Dualism and Polarism: Structures of Architectural and Landscape Architectural Discourse in China and the West

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In the present paper, we propose to offer a number of reflections on a possible approach to cultural difference in the study of Chinese architecture and landscape architecture. The modern study of these cultural fields comes to us within a double framework in which the modern disciplinary division of labour is overlaid by cultural divisions that have separated the understanding of traditional Chinese materials from contemporary debates of these fields, conceived as international in character but commonly narrated as descended from the Anglo-European tradition. In both these fields, contemporary professionals have negotiated their daily practice across a divide between their specific cultural traditions, on the one hand, and the general debates of their profession, on the other. In addressing the problem of cultural difference in architecture and landscape architecture, we believe that theoretical and philosophical resources are quite crucial, for new visions of cultural possibilities in architectural thinking are not secured by (a Eurocentric) "commonsense" but require intellectual tools of some degree of sophistication. In the present paper, we will have occasion to draw on recent work in comparative philosophy and poststructuralist theory as well as works in architectural theory that might be more familiar to our immediate audience. In view of the broad range of sources that we have found pertinent to our concerns, and the restrictions of space under which we are presenting this discussion, we will limit our purpose to indicating relevance between different bodies of scholarly work. This attempt to relate diverse bodies of materials is in part related to our rejection of the idea of 'recognising' ethnic minorities in an implicitly sentimental and humanistic fashion. The usual institutional measures, that it inspires - for instance, in terms of curriculum reform - often reinforce and consolidate rather than challenge the cultural division that segregates the 'Chinese' and the 'contemporary' in architectural discourse. A serious challenge to this cultural division, it would appear, ineluctably calls for different resources gathered across a range of disciplines, and the cross-cultural work that it entails would involve a 'risking' or 'transformation' of important issues of current concern to the Western architectural world.

The present series of reflections is organised around the following foci. We will begin by identifying two contexts of discussion in which the cultural interests of traditional China and contemporary architecture are interestingly related and consider the modes of thinking involved in exploring such relations. Next, we will provide an account of theories of textuality in architecture in the last thirty years that highlights the universalist understandings of architecture that informs them. We will attempt to indicate how some recent works in French philosophy and comparative philosophy open up interesting possibilities in dealing with the issue of China as *other*. Our belief is that the introduction of philosophical resources is useful in producing nuanced readings of Chinese writings on architecture and landscape architecture that have important resonances with contemporary architectural concerns. We propose to illustrate this by a close reading of a crucial passage from the 17th-century treatise *Yuan ye* which has been taken as a *locus classicus* in the modern genealogy of the traditional designer in Chinese architecture and gardens. By way of conclusion, we will address the question "What is it for us to speak of a 'we' in architecture?" We will suggest that an interesting take on this question might be derived from the notion of community in the work of the poststructuralist philosopher, Jean-Luc Nancy.

Our point in addressing an unusually broad range of issues and concerns is simple: Cross-cultural studies in architecture and landscape architecture are most powerful and innovative when conceived as the coordinated exploration of a pattern of relevance in disparate scholarly pursuits. They are least consequential and challenging when pursued as dainty adjuncts to "mainstream" debates in their fields. Since no audience in the field of architectural theory is likely to be familiar with the full range of resources that we will draw upon, we have pitched the present discussion in the following way. Where we have reason to believe that at least some part of our audience will be fully conversant with the sources - for instance, the works of Jennifer Bloomer, Mark Wigley, and the French poststructuralist writers that they deal with - our discussion will presume familiarity with them. In the

case of sources from Sinology and comparative philosophy that are largely unknown to Western audiences in the field of architecture and landscape architecture, we will attempt to work with them without presuming readerly expertise. Since the professional and pedagogical relevance of the research that we are pursuing is already beginning to obtain some degree of appreciation,[1] we will not rehearse matters at a strictly elementary level of discussion on this occasion. Overall, even though there may be aspects of the work that would not be immediately accessible to our audience, we hope that this paper will convey a sufficient sense of our general purpose and the pertinence of the material with which we are dealing.

A sense of the pertinence of traditional Chinese materials to contemporary concerns in architecture and landscape architecture can be articulated with reference to the recent works of Augustin Berque and David L. Hall. In a recent issue of *AA Files*, Berque offered a reading of the importance of the tradition of Chinese gardens with reference to Europe and the death of the modern landscape.[2] China, he says, is the only civilisation apart from that of Europe and "their respective spheres of influence" to have a vocabulary that included a word for "landscape," and a "pictorial repertoire" that included "a genre in which the depiction of the environment is elevated to a theme in its own right, denoted by the term 'landscape.'"[3] Berque argues that, in Europe, "the notion of landscape appeared only in modern times, at the moment in history when man conceived of himself as detached from nature - as the subject, with nature as the object. Until the sixteenth century there was no word for landscape in any European language."[4] The distinction between landscape and environment emerged as the product of a modern mentality in the sixteenth century. Modernity, considered as an historical process, "set in motion, almost simultaneously, and certainly interrelatedly, both a landscapist and a scientific view of nature; then caused them to evolve, paradoxically, more and more independently of one another, and finally … rendered impossible a unified vision of nature and a coherent genre of landscape-painting."[5] Cartesian dualism and the Newtonian conception of homogeneous, isotopic space served as the conceptual underpinnings of this whole process in which "landscape, born as a pictorial genre in the sixteenth century, disappeared from avant-garde art early in the twentieth century."[6] In the course of these centuries, the modern world was "torn apart by the triple forces of science (the factual), art (the sensible), and morality."[7] The story of ecological

catastrophe and moral conflict in recent times is familiar to everyone.

Berque points out that, in contradistinction to the European tradition, the Chinese landscape tradition developed within a non-dualist cosmology and has not entertained "the subject/object opposition."[8] It emphasised the correspondence and affinity of the human world and the natural world. While European events unfolded with an antithesis of the phenomenal and the physical worlds, "the Chinese tradition articulated relationships that integrated landscape with environment."[9] It is of particular interest to us that in looking beyond the modern landscape, and proposing the "reintegration of the worlds of art, science and morality,"[10] Berque explicitly explored the exemplarity of the Chinese tradition.

Whatever the limitations of Berque's account of the history of European landscapes, its suggestiveness echoes strongly with a recent paper by David L. Hall, the comparative philosopher, that offers a more nuanced reading of various aspects of modernity and its disintegration.[11] Hall's basic thesis is that "the values underlying the postmodern critique of modernity resonate more profoundly with the dominant cultural interests of the Chinese than ever did the interests and values of the Modern West."[12] As China and other ethnic Chinese communities rush head-long to enter the modern age and adopt "the institutions of liberal democracy, capitalist free enterprise, and the spread of rational technologies," all of which are being subjected to postmodern critique, "it is unnecessary for the Chinese to reject their classical past in order to enter the modern age, since the modern age is itself entering into a period that is ideologically similar to the classical Chinese past."[13] The import of the ramifications of such a view for educators in architecture and landscape architecture today is clear. In teaching institutions, Chinese and other 'ethnic' materials are segregated from the study of major issues and debates of the disciplines of architecture and landscape architecture. On the one hand, students are coming to grips, if they are lucky enough to have enrolled in a course that deals with their own cultural traditions, with cultures (such as that of China) that are positioned as 'far away,' temporally and geographically remote. Yet as far as their professional skills are concerned, these are defined implicitly against a framework that is international but assumed to be an outcome of the Anglo-European tradition. Members of an increasingly multicultural student body (including students from Asia) are meant to form some sense of their professional identity across this fragmented

situation. Hall's remarks point to possibilities that are significant for refiguring our cultural background with a contemporary world in the fields of architecture and landscape architecture.

In exploring the ramifications of the views of Berque and Hall, we immediately come across two problems. First, the question of China as *other*.[14] Berque's account of the Chinese tradition might give the impression that China and Europe are being configured as mutually exclusive domains of cultural values, so that the dualistic mentality that he highlights as a feature of Western landscape thinking would appear to have been loaded on at the level of inter-cultural comparison. This difficulty is indeed heightened when matters are dealt with summarily. Without losing the valuable impetus given by Berque's work, therefore, it would seem necessary to provide an account that addressed this problem. Second, Hall's remark might be taken as a *prima facie* case to explore possible resonances between postmodern and Chinese materials at the level of architecture and landscape architecture. Yet, as we hope to indicate in more focussed discussion below, a direct juxtaposition of contemporary architectural theory with Chinese sources might require a more nuanced employment of the contemporary writings in terms of developments in Western philosophy before their possible relationship with Chinese writings can be explored fruitfully. We have some reservations concerning direct comparisons of Chinese and Western sources,[15] and it is our hope that the resources of comparative philosophy might provide some assistance in the form of inter-cultural mediation.

We propose now to outline a direction of thinking that an elaboration and refinement of Berque's suggestive remarks might take by recourse to the recent works of Hall and his colleague, Roger T. Ames. Recent writings in architecture and landscape architecture have variously referred to dualisms, binary oppositions and bi-polarity in discussions of important aspects of Western philosophy. We would like to begin by establishing a slightly more formal context for the usage of this cluster of terms even though, for considerations of space, we will not be able to pursue the matter in a nuanced manner.

Dualism is a feature of a world-view characterised by an *ex nihilo* creation in which a fundamentally indeterminate and unconditioned power determines the meaning and order of the world.[16] This primary dualism, in various forms, is the source of dualistic categories such as knowledge/opinion, universal/particular, nature/culture, cause/effect,

which organised human experience. Knowledge has been conceived of as the discovery of the defining essence or form behind changing appearances. In architecture, this is related to the importance of "geometry and number, prototypes of the ideal, … their immutability contrasting with the fluid and changing reality of the sublunar world."[17] The Western conception of architectural and landscape design as the rational application of universal principles to particular sites and as the imitation of nature through the use of geometric and proportional principles is directly related to the predominance of such thought. It is also directly related to a view of architectural education as the reproductive transmission of such principles.

