mystic visions send, as Spenser saw,
> When thro' bewildering Fancy's magic maze,
> To the bright regions of the fairy world
> Soar'd his creative mind.
>
> Thomas Warton, *The Pleasures of Melancholy* (1747)

> We have now conducted the reader, step by step, through the apartments on these two floors, appropriated to the reception of works of art, and may safely assert that no where within a similar extent does there exist such a succession of varied and beautiful scenery, so many striking points of view, so many fascinating combinations and contrasts — so much originality, invention, contrivance, convenience, and taste.
>
> John Britton, *The Union of Architecture, Sculpture and Painting* (1827)

Today, the question of 'genius', in architectural discourse, is, perhaps, associated more with the sciences, with what John Maeda has referred to as "creative code" (2004). However, the persistence of an interest in 'signature effects' among contemporary architects, like Frank Gehry, Peter Eisenman and Greg Lynn, suggests older notions of genius persist. Artistic genius has typically been associated with the Romantic period, when, as a means to theorize the role of the author and the process of creation, the concept became legitimate within the discourses of art and architecture. Its arrival signalled a moment in which design was no longer seen as a process of mimesis — the recombination of pre-existing material — but rather as an individual act of invention. Architecture, in the Romantic period, elaborated a complex definition of genius, tying innovation to its own version of form-finding; to aesthetic theories steeped in atmospherics, mood and effects; to politics, the politics of aesthetic and cultural discourse and the politics of the nation-state. All these concerns can be seen mobilized in the work of that quintessential romantic architect, John Soane. This essay will explore late eighteenth and early nineteenth century aspects of genius, through the motives and motifs at play in Soane's work, focusing largely on the most idiosyncratic of his projects, his own house at 13 Lincoln's Inn Fields.

Soane's house-museum was formally bequeathed to the British nation in 1833 and preserved by an act of parliament on Soane's death in 1837. Work on the house and three adjacent lots began in 1792 and spanned the rest of his life, con-

tinuing from developments at his country house in Ealing, Pitzhanger Manor.[1] Lincoln's Inn Fields was a hybrid in many ways. Nested into the functioning domestic spaces of a cultivated urbanite was an architectural office (in latter years a studio training apprentices); a museum, a room-scaled model case; an archive of drawings and folios; an extensive professional and scholarly library; an art gallery which transformed the walls into cabinets, interleaving the paintings in layers to maximize hang space; and a sequence of themed spaces, largely "gothick" in character and loaded with moody special effects. Special effects, indeed, were mobilized throughout the house in complex spatial interpenetrations; in soaring triple height domes and fissures; in mirrored complexities and gleams; in colorized or gloomy atmospheres. These effects, picturesque and sublime in their aesthetic leanings, but also owing allegiance to popular spectacles in London at the time, were part of the panoply of techniques — and, indeed, technologies[2] — deployed by Soane to exhibit his 'genius' as architect and choreographer of space. These techniques can also be found in Soane's other projects, notably in the domed spaces of the Bank of England's public offices, and his mysterious Freemason's Hall. But it is in the house that they are most intensely engaged.

1 For a more complete history of Soane's building and collecting activities, see Thornton & Dorey (1992); Stroud (1996); Feinberg Millenson (1984 & 1987).

2 No. 13 Lincoln's Inn Fields was an early house to be fully plumbed and have a central heating system.

3 The house was opened three successive Saturday evenings to some 900 invited guests to celebrate the acquisition of an Egyptian sarcophagus. This was also an opportunity to show off the house, which the deployment of theatrical lighting, to interior and exterior, aided. For more on this event, see Furján (2002).

Showing Off:

Soane was no less aware of the economic value of signature effects than today's architects are. He was more than willing to mobilize his own houses as highly successful publicity machines, as others - like the Adams brothers and Thomas Hope - had done before him, demonstrating, to students, peers, critics and potential clients alike, his 'genius' as a tag of marketability. The many visits, tours and parties conducted at both residences were intended to reveal, to influential clients and friends, Soane's architectural skills, to demonstrate his genius, originality and taste, as well as his ability to keep up with fashions. From the *Gothic scenes and intellectual banquets* at Pitzhanger, to the major public spectacles staged at No. 13 in 1825,[3] to the design of the spaces themselves, signature effects were constantly used as marketing devices.

'Effect', and its corollary, 'affect', were frequently used terms during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 'Effect' was the mark of production, it was the mark of the 'hand', the trace of artifice, of fabrication. 'Effect' was also the ability of an artwork to produce an impression on the mind, to produce 'affect'. In Soane's house, eighteenth century aesthetic theories were combined with a baroque theatricality adapted from Piranesi. Soane stage-managed a raft of technological possibilities to produce light and shade, scenography and setting, negotiating tensions between horizontal and vertical, as well as complex spatial manipulations of formal elements, to create a whole range of expressive effects. These effects — the production of a certain image, a staging, an atmosphere, certain qualities of light and shade, and so on — culminated, in the words of his friend, well-known archaeologist, John Britton, in a space designed for "spectacle and display" (Britton, 1827: 44); a theatre of effects designed to highlight and showcase his talent.

The latter is significant here. Showcasing talent, that is, creativity, invention, style, design skill, was a controversial aim in the early nineteenth century. To privilege talent in this way was to mobilize a debate that moved the production of a work

Photographs by Michael Shepherd

of art away from a mimetic act to a highly individualized act of creation, taken to its extreme in Romantic theory under the concept of genius. Soane's house, as showcase, parallels the work of artists such as his friend, J. M. W. Turner, who overturned dominant classical notions of self-effacement, leaving the traces of his 'hand', and his brush or palette knife, clearly legible. Turner's abstractions made explicit the difference between "natural effect and the imaginative reality of art" (Gowing, 1966: 31). He was not content to have his work subsumed under the blanket of good taste, judged on how well it imitated nature or remained faithful to the existing rules of the genre. Rather, he believed in the importance of creative genius, an innate ability which he saw as unique and unfathomable. Like Soane, he also saw himself located in a genealogy of great artists whom he frequently invoked in his paintings or their captions.

The mark of the hand, the idiosyncratic detail or technique, indicated the ambitious subject behind it: creator, inventor. In Soane's house, then, the role of imagination was crucial. The theatrical nature of the rooms, as scenes and evocative settings, demonstrated the range and power of his imaginative faculties. Britton noted this, and thus confirmed Soane's stature, in a text he gave to Soane as a Christmas gift in 1824, on the completion of a suite of rooms in the basement, fictionally inhabited by Soane as the monk 'Padre Giovanni'. "The Sinners [sic] offering at the Shrine of St. John of Soania", professed his admiration for the "most potent, grave and reverend St. John" and paid homage to "the miraculous powers and potencies of that revered Saint, which I had chosen for my father and mediator".[4]

In Soane's style, as in Turner's, the emphasis on individuality worked against the grain of established tradition, by refusing a servile imitation of Classicism, and insisting on the indelible mark of his own hand, his own particular genius.[5] Such inventiveness, a continual re-reading and re-invention of classical rules, was considered to be an example of bad taste (i.e. 'improper'), because it broke the accepted rules of classical architecture.[6] Sir Joshua Reynolds, and other stalwarts, considered marks of authorship defects, and architectural theorists largely continued to assert that Classicism involved the emulation of Antique models and accepted conventions, not invention. In effect, architectural practice was to protect a status quo — an architect was to work within a tradition and pass on its rules to the future. In contrast, Soane's interest in an identifiable style, one that could point directly to its singular author, promoted an interpretive, inventive and highly individual approach to the traditions of architecture.[7]

4 Soane Museum Archive, 7/10/8, 2.

5 For more on the attacks on Soane's style see Schumann-Bacia (1991).

6 Such a resistance to imitation could already be seen in the French querelle over the same issue of imitation (the ancients) versus invention (the moderns). See Perrault (1993).

7 It is also worth noting that part of Soane's re-evaluation of classicism was due to the influence of the picturesque and of romanticism; both had forced a revaluation of the accepted taste of the classical style.

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Poetic Genius:

John Summerson, noted architectural historian and theorist, and curator of the Soane Museum from 1945-1984, was most probably the first to refer to "the Soane style" which he regarded as highly distinctive and idiosyncratic:

> In 1792, when it arrives suddenly at maturity, there was not, anywhere in Europe, an architecture as unconstrained by loyalties, as free in the handling of proportion and as adventurous in structure and lighting as that which Soane introduced at the Bank of England in that year (Summerson, 1983: 9).

Summerson notes that much of that style had been formed under the influence of George Dance, and that Soane developed his own signature version by adding, "a novel handling of proportion, a highly personal mode of decorative emphasis and a tendency to arrive at solutions by unlimited, often bizarre, distortions of old themes" (Summerson, 1983: 9). These traits included pendentive domes with lanterns, often dilating in diameter to all but swallow the springing arches, semi-circular arches screening hidden light sources, double height tribune spaces, coloured skylights, and complex sectional interpenetrations. For instance, the complexities of sculpted space for which Soane has become famous, demonstrate, not an affiliation to style as genre — the following of precedent — but to space, conceived as an abstraction of solids and voids, as a site for morphological experimentation.

Georges Teyssot argues that, for eighteenth century architects, abandoning the rules of classical architecture meant not a freedom *from* technique but a freedom *for* technique.[8] Likewise, writing of the sectional relationship between the gothic parlour and picture room above it at No. 13, John Britton already pointed out that, "it would be utterly impossible to convey by a drawing, however well executed, any adequate idea of the singular effect thus produced" (Britton, 1827: 41). He remarks on the originality and skill evidenced:

> We perceive what beautiful and novel effects may be attained by ingenious and tasteful contrivance — what rich and picturesque architectural scenery may be created within the most confined space … After witnessing what has been accomplished here, let no architect complain that private residences afford little scope for the display of originality

8 See Teyssot (1978: 62).

> and fancy, or that striking effects cannot be produced on a small scale, or that picturesque beauty cannot be obtained, except at the expense of convenience (Britton, 1827: 28-29).

"Singular effect" is critical. In defence of Soane's originality, Britton acknowledged that some critics may have been of the opinion that, "he has occasionally allowed himself too much license", but retorted that there was no reason "why architecture, which is purely an art of invention, should be more fettered or restricted in this respect than any other" (Britton, 1827: 9). This was a reference to a commonly held opinion that painting, since it represented, was an art of imitation; sculpture was part imitation, part invention, as it isolated bodies from settings, stripped colour and was often paired with architecture; architecture and music, being the most abstracted from nature, were non-representational, and hence inventive arts. However, Britton did caution against novelty for novelty's sake and stressed that innovation required, "consummate judgment and the most refined taste" and could in itself be seen as "the touchstone of an architect's ability; for it is exceedingly difficult to hit upon the due medium between servility and timidity on the one hand, or caprice and rashness on the other" (Britton, 1827: 9).

Soane was against the "monotony and tame repetition" (Soane, 1996: 605) of the prevailing neoclassical design method, as a blind copying of historical precedent, and he developed instead a method of invention that abstracted and preserved the *effects* of such styles.[9] Singularity was the product of an experimental technique derived from Dance and the work of visionaries Soane admired - Étienne-Louis Boullée, Nicholas Ledoux, J-B Piranesi. It could also be found in the cult of novelty that took hold of theorists of the picturesque, as it appeared in the continuous references to novel effects made by Barbara Hofland in her commentaries for Soane's privately printed descriptions of his house, or in Britton's earlier *Union of Architecture, Sculpture, and Painting*.[10] In theories of the sublime and the picturesque, architecture turned into a theatre for special effects, characterised by the play of mass and void, of form, and of light, shade and atmosphere. For Britton, Soane's house, especially the museum with its crypt and monkish apartments, aligned architecture with poetry: "We perceive here not merely the imaginative architect, but the poet, and are at a loss which most to admire, the originality or the beauty, the mystery or the intricacy of the conception" (Britton, 1827: 6).

In his 1830 *Description*, Soane himself noted an emphasis on the conjuring of "an almost infinite succession of those *fanciful effects* which constitute the poetry of Architecture", notably through the use of picturesque devices (Soane, 1830: 2).[11] Like many eighteenth century theorists of taste, aesthetics, or association, Soane, when referring to poetics, used 'fancy' and 'fanciful' interchangeably with 'imagination'. It wasn't until Coleridge wrote his *Biographia Literaria* in the early nineteenth century that fancy and imagination were distinguished from each other. Drawing on Aristotle, Coleridge linked "the associating power" to memory and fancy, and kept them both distinct from reason and imagination (Coleridge, 1817: Vol. I, 104-05). In his theory, fancy was characterized by finitude, remaining inseparably linked to the store of impressions, memories and ideas of the perceiving subject's sum of experiences (Coleridge, 1817: Vol. I, 296). In contrast, imagination was limitless; imagination was novelty and invention where

9 On the topic of the abstraction of styles to effects, see Summerson (1983: 14); and Teyssot (1978: 67).

10 "Far above, and on every side, were concentrated the most precious relics of Architecture and Sculpture, disposed so happily as to offer the charm of novelty, the beauty of picturesque design, and the sublimity resulting from a sense of veneration due to the genius and the labours of the 'mighty dead.'" Hofland, B. In Soane, (1835/36: 37).

11 For more on this topic, see Furján 1997.

fancy was mimesis, always beholden to the re-assemblage of precedent. For Coleridge, imagination, "that syncretic and magical power", is clearly the privileged faculty in the cultivation of artistic genius: "Good sense is the body of poetic genius, fancy its drapery, motion its life, and imagination the soul that is everywhere and in each; and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole" (Coleridge, 1817: Vol II, 11-12).

In strikingly similar terms, Soane set out the combination of faculties necessary for the production of great architecture: "rich fancy *and* bold imagination; flights of powerful mind and magical genius" (Soane, 1966: 619, emph. added). Soane made explicit use of poetics in his architectural work, and evoked the term 'poetry' for its romantic and theatrical implications and associations. "Like Poetry, [architecture] presents a succession of varied pictures" (Soane, quoted in Bolton 1927: 100). Recognizing these aims, Isaac D'Israeli was to describe the museum as a "built poem".[12] Thus, the "poetry of architecture" is, in Soane's understanding, a combination of novelty, the picturesque, the sublime and poetic association. However, it is also evidence of that elusive quality, genius. Soane wrote of his paper projects — his "architectural visions" — that they were the "wild effusions of a mind glowing with an ardent and enthusiastic desire to attain professional distinction" (Bolton, 1927: 18).

In 1818 William Hazlitt wrote of the representation of objects distorted by the poetic imagination, thus immediately evoking the distortions of the convex mirror; that beloved of picturesque tourists (the Claude Glass), as well as the many that line the interiors of Soane's house (see Furján, 1997). Combining the mirror with the lamp, he further complemented the mimetic faculty with a reasoning and "emotional light", in order to show that the artistic work is mediated, the product of the object and its contemplation, the work of the mind's reflection (quoted in Abrams, 1971: 52-54).[13] In this analogy, Hazlitt brought together the two modes of composition that formed the basis of a romantic neo-Classicism like Soane's - the mirror of contemplation and mimesis, together with the emanating light of individual genius. The figure of the lamp, in Hazlitt's evocation, originates in notions of God and the human spirit figured as a flame (typically burning in the darkness of evil and disbelief). This romantic re-figuration follows directly from the Enlightenment conception of knowledge understood literally as enlightening, as the bright light of illumination that renders things clear and visible; except that here, it is the light of imagination, of creation, not of nature and reason.

12 Letter from Isaac D'Isralei to Soane, 14 August 1836, in Bolton (1927: 529).

13 Hazlitt is quoted from his essay On Poetry in General.

Styling a Nation, Nationalizing a Style:

John Gwynn, in *London and Westminster Improved*, described the question of "Public Magnificence" in architecture as "a national concern" for honouring the country's distinction and its people's genius, along with its culture's refinement of taste and manners (Gwynn, 1766: 1-2). Soane, in one of his Royal Academy Lectures, linked magnificence to "national taste" and "national glory" through the notion of "character", essentially a representational aspect of architecture, one he admitted is malleable:

Photograph by Helene Furján

> Notwithstanding all that has been urged to the contrary, be assured my young friends, that architecture in the hands of men of genius may be made to assume whatever character is required of it. ... Without distinctness of character, buildings may be convenient and answer the purposes for which they are raised, but they will never be pointed out as examples for imitation nor add to the splendour of the possessor, improve the national taste, or increase the national glory. The want of proper character and appropriate magnificence in the buildings of this wealthy metropolis is not confined to the exterior form and interior distribution of single structures, but is almost general (Soane, 1966: 648).[14]

Britain, as a nation, required a self-image strong enough to bolster her status, both domestically and internationally.[15] The British "Nation" had always included the diverse countries of the British Isles, and was now the seat of an expansive empire. The attempt to develop a self-image was steeped in a cultural anxiety about the implications of its poly-cultural and poly-national constitution. How was England, the origin and centre of this largely remote empire, to keep its presence readable?[16] In *The True-Born Englishman*, William Defoe argued that England was a mongrel nation of mongrel origin, the barbarous offspring of all the invaders and colonizers who had besieged England in the course of history (Defoe, 1701: 28-30). In the multiple and essentially arbitrary answers to the question of, what is English, Defoe saw an indication that the nation was a self-conscious *fabrication*. The poly-stylism of Neoclassicism, meanwhile, which included Egyptian, "Hindoo," Gothic, as well as Greek and Roman influences, reflected the intense effects of travel on British culture, as well as the diversity of the British Empire.

Soane's own stylistic solution to the question of a national architecture, which went beyond that of most of his neoclassical colleagues, was the development of a new classical language. Moving away from the abstracted incising of the Bank of England interiors, for instance, Soane developed a fully-fledged ornamentation that combined Gothic, Roman and Greek detailing. This was intended as a truly national style, original and contemporary, and one that would be significantly unique to Britain. However, it was also highly idiosyncratic, the product of individual innovation, developed in a climate in which "genius is encouraged to create, rather than to copy and adopt" (Papworth, 1916: 312). Soane's "national style" appeared in many of his public projects for London, both commissioned and proposed; for example the House of Lords, the Law Courts, the new Offices for the Board of Privy Trade and the Privy Council, as well as an ambitious (unrealised) scheme for a processional route through the city.[17] Its novelty was timely; a *new* nation needed a *new* language.

'Genius' was thus employed in two different modes by Soane. Through the inventiveness of the "Soane style", he sought to gain a market advantage; through invention, he contributed to the means by which a nation with a newly constructed identity could represent itself. In the architectural world Soane inhabited, they could be, and often were, easily blurred. The numerous controversies that Soane was involved in, and that he so bitterly complained of, pitted him in battle against other architects, as well as the "state apparatus" - in the form of his local district surveyor, the Royal Academy or parliament — in a struggle for architectural prominence.[18] The 'battle of styles' that these conflicts represent was also a battle for political lev-

14 The reference to character here is significant, an important element of neoclassical architectural theory, most notably theorized by Quatremère de Quincy. For more on this, see di Palma (2002).

15 See Colley (1992).

16 See Pagden (1995).

17 For more information on these projects see Richardson & Stevens (1999).

18 For detail on these conflicts, see Darley (1999).

erage. 'Genius' was thus as much about economics — who will receive coveted and lucrative public commissions — as it was about aesthetic theory or artistic merit.

PR:

As a meticulously curated archive of Soane's production and its genealogy, witness the purchase of the Dance and Adams archives, or the prominently displayed Piranesi etchings. Soane's house, too, is an emblem of signature construction within the terms of a legacy. The bequest of the house and its considerable collections, including over 60,000 drawings, forms a cultural inheritance both of his own work, that of those architects to whom he felt himself indebted, and of the aesthetic theories and cultural trends materialized in it. Thus, it was also a temple to fame. One could think of the house — as library and museum — operating as a carefully constructed exposition, with meticulous evidence and detailed footnotes, buttressing a claim to his place in the panoply of great architectural geniuses. One could think for a moment of today's architects engaged in similar moves: Michael Graves, a fan of Soane, turning his house into a museum already gifted to the public; or Frank Gehry, signing and dating everything he draws, the building archive already under contract on his death. It could be said, that they, like Peter Eisenman, Zaha Hadid, and others, are great masters of the signature effect. And perhaps more than any other contemporary architect, Graves and Gehry have literally sold their signatures with canny success.

Photograph by Michael Shepherd

The "Soane style" could be seen as a similarly commercial exploitation of signature. In a parallel move, Turner's famous self-portrait at the Royal Academy annual show on Varnishing Day made great flourish out of his auratic presence, and clearly served to add massive commercial appeal to his signature - both *on* the work and clearly *in* it. Soane's house, and the highly idiosyncratic public projects he built or designed, certainly helped cement his claim to a signature effect - invention as the mark of genius. It gave a competitive advantage to a long line of 'great' architects, from Michelangelo to Ledoux, from Piranesi to Boullée, and continues to do so today. It is not for nothing that Peter Eisenman is want to insert himself into a genealogy of 'signature' architects, just as Soane did, or that his student, Greg Lynn, will talk of 'signature effects' as a deliberate design goal, one that counters the general misapprehension that today's digital architecture is 'autogenerated'.

There is no doubt that Soane was a master of self-representation, ready to demonstrate the greatness of his achievements and certain of their worth as cultural legacy. He used his ability to create a theatre of special effects and spectacular spaces: a sublime architectural virtuosity as a deliberately emphatic way of expressing his professional skill. His house's primary 'effect' was thus the demonstration of Soane's consummate genius as the magician of space, a master showman displaying his talents and achievements in a blaze of effect. Critic John Papworth referred to Soane's work as "the ideal imagery" of "an exuberant fancy" (Papworth, 1816: 312). *The Athenaeum*, reviewing Soane's house-museum in 1828, echoed Papworth's sentiments:

> Here he has collected his rich stores of art and antiquity. Here he revels in architectural glory, dwelling, magician-like, among fairie chambers

> of his own creating. Of its kind it is perfect, the ichnography of the very mind of the architect, everywhere difficulties surmounted, ingenuity triumphant ...