Polarism or bi-polarity, on the other hand, indicates a relationship of two terms each of which can only be explained by reference to the other. Unlike dualistic oppositions, each term in polar relation requires the other "as a necessary condition for being what they are."[18] But it is important to note that terms in polar relation with each other are not 'dialectical.' Unlike dialectic relationships, polar ones are not involved in an oppositional play moving from contradiction, synthesis to sublation.[19] In the Chinese tradition, *yin* and *yang* are not dualistic principles of light and dark, male and female, where each term would exclude its opposite, where each would "logically entail the other, and in their complementarity constitute a totality."[20] Rather, *yin* is becoming-*yang* and vice versa. Further, *yin* and *yang* refer to the relationships of unique particulars and

expresses the mutuality, interdependence, diversity, and creative efficacy of the dynamic relationships *that are deemed immanent in and valorise the world … In sum:* yin and yang *are* ad hoc *explanatory categories that report on interactions among immediate concrete things of the world … Important here is the primacy of particular differences and the absence of any assumed sameness or strict identity.*[21]

By contrast, dualistic oppositions such as nature/culture, or man/woman involve terms that indicate essential sameness. It is important to recognise, therefore, that dualism and polarism refer to different ways in which the relationships of binaries may be thought. The confusion of dualism and polarism would entail serious consequences in the reading of different sources. Later, we will offer a close reading of a Chinese text with this distinction in mind.

We will begin the next step in our attempt to obviate a dualistic comparison of China and Europe, which Berque's work might give rise to, by noting

that thinking in terms of polar relations such as *yin* and *yang* is known as correlative thinking. Polar terms are related to 'correlative' thinking, whereas dualisms are related to 'causal' thinking. The latter involves understanding the world by tracing cause/effect relationships of radically unequal and 'substantial' terms, while the former involves understanding the world in terms of correlated entities or processes of becoming each of which "does not derive its meaning and order from some transcendent source."[22] Correlative and causal thinking can be found in both the Chinese and the Anglo-European traditions.[23] However, the former has been the dominant mode in the Chinese tradition, while the latter has been the dominant mode in the Western. This more complex characterisation of the two traditions provides one of the qualifications that we believe would be useful in construing the relationship of the two traditions in non-dualistic terms.

There are two further elaborations that would also be useful for this purpose. Although they lie in specialised philosophical territory, a line of thinking that involves them, it would seem, brings us close to the domain of architectural theory again. First, we note that correlative thinking lies at the basis of causal thinking if metaphors can be said to ground literal, scientific language. Since the state of philosophy and science offers us nothing more than a series of incompatible visions of the world which logic and rationality has not be able to synthesise, we are perforce left with a taxonomy of theories in terms of metaphilosophy.[24] Thus any attempt to problematize the whole range of theories would entail a correlative mode of thinking. Now, we have already indicated above that correlative thinking construes relationships of particulars. A correlative understanding of the contrast between correlative and causal thinking would de-universalise, historise and particularise both modes of thinking.[25]

Our next elaboration involves a context of thought very close to contemporary architectural theory.[26] The noted linguist, Jakobson, is famous for speculating that metaphoric and metonymic operations form the universal basis of all language learning and use. When the noted structuralist anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, read Marcel Granet's *La pensée chinoise*,[27] a Sinological milestone, he found that Granet's discussion of correlative thinking in the Chinese mind could be related to Jakobson's understanding of the universal structure of language. By recourse to Jakobson's work, Lévi-Strauss formalised Granet's articulation of correlativity in *La pensée sauvage*.[28] Correlativity was

thus introduced into recent Western discourse in a move that entailed the rationalisation and universalisation of a mode of thinking that construes relationships of particulars. Poststructuralist critiques of structuralism have focused on the ways in which causal thinking has slipped in the very move to highlight correlativity as the universal ground of thought and language. At this point, it should be evident that the encounter of Lévi-Strauss with the works of Jakobson and Granet is pivotal for a number of contexts.

In terms of the historical unfolding of philosophy in the Anglo-European tradition, the thinking about correlativity in the philosophical preoccupation with language marks the second important shift away from Enlightenment rationalism. First, a series of thinkers from Descartes to Hegel emphasised

the metaphor of 'mind' as the medium through which the world was to be accessed. Beginning with the existential critics of Hegel - principally … Kierkegaard, there was a shift away from 'mind' to 'experience' as the fundamental medium for world-access.[29]

The moment of Lévi-Strauss and correlativity is part of the second transition from 'experience' to 'language' in recent decades.

In terms of inter-cultural understanding between the Chinese and Anglo-European traditions, the structuralist recognition of correlative thinking as the basis of thought and language is a momentous occasion, for correlative thinking has been the dominant mode of thinking of the Chinese tradition, but for the slippage of causal thinking into the moment of reckoning. In this regard, the poststructuralist critique of structuralism still holds the potential to open up significant cross-cultural work. This is one way in which we might begin to understand the import of Hall's remark that the cultural interests of the postmodern and the Chinese have significant resonances.

In terms of the development of architectural and landscape architectural theory, we can find in the philosophical discussion of language and correlativity direct pertinence both in the discussion of architecture as language and in the ramifications of French poststructuralism in architecture. The matter of Lévi-Strauss and correlativity is therefore, by extension, one of considerable import. It is precisely here, in issues of architecture and language, that we can explore the closest relationship between the Chinese and the Anglo-European traditions. In the light of our comments on Lévi-Strauss and

correlativity, it would appear that this relationship would not be appropriately explored by a simple adoption of Western semiotics, semiology, or structuralist hermeneutics, for the study of Chinese architecture and landscapes.[30] Our foregoing observations indicate that the rationalist, universalist tendencies of causal thinking would need to be kept in abeyance if the resonance of aspects of Chinese and postmodern concerns in architecture and landscape architecture were to be explored.

LINGUISTICS AND SEMIOTICS

In 1961, the American journal *Progressive Architecture* published a series of articles on the contemporary crisis of architecture, with particular focus on the failure of international modernism and the modern movement, and the significance of a new and young generation of architects centred around Louis Kahn, one of whom was Robert Venturi.[31] Emphasis was given to the necessity for architectural practices to address their ground in human cultures and meanings rather than being absorbed with formalism and functionalism. Within the European context, Diana Agrest makes much the same point regarding the "waning of the enthusiasm for functionalism in the 1940," and comments on the work of the architectural group Team 10 who themselves suggest:

Our hierarchy of associations is woven into a modulated continuum representing the true complexity of human associations … We must evolve an architecture from the fabric of life itself*, an equivalent of the complexity of our way of thought, of our passion for the natural world and our belief in the ability of man.*[32]

At this time, there were also the emerging fields of operational research, mathematical approaches to complexity, developments in computing, and artificial intelligence approaches to design and planning. Writings by Lionel March on a mathematisation of the design of architectural and urban forms are indicative of such developments.[33] We may also mention Christopher Alexander's *Notes on the Synthesis of Form* which deals with issues of complexity, cultural diversity and design.[34]

It is during this period of the 1960s that an interest in linguistics developed in the field of architecture. Mario Gandelsonas provides the following scenario:

This interest in linguistics developed while architectural theoretical production expanded at an accelerated rate as a response to the architectural crisis of the 50s. The practical failure of modern architecture after the Second World War during the reconstruction of Europe became apparent during this decade. The most negative aspects of the theories elaborated by the modern movement, which concealed under a descriptive discourse a normative, esthetic-technical discourse based on a 'tabula rasa' approach and an antihistorical position, became apparent.[35]

This interest in linguistics cannot itself be divorced from the developments in a range of cultural studies and human sciences in the 1960s, associated with the developments of structuralism, semiotics and philosophies of language developed from the project of Logical Positivism. The theorist Julia Kristeva suggested at the time that modern linguistics, as "heir to the age of Cartesianism" regarded language fundamentally as a logical synthesis, considering language as a strictly formal object "in that it depends on a syntax and mathematicalisation."[36] Elsewhere she suggested that the study of language is at a "cross-roads" whose opposed directions ultimately inflect on the directionality of opposed philosophical traditions:

The theory of meaning now stands at a cross-roads: either it will remain an attempt at formalising meaning-systems by increasing sophistication of the logico-mathematical tools which enable it to formulate models on the basis of a conception (already rather dated) of meaning as the act of a transcendental ego, cut off from its body, its unconscious, and also its history; or else it will attune itself to the theory of the speaking subject as a divided subject (conscious/unconscious) and go on to attempt to specify the types of operations characteristic of the two sides of this split.[37]

While there has been a long history of the metaphor of architecture as a language, particularly in relation to compositional approaches of Classicism and the Beaux Arts tradition, as with for example Summerson's *The Classical Language of Architecture*,[38] with the development of semiotics and structuralism, the relation of language to architecture takes some new directions. Some markers of these new directions are Venturi's *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* and (the co-authored) *Learning from Las Vegas*; both of which cannot be separated from developments in other cultural spheres, particularly the Pop Art movement which presented the challenge of the everyday chaos of the street and popular culture to the high-culture aesthetics of the white-cube gallery.[39] We may also note Umberto Eco's essay on the column in the journal *Semiotica*;[40] Agrest and Gandelsonas' exchange with Jencks in the journal *Oppositions*,[41] which introduced into American architectural discourse the stakes involved in a European intellectual concern with Althusserian Marxism, foregrounding the relations between production, ideology and sign exchange; Jencks and

Baird's *Meaning in Architecture*, especially Jenck's essay on semiology, which deferred to the English language theorists Ogden and Richards rather than succumb to Continental influences;[42] Gandelsonas' "On Reading Architecture" in *Progressive Architecture*, on Eisenman and Graves,[43] and his essay in Columbia University's *Semiotext(e)*, taking direction from the work of Kristeva on poetics and language.[44] Donald Preziosi's early work on semiotics and architecture represents the most formalist aspects of a structuralist approach to language and architecture.[45] This indexical list is far from constituting an homogeneous grouping, nor can we say this is an exhaustive catalogue of positions or markers of the field. In fact, each of these proper names presents a focus for its own field of discussion within the broad arena of language models and architectural practices.

From the brief survey of the reception of linguistic models in architecture above, we may turn to the semiotics approach of those whose work owes a debt to Ferdinand de Saussure and his binary of the sign as signifier/signified relation.[46] The field of semiotics itself becomes divided between those who see a structuralist project of analysis, exemplified perhaps by the early work of Donald Preziosi, and those aligned with the later work of Roland Barthes, along with poststructuralism's radicality of the signifier. This latter field is dispersed across foci on desire (Lacan, Deleuze & Guattari, Lyotard, Lingis), on philosophy and textuality (Derrida), poetics (Kristeva), transgression (Bataille, Blanchot, Klossowski), the fields of power, knowledge and space (Foucault, de Certeau, Virillio), simulation and hyperreality (Baudrillard). Again, this is a heterogeneous field of elements, linked in some respects by a radical dislocation of the Cartesian tradition and the status of the transcendental ego. One cannot simply trace a lineage from each of these back to Saussure. However, in the possibility of its emergence, each has a concern with the structuration of language and its relation to subjectivity and cultural practices.[47]

With respect to the cultural practices of architecture, dominated by a reductive and instrumentalist functionalism, the importation of linguistic and semiotic theories made possible a questioning of the supposed natural and motivated relations between forms and functions. For example, in relation to Umberto Eco's writings on architecture and semiotics, Gandelsonas comments:

This analysis of the arbitrary linkage between architectural object and function or other meanings invalidates the notion of function as the unique determinant of the form of

the object. It also invalidates the idea of meaning as inherent to the object.[48]

Gandelsonas goes on to present the value of a semiotic model:

Which of the architectural texts (drawing, models, literature, building) is going to be fragmented in order to build these codes? In our Western conception of architecture, where the emphasis is centred on the final product, the answer would be the building. But the architect not only writes in order to establish procedures, conventions, rules, but he also draws. The drafting table is the 'theatre' where the production is developed. One of the implications of the semiotic approach has been to make the theorist aware of the various 'texts.' In contrast with the traditional approaches of art history and criticism which considered these texts to be equivalent, they begin to be studied, as written architecture - the analysis of classical and modern theories, that is the architectural discourse, drawn architecture - the analysis of different systems of representation, and built architecture - the semiotic analysis of technical theories.[49]

Gandelsonas' approach in this essay takes direction from the work of Kristeva on language, transgression and poetics. As it is our aim to situate a current conjuncture of poststructuralist philosophy and textuality, it would be useful to reference the stakes in the emergence of 'writing' as a radical practice for a generation of poststructuralist thinkers. John Rajchman comments:

The debate over écriture *(writing) was thus a debate about the* political *culture of modernism* [as a radical opposition to 'bourgeois language' (Barthes)]. *It was a debate about the vision of a non-technocratic yet non-humanistic culture that would celebrate our 'decentered' relation to language in sublime laughter and 'transgression,' about an avant-garde culture (the term comes from the twenties) presenting itself as the rupture, the threshold, the limits of our age; and about a non-populist or elitist culture which was nevertheless committed to the left.*[50]

The key figures for Rajchman in the emergence of 'writing' as a radical philosophical and political practice: Barthes and the whole *nouvelle critique*, Lacan (whose *Ecrits* appeared in 1966) and Derrida (whose *Of Grammatology* and *Writing and Difference* appeared in 1967). Of Derrida, Rajchman suggests: "He attempted to graft the question of writing onto the entire philosophical tradition, supplanting Heidegger's great 'question of Being.'"[51] Rajchman suggests:

Julia Kristeva's Révolution du language poétique *may some day seem a great summation of the movement. The title captures its spirit - a great revolution emerging from avant-garde writing.*[52]

Many of the approaches to the application of linguistics to architecture were crudely developed, paying little regard to the manner in which extrinsic theory or method may be applied to architectural practices and without questioning or affecting the conservative grounds of those practices. Hence, with essays such as Geoffrey Broadbent's "A Plain Man's Guide to the Theory of Signs in Architecture" there is little, if any, disruption to the givenness of the field named 'architecture,' nor to the formal and functional bases of its practices.[53] The mechanical application of semiotics as a method in design production has had a short life. In this regard, Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas both stressed the manner in which extrinsic models were easily accommodated within architectural discourse, models which had the possibility of shaking the functionalist ground of that discourse, but which failed to do so. One may recognise a more concerted approach to the stakes of linguistic models and architectural practices in Gandelsonas' 1972 article for *Progressive Architecture*, "On Reading Architecture," which is concerned with the work of architects Peter Eisenman and Michael Graves. Gandelsonas configured each of these architects as respectively concerned with syntactics and semantics, the structuration of meanings or the multiple plays of meaning. This focus on signification and the production of meaning, in relation to the arbitrary linkage between architectural form and function, severs the assumed natural relation between form and function, allowing for a reading of architecture as combinations of codes. At the risk of condensing this brief genealogy *ad absurdum*, this difference will come to be played out by Mary McLeod as that between Deconstructivism and Postmodernism, that is to say, a postmodernism concerned with the play of styles, and the examples of poststructuralism and architectural practices being worked together.[54] It is with this working of poststructuralist theory and architecture that the most radical questioning of writing, textuality and architecture has arisen, the central impetus here being the writings of Derrida, and the event of his collaboration with Eisenman.[55]

WRITING /CHINA/ IN *ANY* LANGUAGE

Regarding contemporary developments in the field of textuality and architecture, there are three arena where we may see a more sustained encounter of linguistics and architecture. One arena has developed in response to an understanding of architectural productions as cultural phenomena constituted in and by a complex intertextuality of other cultural productions and itself constituting in part other cultural domains. Thus the edited collections *Architecture/Criticism/Ideology*, *ArchitectureProduction* and *Sexuality and Space* address the complex sitings and dispersions of architecture across mediated sign exchanges, institutional configurations and relations of power.[56] The second arena is constituted in the possibilities that have been pursued in the developments of particularly French poststructuralist philosophy, itself emerging from a radical question of writing and textuality. The most significant here is the writings of Derrida, with its tropic topos of the architectural, and the work of a relatively small group of writers on deconstruction and architecture. Particularly significant here, with theorists like Mark Wigley, John Rajchman,[57] Mark C. Taylor,[58] who are not practitioners in that narrow and conservative sense, is the attention to questioning the stakes, possibility and capacity to bring into a neighbourhood certain philosophemes and architectural texts.

The third arena concerns itself with writings, textuality in its plurality and heterogeneity. The architectural works or 'outworks (*hors-livres*)' of Bernard Tschumi, Peter Eisenman, Daniel Libeskind, Jennifer Bloomer suggest the adoption of practices of textuality as a rupturing of the architectural field, placing into question the ground which would support the proper name itself of architecture.[59] Bloomer says in the introduction to her book *Architecture and the Text*:

Thus this is a work of critical analysis that began with a constellation of questions rather than a hypothesis: Is there further research to be done on the relation between architecture and writing, research that goes beyond the pitfalls and dead ends of the arguments made over the last twenty years that depend on semantic and syntactic translations between languages (the early architectural research of Peter Eisenman and that of Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas, for example) and simple tropic analogies (the early work of Jorge Silvetti, Robert Venturi, and Michael Graves)? Where might be the sites of such relations, if not in causal correspondence? Are the configurations significant that describe the relations among language, literature, writing, drawing, building, and architecture? How might a consideration of the connections between theory and practice inform and be informed by these configurations? The relations of space and time? Those of nature and culture? If we reconstrue history and historical research in terms of a suspension of belief in the mutual exclusivity, or bipolarity, of these pairs of concepts, how

might this inform and be informed by these configurations? … When I use the word writing in this text (and I use it a lot), I do not refer simply to that concept of writing as a mirror or documentation of speech, but to writing as a constructing, nonlinear enterprise that works across culture in networks of signification. This writing, although it makes use of language, is not limited by conventional concepts of language, that is, it does not exist in identity with language.[60]

We have intimated above that the importation of linguistic models and semiotics into architecture during the 1960s and 1970s did not ostensibly address the foundational nature of functionalism and formalism as the determining ground of architectural practices. Regarding poststructuralist incursions, with more radical notions of textuality and outright challenge to the form/function binary, the question remains as to whether the institutional and discursive formations of practices named 'architectural' quite easily continue to go about their economically rationalist, functionally formalist business, and treat such incursions as mere accessory. Indeed, these three contemporary arenas we have just outlined may be seen annually played out within the circuits of the *Any* series of conferences.[61] The *Any* series attempts to accommodate each of these three developments, ironically containing them in a proper name which dissimulates its identity as the identity of dissimulation. The implicit universalism of this title, *Any*, a veritable *leitmotif* for contemporary poststructuralist incursions in architecture, cannot but raise the question of who is or is not addressed by this 'any.' Literally *Anyone*, *Anywhere*, *Anyway*? In the context of a Chinese philosophical and landscape architectural tradition, we want to address precisely the addressivity of the 'any' of poststructuralist textuality in architecture, with reference to contemporary issues in the study of classical Chinese philosophy which suggest resonances between that tradition and poststructuralist thinking. Admittedly, with a recognition of deconstruction's crossing-out of a universalist 'is,' there is a leverage in the play of dissimulation of the proper. Yet, such a play, precisely in its lability, slips quite easily into a universalist discourse. We will return to this theme of an opposition between universalism and unique particularity of the 'any' more fully when discussing contemporary issues in Sinological comparative philosophy. But are *we* slipping into a naive universalism with this nomenclature of the 'any'?

A principal concern of this paper, then, is to address contemporary issues in textuality and architecture, developed within a Western philosophical tradition, in relation to the classical Chinese tradition and its practices of architecture and landscape architecture. It is necessary to locate some of the principal themes in contemporary Western approaches to textuality and architecture as the basis for a further discussion concerning comparative philosophy and Sinology. To locate these principal themes, we need to return briefly to the impetus for an approach to linguistic and semiotic models in architecture, as a move away from functionalism and the formalism associated with European modernism. The problems with functionalism/formalism may be understood ultimately or foundationally as those related to instrumentalism, scientism and an aestheticism derivative from an ideology of utility, rationalism and pure function.[62] These implicitly infer epistemological and ontological conditions: empirico-rationalism, subject/object duality, causal agency of design, an Aristotelian projective teleology in finality of design, which is to say, the considering of design in terms of a narratival order of origins and ends and a causality which relates them. Significantly, there is the predominance of being over becoming: ground, order, the permanent, ideal, finality of form we associate with teleological thinking takes precedence over the formless, process, heterogeneity and flux.