The importance of fiction and imagination to Soane's domestic enterprise must be emphasized; fantastic invention is the mechanism by which genius can be revealed. This 'theatrical' architectonics complimented the architectural theatre of the house (as museum), its role as memorial immortalizing his work, his collections and his creations, of which the house-museum itself was the most exemplary manifestation. It is no surprise, then, that the visitor to the house finds, in the centre of the double height tribune space that focuses the museum section, a bust of Soane himself, surveying his collections and accomplishments.

John Britton, in his theorization of architecture as an art of invention, necessitating originality, experimentation and innovation, was mindful that 'genius' was merely the flipside of a failed experiment:

> In this, as in many other things, much depends on success: if the architect be fortunate in his attempts, he enriches his art and adds to his powers; if he fails, he has done worse than nothing, and exposes himself to derision. Innovators are like usurpers: they either become the founders of new dynasties, or are hurled as rebels from the eminence to which they aspired (1827: 9).

Soane may not have generated the dynasties he hoped for, but for Britton (as for the many admirers of Soane's work today) it was clear that No. 13 Lincoln's Inn Fields memorialised, more generally, the achievement of genius in Soane's oeuvre. Soane's risky experiments in morphology and effect had paid off.

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Mistresses and Others:
The "body as subject" in (architectural) discourse

Mirjana Lozanovska

> Apparently Arab scholars when speaking of the text use this admirable expression: the certain body. What body? We have several of them; the body of the anatomists and physiologists, the one science sees or sicusses: this is the text of grammarians, critics, commentators, philologists (the pheno-text). But we also have a body of bliss consisting solely of erotic relations, utterly distinct from the first body: it is another contour, another nomination; thus with the text: it is no more than the open list of the fires of language (those living fires, intermittent lights, wandering features strewn in the text like seeds and which for us advantageously replace the "semina aeternitatis," the "sopyra," the common notions, the fundamental assumptions of ancient philosophy). Does the text have a human form, is it a figure, an anagram of the body? Yes, but of our erotic body. The pleasure of the text is irreducible to physiological need. The pleasure of the text is that moment when my body pursues its own ideas - for my body does not have the same ideas I do (Barthes, 1975: 16).

Greatness, or recognition, as a master architect is not possible for most people. Only a few in history attain such stature and this might have to do with a number of variables: family history, work, genius, talent, economic foundation, labour, intensity of personality and luck. The ideal image of the master architect is not the real image of the architect; it is the mirror or the lens through which the real architect is seen. Nonetheless this image mediates each self-identity as an architect, and mediates the question of who can become an architect.

A popular exemplification of this image is the architect in the 1949 film, *The Fountainhead*, famously captured by Gary Cooper playing the lead role, as architect Howard Roark. Howard Roark is portrayed as creative, artistic, brilliant and unforgiving, an image that is typical of the genius in history. He will not give in to the mediocrity that is central to the society he lives in. He is perceived as a solitary figure acting against the grain. He believes in his own creativity and his own vision, and will not negotiate this with others or with the context within which he must function. This makes him both impossible - he burns drawings and goes to work as a labourer - and desirable for the same reasons. Howard Roark (Gary Cooper) is both elegant and understated, demonstrating the effects of his masculinity as mind, and, handsome and sexy, demonstrating the effects of his masculinity as body. The image of the master functions as an ideal image. It is argued in contemporary psychoanalytic theory that idealization is the single most powerful inducement for identification – we cannot idealize something without, at the same time, identifying with it (Silverman, 1996: 2). The first instance of this is the idealized image of the body. The body of the master architect is a determinate body; it permeates the architectural community at a level of identity and idealization.

Within a field in which the master holds a transcendental and heroic vision that budding architects aspire to, how can identities perceived as the non-master - subjects who are crossed by signs of the female body, the black body, the migrant body, the working class body, the peasant body - become great architects? If notions of genius, as that "part of us that surpasses and exceeds ourselves" (as outlined in the theme description for this periodical) are etymologically and intimately linked to notions of genealogy, as the tradition of interdependence and becoming-embodied, then the struggle is between a grand narrative of master architect - always already masculine, Eurocentric, white and privileged - and the story of others embedded in a group (not individual), and located in a place (not universal). The idealized image of the body alludes to both genius and genealogy, in that it contains a specific body rendered beyond its specific details. How can unmasterful subjects, construed through their specific detail, stage themselves as provisional masters? Secondly, how does this affect the canonical topography of the discipline, and what kind of architectural discourse is generated through this staging?

This essay will focus on sexual difference as a specific detail symptomatic of the unmasterful subject. Within language, a strange equivalence between the two terms 'old masters' and 'old mistresses' is revealed; the second term carries traces of entirely different histories and connotations (Pollock, 1988). In the first part of the essay, theories of sexuality and otherness will be introduced. The second part of the essay will elaborate on this, through a case study of Zaha Hadid and the effect of her presentation of her work at The American University of Beirut, in late 1996.

Body as object / Body as subject

Theorist and psychoanalyst, Luce Irigaray, argues that gender and sex, or the social and biological are interwoven, and the connection she makes between them has thereby provided a radical and influential theory of sexual difference. Society is divided and organised in terms of two sexes, male and female, not only two genders, women and men, Irigaray argues. The human subject is more like a body-subject, and the subject's social practices are embedded in the inscriptions of a sexually specific body history (Irigaray, 1985; Grosz, 1989). A very different concept of human subjectivity emerges, one that differs from both the essentialist claim, that gender is an innate biological condition, and from the culturalist claim, that gender is constructed culturally and has nothing to do with biology. Earlier theories of gender and sexuality proposed that culture (gender) and biology (sex) were either conceptualised as two separate realms, or that they were conflated. Irigaray, drawing from psychoanalytic theory and practice, develops a concept of the body as structured and inscribed, even at levels of bodily experience. Irigaray refers to the morphology rather than the biology of the body, a body that is already coded and given meaning socially and historically (Grosz, 1989: 111).

In the practice of architecture, as in other creative work, the body also refers to the created object, its form, shape and matter. Buildings become body-objects in a counterpoint gesture to Irigaray's body-subjects, acting as metaphoric expressions of subjectivity. Theories of deconstruction were disseminated and found

expression in visual fields. Ideas about the western subject as a deconstructed subject became associated with broken looking buildings and forms. The specific body is also pointed to: Viennese architects, Coop Himmelblau, ironically use images of their own faces to generate urban design schemes. Their bodies do not actually generate the design, but are turned into visual representation, a two-dimensional map or composition. Representational techniques, already within architecture, are used to manipulate the images. At one level the process has nothing to do with their bodies, at another they joke about their own bodies as inanimate objects. Unwittingly, their bodies, integral to their identity as creative artists, are turned into objects on which they act out their creative processes.

Notions of the other, and theories of otherness, are explored through radical and illicit body-objects, exploring that which is strange to and yet within architecture. Most poetic is the work of American architect John Hejduk. While he was in Vladivostok, and as shown in his book, Hejduk's drawings explore the human subject of architecture - user, symbolic figure, or fictional character - transforming the nomadic, the homeless, or the vagabond, as figural concepts, into architectural imagery and signification (Hejduk, 1989). The subject becomes a particular kind of metaphor transporting humanity, as understood in literature, into the field of architectural making. It offers a point of encounter with the opening quotation from Roland Barthes' *Pleasure of the Text*, because Hejduk preserves the creative process of making architecture as a dialogue between objects and subjects, but, more importantly for the understanding of Barthes, as an intimacy and conversation between the reader and the work. Barthes is referring to the reader, not as a subject who is merely absorbing information, or reacting to it mentally, but as a body-subject who might wander into a daydream. For example, if architecture is largely a field of housing, Hejduk presents the architectural community with human figures that have strange relations to housing. This inspires rethinking about housing. The rethinking is not about housing as a typology, but as constitutive of architecture, begging the question, "what, who and how does architecture house?" It is the precise openness of the question that enables Barthes' pleasure because it liberates ideas about architecture.

Titles of recent publications, including *Sexuality and Space* (Colomina, 1992), *Building Sex* (Betsky, 1995), *Architecture and Body* (Flynn, Al-Sayed, Smiley, Marble and Lobitz, 1988), *The Sex of Architecture* (Agrest, Conway and Weisman, 1996) indicate that there is theoretical engagement with the body and sexuality in architecture. Aaron Betsky's argument is founded on concepts of gender conflated with biology, and endeavours to divide space according to a feminine interior and a masculine exterior. If, as Barthes suggests, the pleasure of the text is associated with a body that pursues its own ideas, then, in the analytical essays of *Sexuality and Space* and *The Sex of Architecture,* the body is buried within architectural discourse, becoming the silent other. The body, as reader, is subjected to the density and weight of theory, or to an explicitly ideological position. In contrast, *Architecture and Body,* comprising a mixture of creative projects and visual musings rather than a collection of essays, and Jennifer Bloomer's critical creative essay, "The Matter of Matter: A Longing for Gravity" in *The Sex of Architecture,* present an erotic body. The reader finds herself looking at, or reading literally, about a body rather than discovering the body of and within language. The text thus behaves auto-erotically, presenting its own enjoyment of itself as a body. The reader is subjected to being a witness of this performance.

In this discussion, my enquiry is oriented towards a study of otherness. If body, sex and gender index *woman,* my discussion will read for *difference* within woman (Gunew, 1994). In particular I am thinking of two tactical moments: the moment in which a woman is different from a man, even though she may be an architect and, momentarily, a master/mistress; and the tactical moment in which *women* is different from woman, one woman is different from another woman (and man is different from men), a moment which coincides with culture, race, ethnicity, class and a history of the present (Spivak, 1986, 1988, 1990). How are *different subjects* either enabled or disenabled by the bodies of, and in, architecture, and what is the possibility of agency for these subjects? Subjects are positioned in a hierarchical structure of society partly through the specific characteristics of their bodies. Ideally, their objects of production are independent of this position as subject. However, my discussion, in this essay, explores how the body is a link between subjects and objects. In a similar sense, the body is a point of collision in the perceived opposition between genius, as the impersonal divine that is within and exceeds the personal, and genealogy, that ties persons to their biological/cultural lineage. The study of a presentation by Zaha Hadid serves to elaborate the ongoing resistance and battle undertaken by subjects, in order to make this collision between genius and genealogy a productive and performative meeting, wherein identity is that which is mimed and constructed rather than pre-given (Butler, 1990).

1 The presentation by Zaha Hadid at the School of Architecture and Design, The American University of Beirut in 1996 coincided with a seminar course, "The body in/of architecture," that I ran at AUB in 1996 and 1997.

2 The idea of traditional Jewish architecture is difficult to describe due to centuries of Jewish diaspora. However, it is evident that Libeskind's use of the Star of David is not a feature of the museum, but a less visible reference generating the design. Libeskind is represented as an architect in forums that are not about Jewishness, such as the competition for the World Trade Centre.

Mistresses: Zaha Hadid At The American University Of Beirut (AUB)

In a presentation by Zaha Hadid at the Department of Architecture and Design, The American University of Beirut, some specific factors around the theoretical concerns raised here came to the surface.[1] The architectural community were the recipients of a presentation from Hadid, who has emerged as an international architect and an important speaker and critic on architectural projects and design approaches. While there was much to ponder in Hadid's presentation, the questions from the audience shifted the discussion from the realm of the object, in terms of form, composition, and philosophy, to one about the role of an architect in the field of identity, politics and cultural representation.

Zaha Hadid's work is most often categorized as deconstructionist and placed in the same field as the work of Bernard Tschumi, Lebbeus Woods and Daniel Libeskind (Noever, 1991; Gulsberg, 1991; Norris & Benjamin, 1988). Hadid's work is not categorized with the work of the so-called regionalist architects, and Hadid is not seen to belong to a specific architectural tradition. She does not, in any immediately visible way, make references to Arab culture, to the Middle East or to femininity. For example, Indian Charles Correa, and Sri Lankan Geoffrey Bawa, are too easily placed in the regionalist category by both local and international architectural forums. In questions of ethnicity and ethnic identity, Daniel Libeskind, as the architect for the Jewish Museum in Berlin, has not been explicitly discussed, or rather Libeskind's Jewishness is not transferred over to the object as an essential ethnic identity. The Jewish Museum does not look Jewish, in a traditional sense of the term, and Libeskind receives projects other than Jewish projects.[2] The subject-object relation here is not essentialized as a fixed and bounded cultural structure. However, there is a belief that, through his Jewishness, Libeskind was able to bring a profound architectural sensibility to the project. The term regionalist implies an identity intrinsically related to place, a location that is non-western, a genealogy perceived as the antithesis to western constructs of genius.

In the regional category, the subject-object relation becomes essentialized, and both subject and object are contained and constrained within traditional parameters that the western subject is liberated from. Hadid has noted that Kenneth Frampton and Rem Koolhaas have commented that the fluidity of her architectural plans is associated with Arab calligraphy. In response, Hadid asserts that this association "has nothing to do with the organization, it has to do with the fluidity of the pen - these very fluid spaces which seem to flow like a line, like a sentence" (Hadid, 1995: 15). This comment specifically ensures that the association between the plan and Arab calligraphy is not about an ethnic building tradition, but about sketching and writing. And yet it reveals a trace of the generative potential of tradition, of the original within genealogy. It might be only a small step to imagine that the work of the regional architect engenders creative architectures through that which ties her to a tradition.

If Hadid's work is not identified in relation to a specific cultural tradition or ethnicity, I argue that it is not the object of architecture that invites the unusual response to Hadid's presentation. That Zaha Hadid's visibility, as an immaterial media figure, shifts from untouchable to embodied and specific is a transgressive event between audience and speaker. An intense interest about Hadid's body and appearance, and factors of identity and physicality, entered and intervened in Zaha Hadid's presentation. The audience enquired whether she was an ambassador for the Middle East, and whether she represented this marginal position in relation to the dominant west. After the presentation students came to me and made comments about her shoes, her jacket, and her physical presence. They found there was something especially confident and excessive about her appearance. The object was radically overlooked in this case. While this is only one event, it is symptomatic of the role of the body as subject in architecture. It is also a curious coincidence that three internationally acclaimed contemporary female architects are not western, not Anglo-Saxon, American or European: Zaha Hadid, Itsuko Hasegawa, Kazuyo Sejima.

The Body

According to Mary Douglas, in her radical anthropological work, *Purity and Danger* (1966), the body is invested with social demarcations; its perception and experience is mediated through a cultural map of social coherence. "The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious" and that "all margins are dangerous. …Any structure of ideas is vulnerable at its margins" (Douglas, 1966: 138-145). Somewhere between the objectivity of Zaha Hadid's architectural work, and the embodied subjectivity of her presentation, a certain boundary is crossed, so that what should have been separate is joined. In this case, there is no tidy distinction between the representation of the object and the presentation of the subject. It seems that Hadid's presence and presentation as a subject is incongruous with the representation of the object for which she is recognised. If there is symmetry between the subject and object in canonical production, in this event, it is unwittingly disturbed. The debate that resulted amongst the audience and the speaker was an attempt to redraw, to make right again the institutional and disciplinary lines. It was a way to turn away from the fragile lines and orders between the objects and subjects in the structure of knowledge in architecture.

If, as in contemporary writing in psychoanalytic theory and identity studies, the body is not determined by nature and biology, the question of Hadid's body is not simply a physical one, but becomes a cultural terrain of signification. The body as signifying and physical, rather than the body as metaphor, or the body as process, is a concept that intervenes in the discourse of architecture. Zaha Hadid has already crossed the structural lines that divide woman/architect, oriental/western, local/foreign. If questions of the body as subject are marginal to central canonical interests of the architectural edifice, of form, design and urban strategy, this particular presentation made visible the interwoven layers between them.

Most visible is her dress and appearance. Hadid is reputed to wear clothing by the Japanese designer, Issey Miyake. On this occasion the jacket Hadid was wearing - black and made of the folded fabric that Miyake has invented - appeared to be one of his pieces. The jacket behaved like a shawl, loosely sitting on Hadid's shoulders. The weather always seems to be warm in Beirut; it was that day, though it was autumn. Hadid's simple black soft dress set the background for the jacket. On her feet was a pair of slip-on shoes with a small black heel and a clear plastic strap over her toes. They were somewhat like Cinderella shoes, redolent of fantasy and dress-ups.[3] Hadid has an expressive, strong face and flamboyant hair that complements her stature. Miyake's clothing is noted for its innovative technology and imagery, referencing the east and dismantling a simple division between east and west (Miyake, 1997). This is demonstrated in his interest in the space between the body and the garment, and for allowing the female form to create the shape of the garment. The star architect's dress functions as a Eurocentric global code, following the Miesian dictum of 'less is more', and making the body more or less invisible. Invariably black and tailored garments are structurally set against the form of the body, rather than sensorially responsive to the kinetics of the body as was Hadid's jacket. In dematerializing the body, the code of dress, in the west, functions predominantly as a sign. It does not entangle itself with the body as physical and sensual matter, and attempts to avoid historical or cultural discrepancies. Zaha Hadid produced a version of the west through the code of black and designer label; but also produced a version of the west's image of the orient. Her performance is differently crafted, reproducing an exotic and feminine imagery through a play of signifiers of femininity, and perhaps an irony about an oriental woman/architect. Her dress, as appearance, is in play with her body, making both strangely visible. It is a discomforting visibility. The audience found themselves doing in-disciplinary things - looking at her not her work, stealing moments for their own gaze at a body rather than at the architectural objects. The audience is confronted by the *body as subject*, initially via Hadid's subversive manner of dressing.

In its most radical sense, an oriental appropriating the occident (and in Hadid's case, especially Englishness) is perhaps explained as a kind of mimicry that shows up the west, as well as the east, as an artifice, a kind of masking or dressing that makes for theatrical play and performance. The effect is one of restaging appropriation. If Hadid has become an internationally acclaimed architect through particular routes and economies within the west, her dress displayed that she was not strictly assimilated in that role. Hadid looked like a foreign woman, but this appeared to be an act rather than an authentic position. In this sense, her presentation was like a performance of a creative actress subverting both the central place of Eurocentric subjects and the authentic places of others.

3 The way clothes have played a role in Hadid's role as a designer and as an identity are noted in an interview in which Hadid states that she used to wrap herself in fabric, tying it and fastening it with pins; and later that she would wear designed clothes upside down (Hadid, 1995: 9).

The problematic is not Hadid's presentation of her work, but the presence of her body. Zaha Hadid displayed an image of a non-master (an eccentric foreign woman) and yet she was speaking in the mode of a master architect. What is being threatened here is the neat division between the west and the non-west. If Hadid's work is already central to economies of the west, her identity, as not strictly part of this economy, affected that place of her work. Identity theorists propose that the difference that is encountered in the body as subject is always an indigestible or irreducible difference (Gunew, 1993: 3, 9). An international architect is assumed to have a disembodied subjectivity which, in the presentation, coincided with a specific subjectivity, through the body as subject. The idea of a disembodied subjectivity is therefore a misreading of real practices and presentations. The fantasy body of 'master' is precisely not mistress, not Arab, not black, not Asian and not working class.[4] It is the antithesis of indigenous, to the extent that these signs belong somewhere. In this sense, the canon is bought into a field of encounter with the margin in and through the body of the subject. The specific identity position that enters the scene of architecture literally changes the terms of the discourse (Gunew, 1992). The specific body renders itself visible because it is not the same as the determinate body of the master architect, and its visibility calls into question the subject position of the architect. Is this architect in the right place? What gives this architect the authority to present her work in a masterly way? How can we take the work of this architect seriously? The discourse shifts from one about the architecture as an object of study, about the work and the symbolic production, to one about the architect as a specific subject.

Difference

Identities are not fixed in time or place - they are not ahistorical - rather they are produced within institutional parameters and disciplinary structures (Hall, 1996: 4). Two levels of symmetry are disrupted in the visibility of the specific body as subject: firstly, the projective symmetry between the subject and the object; secondly, the reflective symmetry between the specific subject and the constitutive subject of the discipline of architecture. Psychoanalytic theorist, Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, explains Lacan's mirror stage as a moment in the subject's awareness of her own reflection, from the point of view of another. As a result, the ego is an imaginary form, both alien and yet also whole (Ragland-Sullivan, 1987: 16-30). The mirror stage is not a developmental phase in Lacanian theory; rather, misrecognition repeatedly acts like an interruption to symmetrical reflections of the subject, and between the subject and the object. If man is perceived as constitutive of humankind, and if whiteness is perceived as constitutive of a hegemonic humanity because it has the capacity to be no colour or all colours, then a misrecognition, or a cultural mirror stage, would occur precisely at the moment that such a myth was dismantled. The excess and limit of whiteness is a specifically coloured human subject, as the excess and limit of man is a specific man or woman (Gunew, 1994: 31). White is invisible only until it encounters something which is not white, its own margin, its own limit, something that interrupts the fiction of its mythical field of representation.

Stuart Hall argues that identity arises at the point of intersection between the political field of the social realm and the psychoanalytic conception of subjectivity (Hall, 1996: 2-10). The function of misrecognition, and the concept of ideology in

4 I have found that 'international speakers' in other disciplines might also be subjected to this type of questionnaire. Recently a presentation by Slavoj Žižek, "The Only Good Neighbour is a Dead Neighbour," (The University of Melbourne, 27th July 2001) inspired such a response. In one example, Žižek cited an incident about a reaction to him as a representative of the Balkans – barbaric, volatile, violent - a reaction that crossed over the line of the usual tolerance and political correctness given to specific significant 'others'. In that moment, Žižek, the master theorist, and Žižek, the symbol of Balkanness, coincided, and Žižek projected that coincidence back to the audience.

Hall's social theory, elaborate that "identities are constructed through, not outside, difference" (Hall, 1996: 4). Theorists, including Jacques Derrida (1981) and Judith Butler (1993), have termed this the subject's constitutive outside, "the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks" that the term identity can have a positive function (Hall, 1996: 4). In other words, the subject is a precarious sort of identity in a process of redefinition against the grain, against that which it excludes. What might be seen as a dominant discourse in architecture, invested through the object of architecture and body-objects, is contingent on what it delimits to its outside, or its margins. In my discussion, this limit is defined as the body as subject. It can be read as the encounter between genius (the masterly subject who exceeds her personal boundaries) and genealogy (the manifestation of her material lineage) in the becoming of a great architect.