The multiplicity of directions taken during the mid-20th century in addressing, in a more complex fashion, an orientation to human cultures and meanings by no means countered all of the above. Most of the sociological, anthropological, or linguistic-based research which has overrun the disciplinary boundaries of architectural practices, has continued to inscribe a humanist-rationalist subject, an empirically knowable world, an implicit Platonic-Cartesian metaphysical tradition, a causal and narratival accounting for human agency. The most radical challenge to this order of the human sciences in their wholesale incursion into the disciplinary field of architecture has been that limited corpus of works which have addressed head-on the implicit epistemological and ontological grounds of this humanist tradition, and which are located in the work of those concerned with textuality and writing, as the predominantly French poststructuralist tradition has developed it. Precisely because of the disturbance made within this aspect of architecture to the deeply embedded strata of the Western metaphysical tradition, there is particular efficacy in examining correlative fields within cultural traditions themselves not founded on the Platonic-Cartesian tradition. Hence, in suggesting a turning, via contemporary comparative philosophical writings, to a classical Chinese tradition, we are not suggesting that the contemporary field of textuality and architecture is itself dominant in Western discourses

in architecture, nor that it signals a future horizon as destinal for architectural practices, nor that it harbours a truth veiled by a humanist-rationalist tradition. Rather, because of the thinking of practice that its dislocation makes possible, it affords an openness or *horismos* for reconfiguring how we encounter China. As we have introduced earlier, the philosophical writings of Hall and Ames suggest a resonance between the classical Chinese tradition, understood in terms of correlative thinking, aesthetic order, polar-terms, rather than binary oppositions, rational thinking, logical order and causal relation. In Hall's text, cited earlier, suggestion is made in particular of the relation of Derridean deconstruction, with its undoing of the binary logic of Western metaphysics, and the bi-polarity of classical Chinese correlative thinking.[63] For this reason we consider that approaching a classical Chinese tradition in architecture and landscape architecture with the resources of contemporary philosophical developments in Western notions of architecture and writing clearly disturbs the disciplinary boundaries of histories and theories of architecture in the West, which figure 'Chinese architecture' as a provincial, secondary, accessory to the mainframe of an implicitly universalist Western tradition.

Thus, in what follows we are considering how contemporary practices of textuality and architecture may be understood in terms of their poststructuralist lineage, and indeed, in terms of their emergence from a more general field of the application of linguistic models to architecture, commencing in the 1960s. The major issue for us though, is the extent to which we may understand such practices in architecture as corresponding to those alluded to by Hall and Ames when they suggested correlations between poststructuralist thinking and the classical Chinese tradition, or the extent to which these practices in fact constitute a continuance of the Western tradition of logical order and causality. Due to the limited space available in this paper and the breadth of material we are covering from two philosophical traditions, we need necessarily to assume that our audience is familiar enough with the issues and themes of the poststructuralist tradition and the work of some of the principal architectural theorists in this field, in particular Jennifer Bloomer and Mark Wigley. However, we cannot treat the work of theorists such as Wigley and Bloomer simply as the datum level of poststructuralist writings in architecture; we cannot assume that their work simply correlates with that implied by Hall and Ames. The problem is that we see complications arising in the Western architectural material, which

may be explained in terms of something like a lapse into logical order and universalism, even when the stakes of such a lapse are so critically understood by the work of deconstruction. Given that deconstruction parasitically inhabits the philosophical tradition of causal thinking and logical order, this inhabitation constitutes the locating of the lability of this order, the lapsarity of its systemic structuring.[64]

For this reason we are introducing the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, which offers what we consider to be a poststructuralism correlative at an intimate level with the classical Chinese tradition, in the sense that Hall and Ames have configured. In the work of Nancy, it is apparent that any investing in universalisms constitutes an underside to the discourse of the *other*. Nancy answers the universalism of the 'any' with a philosophy of touch, where every notion of otherness is constituted not in a remoteness of 'the other' but in a body touchable and touching. The field of textuality and architecture cannot broach the thematics of cultural difference, except via a recourse to discourses of exclusion, marginalisation, otherness, implicitly an embeddedness in, and a reliance on, an Anglo-European tradition. The work of Nancy which, of course, cannot escape precisely the same lineage, poses the possibility of thinking this question of cultural difference more radically, more intensely, than does the thinking of a humanist tradition, or even that anti-humanist tradition that thinks the dislocation of our Western tradition in terms of a 'spacing' of writing. Nancy provides us with the impetus to ask in a thorough way the question of what it is to encounter cultural difference. His philosophemes of the touch, we will see, suggest a rich correlative resonance with the comparative philosophemes of Hall and Ames. Initially, as something of a detour, we will deal with the work of Nancy, introducing briefly some of his notions of writing, body, limit, weight, and pose the question of how we approach China otherwise than as other.

TOUCH AND TACT

Something more needs to be said on dislocation and the approach to China. This something more would comprise two questions, or two halves to a question, or a problematic that in unfolding exposes two surfaces: how do practices of writing, textuality touch on China, how is contact here understood, how do we weigh the issue of tact, an approach, a touching which weighs up a long history of making contact, of violence, wounds, impenetrable bodies, dissolvable bodies? The reason we ask this question here is that, in a sense, we seem to be making things

too simple, too straight-forward, precisely by not reflecting on that long tradition of violence to the other that constitutes the West's relation to China. Already the drift of our text infers a resonance, an intimacy between contemporary practices of textuality and their philosophical radicality *and* a non-Western tradition, in classical Chinese philosophy. Which is to say, once again a Chinese tradition gains its identity as a gift from the West, as a recognition adequate to our specular demands for a reflection of, and on, our own philosophical speculations in poststructuralism. We need to ask a difficult question here - difficult in that we must be careful that the answer is not simply lying in wait, in anticipation for us because it is a question: how do we touch upon China? One may consider, for instance, what is and is not touched upon by Foucault in the preface to *The Order of Things* as he first accounts for this most remarkable of books on European thought, a text which not incidently so aptly construed the stakes in *écriture*:

This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought - our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography - breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopaedia' in which it is written that 'animals are divided into …' In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.[65]

At stake here, for Foucault, is a transgressive laughter, to be read, we expect, in intimate proximity to a Bataillian *rire*, which takes thought to two limits at once: firstly to the co-incidence of limit with itself, the limits to thought inscribed as the impossible. But, and this is the second limit, this breaking of an ordered surface, which Foucault refers to, is, as well, a "great leap" to "the thing," touching that other limit, where thought touches itself as the impossibility of the thing. But can we not say also that thought, this thought at least, is a *thing*:

Thought leaps: it leaps into things, trying to get there with the same leap as the 'before' ['This book first arose']*, to recover the irrecoverable. It touches the thing itself, but this thing is also thought itself.*[66]

Hence for Foucault another system of thought, within the fable, China, touches on but never *touches* China. Is not China here the stark impossibility of thinking *that*, what can never be touched, limit to thinking, to experience, yet a limit only reached by this encounter? We may recognise the dilemma we face here and the difficulty of the question simply asked: How is China encountered, how do we read it, experience it, know it, where the 'it' is constituted in a multiplicity of particulars within the orbit of a system of thought. But why are we asking this, as if we are not the ones who are proposing the possibility of such an encounter, as if we have not already, in writing this question, prepared its answer via a tradition of philosophical, historical and anthropological writings. Yet it is precisely because of these long traditions - the givenness, naturalism of their presentations - that the question is so difficult to put, a question we need to repeat with respect to textuality, and repeat again with respect to architecture.

There are two approaches in answering this, antithetical to one another. With the first we invariably commit to repetition a long history of empiricism and rationalism in recognising what we may call the other as the other of the same, and in constituting the impossible precisely as the impossible limit to an identity assured and knowable. In this approach, the border, that place of encounter is itself constituted in one of two ways. It is either the place of a non-touching of impenetrable bodies which recognise only the impossibility of the other, armoured bodies that fail to recognise any thing but themselves. Or it is the space of a dissolution of bodies, where the other of the other dissimulates, for example, a Foucauldian "impossibility of thinking *that*" dissimulated in dreams of isomorphism and correspondence, pure translatability, pure transparency, becoming Spirit. In either case there is little that shakes the hegemonic assurity, identity, propriety in appropriation. The second approach (and *this* writing already marks the aporia of otherness inscribed here) recognises the locus of the impossible as not residing *in* 'China' but rather in the limit that constitutes the possibility of experience, that the "stark impossibility of thinking *that*" demands the thinking of the impossible, what the 'impossible' as such is, as limit to what is, to the 'there is' of thinking and the 'there is' of the thing, in short to the limits of experience.

But how is China touched here, with what tact? We want to explore this question briefly, a very difficult question, a question which is at the heart of our paper, a question which resonates with the most

pertinent issues in writing and textuality, in comparative philosophy and Sinology: what is a border, a neighbour, an interior and exterior, a thought and a thing, a self and an other, what traverses and touches upon this catalogue? For Foucault "the exotic charm of another system" names via the "fable" what is beyond the limits to thought, an outside, untouchable, impossible, yet nevertheless included within the limits, the touchable. Every question of border crossing bears on this difference, weighs on this sense of touch, where experience is touch, where it touches its limits. These limits, in the relation between the touchable and its untouchable limit, are thought as the possibility of a leap, or more correctly, are thinking as a leap, a counter-weight to touch, where weighing and thinking remain infinitely separable, in a place where they are inseparable.

With this rhetorical and philosophical *mise-en-abyme* of the touch, we need to introduce the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy.[67] Nancy's work embodies for us a somewhat provisional and strategic intervening of a philosophy of touch precisely because such thinking seems to address three problematics we have tentatively intimated, that of the relation between textuality and architecture, that of the relation between China and the West, and that of bringing both of these together. Nancy's work addresses these in a way which does not resort to, nor rely upon, an empiricism or rationalism of subject/object dualities, or the givenness or naturalism of categories, the givenness of a disciplinary field or geographical region or faculty of thought. Nancy treats every border as the touching of bodies, bodies which have no residual signification, interiority, transcendentalism or incarnation. Textuality and architecture too easily have the remains of a signification, and China has the remnants of an anthropology, an interiority, a transcendental signified as inscripted guarantor, as incorporated truth. We introduce Nancy not in order to contest, discount or criticise contemporary work on textuality and architecture, nor to provide a new path to thinking comparative philosophemes on China, but rather to remain tactful, to be as close to these contemporary accounts as possible, to their literalness, to literally be them, without simulation, mime, representation or allegory, to touch them, their body, their corpus, faithfully, tactfully. We take the failure of linguistic models, semiotics, models of inscription, the lapse of strategic interventions in textuality and architecture, as writing's inevitability, the inevitability of writing's wanting-to-say, its law of inscription, the impossibility of writing touching itself as the no-longer-saying of

discourse. Hence these lapses and failures are not positioned to be corrected, to be put on the right path, to invoke a better theory of textuality, a more nuanced reading of *ecriture*. We attempt to be more tactful than that, particularly as such a strategy commits us only to the repetition of the mime of *writing in*, which is to say, the mime of inscription. It is this which leads us to Jean-Luc Nancy's work, particularly his notion of *exscription*, in relation to touch and tact, and in relation to writing and inscription.

This is indeed what writing is: the body of sense that will never tell the signification of bodies, nor ever reduce the body to its sign. To write the sign of oneself that does not offer a sign, that is not a sign. This is: writing, finally to stop discoursing … Bodies are first masses, masses offered without anything to articulate, without anything to discourse about, without anything to add to them … For indeed, the body is not a locus of writing. No doubt one writes, but it is absolutely not where one writes, nor is it what one writes - it is always what writing excribes … A body is what cannot be read in writing. (Or one has to understand reading as something other than decipherment. Rather, as touching, as being touched. Writing, reading: matters of tact) … In incarnation, the spirit becomes flesh. But here we are talking about a body that no spirit has become. Not a body produced by the self-production or reproduction of the spirit, but a body given, always already abandoned, and withdrawn from all the plays of signs. A body touched, touching, and the tract of this tact.[68]

More needs to be said here. Derrida comments on this very difficult notion of writing. His comment is made in the context of a discussion about the intangible and the untouchable and the 'between' of these as tact, the between of a cannot-touch and a must-not-touch, a law as a law of tact. Derrida will have already said, at the commencement of his writing on Nancy, "*Le toucher*":

For there is a law of tact. *Perhaps the law is always a law* of tact … *Between two given orders, it in effect installs a relationship that is at the same time conjunctive and disjunctive. Worse than that, it brings into contact (contamination and contagion)* contact *and* non-contact.[69]

Thus Derrida says:

It [the law] *thus inscribes the uninscribable in inscription itself, it excribes. The law of excribing, of excription as 'the last truth of inscription' finds here at least one of its essential demonstrations.*

Derrida goes on to quote Nancy on excription and sense, the propriety of sense, proper sense, a tact of sense:

the most proper sense, but proper on the condition of remaining inappropriable, and of remaining inappropriable in its appropriation. Of producing an event and a disruption even as it inscribes itself in a register of sense. Of excribing *this inscription - and that the inscription be inscribed - being, or rather the true inscribing - being of inscription itself. Of having* weight *at the heart of thought and in spite of thought.*[70]

To reiterate, there are two issues of concern for us here, those of textuality and architecture, and those of contemporary comparative philosophical writings concerning China. In the following, we want to broach some issues in comparative philosophy and Sinology in a reading of the Chinese text, *Yuan ye*, and, finally, return to the work of Nancy in questioning the notion of 'community' inferred by the epistemic divergencies between China and the West.

SUBJECT/OBJECT

For considerations of space, we cannot offer here a detailed account that avoids an overly schematic juxtaposition of Chinese and Western materials, nor will we be able to explore the nuances of terms from *Yuan ye* in full. Our purpose here is only to put forward a preliminary reading that explores Chinese garden history as a cross-cultural mode of scholarship that addresses an international audience. Our main focus is as follows: The traditional Western opposition of reality and appearance, also understood as a Platonic division of ideal and copy and a Cartesian division of mind and body, has its most significant articulation in the binary opposition of subject and object. In the fields of architecture and landscape architecture, we have the notion of architect-designer as a subject rationally designing a world of designed objects. Now, in his discussion of the problems of the modern devastation of the environment, Berque points precisely to the absence, in traditional China, of "the subject/object opposition"[71] which became the conceptual foundation of the modern world and its environmental devastation. If *Yuan ye* is indeed a classic that speaks not only to the world of 17th-century China, "but says something to the present as if it were said specially to it,"[72] it might be fruitfully construed as a treatise that discussed garden design without recourse to the binary opposition of subject and object. Even though we will not have the opportunity to discuss in detail contemporary

concerns with the opposition of subject and object in architecture and landscape architecture, we propose to articulate aspects of *Yuan ye* that might be fruitfully brought into relation with these concerns.

The key terms we propose to discuss are introduced in *Yuan ye* as follows:

The skill [qiao] *of designing gardens lies in interdependence* [yin] *and borrowing* [jie] *and their excellence* [jing] *lies in their suitability* [ti] *and appropriateness* [yi] ... *'Interdependence' means following the rise and fall of the site* [ji shi][73] *and investigating its proper disposition, pruning the branches of obstructing trees, directing streams to flow over rocks so that they are mutually complementary* [lit. borrowing and resourcing], *erecting pavilions and kiosks where appropriate, not interfering with out-of-the-way paths, and letting them wind and turn: this is what is called 'excellent and appropriate.' 'Borrowing' means even though every garden distinguishes between inside and outside, in obtaining views there should be no restriction on whether they are far or near. A clear mountain peak rising up with elegance, a purple-green abode soaring into the sky - everything within one's limit of vision - blocking out the commonplace, adopting the admirable, not distinguishing between cultivated and uncultivated land, making all into a misty scene: this is what is called being 'skilful and suitable.'*[74]

The initial relation of "skill" (qiao) with "interdependence and borrowing" (yin, jie) and "excellence" (jing) with "suitability and appropriateness" (ti, yi) in lines 1-2 suggests a reading of the first three terms as those pertaining to the designer (subject) and the latter terms as those relating to the designed outcome (object). The subsequent unfolding of the passage, however, prevents a simple reading in terms of subject and object: jing (excellent) and yi (appropriate) are applied to yin (interdependence), while qiao (skilful) and ti (suitable) are used to characterise jie (borrowing). This shifting relation of terms can be directly contrasted with the following words of Repton: "I confess that the great object of my ambition is not merely to produce a book of pictures, but to furnish some hints for establishing the fact that true taste in landscape gardening, as well as in the other polite arts, is not an accidental effect, operating on the outward senses, but an appeal to the understanding, which is to compare, to separate and to combine the various sources of pleasure derived from external objects and to trace them to some pre-existing causes in the human mind."[75] Repton's words implicitly emphasise the binary dualisms of "external object" and "human

mind," "accidental effect" and "cause" as intentional act. Thus, the human mind, in its rational understanding, causes there to be "true taste" in landscape gardening. Repton makes a distinction between the contingency of "outward senses," aligned with "accidental effects," and "true taste" which appeals to universal human understanding, aligned with a priori (pre-existing) causes in the human mind. We see here a privileging of the universal, on the side of subjective mind, over the external object.

In contrast to the fixed relation of subject to object and mind to matter that we find in Repton's words, with its unity of opposites - "true taste" - marking the finality of understanding, we have the shifting relation of terms we have just noted in the quotation from *Yuan ye*. Here, the notions of skill and excellence both qualify the comportment of landscape, as in everything made "into a misty scene," *and* the agency of following, pruning, directing, erecting. "Skill" and "excellence" slide between the agency of the designer and the land that is acted upon. We have here the elusive correlations which constitute interdependency. This sliding of meaning occurs between an interior, the designer's mind, and an exterior, the site of the garden. We encounter this same sliding also in another part of *Yuan ye* in discussion of different suitabilities of sites:

Thus sites also have different suitabilities, and this should be assessed. Only when the master designer has hills and streams in his bosom can a garden be either elaborate and ornate, or simple and casual.[76]

In contrast to the dualistic terms in the quotation of Repton, we find our Chinese terms "interdependence" and "borrowing" in polar relation, each requiring the other in articulating its sense. In the final chapter of *Yuan ye*, we read more explicitly: "The composition of gardens has no fixed patterns; the borrowing of views involves interdependence."[77] This echoes the text from the beginning of *Yuan ye* we have adduced above. There, the passage on "interdependence" characterises the actions of the designer as well as the mutuality of scenic elements, discussed in terms of "mutually borrowing and resourcing." The passage on "borrowing" conveys the action of "adopting" and "blocking out" as something undertaken depending on whether the elements are "admirable" or "commonplace."

The mutuality of meaning that we have identified in the Chinese terms can itself be designated by *yin*, one of the terms under study. This leads us to render it as "interdependence" rather than "following" or "dependence."[78] By doing so, we are attempting to

call attention to a reading of the relationship between designer and site that does not follow the subject/object dichotomy. The dualistic logic of subject and object is commonly involved in conceiving of the designer as an autonomous individual, whose design ideas have a causal relation to a given site. On this view, the site is a physical, empirical datum onto which a project, plan, intention is projected. The designer and his subjective intentions are active, and the objective conditions of site are passive with respect to them. Alternatively, the designer's actions might be conceived of as a passive following of the objective dictates of site and materials. In this instance, the previous relationship is simply inverted, but remains dualistic. The passage on *yin* we quoted above clearly side-steps this dualistic logic. First, the designer's actions are spoken of as a "following" and not as an imposition of active agent on passive land. Second, this "following" is not a passive procedure but involves actively "pruning," "directing," and "erecting." "Interdependence" is discussed in such a way that obviates the subject-object opposition.