It would be a mistake to think that the reaction to Zaha Hadid's presentation was due only to the traces of her gender, ethnicity, culture - in other words to her identity as a signal of origins. Histories of origin, co-existing within a subject speaking in a masterful way, are imagined as journeys and routes which suggest movements rather than static points. They indicate a radical enunciative position in Hadid's presentation: not who Zaha Hadid is, her being, but rather the process of becoming Hadid; not a projected restrictive genealogy, but the genius within a genealogy that is becoming of interest to the field of representation in architecture. Sneja Gunew describes such practices of identity:

> so here we are, ethnics who are pagan or heathen in the sense that we are not part of the dominant ethos of this culture – hence we mimic its character at times in order to produce our own performative gestures of a different aesthetics, a different rhetoric (1993: 11).

The subversive impact of Hadid's presentation is not strategic or planned; it is an outcome of a continual readjustment in the relation between subjectivity and disciplinary boundaries.

The architect who enters the discourse from the margins is threatening, if her enunciative position is contradictory and complex when participating in an intellectual field of sophistication, irony, double vision, hybridity, subversive play, or mimicry. Why? Because that sort of intelligence, insight or pleasure threatens the stability of the normative subject of western culture and civilization, whose constitutive outside becomes visible as an excess that is central to its own construction. In an uncanny way a similar destabilisation occurs with the normative other, the non-western subject constructed through western historical delineations:

> Minority individuals are always treated and forced to experience themselves generically. Coerced into a negative generic subject position, the oppressed individual responds by transforming that position into a positive collective one. And therein, precisely, lies the basis of a broad minority coalition: in spite of the enormous differences between various minority cultures (Gunew, 1994: 42).

Conclusion

Hadid is recognised for developing a strange mathematical basis to her drawings, not a strictly western perspective. Hadid's design for The Peak Club, Hong Kong, 1982-1983, won the Pritzker Architecture Prize (Hadid was the first woman to win the prize in its 26 year history) and has been recognised for its extraordinary visual imagery using 89 degree perspective. The perspective projection interfaces the picture plane surface tilted at 89 rather than 90 degrees. Drawing on Hong Kong urbanism - Kowloon crowds and the city's high-rise prowess - Hadid had planned to excavate and rebuild the landscape. In drawing after drawing, Hadid has produced a new geology that combines this urbanism with the organicism of the mountain. Through an extraordinary mathematical construction, the perspective approaches its own margin and excess, its own planar surface materiality. It produces a strangely surreal image of topography and building, in which the distinction between ground and figure is dismantled, and both are strangely floating beyond the grasp of reality. It is a kind of morphological genealogy of Hong Kong.

In one slide during the presentation, Hadid - who paints her architectural drawings - revealed the edges of the painting, unmasked, showing at once that the construction of precise lines is dependent on a highly extensive labour of the hand. Hadid's presentation exemplified a labour of love, and also indicated a substantial body of work. That the architect is both the subject of this work - the creative origin - and also that the work preoccupies the architect - the subject is pre-occupied by the object - becomes a fantasy about the master architect. The object extends the subject backwards and forwards. Such a relationship between the body as object and the body as subject is circumscribed by desire and pleasure. It belongs to the hand of the master in the gesture of object-making and object-love. Transferred to a non-master (a mistress, as language has it, or a slave, as in philosophy) it is a pleasure that risks transgression. It is a transgression because a gesture of object-making and object-love in the hand of a woman has associations that are entangled in a web of sexual difference, the difference between a master and a mistress. A coincidence between genealogy and genius becomes a transgressive act.[5]

5 In a similar sense, a gesture of object-making and object-love in the hand of a man who is a slave or a native has associations that are entangled in a web of sexuality and power, the difference between a master and a non-master, a slave.

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Genius Loci

Mark Jackson

Introduction

This paper, as with others in this series, takes its impetus from the short text 'Genius' by the philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Agamben alerts us to the complications in coming to an understanding of this notion, from its origins in the Roman god given to each of us at birth, to something like what crucially constitutes the impulses of life in our animal bodies:

> But Genius is not only spirituality, it doesn't appertain only to things that we are used to considering as the highest and most noble. All that is impersonal in us is ingenious. Above all, ingenious is the force that drives the blood coursing through our veins, or that which causes us to sink into a deep sleep; ingenious is the unknown power in our bodies that regulates and distributes warmth so delicately, and limbers up or contracts the fibres of our muscles. It is genius who we obscurely exhibit in the intimacy of our physiological life, there where the most personal is the most alien and impersonal, the closest is the most remote and uncontrollable (Agamben, 2006: 96).

There is also a legacy, in architectural discourse, of this notion of genius which is expressed in the term, 'genius loci', translated as the 'spirit of place' or what, in a fundamental way, constitutes the taking place of architecture as its essential constituting force. Would it be possible to pose for architecture the kinds of complications offered by Agamben with his notion of genius? This would amount to developing some complicity between what I understand as the essential constituting force of architecture's 'taking place', and the very drives that make up the impulsive becoming of bodies. This paper approaches the possibility of considering such a complicity in a reading of two texts by the psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, both written at about the same time. One concerns architecture and sublimation discussed in the context of perspectival space and anamorphic construction; the other concerns the subversion of the subject as a void or nothing for the signifier. Both texts are particularly concerned with an understanding of the notion of the void or nothing that is constitutive of a self or architecture as such.

Sublimation and the Thing

Lacan's mention of architecture is found in *Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (1992 [1959-60]). This material is discussed by Lorens Holm in his essay, "What Lacan said re: architecture" (2000). Holm stresses that Lacan didn't ever say very much about architecture, and perhaps what is more interesting is what architectural theorists say about Lacan, that his comments directly addressing architecture are confined to *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (Holm, 2000: 29).

However, it must be noted that Lacan does indeed discuss architecture in later seminars (in particular *Seminars IX, XI, XVIII* and *XIX*). In *Seminar VII,* Lacan addresses architecture in a chapter titled "Marginal comments". What is interesting here is that these comments do not figure as marginal because they are not stitched onto the end of the seminar, nor are they an addendum to something else, but rather they operate as a kind of *apologia*, an apology for not being prepared:

> I am not this morning in a state of readiness I consider necessary for me to conduct my seminar in the usual manner. And this is especially the case, given the point we have reached, when I particularly want to be able to present you with some very precise formulas. You will thus allow me to put it off until next time (Lacan, 1992: 128).

Lacan wants to talk about Courtly Love in the 12th century as a presentation of anamorphosis, and some weeks later he will do just that. Where he was up to is an emptiness that needs to be skirted around, as if something essential is veiled enough to leave him unprepared to address it with precise formulas. This week's class in the seminar is a filler, a circling around what Lacan actually wants to get at. What he wants to do is present some introductory remarks on anamorphosis, or the scant view, the oblique view of what concerns him directly such that something other comes into view. At stake is his discussion of sublimation in relation to the pleasure principle, and an articulation of how sublimation is constitutive of art, religion and science, which is to say, constitutive of human creation, belief and knowledge, or truth. Sublimation of what? This is sublimation of the Thing, what can never be approached directly:

> Neither science nor religion is of a kind to save the Thing or to give it to us, because the magic circle that separates us from it is imposed by our relation to the signifier. As I have told you, the Thing is that which in the real suffers from this fundamental, initial relation, which commits man to the ways of the signifier by reason of the fact that he is subjected to what Freud calls the pleasure principle, and which, I hope it is clear in your minds, is nothing else than the dominance of the signifier - I, of course, mean the true pleasure principle as it functions in Freud (Lacan, 1992: 134).

What is crucial for Lacan is that while perspective will shore up the processes of sublimation, anamorphosis can precisely show these processes. But I am moving ahead of myself. Lacan suggests that primitive architecture can be defined as something organised around emptiness. He does not mean by this that architecture is a kind of shell determined around an internal void because an empty space needs to be filled up with habitation. This emptiness is what he will qualify by the sacred, and in that sense, not for habitation but for the infinite Thing. The Thing is severed from us, perhaps a Father radically severed or cut from us, perhaps Judaic more so than Greek. Yet, in what he is saying here, Lacan will be doing nothing other than re-emphasising what he had already discussed the week before, precisely in the class titled, "On creation *ex nihilo*".

The Father Thing: God is dead

Lacan emphasises, on many occasions, his faithfulness to Freud, that all of Freud commences with, and never ceases to ask, the question, "What is the father" and ceaselessly works through the father's murder. At the conclusion of the chapter "On creation *ex nihilo*", Lacan notes:

> It is obvious that God is dead. That is something Freud expresses from one end of his myth to the other; since God derives from the fact that the Father is dead, that clearly means we have all noticed that God is dead (126).

Lacan is treating here the relation between the creature and the creator, the attributions of creation in processes of sublimation of the creature's drives at the insistence of the signifier as constitution of pleasure:

> And here we encounter linguistic usage that, at least in connection with sublimation in the sphere of art, never hesitates to speak of creation. We must now, therefore, consider the notion of creation with all it implies, a knowledge of the creature and of the creator, because it is central, not only for our theme of the motive of sublimation, but also that of ethics in its broadest sense (119).

A number of key notions need to be kept in play. The Thing is fundamentally veiled, concealed, hidden, by precisely that which we encircle or bypass in order to conceive of it. It is that which, in the real, suffers from the signifier, as an emptiness un-representable. The Thing is the place of the drives, and this place is what I want to emphasise throughout this paper as a concern with genius loci. "I" am that nothing that separates the organization of a signifying network as representation and the constitution in the real of the place in which the field of the Thing as such presents itself. For Lacan, the real is not 'reality' as we would conceive of our world securely known. Rather, such a notion of reality is constituted, for Lacan, through the signifying structures of language and imaginary, or fantasy projections. The real is constituted in that lost Thing referred to here, and constitutes the unsecurable object of desire. This place of the Thing, determinable in our bypassing or encircling it, is the locus of the object, always already constituted as found, or more precisely refound, as if it has been lost. It would be what we have been looking for, as if it were there all along to find. This re-finding opens the Thing - by virtue of its structure - to be represented by something else, and, in this sense of a something else, the locus is always already doubled. Moreover, as it is the human creature that is capable of manipulating signifiers, this creature is the creator of that which will come to represent the Thing, that place of the creature's drives. The function of the pleasure principle is to lead this creature, as subject, from signifier to signifier.

The signifying network will sublimate what is not bearable in the Thing, as the hole in the real. But every fabrication, every creation will be possible only from the position of this hole, this nothing in the real that is the Thing. Every creation is *ex-nihilo,* or from the place of the nothing, which is to say from the locus of the drives. Here can be recognised a repetition with Hegel, in the sacred origins of primitive architecture already necessitating a prior originary moment in the

still more primitive vessel that will serve as its model (Hegel, 1975: 632). However, I would also emphasise that there is a strict refusal of Hegel in that the veiled Thing, the nothing, the sacred will not arrive as the Other Thing, as a process of sublation, of dialectical mastery. This may be emphasised in Lacan's repeated insistence that the unconscious is not in a relation of negation to consciousness: "In the Freudian field, the words notwithstanding, consciousness is a characteristic that is as obsolete to us in grounding the unconscious - for we cannot ground it on the negation of consciousness …" (Lacan, 2002: 286). That sublimation is not coterminous with sublation may be emphasised in a marginal comment made by Lacan concerning the equivalence of the fashioning of the signifier, and the introduction of a gap or hole in the real. He suggests:

> Modern science, the kind that was born with Galileo, could only have developed out of biblical or judaic ideology, and not out of ancient philosophy or the Aristotelian tradition. The increasing power of symbolic mastery has not stopped enlarging its field of operation since Galileo, has not stopped consuming around it any reference that would limit its scope to intuited data; by allowing free reign to the play of signifiers, it has given rise to a science whose laws develop in the direction of an increasingly coherent whole, but without anything being less motivated than what exists at any given point (Lacan, 1992: 122).

This "given point" would be entirely the point of perspective's infinitising, its vanishing points whose cones of projection enable a subject, and a world, to find their moment on an abstract plane of existence. And this would be the death of God: "In other words, the vault of the heavens no longer exists, and all the celestial bodies, which are the best reference point there, appear as if they could just as well not be there" (122). This severance from the Father, this cut may be considered in the cut of perspective's cone of projection that constitutes the picture plane, and the orthogonal nature of this cut in all perspectival constructions constituting a centrism. The ex-centrism of this construction is established in an oblique cut that figures an ellipsis that is decentring in the distortions it projects. I read this ellipsis in anamorphism, as the necessity in having to reconstitute one's point of view. This contingency of a reference point is constitutive of the accident that ultimately grounds all knowing, and concedes truth, in truth, as trauma. Trauma is understood in terms of a repetition anxiety triggered by accident. The import of this Lacanian reading is that the finding of the Other Thing, as the work of truth, is a compulsive repetition of circling the hole of the real that constitutes the essence of truth as a contingent accident.

Marginal projections

Lacan suggests that, with the invention of perspective, this pictorial construction will first of all imitate architecture, as a two dimensional plane that projects a three dimensional volume, to the point where architecture itself will come to imitate the geometrical properties of perspective, as a three dimensional volume approximating a two dimensional plane; and in doing so architecture will come to represent itself (he is thinking, for example, of Palladio's theatre in Vicenza, the *Teatro Olympico*, with its elaborately painted false perspective as a principal spatialising device). With the invention of anamorphism, though, something else

is going on. As Holm states, "architecture and perspective enter the symbolic order" (2000: 36). The symbolic order can be understood as a signifying network that constitutes the Other Thing as a naturalised standpoint, sublimating the trauma of the nothing of any "I" *ex nihilo*. Anamorphism allows us to see the signifying construction as such, and in this allows us to glimpse the veiled Thing, the stain that stands out as the emptiness, the absence of signification in the signifying network.

Holm outlines the series of examples offered by Lacan: Holbein's *The Ambassadors*, with its anamorphic smear in the lower right foreground read as *Vanitas,* or a skull from an oblique angle, at which angle the perspectival space of the painting can no longer be deciphered; "an eighteen-metre long fresco in a chapel built in Descartes' time"; and "an anamorphic copy of a Rubens crucifixion, which is organised around a cylindrical mirror" (2000: 36). Lacan suggests that the pleasure of anamorphic images happens in that moment when something undecipherable pops into recognition. We glimpse the thing behind the surface of the imaginary register; we glimpse illusion as illusion, or the visual field as the Other Thing, as the signifying network's play. When we pull back the visual field to see what is hidden behind it, it is the absent object as the cause of desire, an absence that motivates all of the drives - the visual world as screen for originary loss. This absent object Lacan names the 'object *a*'. After *Seminar VII*, anamorphosis is most thoroughly treated by Lacan in *Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, under the heading of, "Of the Gaze as *Objet Petit a*". If genius loci has a legacy in being considered as the sacred or spirit of place, an infinitising in the finitude of taking place, Lacan would suggest that this locus is that of the Thing, radically voided non-being around which creation's signifying structures skirt in sublimation of the nothing. Architecture would, in this sense, be an originary voiding/avoiding in the securing of a creature's existence, in which perspective is a shoring up of sublimation in a 'natural' standpoint, and anamorphosis is an encounter with the veiled Thing, locus of the motivation of all of the drives.

Separation constitutive of an "I"

At the same time that Lacan was delivering his seminar on *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, he delivered a presentation titled, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious" (2002 [1960]). Through a series of increasingly tortuous graphs, Lacan charts the cut in the signifying chain that is constitutive of the subject of desire, and the relation of the unconscious to the constitution of this subject (2002: 291, 294, 300, 302). That is to say, he deals with the hole in the real that is the Thing and the network of signifiers that make this nothing into a *being*. This text also articulates more clearly Lacan's relation to Hegel as a relation to Freud, or, in short, the difference for Lacan between Hegel and Freud, which amounts to a difference in how each differentiates truth (*savoir*) and knowing (*connaissance*).

I want to emphasise that when Lacan is discussing architecture, he is fundamentally addressing the locus of emptiness, or nothing, in the constitution of being, where the question of being, as such, cannot be separated from the question of the signifier and the signifying networks of a creature's language. The spatialising of this locus adheres to the creature's body. It will be determinable by the privileged instance of the delineating of

> a cut that takes advantage of the anatomical characteristic of a margin or border: the lips, "the enclosure of the teeth," the rim of the anus, the penile groove, the vagina, and the slit formed by the eyelid, not to mention the hollow of the ear (303).

These anatomical marks are constitutive of cuts in a creature's body, assimilable to a metabolism of needs, and out of which come objects cut from this creature's body, "the mamilla, the feces, the phallus (as an imaginary object), and the urinary flow. (An unthinkable list, unless we add … the phoneme, the gaze, the voice … and the nothing) (303). Two preliminary comments on these cuts. First, the body's drives will isolate these cuts or "erogenous zones … from the function's metabolism" (303). That is what the drives do, and their isolating phenomenon is the locus or locale we are suggesting as the nothing of the Thing. Second, these objects "have no specular image … no alterity", which means there is no Other Thing that establishes these objects in a signifying network (303). This enables "them to be the 'stuff' or … the lining" of what will have become the subject, but not the reverse of the subject, that one takes to be the speaking subject, the "subject of consciousness" (303). Rather,

> this subject, who thinks he can accede to himself by designating himself in the statement, is nothing but such an object. … It is to this object that cannot be grasped in the mirror that the specular image lends its clothes (303).

If, as Lacan suggests, "a signifier is what represents the subject to another signifier", "I" as subject come on the scene as the being of non-being, as the trace of what must be in order to fall from being, of a true survival abolished by a knowledge of itself, and by a discourse in which it is death that sustains existence, under the formula: "He did not know that he was dead" as the relation of the subject to the signifier in an enunciation whose being trembles with the vacillation that comes back to it from its own statement (304). We need to see in this a precise articulation of anamorphism, of a supposedly radical loss of disclosure, whose true disclosure is the disclosure of the scene of radical loss. This would also be within the province of all accounting or forms of bookkeeping for filiation and history. Genius Loci bears on the place of this radical loss that is circled around, the Thing obliquely glimpsed, this Thing that is also a No-Thing, in the sense that the Thing and its place are not necessarily distinguishable. Lacan emphasises that the creature's body, its real stuff, is born prematurely, which has significant implications on how this body of drives and metabolism negotiates its prolonged dependency, primarily in the relations of need and demand that it establishes, where demand is constituted in the signifier, which is to say in the inter- and intra-subjective. Primarily constituted in dependency, all demand made by this creature will be demand for love from the Other, where love is understood in an economy of deficiency; love will come to be what the Other cannot give, the fault of the Other. However, there is a third term, irreducible to demand and need, and this is desire that is articulated but not articulable:

> there is no demand that does not in some respect pass through the de-files of the signifier. … man's inability to move, much less be self-sufficient, for some time after birth provides grounds for a psychology of dependence, … this dependence is maintained by a universe of

> language. … needs have been diversified and geared down by and through language to such an extent that their import appears to be of quite a different order. … these needs have passed over into the register of desire. … What psychoanalysis shows us about desire in what might be called its most natural function, since the survival of the species depends on it, is not only that it is subjected, in its agency, its appropriation, and even its very normality, to the accidents of the subject's history (the notion of trauma as contingency), but also that all this requires the assistance of structural elements - which, in order to intervene, can do very well without these accidents. The inharmonious, unexpected, and recalcitrant impact of these elements certainly seems to leave to the experience [of desire in its most natural function] a residue that drove Freud to admit that sexuality had to bear the mark of some hardly natural flaw (297-298).

These structural elements, locus of the signifier, are constituted in the unconscious, or what the subject does not know he is saying. The locus of the signifier is the Other (who does not exist other than as a structural locus of the enunciating subject): "No authoritive statement has any other guarantee than its very enunciation" (298). There cannot be another signifier that is not in this locus, in the sense "that there is no Other of the Other", which is to say, "there can be no metalanguage", no other to language outside of language by which language would be understood (298). We cannot emphasise enough this formula of Lacan's that is easily glided over or missed, "that there is no Other of the Other", which means that there is no locus of exteriority to the structural element of the unconscious to which a subject has recourse as a verification of a statement of authority or authenticity. The Other is not the other person or thing, neither as substance or locus. As we have said, all demand implies a request for love, while desire "begins to take shape in the margin in which demand rips away from need", where need becomes *represented* by a subjective opacity, producing the substance of desire, and demand becomes anxiety as unconditional appeal to the Other, a signifying network, having "no universal satisfaction" (299).

The Other's response, which is to say the response of the place of the signifier, to a subject of demand, in deficit, is a "phantom of Omnipotence" in the sense that the question of the Other comes back to the subject from the place from which he expects a reply to "What do you want?" (299-300). The question "leads the subject to the path of his own desire" by reformulating it, "without knowing it", as "What does he want from me?" (300). Crucial to this creature's relation to his desire is not a concern with what he demands, but a concern as to *where* he desires. I am maintaining the notion of creature in order to emphasise Lacan's discussion of creation *ex nihilo* as "a question of what man does when he makes a signifier" (Lacan, 1992: 119). Hence, "the unconscious is (the) discourse of the Other … (objective determination)", and "man's desire is the Other's desire … a 'subjective determination' - namely, that it is qua Other that man desires (this is what provides the true scope of human passion)" (Lacan, 2002: 300). And desire changes according to fantasy as that which "is really the 'stuff' of the *I* that is primally repressed" (302). The subject of the unconscious cannot be designated as the subject of a statement, as the articulator, since this subject of the unconscious, from the place of the Other, "does not even know he is speaking" (302). Hence, it can be understood how it is that the discourse of the drives will come to articu-

late this subject, now "designated on the basis of a pinpointing that is organic, oral and anal" such that "the more he speaks, the further he is from speaking" (302).