Our reading of "interdependence" as a way of operating that is not just following the objective dictates of a physical site can be further supported by considering the chapter on "Assessing the Land" in *Yuan ye*. Here, we do not find any evidence of an understanding of site survey in the modern sense of a quantified, measured study of the physical features of the whole site resulting in objective representations of the land. "Assessing the land" appears not to involve the kind of abstraction of the physical environment that is commonly undertaken in modern practice. Instead of a discussion of abstraction from actuality, we find instead a fragmented narrative offering indications of what we might call "abstraction from possibility":

Gardens should not be built in cities. If one is to be built, it should be oriented towards the elegant and secluded. Even though one's surroundings neighbour the vulgar, there is no clamour when the door is closed. Creating winding paths, make tall distant walls appear among bamboo trees. Coming upon a stream which twists and turns, at the bramble gate a long bridge may be placed astride the stream. A courtyard wide enough to allow a wu *tree; an embankment, winding and appropriate for willows.*[79]

"Assessing the land" is not discussed as a passive exercise of recording that has its end and goal in a closed and complete understanding of a static external reality, but is presented as a process that already opens up thinking, evokes design responses abstracted from the vast realm of possibilities without drawing its strength on a totalising picture of hard

facts. Thus, unlike Zhang Jiaji, we find that there is no sense that *yin* means "following" an objective ground.[80] The same line of thinking with which we have explored a non-dualistic reading of "interdependence" and "borrowing" leads us to consider their relationship as a polar rather than as a dialectical one, which a reading of Zhang's work seems to suggest.[81] In Hegel's philosophy, all human action is negation, the negating of an existing situation, and involves the dialectical relation of 'thesis' and 'antithesis' in which something is inevitably overcome. The dialectical relation of 'Man' and 'Nature' is, of course, a disaster. In our study of "interdependence" and "borrowing," we find no sense that they are self-sufficient and independent notions, opposed and united as thesis and antithesis. Rather, as the designer's ways of operating, "interdependence" and "borrowing" are related such that each opens onto and entails the other, as *yang* is becoming-*yin* and vice versa.

In line with our reading of "interdependence" and "assessing the land" without recourse to the notion of an objective and quantified site, we will now attempt to indicate a view of "borrowing" that might side-step the common understanding of it as the establishment of fixed relations between vantage point and some scenic element. On this understanding, "borrowing" would be one way in which the intentions of the designer results in a visible outcome. Some commentators discuss it in terms of 'spatial expansion,' in terms reminiscent of modernist descriptions of the extensive use of glass curtain walls. A common way of indicating such outcomes would be the spatial analysis of gardens using orthogonal plans and sections to indicate the determinate relation of vantage point and scenic element or view. However, given our view of "assessing the land" as an abstraction of possibilities for change with respect to a site that is conceived not as a fixed and static entity but as changing pattern in flux, we are concerned with a reading of "borrowing" that would not construe it as a fixation of static spatial relationships. It is therefore of particular interest to us that Zhang Jiaji has argued that "*Jie jing* (borrowing of views) is definitely not merely a means of spatial composition, but is an important way of thinking in the artistic creation of gardens."[82] Following Professor Zhang, we would suggest that although spatial alignments are involved in "borrowing," it is necessary to consider the matter more broadly.

Zhang elaborates his point about "borrowing" by discussing instances of "borrowing views" in Chinese poetry, and eventually relates them to the relationship between *qing* (sentiment) and *jing* (scenery). In a separate discussion, Professor Chen Congzhou makes the same connection, but with an illuminating turn:

As in 'Plucking a chrysanthemum under the eastern fence/in leisure, seeing the southern mountain.' The wonder of these lines resides on the word 'seeing' as it is done between intention and accident, an extremely natural and elegant sentiment.[83]

The classical dictionaries, in fact, speak of *jian* (to see, seeing) in terms of another character homophonic with it and which means "to render present": "seeing" as "presencing."[84] Now, it is certainly appropriate that the practice of "borrowing views" be discussed with regard to examples of classical poetry, but Professor Chen's remark on this "seeing" as between intention and accident would suggest that "borrowing views" is not to be simply considered the work of a conscious intentional designer understood without difficulty by an equally conscious and intentional visitor. Whereas Zhang's point about "borrowing" as not merely spatial alignment is related to the irrelevance of the notion of 'objective site,' Chen's remark is related to the irrelevance of the notion of the active intentional subject.

We will now draw on an excellent textual example cited by Zhang to elaborate the notion of "seeing" that we have just introduced. Referring to *Di jing jingwu lue*, Zhang highlights a passage concerning the new garden of the Duke of the State of Ying on land which the Duke first saw in 1633:

That which the garden pavilion fronted onto is a bridge. Various people crossing the bridge would enter my ken. They join me in mutual regard.[85]

Now, students of Western architecture would be familiar with the relationship of viewing subject and pictured object as a prominent theme in discussions of the mathematisation of space by perspective. It is well-known that this subject-object relationship involves a one-way vision, subject looks at object. This contrasts with the two-way vision that Zhang highlights, which relates garden to urban life and which, he says, "definitely extended and enriched 'borrowing views' as a way of thinking and as an element of life."[86] According to Zhang, this passage "articulated the spiritual essence of 'borrowing views.'"[87] Extending Zhang's point, we would refer to the important work of Wang Yi, who has called attention to the famous lines of Li Bai, "Not tired of looking at each other/there is only Mount Jingting"[88]

as well as other instances in which mutual regard is not just between viewing subjects, as Zhang's example might suggest, but in one sense, between person and landscape elements as well.

Approaching the matter of "seeing" or "mutual regard" in yet another way, we may consider how both Zhang and Chen would agree that "borrowing views" is an encounter of landscape and person, conceived of as the relationship between sentiment and scenery, *qing* and *jing*. In a famous discussion of this relationship, Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) says,

Sentiment is the activity between yin *and* yang*; and things are the product of heaven and earth. When this activity between* yin *and* yang *takes place in one's heart, the products of heaven and earth respond from the outside. Whatever thing there is outside, there can be a counterpart to one's heart; whatever sentiment there is in one's heart, there must be the thing outside* [to match it].[89]

This passage suggests that sentiment and scenery are polar terms. At the risk of serious simplification, we would suggest that the traditional conception of the successful relation of sentiment and scenery as co-arising (*qing jing xiang sheng*) or fusion (*qing jing xiang rong*)[90] is precisely indicative of the absence of a subject/object opposition in poetic encounters between persons and landscapes that Zhang and Chen consider instances of "borrowing views." At the risk of being tactless, we may touch on the matter of seeing as touching in the common expression - *zhu jing sheng qing*, "touching the scenery gives birth to sentiment." This is part of a tradition of speaking of "seeing" as *zhu mu*, literally "touching the eyes" - someone perceives some thing which is said, literally, to touch one's eyes.

Who is the person that encounters the landscape and "borrows views"? Whose are the eyes that the landscape "touches"? In contrast to the Western dichotomy of viewing subject and external object, in which the subject is a universal subject, a person reduced to an abstracted optical apparatus, it would appear the Chinese person who 'encounters' and "borrows" is not just anyone, but particular someones, specifically acculturised, or 'talented,' as in the following words of Chen Jiru (1558-1639): "In severe instances, when one's enthusiasm is exhausted, one's talent [*cai*] would be exhausted; when one's talent is no more, the elegance of the landscape also ceases to exist."[91] These words suggest to us that "borrowing views" is indeed not something guaranteed by the intentional alignment of vantage point and scenic element which anyone can recognise and appreciate. The chapter on "borrowing views" in

Yuan ye gives us an apparently rambling series of remarks, aggregations of scenes, settings and events common in the literary tradition. The discussion appeals directly to the acculturised reader of the Chinese tradition, evoking the encounter of sentiment and scenery. There is no statement here to the effect that what is encountered has been prefigured and pre-determined in the mind of the designer, equivalent to Repton's "pre-existing causes in the human mind." This in fact accords with the general disregard for a designer's intentions in the appreciation of Chinese gardens in the whole tradition of 'records of famous gardens.' Considered in this light, "borrowing views" is not something that is wholly determined by an autonomous designer's intentions in arranging a passive landscape. In "borrowing views," the designer's intentions and scenery are co-arising, and the garden with "borrowed views" enjoins visitors to new occasions of co-presencing, and approaches their experience half-way in further conjunctions of sentiment and scenery.

For this reason, the relationship of time and the "borrowing of views" is particularly significant. The chapter on "borrowing views" in *Yuan ye* announces this explicitly - "One must consider the four times": that is to say, the four seasons and dawn, day, dusk, evening.[92] In this regard, it is important to recall the following characterisation of the Chinese tradition by Hall and Ames,

The Chinese tradition does not have the separation between time and entities that would allow for either time without entities, or entities without time. There is no possibility of either an empty temporal corridor or an eternal anything (in the sense of being timeless). What encourages us within the classical Western tradition to separate time and space is our inclination inherited from the Greeks to see things in the world as fixed in their formal aspect, and thus, bounded and limited. If ... we observe them in the light of their ceaseless transformation, we are able to temporalise them and perceive them as 'events' rather than 'things,' where each phenomenon is some current or impulse within a temporal flow.[93]

Returning to the chapter on "borrowing views" in *Yuan ye*, we can note how the evocative narrative presents us with what Hall and Ames might call "events" rather than fixed views of spatial alignments available in various times of the day or year:

Extending to the utmost one's gaze upon a lofty field, distant peaks form an encircling screen. Halls are open so that congenial air wafts over oneself, while before the door Spring waters flow into a marsh. Amidst enchanting reds

and beautiful purples, one delightedly encounters immortals among the flowers … Sweep the paths and protect the young orchids so that secluded rooms may share in their fragrance. Roll up the bamboo blinds and invite the swallows to occasionally cut the light breeze … One's interests would be in accord with the pure and the remote, and one can find pleasure amongst hills and ravines. Suddenly thoughts beyond the dusty world come and one seems to be walking in a painting. From the shadows of the forest first come the oriole's song; in the bend of a mountain, one suddenly hears the farmer's singing. A breeze arises in the shade of trees, and the atmosphere enters the time of the Emperor Xi.[94]

These "events" are narrated without subsuming them into categories of particular times or seasons so that they can be read as particular entities in a "temporal corridor." They are also the stuff transmitted in the literary corpus. In summary then, the "borrowing of views" involves sentiment and scenery-sentiment and scenery are not 'subjective' and 'objective,' but correlative. The person who notices "borrowing" is not a universal subject; the moment when "borrowing" is noticed is not just happenstance or undetermined. Rather, the "borrowing of views" is discussed in *Yuan ye* as eventful encounter and depends on the notion of tradition, here conceived not as a tradition of stylised or designed objects but as embodied practices of daily living - "rolling up bamboo blinds," "listening to the oriole's song," etc. - recorded, *cat*alogued, (a "gleaned list"?[95]) and handed down in the literary corpus of China.

APPROPRIATE EMBODIMENT

In our discussion of "interdependence" and "borrowing" above, we have located two main points: First, the polar relationship of terms as a clue to their reading, and second, eventful encounter as a function of tradition. The terms *ti* (body, embodiment, 'bodying') and *yi* (appropriateness) appear to qualify the two ways of operating in the design of gardens, "interdependence" and "borrowing." *Ti* is literally "body" but normally understood in this context as *de ti* "being suitable" or "attaining propriety." *Yi* is normally understood as "appropriateness." The common understanding of these terms in *Yuan ye* construes them as synonyms. A proper study of these two terms would entail reading them in relation to other Chinese terms that stand in polar or cognate relation to them such as *li* (ritual action), *yi* (rightness/signification). For considerations of space, we will reserve this task for another occasion. Here, we would like to offer two general remarks about how, taken together, *ti*

(body) and *yi* (appropriateness) are related to the notion of "appropriate embodiment."

In contrasting Western and classical Chinese understandings of the world above, we indicated that the Western understanding of knowledge as the grasping of an unchanging reality behind the world of appearances is related to the understanding of architectural knowledge as the knowledge of universal principles of geometry and proportion. The absence of these ideas in classical China can be related to an emphasis in discussions of gardens, on particular cases without understanding each of them as the outcomes of the application of general rules of design to particular sites. 'Appropriateness' is thus not a judgement reached by applying universal principles of design to particular sites, but rather is the result of attending to the insistent particularity of a situation such that its concrete details stand in harmonious relationship to each other.[96]

From the perspective of the Western tradition, as we have outlined above, the notion of embodiment, the concrete manifesting of a garden or other designs is implicitly understood in terms of dualisms. There is the binary opposition of form and matter, where form is considered the outcome of the designer's agency in changing and shaping raw materials. The designed garden then becomes a container in two senses: as matter, it contains the spirit of the designer, inscribed in its form. It is also a container for the actions of those for whom it was designed. As container in both these senses, its design is a final or fixed and static end. The possibility for action and the competency of the designer are judged in relation to a specific programme of design. In modernist design, embodiment always eschews a symbolic dimension alluding to tradition, foregrounding a functionalist approach to rational design. In the Chinese context of *de ti* (being suitable), there is no explicit statement in *Yuan ye* that the garden as a body is to be judged according to its functional programme, which is always left vague and open, and never itemised into the modern equivalent of a brief. Further, for the eventful encounter of gardens that depends on a notion of tradition embodied in literature and other cultural forms, proper embodiment, with a sense of decorum, is itself contrary to avant-gardist individualism even though change is not precluded in it. As Ames points out, "A person engaged in the performance of a particular formal action, appropriating meaning from it while seeking himself to be appropriate to it, derives meaning and value from this embodiment, and further strengthens it by his contribution of novel meaning and value. He pursues 'rightness' and

'significance' both in an imitative and a creative sense."[97] The appropriate embodiment of gardens as discussed in *Yuan ye* can therefore be understood in two ways: First, as something undertaken without recourse to universal principles of design, but as something pursued by attending to the particularity of situations; and second, as the polar relationship of the body of the garden and the actions of dwellers and designers in the embodiment of cultural tradition.

'WE'

In the foregoing discussion, we have had occasion to perform a juxtaposition of materials from Chinese and Western contexts of discussion. By way of conclusion, we propose to foreground two levels of consideration revolving around the word 'We' and its prospects and significance in contemporary architecture. First, we will consider the 'we' of an internationalism based on a universal sameness, and then we will turn to the possibility of inventing a 'we' that is the becoming, each time, of particularity. Let us echo the question that John Rajchman addressed in his essay, "What's New in Architecture?"[98] and, in the following reflections, attempt to indicate how "What's New" might have something to do with the prospects of a 'We.' To be sure, it is not new to say 'we' in architectural discussions, but perhaps asking "What's New" in this 'we,' in the vicinity of our foregoing discussion, can attain a different sense, even compared with Rajchman's admirable account.

It would appear that the 1930s is a period of continuing significance for the study of Chinese architecture and landscape architecture. At that time, with the advent of the Zhongguo yingzao xueshe (The Society for Research in Chinese Architecture), we find a pivotal point in the institutionalisation of Beaux Arts assumptions in the modern study of Chinese architecture. Architect-scholars such as the late Liang Sicheng introduced to the study of Chinese buildings and documents a range of Western assumptions which continue to dominate academic work. The important work of Hsia Chu-joe has shown recently how the biological analogy prominent in 19th-century Western philosophy of history was inter-mixed with the reformist thought of Chinese intellectuals, how social history was simplified by a mechanistic conception of materialism and by environmental determinism, how the modernist prescription of structural rationalism was adopted as a yardstick by which traditional Chinese architecture was to be validated, and how historiographical practices became determined by

notions of documentary evidence and formalist aesthetics.[99] With these fundamental determinations of the modern study of Chinese materials, Chinese architects entered the international field of architecture. The tendency has been to assume that, behind all manner of differences and divergences, the domain of architecture is engaged in an inquiry of universal problems. The conceptual programme often involves the introduction of an international and disciplinary framework of architecture that puts everything into one set of terms derived from the Anglo-European tradition. We find in Lévi-Strauss' rationalising "translation of *La pensée chiniose* into *La pensée sauvage*," a perfect example of what Hall and Ames would call "transcendental monism grounded in the assumption of universal mental structures shaped by linguistic and mythical categories."[100] The modern 'we' of architecture is mostly the 'we' of this transcendental monism. To be sure, we are here only indicating a fundamental conceptual drive. In actual practice, we find the kind of in-between-ness or hybridity that marks modern Chinese architectural historiography, a glimpse of which might be derived from Zhang Jiaji's comments on *Yuan ye* we have discussed above.

We are very aware that the fragmentary way in which we have conducted the foregoing discussion - with portions that touch/do not touch - does not offer concepts with which to construct another history of Chinese architecture and gardens that would replace and abolish this "transcendental monism." Our words merely attempt to mark, in tentative ways, what the boundaries of our epoch offers us

at the limits of a discourse that are ours *and are no longer* ours *at the same time … Therefore, they only* offer *us the chance to proceed from them - from their meanings and from their absence of meaning -* to *another place of time and of discourse. It is the chance, which we have to take, to have another history come, to have another utterance of the 'we,' another enunciation of the future. This is not a theory, for it does not belong to a discourse about (or above) history and community. But this is - these words, concepts, signals are - the way history offers itself, as happening, to a way of thinking that can no longer be the thinking of 'History.'*[101]

These words of Nancy return us to Rajchman's "What's New in Architecture?" where we are shown how the notions of invention, event and surprise are linked in Derrida's *Psyché: Invention de l'autre.*[102] Invention, Derrida says, comes to us with a radicalising surprise as it introduces a violation of "the peaceful arrangement of things." In architecture,

Rajchman points out, this invention has to open up to historical change the 'monumental,' that which is assumed essential and unchanging. But what is opened up to change is also 'we': "We cannot say that we must invent ourselves, for it is just ourselves who are 'surprised' by the event."[103]

In this paper, we have attempted to address, to develop an appropriate touch for, a task that calls for our attention. What is it to study the history of Chinese architecture and gardens? Will it be a reproductionist historiography, analogous to the European production of bone china, an accessory for refined living? Following Nancy, Derrida, and Hall and Ames, we have attempted to explore an approach that would not make of the history of Chinese architecture and gardens the represented body of a remote other ... History is not narrative, summation and knowledge of what is past and elsewhere. Rather, the task of history here is to help inaugurate a common spacing of time which offers us the possibility of saying 'we': "for in order to say 'we,' we have to be in a certain common space of time."[104] The task of history here is inventive; "it is the *coming* into presence, as the happening."[105] What calls forth this happening? Following Nancy, we would point to mortality and finitude as that which puts us "beside ourselves."[106] This mortality exposes us to community and the silent 'don't go' which brings together mortals. In the citation and recitation of history, a concatenation of singularities without an abstractive purpose ... in the face of the devastation of the environment and the marginalisation of cultural others ... this silent 'don't go' is perhaps the most touching, and, touching us, gathers us as a community of others.[107] The approach we have explored for the study of Chinese architecture and gardens is history as happening. It is eventful to the extent it activates this silent touch that gathers 'us.'

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

NOTES

1   Stanislaus Fung & Phillip Arnold, "Crossings: Cultures, Histories and Architectures," *Ideas Notes/Book* eds. Chee Ang, Kenneth Yeang and Elaine Cheong, (Kuala Lumpur: The Institut Perekabentuk Dalaman Malaysia 1994), pp. 48-59; later expanded as Stanislaus Fung, "Crossings: Cultures, Disciplines, Institutions," *Aspects of Quality in Architectural Education* eds. Desley Luscombe and Steve King, (Sydney: Royal Auustralian Institute of Architects 1995). A further augmented version was presented as "The Architectural Education of Nomads: Cultures, Times, and Disciplines," at "Crossing: The Biennial Oceanic Architecture and Design Student Conference," Perth, April 1995.

2   Augustin Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," *AA Files* (Summer 1993), n. 25, pp. 33-37. We have not had sufficient opportunity to consider a more recent paper by Berque, "Paysage, milieu, histoire," *Cinq propositions pour une théorie du paysage* ed. Augustin Berque, (Seyseel: Champ Vallon, 1994), pp. 11-28.

3   Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 33.

4   Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 33.

5   Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 33.

6   Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 33.

7   Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 33.

8   Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 34.

9   Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 34.

10 Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 36.

11 David L. Hall, "Modern China and the Postmodern West," *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives* ed. Eliot Deutsch, (Honolulu: University

of Hawaii Press, 1991), pp. 50-70.

12   Hall, "Modern China," p. 67.

13   Hall, "Modern China," pp. 50-51.

14   We are indebted to Craig Clunas of the University of Sussex and Vikramaditya Prakash of Arizona State University for this possible criticism of Berque's formulation.

15   See Stanislaus Fung, "The Interdisciplinary Prospects of *Yuan ye*," *Journal of Garden History* forthcoming.

16   Roger T. Ames, "The Meaning of Body in Classical Chinese Philosophy," *Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice* ed. Thomas P. Kasulis, Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), p. 159.

17   Alberto Pérez-Goméz, *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1983), p. 8.

18   Ames, "The Meaning of Body in Classical Chinese Philosophy," p. 159.

19   David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Anticipating China* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 129-130.

20   David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, "The Cosmological Setting of Chinese Gardens," at The Symposium on the History of Chinese Gardens, The University of Adelaide, June 1994, pp. 35-36. A revised and shorter version of this paper is forthcoming in the *Journal of Garden History*.