Only the cut, that trait that distinguishes the drive from its organic function, remains as a signifier (302). As there can be no Other of the Other, the subject's unconscious enunciation can only be located in the Other as that Other's lack, its deficit. It is only in this sense that the subject is a lack, void, nothing for a signifier. But this void or nothing is the shoring up or protection of the place of the "I", a protecting or sheltering that goes by the name jouissance, which requires more complexity in its translations than terms such as 'ecstatic pleasure'. Jouissance should not be collapsed with desire, or with a notion of pleasure or satisfaction. If it is a place of shelter or protection, it protects precisely the contingent nothing that I am, and shores it up for and against demand's response constituted in a signifying network. Hence, the subject cannot be that Other's Other. In this sense the signifier, the locus of the Other is that which represents the subject for another signifier:

> *I* am in the place from which 'the universe is a flaw in the purity of Non-Being' is vociferated. … by protecting itself, this place makes Being itself languish. This place is called Jouissance, and it is Jouissance whose absence would render the universe vain (305).

Jouissance is the locus of the nothing of the signifier for which all other signifiers represent the subject, the emptiness that is the hole in the real around which we skirt. Through an economy that perhaps marks the fundamental structure of the *oikos*, household, holy family or filiations to dead fathers and mothers, this jouissance is usually forbidden me:

> Am I responsible for it, then? Yes, of course. Is this Jouissance, the lack of which makes the Other inconsistent, mine, then? Experience proves that it is usually forbidden me, not only, as certain fools would have it, due to bad societal arrangements, but, I would say, because the Other is to blame - if he was to exist, that is. But since he doesn't exist, all that's left for me is to place the blame on I, that is, to believe in what experience leads us all to, Freud at the head of the list: original sin (305).

Thus, Lacan suggests "that jouissance is prohibited to whomever speaks. … it is pleasure that sets limits to jouissance, pleasure as what binds incoherent life together" (306). The mark of the prohibition of the infinitude of jouissance, the finitude of the subject inscribed in the pleasure of the signifying network, is signified in the unnatural splitting of sexuality at the level of the interventions of desire as the locus of the Other: the phallus as negativity in the place of the specular image, the object *a* or Thing, that non-being which we encircle in order to be (306). In this sense, the phallus embodies "jouissance in the dialectic of desire", while castration is the name given to the work of the signifying network in the pleasure principle, as a principle of sacrifice but as well as the possibility of knowing (307).

Genius loci could be thought of as that place of the Other, whose demand we make our own, whose locus is the locus of the discourse of our unconscious enunciation, and whose locale is that of our desire. But then, perhaps more radically, and

impossibly, genius loci would be that place called jouissance, an incoherency, stain of the real, stuff of the "I", infinitisation of the drives, glimpsed, in its horror perhaps, as our own deficit of being, the non-being that is the clamour of being: "For this subject, who thinks he can accede to himself by designating himself in the statement, is nothing but such an object" (303). Would this enable me to say something more concerning architecture, where I would think of architecture as a locus of structural elements, in the abstract sense that I have given for an understanding of jouissance? This would suggest that something is always already forbidden in architecture's presentation. In a way, Lacan has said as much in his pronouncement on the void that centres architecture and the skirting around of this Thing, or the glimpse that can be made of the horror once architecture enters the symbolic order of representation in something like a sublation to painting, in anamorphism.

Equally, I would acknowledge a long history of architecture's Classical legacy in deriving from its *genius loci*, its authentic or originating unfolding in the circumstance of its place, placing or placement. But, ultimately, it is necessary to recognise that the Thing is not a material substance in the world, veiled in its knowing, a form-content relation waiting for revelation or actualisation, that self and world are not bifurcated like this. What Lacan says regarding architecture attunes us more closely to something essential in the primordial relations that establish the structural elements for the signifying networks of architecture's discourses: separation, locus, protection. It is, perhaps, protection as a sheltering securing that is privileged here, and one would want to understand how Lacanian jouissance, as a forbidden protecting locale, is at once a primordial articulation of the essence of architecture, and a powerful moment of critical analysis, resonating with the uncanny in both Freud and Heidegger, as a primordial relation to homelessness.

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“I AM”:
Colin McCahon Genius or Apostle?

Laurence Simmons

Genius

Genius is a most difficult subject to talk about, seeming as it does to put us in touch with something other than ourselves, something we may never, perforce, be able to understand, while leaving us open, in the process of investigating and proclaiming it, to be read ourselves as tragic overreachers, lacking in true intellectual humility. The easy scholarly path might be to distance oneself from genius, to re-conceive of it dispassionately, hands off, so we might more accurately represent the truth of its object. Or, should that be, its subjects? But just as the closer we seem to approach it the more unknowable it appears, so the more distance we place between it and ourselves the more unknowable genius also seems in its very aloofness. It could be that the question of genius consists in the absence of a relation to knowing. This absence of relation invites at least two different types of evaluation, inexhaustible and contradictory: first there are those who seek to wage war on genius, to chop off its self-conceited head should it appear above the parapet, those who feel threatened by genius and desire ‘to chop down tall poppies’, as we so often say in poppy-less New Zealand; and then there are those who relinquish themselves in front of it, lay down in a stupor of timidity and awe that finally resolves itself in outright passivity. What links these two efforts, in terms of shared rhetorical energy, is sheer intimidation of mind where language, either through exasperation or linguistic lassitude - a sort of stammer of fury or ineptitude - meets its unmaking.

Despite all these problems, I am going to stick with genius, to track it and trace it, to open myself to it (oh, that some of it might rub off!), to discover in each (nearly missed) encounter with it a fundamental inability to know it, completely or objectively, and a fundamental inability to represent it. Of course, my encounter here, so far, reflects that encounter with *Genie*, or genius, which Kant faces on the margins of several of his texts. Genius is a natural endowment, deep, strange and mysterious. We ought not to expect, Kant claims, that genius can explain itself. Kant argues that the genius does not himself know; he has not learned and cannot teach what he has produced. Elsewhere Kant specifies that we are not dealing with a flash of something like inspiration, but rather with the slow and even painful process of improvement.[1] This is why genius flashes, like an instantaneous phenomenon which manifests itself in intervals, and then disappears again; it cannot be turned on at will like a light. All of this — the occasion of luminous self-dissemination, of the violent flash and gaiety of a sudden crisis and loss (but perhaps it is not loss since genius was never sought) of self-knowledge, the invention of the unteachable and unlearnable - for Kant, exceeds the structure of the possibility of all that which belongs to the specifically Germanic. Genius comes from elsewhere, it arises on foreign territory; by extension, it is foreign

1 Genius, Kant also says, is the talent capable of “discovering that which cannot be taught or learned” (1974: 234).

to philosophy, or at least to the German "temperament of cold reflection" (Kant, 1974 [1798]: 233). But if genius is seen to yield to thought, to surrender and annex itself to the strength of philosophy, this must derive from the way it resists substantialization into an entity that would be opposable to thought. In this sense, although deriving from elsewhere, the absence of a relation to knowing that is genius, is something that can be known. While not offering a detailed history of the concept of genius, I shall draw upon a selection of philosophical perspectives to show how genius entails a process of othering that splits the individual from their gift.

2 Genius is linked etymologically with generare, or generation as the personification of sexual energy, and ingenium as the apex of innate physical and moral qualities of the person who comes into being.

Individual or Individuation?

In Giorgio Agamben's short essay on "Genius", where he advances a theory of the subject reformulated as the relationship between genius and 'I',[2] the concept of genius represents "in some way the divine essence of the self" (2006: 94). This implies that the human being is not only consciousness, but that an impersonal, pre-individual element also lives inside us to whose spur we must constantly respond. The subject, suggests Agamben, is not an essence but rather a field of tensions that is covered by two joined but opposing forces, moving from the individual to the impersonal and vice-versa. The human being is the result of a complicated dialectic between a part that is impersonal, and not (yet) isolated, and another side marked by individual experience. These forces intersect and they separate out; they can never perfectly merge nor can they completely free themselves from the other. Genius is the most intimate but also the most impersonal part of us: "the personalization of that, within us, which surpasses and exceeds ourselves" (95). Agamben suggests, "To live with genius means, in this way, to live in the intimacy of an alien being" (96).

According to Agamben, we all need to come to an accommodation with genius, "with that inside us which does not belong to us" (98). Let us take the example of the writer: the desire to write signifies an impersonal power to write somewhere inside me. The paradox is that I write to become impersonal. However, by writing I become identified as the author of this or that work, which in turn becomes personalized. Thus, says Agamben, I perforce distance myself "from Genius, who may never have the form of an 'I', and even less that of an author" (96). Every effort of my authorial 'I' to appropriate genius is destined to fail, for "only a work that is revoked and undone can be worthy of Genius" (96).

Genius or Apostle?

In both his aesthetic pseudonymous works, and those ethical and religious writings published under his own name, Kierkegaard reminds us that he speaks without authority. He says in his essay "On My Work as an Author", "From the very beginning, I have stressed and repeated unchanged that I was 'without authority'. I regard myself rather as a reader of the books, not as the author" (1998a [1851]: 12). The question of authorship is covered more extensively by Kierkegaard in *The Book on Adler* of which only one chapter, entitled "Of the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle", was published during Kierkegaard's lifetime. It responded to the writings of Adolf Peter Adler (1812-1869), a minor

Danish preacher. In 1843 Adler published a collection of his sermons in which he distinguished between those he had written in the normal manner, and those he had written assisted by what he called the spirit. The following year he was suspended by the Bishop of Mynster and in 1845, following an inquiry, he was deposed. Adler later conceded his revelation was a mistake; but then, to make matters worse, he declared that his sermons of revelation had really been works of his genius. Kierkegaard's writing about Adler is a mixture of sympathy for someone who has suffered at the hands of authority, and frustration with someone who, he claims, is confused. He also understands Adler as a representative of his age, someone who embodies all the contemporary confusion about questions of authority and revelation in the nineteenth century.

Kierkegaard asserts that Adler confuses the categories of genius and divine revelation, or, as he puts it, Adler is confused between the state of a genius and that of an apostle, who is associated with the absolute (the religious) and speaking with (divine) authority. What, then, asks Kierkegaard, is the nature of authority: is it about doctrinal profundity, excellence or brilliance? He thinks not, since the difference between a learner and a teacher is not simply about understanding the doctrine, but also about "a specific quality that enters from somewhere else and qualitatively asserts itself precisely when the content of the statement or the act is made a matter of indifference aesthetically" (1998b [1848]: 175).

Kierkegaard notes that the apostle speaks directly and under inspiration, and hence with authority. The genius has no such authority. First, the genius belongs to the sphere of immanence, the apostle to the sphere of transcendence (174). The original contributions of genius will eventually be assimilated by others, whereas those of an apostle retain forever their startling newness. Secondly, genius is what it is out of its own resources, whereas apostles are apostles by virtue of being appointed by divine authority. Thirdly, the goal of genius is fulfilled in the completion of an immanent work of genius, while an apostle carries out work only in order to fulfil an "absolute paradoxical teleology", or a purpose that transcends the work itself (175). Thus authority is not immanent but transcendent; it is not rational but paradoxical; it is not a matter of content but of otherness or heterogeneity, of coming from elsewhere.

Kierkegaard reverses the traditional view of genius by declaring the apostle to be the anti-genius: qualitatively different, a genius and an apostle belong each in different qualitative spheres of immanence and transcendence. When Kierkegaard defines the genius by what he is by himself (in himself), and an apostle by what he is by his divine authority, he refers to the traditional definition of genius as a passive endowment or gift that has no active component. "Genius, as the word itself says (*ingenium*, the innate, primitivity (*primus*), originality (*origo*), pristineness, etc.), is immediacy, natural qualifications - the genius is *born*" (175). Kierkegaard's genius is only a temporary exception and paradox, while the apostle is absolute. A genius may be paradoxical in his first communication, but the more he comes to himself the more the paradoxical vanishes. The apostle is first and foremost difference: "It is different with an apostle. The word itself (it means 'one who is sent' in Greek) indicates the difference. An apostle is not born; an apostle is a man who is called and appointed by God and sent by him on a mission" (176). This is what Kierkegaard designates as "the paradoxical-religious relation" (181).

In *Philosophical Fragments* (1985 [1844]), Kierkegaard makes a distinction between *philosophy* and *theology* over this question of the transferential relationship to truth. Whereas, in traditional philosophy, a philosopher like Socrates is only the midwife for a timeless and eternal truth, in Christian doxa the truth of a statement lies, not in what is said, but, in the authority of the one who speaks. The truth of Christ's message lies not in any actual content but in the very fact that Christ said it. This is the meaning behind Kierkegaard's insistence, undoubtedly a little strange to our ears, that those who believe what Christ is saying because of what He says, reveal themselves not to be Christian: Christians, on the contrary, believe what Christ is saying because it is said by Christ (93).

Yet it is not quite as simple as this, for despite His absolute personal authority, Christ is also only an empty vessel for the Word of another. In other words, Christ only possesses authority because He carries the higher transcendent Word of God. It is in what He transmits and not in Christ Himself that His power lies. Or, to use Kierkegaard's own distinction, Christ is not so much a genius as an apostle. This seems to pose a dilemma, for while the authority of Christ lies not in what He says but only in His personal authority, He only retains this personal authority insofar as He transmits directly and without mediation the Word of God. What then lies at the impossible intersection of these two sets - Christ's life and His teachings? How may we think together these two elements that at once exclude and necessitate each other?

Practical Religion

The second chapter of The Letter of James, especially verses 17-21, was Søren Kierkegaard's favorite passage of Scripture. "Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works" (James 2: 18 King James Version). [3]

For Kierkegaard, this was an important parable about the reading of scripture. Taking up the metaphor, he argued for an understanding of God's word as a mirror in which one should observe oneself and not merely as a doctrine, "something impersonal and objective". For,

> if you want to relate impersonally (objectively) to God's Word, there can be no question of looking at yourself in the mirror, because it takes a personality, an I, to look at oneself in a mirror … while reading God's Word you must incessantly say to yourself: It is I to whom it is speaking; it is I about whom it is speaking (1990 [1851]: 43-44).

I want to suggest that this statement of Kierkegaard's is critical to Colin McCahon's understanding of his own painting, and is also an effective mechanism for considering how his use of biblical quotations in painting can be conceived autobiographically. I shall endeavour to weave all these themes together through an examination of a series of works by McCahon entitled *Practical Religion*, in particular the subgroup based on The Letter of James.

The most elemental feature of these works is their form. These paintings, now popularly known as scrolls, are crayon and wash texts on blank wallpaper stock.

3 Kierkegaard declared The Letter of James to be his only love, to which he returned again and again.

According to McCahon scholar and biographer Gordon H. Brown, "The scrolls were all produced in 1969, most during August or September" (2003: 3). McCahon eventually completed 72 scrolls that were hung together edge to edge to create an installation at the Barry Lett Galleries in October 1969, of which *Practical Religion*, containing instructions for everyday life drawn from The Letter of James, was a subgroup.

In terms of art historical tradition, McCahon's paintings also allude to the visualization of oral sequences of words and sentences painted on a scroll, frequently found in Renaissance paintings.[4] McCahon's choice to illustrate (or appropriate?) The Letter of James is as unusual as Kierkegaard's appreciation of it was. In the seventeenth century, Luther had dismissed the Letter as "an epistle of straw", and it was far from popular in the twentieth century – often rejected as lacking unity (Williams, 1965: 92). This raises another point about the *Practical Religion* subseries, the question of its address. The key to understanding James is the rhetorical figure of *paraenesis* or *protrepsis*, an exhortation that employs traditional ethical teaching and consists mainly of short sayings and commands. James is full of these: "Do not deceive yourselves, my friends" (1: 16); "Only be sure that you act on the message and do not merely listen" (1: 22); "Come close to God, and he will come close to you" (4: 8). The Letter begins with the stereotypical traditional epistolary form of opening (of X to Y), "From James, a servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ. Greetings to the Twelve Tribes dispersed throughout the world" (James 1: 1). The question of address raises the question of authorship and, in the case of McCahon's painting, the question of the appropriation of another's (James's) address. This address, in using words of another, implies a certain self-absence. When McCahon calls up speech, or at least a voice, we might say that his is an avowal, in the sense of the root of the English word *avow* - to call to one's aid the voice or speech of another.[5] The *advocate*, another word from the same root, is called to speak in place of the other, to lend his or her voice to the other's cause. I want to argue that this process is embedded in the selections from The Letter of James which McCahon chooses to illustrate.

As the body is dead … (1969), a painting on hardboard, draws upon James 2 (not 3 as McCahon incorrectly suggests in the upper right corner), verses 16, 18 and 26, from a section that looks at the relation between faith and action.[6] I want reflect upon the two texts in the lower half of the painting. The wider textual context for the phrase is verse 18:

> But someone may object "Here is one who claims to have faith and another who points to his deeds." To which I reply: *"Prove to me that this faith you speak of is real though not accompanied by deeds, and by my deeds* I will prove to you my faith" (James 2: 18 New English Bible, emphases added).

Part of James's reply (italicized) is quoted by McCahon, and it is this very verse which, in giving the views of an unidentified objector, is ambiguous. McCahon gives the response to the unnamed objector. We need to ask who is the person speaking? Who is the objector? Is he speaking as a friend or opponent of James? Could the person speaking (objecting) be James himself, or James projecting himself? The words McCahon adopted from the New English Bible, "To which I reply", are not to be found in the Greek original. That is, there is nothing in the

4 For instance, in Jacobello del Fiore's 1421 *Justice between the Archangels Michael and Gabriel*. In Renaissance painting a scroll often identified its bearer as an Old Testament Prophet. The inscriptions on these scrolls were often legible, especially when the individual was associated with a familiar text, such as the 'Ecce Angelus Dei' of St John the Baptist. In many cases the writing was illegible or false, for example fictive Hebrew. A scroll also often signified speech and sometimes emanated from the speaker's mouth while a codex signified writing. The most familiar example of visualized speech is the dialogue between Gabriel and the Virgin Mary at the Annunciation. See Sparrow (1969) and Covi (1986).

5 Voice is a multi-semic notion with divergent meanings. The grammatical category of voice refers to the speaker of an utterance, the implicit or explicit 'I' supposedly speaking. It also refers to the form in which this subject speaks, the register. In the analysis of narratives, the concept enables us to address the question 'Who speaks?' and thus almost automatically entails the question of intention. With its connotation of bodiliness the term voice brings to mind Jacques Derrida's critique of the preference for voice over writing in *Of Grammatology*. For a discussion of the voice of prophetic suffering in McCahon see Pound (1993: 3-12).

6 Colin McCahon, *As the body is dead … (James 3: Practical Religion)*, 1969, acrylic on hardboard, Private Collection, Auckland, [cm 1625].

7 Colin McCahon, *A word with you … (James 5: Practical Religion)*, 1969, conte crayon on wallpaper stock, Private Collection, [cm 56].

Greek to make it clear that a change of speaker is intended, which would imply that James speaks the words of the objector, too.

The phrase reproduced in capitals from verse 16 at the bottom of the painting is similarly fraught with ambiguity. The wider textual context for this phrase is:

> My brothers, what use is it for a man to say he has faith when he does nothing to show it? Can that faith save him? Suppose a brother or sister is in rags with not enough food for the day, and one of you says, *"Good luck to you, keep yourselves warm, and have plenty to eat"*, but does nothing to supply their bodily needs, what is the good of that? So with faith; if it does not lead to action, it is in itself a lifeless thing (James 2: 14-17, emphases added).

"Good luck to you ..." is a voice projected by the voice of James on to one of us, you or I. In some way we are made to say this phrase: "one of you says" it tells us. But it is also a phrase that comes from the outside, that is uttered by James and in turn avowed by McCahon in his painting. McCahon, too, makes us speak the phrase by putting it in quotation marks. In both examples, the question 'who speaks?' is thus foregrounded through the problems of trying to project McCahon's voice into the textual space of the painting, and our own imbrication as reader/spectators in its saying. In a sense, the 'who speaks?' is doubly removed, for the voice is lifted from its original reference in the New English Bible which already contains a shadowy interlocutor - whether that be the objector, or ourselves or ultimately, of course, God.

McCahon's work also raises important methodological questions. What does it mean to represent the voice in painting, silently, pictorially? How can the word (or the Word) be sent to sight? Where is the site of that sending? How might we hear the voice with our eye, or with our 'I'? McCahon's work implies a shift of both the voice and its signs towards the figural. It explores the connection between voice and motifs of visual representation, where the voice is manifested in the syncopes of the figurative mechanism, the signs that mark the space between saying and inscription. His choice and painting of text strains towards the moments where the force of the voice shows itself to the gaze, and where it reveals the things that allow us to hear a voice in painting. These works struggle with, and through, the attempt to make the force of the voice visible. This struggle is also reinforced by the way the words are painted: how the section referencing the living deeds of faith is placed above the horizontal line we might take to represent the earth's surface; how the capital "P" of "Prove" and the word "accompanied" are given special painterly emphasis. Even through its very materiality, McCahon's painting in this instance can be understood as a theoretical object that interrogates the relations of convertibility between saying and seeing. This relation is heightened in those of McCahon's paintings which take the word as their subject matter.

The presence of the voice in these paintings does not only have to do with a sequence articulated in words or sentences on the scroll or painting that might be read, but it resides in the moments in which a given sentence or formula was pronounced. Let me offer a few more examples from *Practical Religion*. "A word with you …", from James 4: 13-17, begins one scroll.[7] The voice (of James? of McCahon?) ascribes again a voice for you and I: "*you* who say, 'Today or tomorrow we will go

off to such and such a town and spend a year there trading and making money'" (13, emphasis added); and "What *you* ought to say is: 'If it be the Lord's will, we shall live to do this or that'" (15, emphasis added). The Letter of James also thematicizes the question of speech, the importance and the dangers of the tongue. It is not by chance that in the first scroll I referred to, at the bottom of the text separated out from the rest, we find the verse: "So with the tongue. It is a small member but it can make huge claims" (James 3: 5).[8] Two scrolls, based on the text from the Letter, look at the consequences of uncontrolled speech. "And the tongue is in effect a fire" (6), "Out of the same mouth come praises and curses" (10) (James 3: 6-12 and 10-12).[9]

It is also significant that an important painting like *Victory over Death 2* (1970), which I cannot discuss here, has recently been read, with its monumental 'I AM', as intensifying "the uncertainty that surrounds the figure of the written 'I' in McCahon's art" (Smythe, 2004: 28). While not labelling it as such on the canvas, McCahon was careful to note in his Survey Exhibition catalogue that this painting "belongs to the *Practical Religion* series - a simple I AM at first. But not so simple really as doubts do come in here too. I believe, but don't believe" (1972: 29).[10]

(Auto)biography

McCahon's work has long been studied from an (auto)biographical perspective, relying on the artist's own statements to analyse his paintings. Until recently, the figure of the painter Colin McCahon may have profoundly affected critical response to his work, perhaps even straight-jacketed it. "My painting is almost entirely autobiographical — it tells you where I am at any given point, where I am living and the direction I am pointing in", claims McCahon (26). I am intrigued by the notion of McCahon somehow 'destining' or 'programming' his fate, how his work is actually about this destiny or destination and how it both predicts and creates for itself a future. This is, indeed, close to the idea of religious prophecy (and thus can be linked to McCahon's subject matter), but this sense of fate or destiny cannot be separated from the day-to-day machinations of actually creating an artistic reputation in a small settler culture with a nascent art market. Again, the point here is that this sense of destiny is not to be thought of as somehow contrary to McCahon's religious beliefs (either in the sense of a willless predestination or a lack of Christian charity), but is absolutely the expression of them. In other words, McCahon's religiosity and his art-world manipulations should not be seen as opposed: the two are absolutely the same thing. It should also be clear that I do not find McCahon's actions, in a moral sense, reprehensible in any way.[11]

As the first stage of this investigation let me briefly examine the actual specifics and mechanics of the production of McCahon's reputation; how he systematically set about to do all the things possible that would ensure his work's future, to diminish his rivals, etc. In the early 1940s McCahon worked in relative obscurity and had little in the way of a media profile. However, during 1947 and 1948, McCahon's public profile swung to the opposite extreme, as he consciously organized a medley of one-person shows at various locations throughout the entire country: Dunedin's Modern Books, the Lower Hutt Public Library, the Helen Hitchings Gallery in Wellington, Amalgamated Studios in Auckland, numerous

8 Colin McCahon, *My brothers not many among you … (James 3: Practical Religion)*, 1969, water-based crayon and wash on wallpaper stock, [cm 63].

9 Respectively, *What a huge stack of timber… (James 3: Practical Religion)*, 1969, conte crayon on wallpaper stock, Private Collection, [cm 79]; and *Out of the same mouth come praises … (James 3: Practical Religion*, 1969, charcoal and traces of watercolour on wallpaper stock, Private Collection, [cm 960].

10 Another painting which does contain the inscription is the equally monumental *Practical Religion: The Resurrection of Lazarus Showing Mt Martha* (1969-70). See my discussion of this work (2003: 11-27).

11 My itinerary is selective and I am drawing upon the copious detail of a recent superbly researched PhD thesis on McCahon by Richard Lummis (2004).

Group shows in Christchurch. Although these venues might seem inauspicious to us today, this frenzied exposure was a remarkable feat in the cultural context of the day, and McCahon's stock accordingly rose. He was taken up as the critics' *cause célèbre* and these exhibitions generated over 19 published critical responses, including those from A.R.D. Fairburn, James K. Baxter, J.C. Beaglehole, Rita Angus, Louis Johnson and Charles Brasch. At this early point McCahon's art was visited and sustained by some of New Zealand's most articulate voices. McCahon's ascendancy was meteoric, and the volume of writing his work provoked was unprecedented. This was even more remarkable in that the arts scene of the time was devoid of even the most rudimentary infrastructures that might aid any aspiring career-minded artist. The making of McCahon as a figure of national notoriety also had much to do with his intimacy with Charles Brasch, most obviously in Brasch's capacity as editor of *Landfall*. But Brasch also took on McCahon as a talent in need of fostering, mentoring and financing. Not only did he regularly buy works directly, he also facilitated commissions, gifted money and financed McCahon's trip to Australia in 1951. The activities of the writers who helped put McCahon on the map are well-documented in the archives and the critical literature.

McCahon has often been characterized, and increasingly mythologized, as a victim of widespread critical and ad *hominem* hostility particularly at the outset of his career. In contrast to these sentimental accounts of the artist's heroic struggle it would be more profitable to establish how the impediments, and at times negative response, in fact contributed to the discursive invention and institutionalization of McCahon, how the negative talk might have helped a prominent profile.

Profanation

Let me now see if I can bring my various threads together. What holds together Agamben's reformulation of the subject as a process of individuation between 'I' and Genius, Kierkegaard's distinction between a genius and an apostle, and McCahon's insistence upon practical religion and his worldliness as a sign of his genius, is that they all involve a mediation between the sacred and profane. Before proceeding any further, it is necessary to distinguish here between secularization and profanation. Secularization is a form of displacement which leaves basic forces intact; for example, the secularization of theological concepts of politics simply shifts heavenly power to an earthly form but leaves intact the nature of that power. Profanation, on the other hand, implies a neutralization of that which is profaned. Once it has been profaned, that which was separate and untouchable loses its aura and is returned to use. Sacer (sacred) is, in Latin, that which is separated, put aside, subtracted from common usage and, in opposition, profane is that which escapes this separation (etymologically *pro fanum* means before, or outside, the temple). To profane something signifies touching the sacred in order to liberate it. Agamben notes: "To profane signifies opening the possibility of a special form of negligence, which ignores the separation, or rather, makes a special use of it" (2005: 85).

One of those special uses, I have attempted to argue here, is art or more precisely painting. Within the destining or programming of a career, the authenticity of a work of art is reduced to an institutional framing, and to a signature whose reference is precisely the possibility of commodification. As we have seen, the circula-

tion of McCahon's painting cannot do without myths, prophets, paymasters and priests explaining and interpreting it, and I fear that I may have become just one more in that long line. This is not to deny that commodification may incorporate within it the paradox of reflexivity. The problem that the work undergoes as its condition of existence (the impossibility of avoiding the art system) becomes, or can be read as, the theme of the work, its destiny. In this sense, McCahon's work is about its self, its own fate, as it attempts to mediate between the spiritual and the practical, the sacred and the profane. This is why, in a version of ventriloquism, we find McCahon taking on a voice, to lose his own voice, to find it again. As Agamben has reminded us in an interview:

> when your life becomes a work of art, you are not the cause of it. … at this point you feel your own life and yourself as something 'thought', but the subject, the author, is no longer there. The construction of life coincides with what Foucault referred to as '*se deprendre de soi*' (2004: 613).

Foucault's phrase is difficult to translate; it has all the connotations of 'to shake free of the self', 'getting rid of oneself', 'detaching oneself from oneself', 'unlearning oneself', 'taking oneself out of oneself'. Genius is an issue here precisely because it evades our grasp and takes us out of ourselves. As Agamben has noted, "when we love someone we don't really love his genius, nor his character (and even less his "I"), but we love the special way he has of eluding both of these" (2006: 9).

Despite, but also because of, his best intentions, McCahon himself cannot fall outside of the structure of passage from the profane to the sacred and the sacred to the profane, nor can his work. So we might say that McCahon's work falls between Jean-Luc Nancy's two precepts regarding the contemporary Christian framework: "The only current Christianity is one that contemplates the present possibility of its negation"; and "The only current atheism is one that contemplates the reality of its Christian roots" (Nancy, 2001: 113). This is the exceptional place that McCahon occupies in terms of the religious today. It is an exceptional place less in terms of the question of the religious than in terms of the religious as a question.[12] Let me conclude, then, by suggesting that McCahon was no apostle, despite his aspirations to be one, but he was perhaps a genius.

12 See my discussion of McCahon's relationship to the religious as an example of "what Derrida has identified as 'religion without religion', a philosophical discourse that would articulate the structural possibility of the religious without professing a determinate, orthodox faith" (2003: 27).

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Non-refereed Papers, Projects, Reviews, Translations

Genius

Giorgio Agamben
Translation by Laurence Simmons

> Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
> And what strength I have's mine own.
>
> (Prospero to the public, Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, Act V. 1: 2404-5)

This text first appeared separately in Italian as *Genius* (Rome: I sassi nottetempo, 2004). It was subsequently reprinted as one of the collection of essays in *Profanazioni* (Rome: Nottetempo, 2005).

Genius was the name the Latins gave to the god to whom each man was placed under tutelage from the moment of his birth. The etymology is transparent and still visible in Italian in the proximity between *genio* (genius)[1] and *generare* (to generate). That Genius must have had something to do with generation is otherwise evident from the fact that the object pre-eminently considered 'ingenious' ('*geniale*') by the Latins was the bed: *genialis lectus*, because the act of generation was accomplished in bed. And sacred to Genius was the day of one's birth, which because of this, is still called *genetliaco* in Italian. The gifts and the banquets with which we celebrate birthdays are, despite the odious and by now inevitable English refrain, a trace of the festivities and sacrifices which Roman families offered to Genius on the occasion of the birthdays of their family members. Horace speaks of pure wine, a two month-old suckling pig, a lamb "immolato", that is, covered in sauce for its sacrifice; but it seems that, initially there was only incense, wine, and delicious honey focaccia, because Genius, the god who presided at birth, did not welcome bloody sacrifices.

"He is called my Genius, because he generated me (*Genius meus nominatur, quia me genuit*)". But this is not all. Genius was not only the personification of sexual energy. Of course, every male had his Genius, and every woman her Juno, both of which were manifestations of the fecundity that generates and perpetuates life. But, as is evident from the term *ingenium*, which designates the apex of innate physical and moral qualities of the person who comes into being, Genius was in some way the divine essence of the self, the principle that supported and expressed its entire existence. Because of this the forehead was consecrated to Genius, not the sex; and the gesture of bringing one's hand up to touch one's forehead, that we perform without even being aware of ourselves in our moments of confusion at a loss, when it seems that we have almost forgotten our very selves, recalls the ritual gesture of the cult of Genius (*unde venerantes deum tangimus frontem*). And since this god is, in a certain way, the most intimate and personal (*proprio*), it is necessary to placate him and to have him propitious in every aspect and in every moment of one's life.

There is a Latin expression that wonderfully expresses the secret relationship that each one of us must learn to entertain with our own Genius: *indulgere Genio*

1. Agamben consistently uses the Latin word '*Genius*' when he is referring to the deity but the Italian word '*genio*' when he is referring to the earthly quality or attribute [tr. note].

[to indulge Genius]. It is necessary to agree with and abandon oneself to Genius, we must concede everything that he asks of us, because his demands are our demands, his happiness is our happiness. Even if his – our! – expectations might seem unreasonable and capricious, it is better to accept them without question. If, in order to write, you require – he requires! – that yellow paper, that special pen, if you really need that muted light which cuts in from the left, it is useless to say that any pen will do the job, that all paper is good paper, that any light will do. If you can't live without that light blue linen shirt (for heaven's sake, not the white one with the salesman-like collar!); if you can't carry on without those slim cigarettes in the black wrapping paper, it is not good enough to repeat that these are only obsessions, that it's time to display some common sense. *Genium suum defraudare*, to cheat one's own genius is the meaning in Latin: to fill one's life with sadness, to dupe oneself. And *genialis*, pleasant (*geniale*) is the life that distances death's gaze and responds without hesitation to the spur of genius that has generated it.

But this most intimate and personal of gods is also the most impersonal part of us, the personalization of that, within us, which surpasses and exceeds ourselves. "Genius is our life, in as much as it was not given origin by us, but gave us origin". If he seems to identify himself with us, it is only in order to reveal himself immediately afterwards as something more than ourselves, in order to show us that we ourselves are more and less than ourselves. To comprehend the concept of man which is implicit in Genius, means to understand that man is not only 'I'[2] and individual consciousness (*coscienza*),[3] but that from the moment of his birth to that of his death he lives instead with an impersonal and pre-individual component. That is, man is a unique being in two phases, a being who is the result of the complicated dialectic between one side not (yet) singled out (*individuata*) and lived, and another side already marked by fate and by individual experience. But the part that is impersonal and not isolated (*individuata*) is not a chronological past which we have left behind once and for all, and which we can, eventually, recall through memory. It is always present in us and with us and from us, in good times or bad times; it is inseparable. The face of Genius is that of a young man, his long restless wings signify that he does not know time, that when he is very close to us we feel him as a shiver, just as when we were children we felt his breath upon us and his wings beat our feverish temples like a present without memory. This means a birthday cannot be the commemoration of a day that has passed, but like every true festival, it entails the abolition of time, the epiphany and the presence of Genius. And this presence that cannot be separated from us, that prevents us from enclosing ourselves in a substantial identity, is Genius who breaks apart the pretext of the 'I' that it is sufficient for itself alone.

It is said that spirituality is above all this consciousness of the fact that the being singled out (*individuato*) is not entirely identified (*individuato*), but that it still contains inside itself a certain charge of unidentified (*non-individuata*) reality, that it is necessary not only to conserve but also respect and, in some way, to honour, as one honours one's debts. But Genius is not only spirituality, it doesn't appertain only to things that we are used to considering as the highest and most noble. All that is impersonal in us is ingenious (*geniale*). Above all, ingenious (*geniale*) is the force that drives the blood coursing through our veins, or that which causes us to sink into a deep sleep; ingenious is the unknown power in our bodies that regulates and distributes warmth so delicately, and limbers up or contracts the

2. 'Io' in Italian is the first person singular personal pronoun but also the translation of the Freudian psychoanalytic term *'Ich'* (or *'ego'* in the English *Standard Edition* of Freud's works). Lacan was to make the distinction between *'je'* and *'moi'* both of which had been used to translate Freud's *'Ich'*. Lacan refers to the *'je'* as a shifter, which designates but does not signify the subject of the enunciation. I have translated *'io'* as 'I' and retained single quotation marks in order to alert the reader to these associations [tr. note].

3. As well as 'consciousness' in Italian, *coscienza* also carries the meaning of 'conscience' and may be used to convey the idea of capacity or competence in terms of knowledge of a practice [tr. note].

fibres of our muscles. It is Genius who we obscurely exhibit in the intimacy of our physiological life, there where the most personal (*proprio*)[4] is the most alien and impersonal, where that which is closest is the most remote and uncontrollable. If we did not abandon ourselves to Genius, if we were only 'I' and consciousness, we wouldn't even be able to urinate. To live with Genius means, in this way, to live in the intimacy of an alien being, to keep oneself constantly in relation with a zone of non-consciousness (*non-conoscenza*).[5] But this zone of non-consciousness is not a discharge (*rimozione*), it doesn't displace and dislocate an experience from consciousness to unconsciousness, as if it has deposited itself as a disquieting past, ready to flare up again in symptoms and neurosis. The intimacy with a zone of non-consciousness is a daily mystical experience, in which the 'I', in a kind of joyful esotericism, smilingly assists at its own undoing and, whether one is dealing with digestion or with illumination of the mind, it is an incredulous testimony to one's own incessant becoming less (*venir meno*). Genius is our life, in as much as it does not belong to us.

We need therefore to see the subject as a field of tensions, whose antithetical poles are Genius and 'I'. This field is covered by two joined but opposite forces, one that proceeds from the individual to the impersonal, and the other from the impersonal to the individual. These two forces live together, they intersect, they separate out, but they can neither free themselves completely one from the other, nor perfectly identify each with the other. What then is the best way for 'I' to bear witness to Genius? Let us suppose that 'I' wishes to write. Not to write this or that work (*opera*), only to write, that's enough. This desire signifies the following: 'I' feel (*Io sento*) that Genius exists somewhere, that inside of me exists an impersonal power which impels me to write. But the last thing that Genius, who has never taken up a pen (even less sat in front of a computer), needs is a work of art (*un'opera*). One writes in order to become impersonal, in order to become ingenious (*geniale*) and, nevertheless, by writing, we identify ourselves as authors of this or that work, thus distancing ourselves from Genius, who may never have the form of an 'I', and even less that of an author. Every effort of 'I', of the personal element, to take possession of Genius, to constrain him to sign in his name, is necessarily destined to fail. Herein lies the relevance and the success of ironic moves like those of artistic avantgardes, in which the presence of Genius was certified through a process of 'un-creating' (*decreando*) or destroying the work (*opera*). But if only a work that is revoked and undone can be worthy of Genius, if the truly ingenious (*geniale*) artist is without work (*senz'opera*), the 'Duchamp-I' can never coincide with Genius. In the context of general appreciation it proceeds around the world as the melancholy proof of its own inexistence, as if it were the notorious carrier of its own worklessness (*inoperosità*).

Due to this, the encounter with Genius is terrifying. If the life that is held in tension between 'I' and Genius, between the personal and the impersonal, is a poetic one, the feeling that Genius exceeds and overcomes us from every side is one of panic, the panic that something infinitely much greater than what we appear to be able to endure is happening to us. Because of this the majority of human beings flee terrified in front of their own impersonal aspect, or they, hypocritically, try to reduce it to their own minute stature. It may happen then that the rejected impersonal reappears in the guise of tics and symptoms that are even more impersonal, in the guise of a scornful gesture that is even more excessive. But equally laughable and fatuous are those who live the encounter with Genius

4. *'Proprio'* has associations of 'one's own' but also that which is 'correct' or 'proper' [tr. note].

5. The Italian *'conoscenza'* can mean 'knowledge' (*'una buona conoscenza dell'arabo'* – a good knowledge of Arabic) as well as 'consciousness' (*'perdere la conoscenza'* – to lose consciousness). So 'non-knowing' would be an alternative here [tr. note].

as if it were a privilege; the Poet who takes on airs or assumes a pose or, even worse, who with false humility gives thanks for the grace he has received. Before Genius there are no great men, they are all equally small. But some are reckless enough to let themselves be thwarted and beaten by him to the point at which they break into pieces. Others, who are more serious but not as happy, refuse to impersonate the impersonal, refuse to lend their own lips to a voice that does not belong to them.

There exists an ethics of the relationship with Genius that defines the arrangement of all beings. The lowest level of the rank competes with those – and they are often celebrated authors – who rely on their own genius (*genio*) as if they were relying upon a personal sorcerer ("let everything turn out well for me!" "if you, my genius, do not abandon me …"). How much more agreeable and restrained is the gesture of the poet who can do without this sordid accomplice, because he knows that "God's absence will favour us"!

Children experience a particular pleasure in games of hiding, and not, because of this, at the end in being discovered. There exists in this state of being hidden, of huddling down in the laundry basket or squeezing behind a wardrobe, of crawling up into a corner of the attic to the point of disappearing, an incomparable delight, a special sensation of fear which they are not ready to renounce for any reason. It is from this childhood fear that the desire which made Walser secure the conditions of his own illegibility (his micrograms) originates,[6] and from which Benjamin derived his obtuse desire not to be recognized. These writers are the custodians of the solitary *glory,* that his hideout has revealed one day to the child. Because in 'non-recognition' the poet celebrates his triumph, just as the child anxiously reveals the *genius loci* of his hiding place.

According to Simondon,[7] we enter into a relationship with the pre-individual through our emotions. To become excited (*emozionarsi*) means to feel the impersonal inside of us, to have an experience of Genius as anguish or joy, security or agitation.

On the threshold of the zone of non-knowing (*non-conoscenza*), 'I' must lay aside its own propriety and characteristics (*proprietà*),[8] it must be moved. Passion is the rope kept taut between ourselves and Genius, the rope on which life, the tightrope walker, balances. Even before the world outside of us, what is wondrous and astonishes is the presence inside us of that aspect which is always immature and infinitely adolescent, that hesitates on the threshold of every individuation (*individuazione*). And it is this elusive child, this obstinate *puer* that pushes us towards others in whom we only seek the emotion that has remained incomprehensible inside us, hoping that by some miracle in the mirror of the other we might clarify and elucidate ourselves. If one looks at pleasure, the passion of the other is the supreme emotion, the primary politics, this is because in the other we look for that relationship with Genius in which, on our own, we are unable to bring to a conclusion our secret delights and our self-conceited agony.

With time Genius divides in two (*si sdoppia*) and begins to assume an ethical hue. The sources, perhaps due to the influence of the Greek theme of the two demons inside every man, speak of a good genius (*genio*) and a bad genius, of a white (*albus*) Genius and of a black (*ater*) one. The first counsels and pushes us in the

6. The reference is to the Swiss writer Robert Walser (1878-1956) and his unpublished manuscripts ('micrograms') composed in an infinitesimal shorthand [tr. note].

7. See Gilbert Simondon, *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*. Paris: PUF, 1964; and *L'Individuation psychique et collective*. Paris: Aubier, 1989 [tr. note].

8. The Italian word contains associations of propriety, properties and property. See also note 4 above [tr. note].

direction of good, the second corrupts us and turns us towards evil. Horace, probably correctly, suggests that in reality we are dealing with a single Genius that is however changeable, now white then dark, now wise then depraved. This means, and it is worth noting that it is not Genius who changes but our relationship with him, that from luminosity and clarity everything becomes opaque and dark. Our life principle, the companion who directs and makes our life pleasant, is suddenly transformed into a silent stowaway who shadow-like follows our every footstep and conspires in secret against us. In Roman art two Genii are represented one alongside the other, one has a burning torch in his hand, the other, a messenger of death, turns the torch upside down.

In this late moralization, the paradox of Genius emerges into the full light: if Genius is *our* life, in as much as he does *not* belong to us, then we have to respond to something to which we are not responsible, our salvation and our ruin have a childlike (*puerile*) face that is and is not our face.

Genius finds an equivalent in the Christian idea of the guardian angel – indeed of the two angels, one good and holy, that guides us towards salvation, and one evil and perverse, that prods us towards damnation. But it is in Iranian angelology that the guardian angel finds its most pure and unprecedented formulation. According to this doctrine, at the birth of every man an angel called Daena, who takes the form of a beautiful young girl, presides. The Daena is the heavenly archetype in whose likeness the individual has been created and, at the same time, the silent witness who watches over us and accompanies us in every instant of our lives. However, the face of this angel does not remain unchangeable and fixed in time but, like the portrait of Dorian Gray, it changes imperceptibly with our every gesture, our every word, our every thought. So, at the moment of its death, the soul sees its angel who comes towards it transfigured, according to the conduct of the subject's life, into a creature even more beautiful, or into a horrendous demon. The angel whispers: "I am your Daena, formed from your thoughts, your words, your acts". In this vertiginous inversion our lives mould and design the archetype in whose image we have been created.

All of us in one way or another come to an arrangement with Genius, an agreement with that inside us which does not belong to us. The way that each of us tries to disentangle ourselves from Genius, to flee him, is his own nature. This is the grimace that Genius, in as much as he has been shunned and left without means of expression, scores on the face of 'I'. The style of an author, like the grace of every creature, depends however, not so much on his own genius (*genio*), but on that in him which is lacking in genius, on his character. Because of this, when we love someone we don't really love his genius, nor his character (and even less his 'I'), but we love the special way he has of eluding both of these; that is, his quick-witted coming-and-going between genius and character. (For example, the childish grace with which a poet secretly gulped down ice-creams in Naples; or the languid uncoordinated way a philosopher had of walking up and down the room as he spoke, suddenly stopping to fix his gaze on a remote corner of the ceiling).[9]

Nevertheless, for each of us there comes the moment when we have to part company with Genius. It might be suddenly in the middle of the night, when at the sound of a passing brigade, you don't know why but you feel that your god has

9 The poet referred to is Giacomo Leopardi and the philosopher is Walter Benjamin [tr.note].

abandoned you. Or instead it is we who dismiss him in a very lucid, extreme moment when we know that salvation exists, but we no longer wish to be saved. Go away Ariel! It is the moment when Prospero sets aside his spells and knows that whatever force that is left to him is his alone. It is the final late period of life when the old artist breaks his paintbrushes in half and contemplates. What does he contemplate? The gestures: for the first time they are entirely our own, they are completely demystified (*smagati*) of any incantation. Certainly, life without Ariel has lost its mystery – but, nevertheless, from somewhere we know that now it belongs only to us, that only now can we begin to live a purely human and earthly life, a life that has not kept its promises and can now, because of this, offer us so much more. It is exhausted and suspended time, the sudden shadow in which we begin to forget Genius, it is the night that has been granted us (*la notte esaudita*).[10] Did Ariel ever exist? What is this music which unravels and grows fainter in the distance? Only the leave-taking is true, only now begins the long process of unlearning oneself (*il lungo disapprendimento di sé*),[11] before the idle child returns to take up one by one his youthful blushes, to urgently take up one by one, his doubts (*esitazioni*).

10. The *'notte esaudita'* recalls the *'notte salva'* at the end of Agamben's *L'aperto*. There the phrase is derived from Walter Benjamin's *'Die gerettete Nacht'*, 'the redeemed night' [tr. note].

11. The Italian phrase here is a translation of Foucault's *se deprendre de soi*. In turn, Foucault's phrase is difficult to translate; it has all the connotations of 'to shake free of the self', 'getting rid of oneself', 'detaching oneself from oneself', 'unlearning oneself', 'taking oneself out of oneself' [tr. note].

Dreamlikeness

Stephen Appel

> Dreams are performed in 'dimension one', while they are recounted in 'dimension two'. (Ellie Ragland, 2000: 70)

There was toilet in a run-down house. It was filthy. There were rotting leaves on the floor and the paint was peeling off the walls. It was a toilet, but it was somehow also a pantry or a butcher's fridge. There were pig carcasses hanging from a rail. I think there was a woman in there. She gave me a fright. She had long dark hair and I couldn't see her face. She was wearing a Jewish prayer shawl. But isn't the tallis worn by men? Anyway, I don't know if it was the same woman, but in the little room next door there was a woman also in a white dress. She was on a high shelf. She was standing in a very awkward position, sort of sideways, as if she might fall. I could see her leg through a slit in her dress. Her fingernails were red. Oh yes, there was a jewelry box on the floor.

What have we here? It is very much like being told a dream. In fact, though, it is a description of a libidinous and forbidding photograph in Julie Firth's *Stain* (2006) corpus. Although it is not her particular purpose to do so, in her evocative series Firth has gone a long way towards solving a curiously persistent problem in art; that of dream depiction.

Reading, watching, or looking at a work of art can be like watching a dream unfold, and yet the problem of actually portraying a dream remains. Painting, film and prose literature have several devices with which to depict dreams: from simple wavy lines or altered typeface to accompaniment by weird music. Or sometimes the problem is side-stepped and an apparently realistic episode ends with the dreamer waking up.

Now and then a more determined effort is made, as in the dream sequence designed by Dali for Hitchcock's film *Spellbound* (1945) which includes memorable surrealistic images - huge floating eyes, twisted landscapes, a faceless man in a tuxedo. The producer, David O. Selznick, cut a scene in which Ingrid Bergman lifts her skirt revealing armies of ants.

The invitation to read David Lynch's film *Mulholland Dr.* (2001) as a dream is made early in the film where a bit-character, Dan, recounts a terrifying dream. Lynch himself gave the movie the tagline, "A love story in the city of dreams". The question of how much of the film is dream and who is the dreamer is not answered. In his novel *Eating Pavlova*, D.M. Thomas segues from one state of consciousness to another in his fictional version of Freud's dying delirium in the house at 20 Maresfield Gardens, Hampstead: "I dream we live in a mare's field. It must relate to my first sight of my mother's genitals - but not the last, for we lived in just one room" (1994: 3).

Julie Firth: from the corpus Stain *Colour transparency image with single-channel real projection video, 1200mm x 1200 mm, 2006*

These are attempts to capture something of the nonsensicality of dreams, their uncanniness and fascination for us. Both puzzlingly illogical and redolent, they make no sense, and yet we have a feeling that these "sweet, dark playthings", as Anne Sexton calls dreams, have meaning (1999: 97).

But how to show them? Dreams, as depicted in art, tend to *signify* dreams. They are *like* dreams and we come to recognize them *as* dreams, but they are not *dream-like.* (I purposely exclude poetry here. A single line from *The Man Who Dreamed of Faeryland* by Yeats should be proof enough that poetry is at home with the nonsensical knowledge of dreamlife: "His heart hung all upon a silken dress" (2004: 18)). Attending to a dream in art is too seldom like having a dream.

> We must note about the dream a quality of bizarreness which is composed of several elements. Scenes shift abruptly and discontinuously. People change their identity; the furniture of a room is unpredictably altered. Unusual things happen; birds talk, toilets are placed against windows opening into restaurants, sleeping pads are spread on the floor of public corridors, one is dispossessed of one's bed. And yet *none of this seems remarkable to the dreamer*; he goes from one adventure to the next *quite unconcerned* at the inconsistencies and logical absurdities of what is happening (Nemiah, 1961: 202, emphases added).

Perhaps there is a clue here as to why dreams in art are so often not dream-like. Precisely because dreams depicted point to their own nature - this is a dream - they cannot but seem remarkable to the viewer or reader. In order for something to be dream-like, though, it is necessary that the viewer be unconcerned at its inconsistencies and absurdities. I would go further, the viewer needs to be *unaware* of the bizarreness and to take for granted the dream's crazy premises. (The lucid dream is a dream in bad faith, like a child's fearful reassurances, "It's only a movie, it's only a movie"). This defamiliarised world is somehow familiarised. Sometimes in a dream the dreamer thinks, "That doesn't make sense", but if the dreamer is not to wake up, this realistic judgment must remain in the background. To my mind even surrealistic paintings are too obviously like dreams. In reality, roses don't levitate, but Dali's drawing attention to this fact,

Julie Firth: from the corpus Stain
Colour transparency image with single-channel real projection video 1200mm x 1200 mm, 2006

in *The Meditative Rose* (1958), detracts radically from the possibility of viewing such a picture as being like having a dream. However, when a pig's carcass transforms into a woman's lower leg, in Image 1, it does not press to be decoded as a symbol or metaphor. Rather than specifying a meaning, it is more generally suggestive.

But of course, we don't actually *have* dreams, we only *remember* them. When we - our waking, conscious selves - tell a dream to another or to ourselves we are *re*telling it. This is one of the functions of what Freud called *dream-work*: "This function behaves in the manner which the poet maliciously ascribes to philosophers: it fills up the gaps in the dream-structure with shreds and patches" (1900-1901: 490). Waking, we see the dream with the mind's eye, but this is a re-visioning. Like any eye-witness account it is, after all, but an account. Remembering a dream is the first retelling of it, and retelling a dream recasts it.

It might be that this is another reason for the problems artists have had depicting dreams. Too often they have been concerned to demonstrate what lies beneath the dream, to suggest its meaning; but that is to deny the most elementary fact about dreams. If dreams have meaning, that meaning is thoroughly hidden from view and one cannot get its meaning from direct apperception of it. The melting watch in *The Persistence of Memory* (1931) too obviously signifies the non-linearity of time. This outer knowing gets in the way of any inner knowing.

It is well known that, according to Freud, the manifest dream is a transformation, or revision of underlying latent dream-thoughts. Dream-work distorts day-residues and unconscious material to produce the dreamer's dream. Then there is a secondary revision when one wakes, remembers a dream, and tells it to oneself. Unavoidably one attempts to render the dream as a more or less consistent and intelligible scenario. This secondary revision is the attempted removal of the dream's seeming absurdity and incoherence, filling in its gaps, reorganising its elements through selection and addition; in short, "the attempt to make it something like a day-dream" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1980: 412).

The curious thing about recounting a dream is that while the critical, logical ego is disputatious: "I can't quite remember, it was either a toilet or a butcher shop", one still has access to the mysterious logic of the dream world: "In the dream it was both a toilet and a butcher shop". It is this experiential doubleness that so many depicted dreams miss: the paradox of their believable fabrication, their lying veracity. And it is precisely here that Julie Firth's photographs work so well. Consider Image 2. Treat it as a pictorial composition, as an event in a story, and it might seem faintly ridiculous. Treat it, as I think one must, as a palimpsestic rebus and it pulses.

When it comes to the depiction of dreams, poetry and photography seem better-suited than narrative fiction, painting, and, surprisingly, film. This is a topic for another day, but perhaps a case could be made that the formal qualities of poetry and photography - particularly layering and juxtaposition - cohere with the mechanisms of dream-work - condensation, displacement, and symbolization.

The photographs by Julie Firth are not intended as the artist's dreams and we should not try to interpret them as such. But they do have many of the features of dream enigmata. They are layered and suggestive, without having an explanation. They are over-wrought: beautiful without being pretty; horrific but not horrible; sexual, not crude; intelligent without being clever-clever. And they are dream-like precisely in the sense that, while they don't make sense, they seem to have a deeper affinity. When we look at these photographs, absurd as they are, they work on us and we go along with them. "Whether or not dreams are meaningful, they are good to make meaning with" (Phillips, 2001: 57). Similarly, it seems contrary to the spirit of these images to insist on explanation. It is not just that we cannot determine what they mean; we should not. Far better to allow them to make us daydream.

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Julie Firth's images are originally in colour. A full reading and appreciation of the work would certainly depend on this aspect. Regrettably, we are only able to reproduce them as greyscale

Planning's Contradicting Genius
within the Twilight against the Empty Night

Michael Gunder

> Just as men [sic] will want to stave off contradiction as much as possible in life, they seek an equal degree of comfort in science by decreeing as axiomatic that contradiction could not be real. … Only contradiction drives us – indeed, forces us – to action. Contradiction is in fact the venom of all life, and all vital motion is nothing but the attempt to overcome this poisoning (von Schelling, 1997 [1813]: 124).

Most planners consider their profession to be primarily concerned with the aims of modern enlightenment. Arguably, the enlightenment is the promotion of a spirit of progress resolutely seeking a superior world, a better future of light and purity for the collective good. The definition of better and good is open to contention, and, of course, herein lies the rub. In attempting to create, at least the appearance of, a level playing field of fairness as to who defines the good, planning generally advocates a set of core values supportive of equity, democratic method and social justice. Explicit forces seldom overwhelm these norms of fair process in most modern democracies. However, they are often overcome when confronted by subtle, and frequently unquestioned beliefs, or sometimes even overt authoritative rationalities, which seek to advance predispositions disproportionately supportive of the principles of wealth maximisation and its concentration, not to mention power, in our, now globalised, capitalistic system.

When planning does fall short in applying this distributional 'goodness', or at least the appearance of fairness, many would consider that planning is no longer an agent of enlightenment. Some authors consider this to be planning's 'dark side', a term initially deployed by Oren Yiftachel (1995) and Bent Flyvbjerg (1995) in quite dissimilar circumstances. Yiftachel's use of the concept 'dark side' was as part of a title for an empirically based case study, illustrating how planning had been unashamedly deployed overtly by the Israeli State as a mechanism of tribal control, land alienation and displacement of Israeli Arabs.

Flyvbjerg's deployment of the term was as part of a broader critique of planning theory, which Flyvbjerg argued to be synonymous with modernity's wider inclination towards normative idealism. This is the propensity of modernity's orthodox discourses of social science, and related 'progressive' disciplines, including planning, to see only what is desirable, as if one lived in an ideal and perfect

social reality, devoid of contradiction, meanwhile unashamedly failing to notice what is actually occurring.

In other words, modernity's propensity is a desire for a fantasy of perfection and light – the perfect city shining in the light of perfect structures inhabited by the lightness of being provided by perfect angelic people. This is a fantasy especially perpetrated by traditionalist theoreticians of modernist planning, in which only the desired enlightened side is privileged, theorised and observed. The imperfect, dark side that constitutes a less coveted social reality of blemish and strife, is largely empirically overlooked. This agonistic reality is, Flyvbjerg argues, the real rationality, or *realrationalität*, of the genuinely grounded world constituted by the imperfections of human striving, disagreement, desire and real-politics. It is an actuality of the Heideggerian 'being in the world', which Lacanians would suggest we desire to block out and, inauthentically, obscure with fantasies of ideological justification and wish-fulfilment. This allows us to preserve our desired delusions of a preferred genius – a spirit – that presents a world of sanctuary and certitude, not to mention a progression to an even better place on earth, even if this illusionary construct of social reality may be somewhat more appropriately predicated on a desire for enlightenment's precursor; ie. the baroque, which sought the creation of a taste, illusion or simulation of heaven on earth, rather than a materialisation of the real thing.

This delusion of solidity and safety, not to mention the dream, if not the fulfilment, of the creation of heaven on earth, is consistent with another everyday fantasy of modernist social reality, a fantasy unequivocally facilitated by planning's normative desire and advocacy for fairness. This is the fallacy that the state (in place of any former God) has concern and cares for us, provided we act responsibly in our duties to the state as good citizens. In Lacanian parlance, we are desired, protected, and even loved by an abstract 'big Other' that in its totality represents a fair social order. Yet, Lacan suggests that this big Other does not exist, rather it is merely a desired illusion (2006: 688). Further, it is an illusion perhaps believed and sought after most devotedly when society is being particularly unfair. For the very notion of the modern, its essence or central spirit, is perhaps the resultant aggregate product of our desired fantasies and their mandatory prerequisite not to challenge, or examine too finely, the cracks of contradiction in our beguiling dreams and ideals.

Accordingly, a dark side appraisal of our ideologically shaped reality may provide a helpful traversing of our fantasy constructs. It may be an intrinsically anti-modern intrusion for interrogating the outcomes of planning and other, more diverse, disclosures of the cultural and hegemonic movements that shape our public policies and actions. Yet, theorising issues within the context of a light/dark dichotomy creates its own problematic. The traditional spirit of modernity, as well as other conventional forms of western thinking, are placed, or located, under the inexorable power of binary reason, an underlying logic that Ed Soja refers to, after Derrida, as the "the terrorism of the either/or" (Soja, 2003: 271). Moreover, planning, and its related modernist disciplines, is seldom black or white in its agency. Planning rarely attains absolute fairness. Yet, similarly, it is seldom totally deceitful and discriminatory, at least within regimes that attempt to provide, at a minimum, the appearance of democratic rights for all citizens (perhaps in contrast to Yiftachel's Israeli planning appararti).

While perhaps a bane to some, a core role of planning is to supply an aspect of society's paternal figure of authority and regulation, one that says: "No, you are not permitted to do that in this environment!" This regulatory function actually helps constitute our symbolically constructed culture and society. Most consider this regulation a societal good, if applied with fairness towards an acceptable end. Yet, as this seeming fairness or acceptable goal deteriorates towards what may be perceived by many as tyranny, planning, at a certain point, stops constituting a common good and develops into a specific blight. Further, the point of change from being a beneficial remedy to a toxic affliction is usually undecidable, ambiguous, and generally dependent on one's specific individual perspective and aims – be it those of developer, architect, or affected party (Derrida, 1981: 125).

Fundamentally, the light/dark duality only favours the achievement of perfectly impossible ideals. This idealised transcendental perfection is beyond what is achievable by human knowledge, or even knowable by experience. The attainment of any transcendental ideal is impossible, by definition – indeed, a true contradiction. To suppose otherwise is, innately, a utopian dream of modernity, or some other similar faith. Lacan suggests we have to acknowledge that our ideals will always come up short; they will always lack completeness and, even when the truth about our ideals is forthcoming, it may not be beneficial (2004: 15). Fundamentally, our ideals are so lacking in completeness that, over time, many turn out to be the cause of their initial decline and eventual obscurity. To paraphrase Lacan, with a touch of Deleuze, we simply overthrow the mastery of one transcendental ideal to replace it with the mastery of another, perpetuating a new void of lack, undecidability, contradiction and eventual dissatisfaction (129).

I suggest that the modern human disciplines, including planning, which, on the whole, materialised as artefacts of modernity's constant search for knowledge to contribute to the production of some better enlightened world, should not be considered as spirits that reside in either the light or dark: rather they should always be considered to reside somewhere in between. Planning resides in perpetual twilight, for planning's actual spirit of place – its specific genius loci – dwells somewhere between that of the empty darkness constituting the night of the world, and the divine light of our desires. Planning and modernity's other human practices of collective action are grey arts of chiaroscuro that take place in a shadowy reality of particularity and ambiguity (after Hillier, 2002: 17). This is a social reality where our practices, norms and ideals are imperfect, lacking and incomplete, consistent with the imperfection which constitutes the human condition of inherent contradiction. Here, perhaps, one task of academic critique is to expose these absences and tackle the illusions we form to cloak this emptiness.

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The Passion of Ignorance

Review by Lucy Holmes

Dany Nobus and Malcolm Quinn, *Knowing Nothing, Staying Stupid: Elements for a Psychoanalytic Epistemology*. London: Routledge, 2005.

At a conference on tertiary education management, in July 2006, Kuni Jenkins mentioned Lacanian psychoanalysis and its principle of the passion of ignorance.[1] A leading academic making a place for ignorance seems surprising, as does reference to a field of psychoanalysis yet to find a place, either as theory *or* as clinical practice, in a New Zealand tertiary institution.

1 2006, 3-4 July. Association for Tertiary Education Managers, New Zealand Branch Conference. Bay of Plenty Polytechnic, Tauranga. Kuni Jenkins is Interim Chief Executive Officer of Te Whare Wanaanga o Awanuiarangi, Whakatane.

The first chapter of *Knowing Nothing, Staying Stupid* intimates why this may be so. The analyst's passion of ignorance is defined, not as the absence of knowledge, but as the recognition of the limits of knowledge: as knowledge does not hold all the answers, so the analyst's knowledge must not be presented as the truth about the patient (25-26). Lacanian psychoanalysis focuses not only on the speech of each unique person within a specific social formation, but also on how speech is unconsciously marked by the satisfaction and suffering driving the subject's words. Nobus and Quinn's book links these clinical concerns to epistemology, making the case that the unconscious presents us with the limits of our knowledge; its truth is the "human being's incapacity to master all knowledge owing to the absence of a knowing agency at the level of the unconscious" (49). In the context of tertiary education, to speak of the passion of ignorance implies a challenge to education to account for the 'other' of academic reason.

In contrast to a Lacanian epistemology, contemporary universities tend to rationalise all knowledge in terms of its market value whose goal is social and economic success (121-122). This implicit denial of the failure and fall of knowledge results in a mania for progress and completion, paradoxically working to hinder the development of academic knowledge (196). Similar criticisms have been made of New Zealand tertiary education; the knowledge economy provides more funds for those bodies of knowledge "that support competition and economic growth" (Harvey, 2003: 4).

Using Lacan's discourse theory, Nobus and Quinn explain how the discourse of the university always serves a master – in this case the economy and the market place of ideas. Their book explains an important difference between those discourse theories in which ideology finds its support in the social practice of language, and Lacan's "discourses [which] are not to be used as keys to the meaning of speech, but as a means of separating speech from meaning" (2005: 128). This separation makes explicit a distinction between the truth of the unconscious as a causal function that "drives and structures speech", and the view upheld by the knowledge economy of "truth as a consciously achieved effect" (132). The conscious use of speech aims to convey a certain meaning. However, the unconscious undermines intended meaning and its reception; thus, communication entails its failure, no matter how skilled the speaker.

In *Knowing Nothing, Staying Stupid,* the role of applied psychoanalysis, and how it might avoid being yet another interpretive procedure servicing the market place,

is a key question. Nobus and Quinn present various philosophical and artistic hoaxes – Žižek, Sokal and Duchamp – to explain how the logic of the unconscious redirects the search for an interpretive truth. Žižek's hoax involved his interpretation of a painting about which he knew nothing. However, his listeners, at an art round table, accepted it as a successful interpretation. The hoax is used in his critique of cultural studies' use of theory to highlight the "radical apathy at the very heart of today's cultural studies" (Žižek, 2001: 6, 130). Adding a further twist to the critique, Nobus and Quinn point out that Žižek falls into his own trap when he later applies the same interpretative approach as a legitimate method; thus the critical force of the hoax is lost, changing neither "the relations of 'The Žižekian field' that secured him a place at the art round table", nor "the relations within the market place of ideas in which the public discourse on art and psychoanalysis is contained" (2005: 178). As Žižek's readers, we are in the same position as the participants of the art round table, uncritically accepting interpretative mastery. This is a position shared by the editors of the journal *Social Text* when they accepted Alan Sokal's paper on the basis of the author's credentials, despite his fraudulent use of cultural theory. Sokal disturbed the realm of academic reason by showing that cultural theory (including postmodernism and Lacanian theory) is nonsense, a mistaken belief. However, Nobus and Quinn claim that the consequence of Sokal's hoax demonstrates that "the exchange of nonsense" is able to make perfect sense (190). The affair underlined how the stupidity of signifiers (i.e., the style of theory-speak used by Sokal) constructed an artifice, a fabrication, effectively exposing the manoeuvres of academic speech for which there are no "academic subjects to speak, receive, or understand it" (181). The consequences of the hoax exemplify the Lacanian theory of discourse, where the separation of speech from meaning may produce an effect that the author did not intend: Sokal, unwittingly, proved that Lacan makes sense.

Knowing Nothing, Staying Stupid examines the effects of the hoax on an institutional critique. Pierre Bourdieu's admission that his institutional critique ironically perpetuated the success of those institutions, introduces a discussion of Duchamp's submission to the New York *Independents' Show* as an intervention leading to institutional failure and the fall of knowledge. Rather than contributing to the *Independents' Show's* progressive aims – of allowing anyone to enter an art show – Duchamp's action averted institutional and discursive ideals by highlighting progress' latent possibility of failure (184). For Nobus and Quinn, this action operates in the same way as the psychical object or artifice, which is constructed on the basis of the unconscious effects in speech, and on which the patient's fantasy is articulated and traversed. The analyst's position of misunderstanding, of playing the dummy hand – as with the gap made by the work of art – deflects the patient's request for interpretation, allowing space for a strange nonrelational form of knowledge at the limits of representational systems.

This book's critical potential lies in its advocacy of a form of knowledge "that is no longer relational, that essentially disrupts the relational quality of any discursive structure" (5). The unconscious occurs in the discontinuities of speech, thought and action, and interrupts communication between self and others. The non-relational stupidity of the unconscious may seem regressive when compared with the emphasis on the intersubjective in certain social constructivist theories and relational aesthetics. A psychoanalytic epistemology is concerned with what

continually prevents the full realisation, or closure, of relationality, and instead takes into account the resistances to meaning where the search for knowledge about self and other fails.

Knowing Nothing Staying Stupid concludes by addressing the question of what use Lacanian psychoanalysis is, if it does not improve interpretive methodologies. Rather than providing a hermeneutical model, a psychoanalytic epistemology offers another paradigm where, like Duchamp's intervention,

> an apparently negative or spurious act, which seems to invent problems where none exist, or which fails to respect the wish for knowledge to 'move on' in search of the latest epistemological trends, is precisely what is needed in order to link knowledge to its effects (197).

In the context of a local and global focus on the society of knowledge, in which research is increasingly measured by its market value, the consequences of knowledge become less creative and more constrained.[2] An alternative approach to an ethics of knowledge allows for the passion of ignorance, the moment when the failure of knowledge has creative and critical effects.

2 Sharon Harvey's criticism of the New Zealand knowledge society makes a similar argument when she points out that academics tend to decry the processes of the knowledge economy, but are less concerned with the "destination" of knowledge that advances the globally competitive market place (2003: 5).

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Carved Histories:
Rotorua Ngāti Tarawhai Woodcarving

Review by Arapata Hakiwai

Neich, R. (2001) Carved Histories: Rotorua Ngāti Tarawhai-Woodcarving, Auckland: Auckland University Press

This book is both a personal journey and a record of over three decades of dedicated research by its author, Roger Neich and we are indeed fortunate to have this research published.

Māori carving has been the object of fascination and intrigue for over two hundred years, and continues to be the subject of ongoing research by ethnologists, anthropologists, art historians and Māori scholars today. For Māori, the whakairo, or carving art form, is a powerful language of communication, and one of the richest artistic expressions of the Māori world. It contains a profound body of knowledge and tradition that speaks of tribal and sub-tribal histories, traditions, narratives and world-views.

However, this is more than just a book on Māori tribal carving. Turning the pages, you discover a richness and depth that is often lacking in other Māori tribal carving publications. You are reminded, too, of its importance to the Ngāti Tarawhai people. The Foreword, written by Joseph Te Poroa Malcolm, Chairman of the Ngāti Tarawhai Trust Board, affirms the confidence and trust that he has in author and scholar, Dr. Roger Neich. For the descendants of Ngāti Tarawhai, this research will be an enduring legacy of the past and a guiding light for the future.

Neich also reminds us of the importance of working closely with the Ngāti Tarawhai people. He notes, in the Preface, that key people helped him throughout his research work. This should not be underestimated, as there are many examples where researchers enter into Māori areas of research without ever consulting the people who are being studied. The book is an invaluable treasure and will have enduring relevance for descendants, Māori carvers/artists and historians alike. The meticulous attention to detail in the text is a strength that future researchers should take note of. Recently, the Te Arawa master carver Lyonel Grant, speaking at the National Museum in Wellington about Anaha Te Rahui and the Ngāti Tarawhai carving traditions, reinforced the respect that he had for Roger Neich and his research work documenting the Ngāti Tarawhai carving traditions.

The book comprises twenty chapters, beginning with the history of Ngāti Tarawhai and their first settlement at Okataina. It describes the influence of missionaries, the New Zealand wars and the various religious, political and economic factors that affected Ngāti Tarawhai, and the wider Rotorua region. The lives of Ngāti Tarawhai woodcarvers and their relationships with related Ngāti Pikiao carving traditions are detailed, along with chapters that consider the nature of art, Māori carving, and the impact and influence on Ngāti Tarawhai Māori carving practice of a changing patronage. The identification and examination

of individual carvers and their styles reveals the strength and depth of carving in this tribal region.

The book has a freshness, and delivers a welcome insight into the artform known as whakairo Māori, or Māori carving. If you are unaware of Ngāti Tarawhai, then reading this book will give you a good understanding and appreciation of this tribe, their history and their established carving traditions. The mana and reputation of Ngāti Tarawhai carvers is apparent when you discover that their master carvers travelled all over New Zealand – including Waitangi, Otiria and Hawke's Bay – to carve meeting houses. The title is appropriate too, because the depth of scholarly research on Ngāti Tarawhai carving, history and life is, in fact, the history of its people as carved out by its leaders, men such as Anaha Te Rahui, Neke Kapua and Tene Waitere.

Although the text is dense in parts, in particular the chapters on the theoretical approaches to art, this does not detract from the readability of the book. It is rich in photographs and visual representation, with carvings identified in museums throughout the world. Identifying Ngāti Tarawhai carvings held in museums, and in private collections around the world, is an enormous task and Neich has done a superb job bringing this information together to sit alongside the historical record. Through the visual record, and the depth of social and historical context provided, one is reminded that what is being presented here is the lives of real people through time.

Neich not only identifies these carved treasures, but brings them to life through the art historical process, identifying the actual carver(s) who carved them and the date(s) as well. A benefit of this research methodology, as Neich has shown here, is that we can now document changes in style over time. Changing patronage and historical circumstances have certainly impacted on the carving traditions of Ngāti Tarawhai. As Joe Malcolm says in the Foreword: "The burgeoning European market gave rise to an entrepreneurial spirit within the Ngāti Tarawhai carving community so that opportunities for individual enterprise were readily available". The impact and influence of Tourism in the Rotorua region on the Ngāti Tarawhai carving traditions, as mentioned in Chapter 15, was also significant. As Neich says: "'Tourist' carving, defined by reference to its patronage and its public, represents the ultimate end-point of commodification and commercialisation of ethnic art" (p.232). Dr. Roger Neich is well known in Māori and Pacific art circles and his publications carry a reputation for integrity, thorough research and impeccable scholarship. This is true of this publication.

Regrettably, there are still many taonga, including carvings, that have not been reconnected with their tribal descendants, and remain on shelves in museum collection storerooms. At a time when Māori are advancing their cultural heritage initiatives, and reclaiming and reaffirming their art heritage foundation, these carved treasures are extremely important for Māori tribal identity and belonging. This art historical publication is an excellent example of contemporary research and has the power to make a considerable difference to the Ngāti Tarawhai people. It will have great value, too, for present day carvers and carvers yet unborn, by providing an opportunity to study and analyse the rich carving traditions of this tribal region. As well, it provides a good model and template for others to follow. We are indeed fortunate that Dr. Neich has given us this book, as without it, all of us would be denied an important treasure.

Genius and Genealogy

John Walsh

New Zealand has a genius for genealogy. Māori trace their whakapapa back to a first canoe and many European New Zealanders track their ancestral spoor back to a first ship. Who you're from, where you're from – perhaps it isn't surprising that issues of identity are of concern in a country that is a remote fragment of larger landforms and bigger societies.

Though a preoccupation with descent may be endemic, it is, mercifully, not mandatory. For instance, I presume my forebears dwelt in various Irish bogs. Some may even have been princes of their patches of peat. Who knows, and, at this remove, who cares? The point is, clan or family history matters more to some than others; it matters most, of course, to those who evoke the past in support of territorial claims.

How important is the question of lineage in New Zealand architecture? A recent and happy coincidence of anniversaries offers some indication. Over the summer of 2005-06 three of the country's larger architecture practices celebrated fifty years of professional existence. The birthday boys – a literal description: the practices cannot muster one female partner between them – were Auckland-based ASC Architects; Stephenson & Turner, which has offices in Auckland and Wellington; and Warren and Mahoney, which has offices in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. All three practices gave some thought to how they should acknowledge their Silver Jubilee; in ascending order of pomp, let's look at what they came up with.

ASC Architects marked their milestone with an edition of their occasional two-page newsletter and a party at a café next to their city-fringe premises. This effort – comparatively modest, as we'll see – suggests a busy office, or ambivalence towards self-promotion, or a lukewarm interest in genealogy (or all three). Certainly, ASC does not have a pretentious persona, and the firm's low-key celebration of reaching fifty was in keeping with its journey there. The history of ASC serves as a reminder that, for all the debate about whether architecture is an art or a craft, it is also a business.

The practice now known as ASC Architects was established by the late Nyall Coleman. Gordon Moller, the immediate past president of the New Zealand Institute of Architects, worked for Coleman in the early 1960s and remembers his employer as, "a very urbane gentleman". A Catholic, who drew upon his social contacts to get school commissions, and a businessman who recognised the value of the repeat client, Coleman exemplified the normal type of successful twentieth century architectural practitioner. That is, he wasn't an auteur, but rather a respectable professional man. Though Coleman did well in his career he didn't make it into the Kiwi canon, and though his firm has endured his name has long since disappeared from its title (the "C" in ASC is Neil Cotton). ASC's continuity is attributable to an overlap of personnel, not to dynastic succession.

So, no ancestor worship at ASC, and maybe its founder would have wanted it that way. Filial piety, at least formally, is more evident at Stephenson & Turner, and self-esteem more obvious. On its fiftieth birthday S&T hosted functions with a high suit count at the Price Waterhouse tower on Auckland's waterfront (architect: Stephenson & Turner) and Te Papa in Wellington. Guests were welcomed by a hired raconteur and farewelled with a complimentary copy of a history commissioned by the practice (publisher: Balasoglou Books; RRP $59.95).

Very Establishment, very corporate, very much in keeping with S&T's reputation as a practice that does the business for finance companies, health boards and government departments. And true to the memory of the firm's progenitor, Sir Arthur George Stephenson (1890-1967), Knight of the British Empire, holder of the Military Cross, fellow of the RIBA, RAIA, and NZIA, and recipient of RIBA and RAIA Gold Medals. Now there's a father figure, and S&T have been pretty happy to follow in the footsteps left by his big brogues.

However, there have been a couple of issues along the way. For one thing, Sir Arthur and his company were *Australian*, and in New Zealand Stephenson & Turner started out as a branch office. Separation from the Australian parent eventually occurred, but not without some anxiety. It must have been tempting to signal a new start with a new name, perhaps some clever piece of architectonic lexicology. But S&T didn't get where they are by essaying hip, and they stuck with the brand. By keeping Dad's name, Stephenson & Turner acknowledged that they had embraced their destiny. No apparent regrets, just a hint, now and then, of wistfulness: those who have chosen to work in prose must occasionally wish they'd opted for poetry.

Warren and Mahoney's anniversary celebrations were the most ambitious of all. Birthday bashes in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland served as launch parties for a monograph that, even priced at $110, must have cost the practice a small fortune to produce (again the publisher is Balasoglou Books). It is the best-looking architecture book to have been published in New Zealand, though it's title is a real mouthful: *New Territory/Warren and Mahoney//50 years of New Zealand Architecture*. Or: Vision/Brand//History.

In this book Warren and Mahoney are both claiming and reclaiming territory. The practice wants to have it both ways: it is established (in terms of back catalogue Warren and Mahoney are the Lennon and McCartney of New Zealand architecture) *and* it is innovative (the practice seems to believe it has the local franchise for Environmentally Sustainable Design). What the book also announces is that the practice has worked out an answer to the question of Miles. For a while the firm's partners seemed intent on escaping the shadow of W&M's famous (and still very much extant) founder, Sir Miles Warren. Edging down the route to professional parricide, they even changed the practice name to Architecture Warren and Mahoney.

The redundant prefix is gone now. Warren and Mahoney, as one would expect of a practice sired in origin-conscious Christchurch, has realised the advantages of its inheritance. To put it another way: if you're descended from genius, there's good reason to be a genealogist.

Indifference as a subversive strategy

Leonhard Emmerling

> The more total society becomes, the more completely it contracts to a unanimous system, and all the more do the artworks in which this experience is sedimented become the other of this society. … Because the spell of external reality over its subjects and their reactions has become absolute, the artwork can only oppose this spell by assimilating itself to it. … This shabby, damaged world of images is the negative imprint of the administered world. … Just as art cannot be, and never was, a language of pure feeling, nor a language of affirmation of the soul, neither is it for art to pursue the results of ordinary knowledge, as for instance in the form of social documentaries that are to function as down payments on empirical research yet to be done. The space between discursive barbarism and poetic euphemism that remains to artworks is scarcely larger than the point of indifference into which Beckett burrowed (Adorno, 1997: 31f).

I

Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, published in 1970, one year after his death, begins with the statement: "It is self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore" (1). Beyond that, his often meandering writing is motivated by the question, "whether art is still possible"(1). This question results not only from the shock that Auschwitz caused, and which provoked the often quoted and often misunderstood sentence – to write poetry after Auschwitz would be barbarian[1] – but it is also aimed at a characteristic of the work of art itself, resulting in an intrinsic and indissoluble ambivalence. Adorno reveals this ambivalence by the use of mutually complementary notions.

Autonomy and heteronomy may be seen as the configuration on which others are based, with both spheres intricately and dialectically related. The work of art aims at autonomy; or, its status in the post-feudalistic world is dictated by the autonomy of the artist from commissioners, and the limitations of social institutions like the church or the court. The artist is free to escape the demands of society by withdrawing into his own subjectivity. However, the autonomy Adorno speaks of is the autonomy of the work of art from the empirical world. The empirical world is to be considered as the same as the sphere of heteronomy, in which no other law than that of exchange is valid. Thus, another pair can be added to the autonomy/heteronomy configuration: that of "being-for-others" (everything is subject to the law of exchange), and of "being-for-itself" (the work of art).

As the autonomy of the work of art guarantees its utopian potential,[2] it tends, exactly for that reason, towards an affirmation of the existing conditions, be it even involuntarily.[3] As the autonomous work of art constitutes itself by follow-

1. "Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric, and this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today". Adorno, *Kulturkritik* I, quoted in Martin, (2006)

2. "By emphatically separating themselves from the empirical world, their other, they bear witness that that world itself should be other than it is; they are the unconscious schemata of that world's transformation" Adorno, (1997: 177).

3. "Artworks detach themselves from the empirical world and bring forth another world, one opposed to the empirical world as if this other world too were an autonomous entity. Thus, however tragic they appear, artworks tend a priori toward affirmation" (1).

ing exclusively its own "law of form" (*Formgesetz*), and so opposes any need to be useful, it is opposed to the empirical world. It is for itself instead of following social standards. "Art's asociality is the determinate negation of a determinate society"(226). This asociality, however, is also the reason for its ineffectiveness: "The society at which it shudders is left in the distance, undisturbed"(226). "Neutralization is the social price of aesthetic autonomy" (228).

Thus, every work of art is characterized by an indissoluble ambivalence. Its autonomy does not erase its character as a "*fait social*", and even if it is, as far as possible, removed from the "the crudely empirical" (203), it will not lose its double character as "being socially determined in its autonomy and at the same time social" (210). The aporia, to which the work of art is subjected, is not only to be found in this double character, but is more deeply constituted by the aporia of what Adorno calls the "law of form". On the one hand, this guarantees the distance of the work of art from the empirical, its being-for-itself, its autonomy and its utopian potential; but, on the other hand, the law of form itself is not free from the quality of violence. The process of submitting diverse elements to the dictates of unity and purity is modelled on the principle of heteronomy, which Adorno describes as the submission of the plurality of life to a totalitarian unity. For this, all beauty (as the purity in which the law of form is realized) has an affinity to death, in which all diversity and divergence expires (52). However, at the same time, Adorno describes the force that constitutes the work of art as a violence that respects that which it matches:

> "It is through this idea that art is related to peace. Without perspective on peace, art would be as untrue as when it anticipates reconciliation. Beauty in art is the semblance of the truly peaceful. It is this toward which even the repressive violence of form tends in its unification of hostile and divergent elements" (258).

The restlessness of the dialectic process, which becomes evident here and finally threatens to end in absolute negativity, rarely comes to a standstill in Adorno's writings. He seems to undermine every positive idea of art. For that reason, it is not surprising that he writes (using Beckett again) that every work of art wants to return to silence, because it is intertwined with what he calls the universal context of guilt. And, where it does not atone for its guilt, the work of art would be nothing but a *desecration of silence* (134).

The absolute negativity of Adorno's theory leaves almost no way out. But there are some key notions in his theory which offer a more positive perspective. Apart from the notion of shock, and an often surprisingly positive idea about nature's beauty (*das Naturschöne*), it is particularly the notion of reconciliation which infuses the whole *Aesthetic Theory* and leads to ever new movements of thought. Questioned, doubted and reconsidered again and again, its central role and its importance regarding the work of art's potential for humankind is never undermined.

The way in which the work of art could be a pre-appearance of reconciliation unfolds in the light of the notion of "correct consciousness", which is itself dialectically folded. "…, ever since freedom emerged as a potential, correct consciousness has meant the most progressive consciousness of antagonisms on the horizon of their possible reconciliation" (191). First, this means that correct consciousness is

historically determined and not absolute and invariant; it is not an un-historic or super-historic knowledge about the "real" character of things. Secondly, it, too, is characterised as a *negativum*, as the consciousness of antagonisms and not as the sum total of positive knowledge or convictions, all of which, for Adorno, are under suspicion of being ideological. Thirdly, correct consciousness unfolds on the horizon of reconciliation, as the unredeemed promise of the potential of freedom previously mentioned. Reconciliation in the work of art, therefore, happens in the form of a principal failure: "That is the melancholy of art. It achieves an unreal reconciliation at the price of real reconciliation. All that art can do is grieve for the sacrifice it makes, which, in its powerlessness, art itself is" (52). Through the irreconcilable renunciation of the semblance of reconciliation, art holds fast to the promise of reconciliation in the midst of the unreconciled ..." (33).

Adorno's ambivalent notion of reconciliation, which essentially constitutes the utopian potential of the work of art (and for which autonomy is an indispensable pre-condition), is related to his insistence on the character of the work of art as semblance. If the work of art is untruthful, insofar as it stages reconciliation as realisable, and if its truth is precisely that, in renouncing reconciliation, as a symptom of suffering and disruption, it still recollects the possibility of reconciliation negatively, then, in a world in which infatuation, as the counterpart of real alienation has become total, it stages the semblance of its being-for-itself as the mask of truth (p. 227). What appears, but is not, promises to become by appearing. "The constellation of the existing and non-existing is the utopic figure of art" (233).

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The "unanimous system" Adorno speaks about is, today, not that of the administered world, but that of the globalized world. The mechanisms of this world follow exclusively the demands of quantification (Jameson, 1981). As long as a value can be quantified, i.e., can be transformed into an economic value, it is an object of interest. If it cannot be transformed into an economic value, it is completely ignored.

Capitalism has the wonderful nature of complete permissivity; there are no values to be fought against, because it soaks them all up. Capitalism does not attack values, nor does it destroy them; it simply incorporates and assimilates them. They live on inside capitalism, untouched, completely neutralized, as long as they do not resist its tendency to quantification. I am not sure whether there are any values that can resist.

Since World War II, two artists, more than any others, at least from a European perspective, have changed the idea of the work of art: Joseph Beuys and Andy Warhol. While Beuys' obvious political activism leaves no question regarding his critical attitude, Warhol is often discredited as a cynic, unable to develop a deeper interest in people or social issues. My question, here, is whether his strategy of indifference, and affirmation, of a society which, since capitalistic, uses values only for a humanist masking of its real indifference towards values, might be a riddle; one which is not so easily unravelled by simply resorting to the bourgeois and snobbish position that the work of art should provide us with

that non-quantifiable surplus we are missing, painfully, in our economically determined world.

The character of indifference is to be found in Warhol at the level of his chosen medium, and at the level of semantics and iconography. The silk print, which Warhol for decades preferred to painting, comes from the profane area of advertising (Warhol began his career as a graphic designer), and is, from its origins, opposed to the valorised area of the "arts" (Groys, 1992). Its use testifies to Warhol's indifference as regards the category "art", as the principle of the one-off was given up for the principle of unlimited reproducibility, even though he produced limited editions. To distinguish a silk print reproduction of a silk print, from a silk print might be quite difficult, and borders on the imbecile; in the end, the certificate, or the signature, decides whether the print sells for five dollars in the next poster shop, or for a fortune at Sotheby's.

However, even if, following Boris Groys, we would like to read Warhol's strategy as a valorisation of the banal, it is not completely clear whether Warhol himself differentiated between the banal and the non-banal. His often quoted sentence, "All is pretty", is one of his manoeuvres to neutralize the traditional antagonisms of High and Low. The work itself does not offer any evidence that he appreciated images of cows, flowers, scissors or dollar notes less than images of Goethe, or of Leonardo's *Last Supper*. Instead of calling this a valorisation of the banal, it would probably make more sense to call it the elimination of the idea of "value" itself. The virtually endless reproducibility of the silk print has its analogue in the repetition of the motive, which can be understood as a negation of the idea of the image. Instead of an elaborate definition of the image, there is the motive's diffusion all over the surface, an All Over without centre, a radical equalization; instead of concentration, a tiring, if not boring, repetition of the same. And it is only logical that Warhol used this equalization for images of soup cans, porn scenes or Vesuvius, as well as for depictions of Marilyn Monroe, Mao Tsetung, James Dean or suicides jumping from sky scrapers (Feldman & Schellmann, 1989).

Another famous sentence by Warhol states that everybody will be famous for 15 minutes. This sentence is nothing but an oxymoron: to be famous for 15 minutes means not to be famous at all. The idea of celebrity simply loses its meaning; nevertheless this phrase exactly meets our talk-show reality. And it meets, in its paradoxality, exactly the neutralization of value and meaning that is driven by capitalism. The icon of this paradoxality is Warhol's self-portrait, with the silver hair wig and camouflage patterns. This self-portrait can be understood as the culmination of his strategy to establish himself as a brand, and to disappear as a person. To the extent that Warhol established the brand Warhol – *his* face, *his* wig – the person who wore that wig vanished as a replaceable quantity. In the end, the category of individuality is eliminated by the system's unanimousity and complete indifference.

The imbecility, in distinguishing a silk printed reproduction of a silk print by Warhol, from a silk print by Warhol, is the imbecility of a system that tries to camouflage the actual worthlessness of any non-economic idea of "value" behind the smoke screen of culture; which is nothing but the nice and intellectual decoration of the actual system, skeletonized to quantifiable values. This imbecility unfolds exactly here: indifferent to the semantic, or symbolic, "value" of the image, the

art user stares at the certificate or signature which testifies the authorship of the artist. But the surplus here is not the aura of the unique work of art, it is the aura of the fetishlike status symbol.

Warhol's productivity was enormous. The capitalistic principle of division of work in the factory facilitated an output comparable to that of a small-scale company. The market was run. It did not matter whether he delivered images of race riots, car crashes, electric chairs, fellatio, drag queens, Sigmund Freud or Queen Elizabeth, as it does not matter, from an economic point of view, if I sell higher valorised products ("good literature") or lower valorised products (porn booklets). The market swallowed everything, because it could be transformed into money. Warhol's perfect adaptation to the capitalistic mechanisms leaves no space for any euphorical estimation of "art"; it eliminates any category, perhaps even the idea of a distinction between categories.

Warhol's cruelty consisted of his strategy of duplicating the mechanisms of capitalism in a kind of mimicry. Whoever wanted to be portrayed by him was trapped by the logic of elimination of any idea of value. To be portrayed by him amounted to a humiliation, because, in the whole body of his work, the portrait had lost the privileged position it had once had in the history of art. The point, here, is that Warhol used the double faced character of the capitalistic system, and depicted it. By refusing any kind of statement, and by forcing the fetishisation of the Warhol brand, he delivered a perfect picture of the capitalistic system. Whoever bought or commissioned a work by Warhol needed to be asked if she or he were still sane. And this is the question Warhol asked of this society. In a perfidious way he testified to what Adorno had already declared: "Culture is refuse" (Adorno, 1997: 310).

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landscape / inscape

Review by Tony Green

landscape/inscape exhibition at
St Paul St Gallery
April 27 – May 28, 2006

Leonhard Emmerling, the new director of AUT's St Paul St Gallery, put together this show, his first here, in just three months. As will happen with immigrant curators, it juxtaposes the culture he comes from with the culture he is beginning to find here. In this show, he works with German artists and Bill Viola side-by-side with paintings and drawings by Colin McCahon and Stephen Bambury. The main Gallery space is about as not-white-cube as you can get: irregular walls and angles, exposed services in a ceiling that feels oppressively low for the width of the space, one long wall and two short, interrupted by a window, more like a loading-bay than a gallery. This set-up fully tests curators' ability to make anything coherent. Leonhard Emmerling does well: he has undoubtedly got a good eye for hanging a show, giving work that needs slow thoughtful looking plenty of wall-space; making major juxtapositions out of the different framing effects of the walls; not afraid of irregularities in the lines and groupings on the longest wall; and happy to mix – not easy to do – drawing, painting, photography and, in the two more regular shaped rooms, video.

The terms for coherence for this show are laid out in his interesting introductory essay. It covers the ground: landscape as a questioning of mediation of perception; seeing revealed as visionary and seeking the sublime. That works well with most of the imported work, putting in high-relief questions of light, the eye, the perception of something seen as out there, but necessarily elusive and illusionary. In most of them, the instrumentation of lens/camera attempts to make it permanent, fixed, and Pieter Rösel's paintings attempt to do likewise. With Bill Viola's *Chott el Djerid* video, it is mirages – unnameable constantly shifting images from which slowly figures appear, a truck maybe, a camel, motor-bikes; with Rösel's it is again mirages, but unreachable by plein-air painting, because the images are always in flux and such painting implies only one sighting of something, more or less constant, *pace* Monet. In a digital video by Gerhardt Mantz, the views of changing landscape are all fabricated, manipulations evidently schematised by some apparently inner vision. Even photography here is, quite properly, problematic as two pairs of two variant views by Sylvia Henrich dispose of the seemingly evident singularity of what it can say of a place. High up on the gallery's one pillar, that everyone tries to ignore, is the work that Emmerling regards as a paradigm for the whole: Bernhard Härtter's *Egg,* a shining stainless steel ovoid, reflecting in its own re-stating rather than dis-torting mirror-surface whatever for whoever as they pass. These works sweetly cover the ground. The curator's intelligence shines in the conceptual tightness of the show and the recognition of variations on a central issue among the overseas works.

But whether this conception works for the local content is not so clear. It runs into difficulties with Colin McCahon's 'Necessary Protection' painting and drawing straight away. Even the roughest drawings of the series are not the recordings of an eye for a scene. Characteristically, as with the *Northland Panels*, a decade



Bernhard Härtter, Egg, *1998, metal, private collection, Auckland*

earlier, they were done from memory, in the studio. McCahon, in his art, resists every kind of pictorial blandishments, impurities of sense – colour, fine finish, and charm. It cannot accept pure formal abstraction, because that eliminates exactly the justification for painting, the overriding moral purpose that McCahon clings to. It is difficult to see this as other than founded on fear of the biblical taboo on images. His landscapes are, instead, the gradual and difficult transformations of characteristic blocks of light and dark – generalities of a scene, never particulars, into a field filled with symbols. In their furthest extension, the large *Necessary Protection* canvases, the once-seen scene is a lingering specific local reference, alongside moral readings that result from a meditation on the Crucifixion. This puritanical art does not elude, however, the beauty of surface effect, the look, of his paintings and drawings, which does not hide their simple feeling for materials, nor spoil moral utterance with virtuoso displays of decoration. Instead, with the craft pared down to the most direct means, they they are testaments to integrity.

Stephen Bambury, as Emmerling recognises, reverses that which in McCahon's procedure pushes away from pictorial landscape scene to moral utterance. The little *Southland Panels* and the *Sight Line (IX) Oaia Island* are both variants of McCahon images. Bambury begins with some simplicity of formal arrangement, but in the working of the materials, allows for the resonance of the formal with those who have used it before, and that the formal carries a symbolic weight. Further, his working of medium, resin or patinated metal, is always open to the aleatoric. He allows the medium to throw out suggestions of how paint surface or metal patination can be looked at as fleeting unstable landscape-like images. In his continuing meditation on McCahon's painting, Bambury, though capable of a range of feeling from the gentlest, as in the small pieces, to terrible intensity in the large trowelled orange resin [priests' robes] and streaked graphite of *Angkor II.* In all respects, even in its plain reference to Buddhist culture within the format of McCahon's Crucifixion/Necessary Protection, Bambury is performing his necessary corrections to McCahon. In his opening up of abstraction' to image, to symbol, to states of feeling, to landscape, Bambury fits better with the reflections on landscape in the rest of the show. This show, with its high quality work by artists' rarely, if ever, seen here before, has usefully opened up some critical issues.

A marriage of convenience?

Review by Moana Nepia

The Wedding, Royal New Zealand Ballet National Tour. Premiere performance Aotea Centre, Auckland, March 1 2006

The red carpet was laid out for the opening night of *The Wedding*. Television cameras rolled on writer, Witi Ihimaera, as he shared a few last thoughts before curtain up. Promises of strip dancing and all male shower scenes – on stage with the Royal New Zealand Ballet - had already sent ripples of anticipation throughout the land. Bums on stage generally mean bums on seats, and this opening night looked like a sell-out. Just as well. An investment of $1.7 million meant this was the most expensive production ever mounted by the Royal New Zealand Ballet. As composer, Gareth Farr, acknowledged, "If we don't get the sales and nobody wants to go, no one's going to want to do it again" (Watkin, 2006: 17).

Ihimaera approached the company five years ago with an idea for a love story set amidst the multi-cultural reality of contemporary New Zealand, "a new society on the brink of transformation" (Ihimaera in conversation with the author, 1 July 2006). Artistic Director, Gary Harris, and Company Manager, Sue Paterson, were enthusiastic. They brought together part Fijian, ex-pat choreographer, now director of London's Rambert Dance Company, Mark Baldwin, director/dramaturg, Raymond Hawthorne, Gareth Farr, and designer, Tracy Grant, to form, what Tim Watkin described in the weekly *New Zealand Listener* as, the "dream team" (2006: 15). On all fronts, expectations for this production were understandably high, especially given Ihimaera's stellar literary career, and award winning success with the film, *The Whale Rider* (2003).

Ihimaera also promised to bring to ballet "an audience that ballet's never had" (Watkin, 2006: 17). A total of 21,067 people saw *The Wedding* - in Auckland, Napier, Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin (Susana Lei'ataua in conversation with the author, 5 July 2006). A more detailed account of audience figures, and percentages for the whole tour, has yet to be released. Opening night, in Auckland, was a glamorous event, with invited VIP 'Wedding' guests wining and dining in fine style; corporate sponsors mingled with politicians, artists huddled and exchanged notes. According to Ihimaera, two busloads of school children from Ruatoria travelled south, for several hours, to see the production in Napier, and one performance in Wellington was invaded by a contingent of Goths (Ihimaera in conversation with the author, 1 July 2006).

The original storyline featured a part Māori, part Italian female lead, opportunities to portray Samoan and Hindu dance, a Māori karanga (call of welcome), American in-laws, a gay love duet for two men, and, of course, the now famous post-rugby practice shower scene. The media loved the idea. Ihimaera's "My Big Fat Kiwi Wedding" portrait, with lead ballerina Chantelle Kerr, was on the front page of the *New Zealand Listener* (2006, March 4-10). After the hectic season finished, company publicist, Susana Lei'ataua, took a well-earned holiday - on a Fijian beach that wedding-planners anywhere would die for.

The famous shower scene. The audience was kept in suspense until well into the opening act. Then, one by one, the men entered the shower-room. They soaped themselves up one side, then the other, and with a flick of their towels and a few jetés across front of stage, they were off like bouncy spring lambs. What a tease. This was definitely a family production.

For the stag night, female strippers played it safe: they didn't shed a thing. Three male strippers, for the hen's night out, did get their gear off - down to what looked like oversize flesh coloured panties. Not sexy. If they had problems with being completely naked for the sake of art, a jock strap or a pair of y-fronts would have worked better. If they were feeling shy, they should have remembered they were not actually naked, and that - in striptease - it is the promise of something more that counts. Inspired choreography could have had us gasping, if not blushing.

The Wedding was heralded as a groundbreaking ballet love story, but the love story got lost in the mix. By the time the leading couple reached the altar, I knew very little about them as individuals, except that the heroine and the delivery boy rekindled an old flame, when he appeared on her doorstep with flowers - that much I had already gleaned from the programme notes. The groom, who was American, played rugby, got angry and picked a fight with the flower boy at the altar. Why, I am not exactly sure; earlier he had not seemed particularly in love with his fiancée.

For it to succeed, as dramatic ballet, *The Wedding* needed a major element of tension or mystery. Instead, the wedding planners delivered a comic spectacle, a pantomime complete with the frilliest pink wedding dress imaginable, a gorilla, swingers, koru fern frond set motifs, mini-skirted air-hostesses (who stole the show), a pastel chapel altar scene, and main protagonists who all lived 'happily ever after a fight'.

The original story had depicted people of all ages, shapes and sizes, but ballet dancers, as a rule, are generally neither fat nor old. Little surprise then, that the rugby haka translated into something rather more aerial than grounded. The choreographic opportunity to investigate different cultural dance vocabularies and subvert conventional ballet language was also missed. Mark Baldwin exploited the familiar, elegant vocabulary and linear precision that ballet dancers train so arduously to perfect. However, there was no choreographic innovation; likewise, the musical score and design elements lacked any outstanding originality.

I do not have a problem with the ballet company presenting light-hearted and populist work, but promoting it as "groundbreaking" is a patronising exaggeration, and to label *The Wedding* "ruggedly indigenous" is misleading (Watkin, 2006: 17). Are we so gullible that we cannot see the work for what it is? Perhaps Raymond Hawthorne hit the nail on the head when he said: "They'll love it. The dancers all get en pointe and whiz around with their legs around their heads. What more can they want?" (Watkin, 2006: 19). Perhaps most New Zealanders want ballet to be a pastiche of itself. Do they also want New Zealand to become a pastiche of itself? I rather hope not. The ballet company needs to aim higher; it is capable of much more than this.

On the verge of a politically strategic tour to the People's Republic of China, in 1984, the newly appointed management of the Royal New Zealand Ballet commissioned a new work, *Moko.* The Chinese had made a request for something distinctly New Zealand, after noticing the glaring absence of any such work in the proposed programme. Maori choreographer, Piri Sciascia, his wife, Gaylene Sciascia, Maori artist, Sandy Adsett, and composer, Ross Harris, explored ancient and specifically Maori themes and narratives in the making of this work. Chinese, and New Zealand, audiences alike may have had mixed feelings about the artistic outcome, but the symbolic gestures of goodwill were significant.

In 2001, the ballet company joined forces with Mark Baldwin and Te Matarae I Orehu, one of the leading Maori kapa haka performing arts groups. They shared an evening programme where there was little convergence of the different artistic traditions, but enough proximity to suggest further possibilities of working together. To what extent the healthy Maori audience response to this season can be nurtured and sustained remains to be seen.

In 2006, *The Wedding* dream team could have made a much greater commitment to the themes of cultural diversity and interaction offered by Maori writer, Witi Ihimaera. Instead they delivered a simplified story, a safe and pastel romp. A genuine engagement with indigenous themes could help to establish a cultural specificity for the Royal New Zealand Ballet. Is this what New Zealand audiences want?

Dame Peggy van Praagh founded the Australian Ballet with the aim of establishing a repertoire that had a clearly defined balance between classical ballet, modern ballet and Australian work. Her policy was instrumental in supporting Australian choreography and choreographic talent. The aims of the Royal New Zealand Ballet have never been as specific. The company's current vision statement reads more like a report on the status quo, than a guide for the future: "The Royal New Zealand Ballet is a company of 32 dynamic dancers, performing a wide range of choreographic works throughout New Zealand and overseas". It wants "to build a style and repertoire that is ultimately unique to the company". Perhaps this needs to be qualified. Commissioning new work from overseas is a good idea, and, aiming for a repertoire consisting of 30% New Zealand choreography would be excellent. Making a commitment to higher levels of artistic innovation, at all levels of production, must be commended. However, this demands long-term planning and fearless financial application. Perhaps the ballet company could learn a lesson or two from the music industry, where commitment to local music by producers, publicists and local radio has seen a huge increase in the success of New Zealand music, both here and abroad.

The ballet company would risk nothing but change by considering a bicultural aspect to its mission statement. Classical ballet, after all, is an ethnic dance form that has evolved out of specific European movement traditions, myths and historical narratives. Ballet continues to evolve elsewhere, incorporating musical and other cultural influences from Latin America, Asia and, particularly, the United States. The Royal New Zealand Ballet needs commitment and a long-term vision if it is to achieve anything other than a superficial engagement with its own unique cultural position.

In the meantime, the reality of keeping a national institution such as the Royal New Zealand Ballet afloat, remains principally one of negotiating a delicate balance between box office and artistic success: the two do not always neatly coincide. Healthy audience numbers not only generate income, but also make the company a more attractive proposition for prospective corporate sponsors. This, in turn, means more investment in the status quo. As long as this cycle continues, the public feels confident - 'it must be doing well' - whatever the artistic merits or failings on stage. Francesca Horsley thought *The Wedding* was destined to be a winner (Horsley, 2006: 45). At the opening night gala, Georgina Te Heu Heu, opposition spokesperson for the Arts said she loved it, and judging by the applause, so too did most of the audience.

As Gary Harris has quite rightly asserted, "ballet is not brain surgery": ballet is entertainment. Ballet is also a form of spectacle, and, for many of us, an escape from reality, something impossibly un-real. Ballet dancers are 'super-human' and much of what they do is beyond the physical capabilities of their audience. Furthermore, some of the most sublime ballet moments happen when artists transcend the context of the most improbable fairy tale scenario and take us somewhere else, allowing us a moment to dream. Whenever creative dreams are compromised, we compromise the potential to imagine anything better.

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Dr. Leonhard Emmerling, born 1961, Wertheim/Germany, studied Art History, Musicology, German Literature and Byzantine Archeology in Heidelberg. PhD in Art History "The Art Theory of Jean Dubuffet"; assistant at the Collection Prinzhorn, Heidelberg; curator at the Pfalzgalerie Kaiserslautern, the Krefelder Kunstmuseen and Director of the Kunstverein Ludwigsburg; lecturer in art theory at the Kunsthochschule Weissensee, Berlin, and the University of Ludwigsburg; authored books "Renaissance and Gothic art in the Palatinate"; "1. Liga! – The function of the institution museum today"; "Friendly Fire"; "Jean-Michel Basquiat"; "Jackson Pollock". Appointed Director of St Paul St Gallery, AUT University, in January 2006.

Moana Nepia has had an international career as a dancer and choreographer, working with contemporary dance, classical ballet and opera companies in Australia, Greece, and Britain as well as in New Zealand. This has included performing and choreography for Impulse Dance Theatre, the Royal NZ Ballet, Taiao, Footnote, teaching for the education departments of the London City Ballet, the Royal Ballet and Birmingham Royal Ballet Companies, performing with the Victorian State Opera and Danceworks in Melbourne, with Sydney Dance Company, the English National Opera, Dance Advance, Extemporary Dance Theatre and Opera Transatlantica, in Britain. He retrained as a visual artist in London at Chelsea College of Art and Wimbledon School of Art and continues to choreograph and practice as a visual artist while lecturing on both the digital design and dance programmes at AUT University. He is also leading a major research project on Maori Dance at Te Ara Poutama (AUT University).

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These names are but the tip of the iceberg. Journals like this, which are produced on the smell of an oily rag, can only come to fruition within a network of like-minded contributors, only some of whom are named on page 2 of this issue. We thank all.

We also wish to thank the reviewers who contributed much to the quality of the last two issues through constructive criticism: Allan Smith, Anthony Hoete, Bechir Kenzari, Branko Mitrovic, Christina Barton, Christine McCarthy, David Leatherbarrow, Denis Dutton, Desley Luscombe, Elizabeth Grierson, Frances Pound, Gordana Kostich-Levebvre, Gustavo Restivo, Helene Furján, John MacArthur, Jonathan Lamb, Jules Maloney, Julian Young, Justine Clark, Laurence Simmons, Leon Tan, Linda Williams, Mark Jackson, Michael Gunder, Michael Milojevic, Mike Austin, Mike Lindsay, Mirjana Lozanovska, Okusi Mahina, Paul Walker, Peter Wood, Sarah Treadwell, Sean Cubitt, Susan Crozier, Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese Efi, and Warwick Tie. If this list is not complete, we apologise – it would only be due to the many complications that arose during the editorial and refereeing processes.

Apology

Another apology is also in order: Marco Frascari's contribution to the last issue, *Animal/Impulse*, was unfortunately truncated during the last seconds of the layout process without anyone noticing. We have learned a lesson …

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Abbreviations (and punctuation):

cf.	compare	e.g.	for example
etc.	and so forth	i.e.	that is
viz.	namely	vs.	versus

Quotations:

Double quote marks around a quoted word, phrase, or sentence, as follows:

Heidegger would make this point very clear in later two essays, in which he introduces the "primal oneness" of the fourfold where "to be 'on earth' already means 'under the sky'" as a counter to a world in a process of planetary dissolution, in which "everything is washed together into the uniform distance¬less¬ness" (1954: 149), and "airplanes and radio sets are … among the things closest to us" (1975: 21).

Use single quotations marks for quotes within quotes.

If the quotation is 40 words or more it must be indented (left indent only) and does not have quotation marks around the whole quote. Quoted words inside the body of the 40 words are indicated in single quotation marks. e.g.

> The axonometric drawings of Sartoris can be considered ... the locus of a cognitive transcendence: in the finished perfection of the design, where geometry discloses its suprahistorical authority, the architect-theologian catches the 'philosophical and poetic matrix' of the new architecture in the mirror of the 'dreamt image', and anticipating the ends by the mastery of the means, prefigures a reality to come … (Reichlin 1978: 91)

Note that if a word or group of words is omitted from the quotation then three stops are used with a space before and after (see above).

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On-line References:

Humanities Society of New Zealand/Te Whainga Aronui (HUMANZ) (2000b). Knowledge, Innovation, and Creativity: Designing a knowledge society for a small, democratic country. Wellington: Ministry of Research Science and Technology. Retrieved November 23, 2001, from http://www.morst.govt.nz/publications/humanz/Humanz.htm

Frascari, M. (2000). A Light, Six-Sided, Paradoxical Fight. Nexus Network Journal, 4(2 Spring). Retrieved 22 February, 2001, from http://www.nexusjournal.com/Frascari_v4n2.html.

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