21   Hall & Ames, "The Cosmological Setting," pp. 36-37.

22   Ames, "The Meaning of Body in Classical Chinese Philosophy," p. 159.

23   Hall & Ames, *Anticipating China* p. 128.

24   Hall & Ames, *Anticipating China* p. 137.

25   Hall & Ames, *Anticipating China* pp. 140-141.

26   Hall & Ames, *Anticipating China* pp. 126ff. We follow the discussion offered by Hall and Ames in this section of their work.

27   Marcel Granet, *La pensée chinoise* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1934).

28   Claude Lévi-Strauss, *La pensée sauvage* (Paris: Plon, 1962); English trans., *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

29   Hall & Ames, *Anticipating China* p. 142.

30   See Sun Quanwen and Wang Minghung, *Zhongguo jianzhu kongjian yu xingshi zhi fuhao yiyi* (Taibei, Ming wen, 1987).

31   *Progressive Architecture* (March 1961), v. 42.; (April 1961), v. 42.; (May 1961), v. 42. Over these three issues, the editor carried out a series of interviews and articles under the umbrella title: "The Sixties: Symposium on the State of Architecture."

32   Diana Agrest, "Design versus Non-Design," *Oppositions* (Fall 1976), n. 6, p. 55.

33   Lionel March, *Geometry of Environment: An Introduction to Spatial Organisation* (London: RIBA Publications, 1971); see also, Michael Batty and Lionel March, *Dynamic Urban Models based on Information-minimising* (Reading, Department of Geography, University of Reading, 1976).

34   Christopher Alexander, *Notes on the Synthesis of Form* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964).

35   Mario Gandelsonas, "Linguistics, Poetics and Architectural Theory," *Semiotext(e)* (1975), v. 1, n. 3, p. 88.

36   Julia Kristeva, "The Subject in Signifying Practice," *Semiotext(e)* (1975), v. 1, n. 3, pp. 19-20.

37   Julia Kristeva, "The System and the Speaking Subject," *Times Literary Supplement* (October 12 1973), p. 1250.

38   John Summerson, *The Classical Language of Architecture* (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1961). The Classical tradition itself cannot be entirely separated from a classical semiology developed according to differing philosophical bases by both Locke and Condillac.

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40   Umberto Eco, "A Componential Analysis of the Architectural Sign */ Column/*," *Semiotica* (1972), v. V, n. 2. See also idem, "Function and Sign: Semiotics of Architecture," *Via* (1973), n. 2, pp. 130-153.

41   Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas, "Semiotics and Architecture: Ideological Consumption or Theoretical Work," *Oppositions* (September 1973), n. 1, pp. 93-100. See also Charles Jencks' response and Agrest and Gandelsonas' reply to him in *Oppositions* (May 1974), n. 3.

42   Charles Jencks, "Semiology and Architecture,"

Charles Jencks and George Baird, *Meaning in Architecture* (New York: G. Braziller, 1970).

43 Mario Gandelsonas, "On Reading Architecture," *Progressive Architecture* (March, 1972), pp. 69-86.

44 Gandelsonas, "Linguistics, Poetics and Architectural Theory," pp. 88-94.

45 See, for example, Donald Preziosi, *Architectural Language and Meaning: The Origins of the Built World and its Semiotic Organisation* (The Hague: Mouton, 1979); idem, *Semiotics of the Built Environment: An Introduction to Architectonic Analysis* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).

46 Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

47 For an overview, see Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

48 Gandelsonas, "Linguistics, Poetics and Architectural Theory," p. 90.

49 Gandelsonas, "Linguistics, Poetics and Architectural Theory," p. 91.

50 John Rajchman, *Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 10-11.

51 Rajchman, *Michel Foucault* pp. 10-11.

52 Rajchman, *Michel Foucault* pp. 10-11. Rajchman introduces this material, in fact, to indicate the extent to which Foucault himself was 'obsessed' during the 1960s with the question of writing.

53 Geoffrey Broadbent, "A Plain Man's Guide to the Theory of Signs in Architecture," *Architectural Design* (1977), v. 47, n. 7/8, pp. 474-482.

54 Mary McLeod, "Architecture and Politics in the Reagan Era: From Postmodernism to Deconstructivism," *Assemblage* (February 1989), n. 8, pp. 22-59.

55 See, for a thorough discussion of this, Mark Wigley, "The Architectural Displacement of Philosophy," *The Pratt Journal of Architecture* (1988), n. 2, pp. 4-8, 95-99.

56 *Architecture, Criticism, Ideology* ed. Joan Ockman, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1985); *ArchitectureProduction* ed. Beatriz Colomina, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1988); *Sexuality and Space* ed. Beatriz Colomina, (New York, Princeton Architectural Press, 1992). We may, as well, consider here recent writings on pedagogy and

architecture.

57 See, for example, John Rajchman, *Philosophical Events: Essays of the '80s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

58 See, for example, Mark C. Taylor, "Deadlines Approaching Anarchitecture," *Restructuring Architectural Theory* ed. Marco Diani and Catherine Ingraham (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1989), pp. 18-25.

59 See also *Restructuring Architectural Theory* ed. Marco Diani and Catherine Ingraham, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1989).

60 Jennifer Bloomer, *Architecture and the Text: The (S)crypts of Joyce and Piranesi* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 5-6.

61 *Anyone* ed. Cynthia C. Davidson, (New York: Rizzoli, 1991); *Anywhere* ed. Cynthia C. Davidson, (New York: Rizzoli, 1992); *Anyway* ed. Cynthia C. Davidson, (New York: Rizzoli, 1993). Fung wishes to thank James Curry of The University of Adelaide for the loan of a copy of *Anyway*.

62 See, for example, Jean Baudrillard, "Design and Environment," idem, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* trans. Charles Levin (St. Louis: Telas Press, 1981); Martin Heidegger, "Age of the World Picture," and "The Question Concerning Technology," idem, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* trans. William Lovitt, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).

63 Angus C. Graham, "Reflections and Replies," *Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham* ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991), pp. 286-287. We are indebted to John Makeham for directing our attention to this work.

64 See, for more extended consideration of the work of Wigley and Bloomer, Stanislaus Fung and Mark Jackson, "Bone China and Other Accessories," *Proceedings of the Conference "ACCESSORY/Architecture"* (Department of Architecture, University of Auckland, 1995), v. 2, pp. 96-119.

65 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. xv.

66 Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Heart of Things," trans. Brian Holmes & Rodney Trumble, idem, *The Birth to Presence* (Stanford, California: Standford University Press, 1993), p. 170.

67 See also, for example, Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Experience of Freedom* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), and the special issue "On the Work of Jean-Luc Nancy," ed. Peggy Kamuf,

Paragraph (July 1993), v. 16, n. 2.

68   Jean-Luc Nancy, "Corpus," trans. Claudette Sartiliot, idem, *The Birth to Presence* pp. 197-198.

69   Jacques Derrida, "*Le toucher*: Touch/to touch him," *Paragraph* (July 1993), v. 16, n. 2, p. 124. We are indebted to Cameron Tonkin for directing our attention to this work.

70   Derrida, "*Le toucher*" p. 144.

71   Berque, "Beyond the Modern Landscape," p. 34. See also, the important work of Elizabeth K. Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground," *The Culture of Landscape Architecture* ed. Harriet Edquist and Vanessa Bird, (Melbourne, Edge Publishing in association with the Department of Planning, Policy and Landscape, RMIT University, 1994), pp. 12-34.

72   Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1985), p. 257.

73   On *shi* as "positional advantage," see A.C. Graham, "A Chinese Approach to Philosophy of Value: Ho-kuan-tzu," idem, *Unreason within Reason: Essays on the Outskirts of Rationality* (La Salle: Open Court, 1992), p. 125; John Makeham, "The Confucian Role of Names in Traditional Chinese Gardens," *Journal of Garden History* forthcoming. On *shi* as strategic advantage, see Ames, "Introduction," *Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare*, trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), pp. 71-82.

74   Ji Cheng, *Yuan ye zhu shi* ed. Chen Zhi, (Beijing, Jianzhu gongye chubanshe, 1988), pp. 47-48; Zhang Jiaji, *Yuan ye quan shi* (Taiyuan, Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1993), p. 162.

75   Quoted in James Corner, "A Discourse on Theory I: 'Sounding the Depths' - Origins, Theory, and Representation," *Landscape Journal* (1990), v. 9, n. 2, p. 71.

76   Zhang, *Yuan ye quan shi* p. 143.

77   Zhang, *Yuan ye quan shi* p. 325.

78   For a discussion of *yin* as "accommodation," see Makeham, "The Confucian Role of Names in Traditional Chinese Gardens."

79   Zhang, *Yuan ye quan shi* p. 182.

80   Zhang Jiaji, *Zhongguo zaoyuan lun* (Taiyuan, Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 1991), p. 130.

81   Zhang, *Yuan ye quan shi*, p. 165.

82   Zhang, *Zhongguo zaoyuan lun* p. 130.

83   Chen Congzhou, "Jianzhu zhong de 'jie jing' wen-ti," idem, *Yuanlin tancong* (Shanghai, Shanghai wenhua chubanshe, 1980), p. 168.

84   We are indebted to John Makeham for this point.

85   Zhang, *Zhongguo zaoyuan lun* p. 132.

86   Zhang, *Zhongguo zaoyuan lun* p. 133.

87   Zhang, *Zhongguo zaoyuan lun* p. 133.

88   Wang Yi, *Yuanlin yu Zhongguo wenhua* (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1990), p. 287.

89   Cecile Chu-chin Sun, "A Sense of Scene: Depictions of Scene as Expressions of Feeling in Chinese and English Poetry," (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1982), II-2, II-55, n.3. Wang Siu-kit, "Ch'ing and Ching in the Critical Writings of Wang Fu-chih," *Chinese Approaches to Literature from Confucius to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao*, ed. Adele A. Rickett, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 140. We have based our translation on these two works.

90   Sun, "A Sense of Scene," II-38.

91   Chen Jiru, "Woyou bian xu," *Bing xue xi* ed. Guoxue zhenben wenku, (Shanghai, Zhongyang shudian, 1935), ser.1, n. 4, 1:8.

92   Zhang, *Yuan ye quan shi* p. 325.

93   Hall and Ames, "The Cosmological Setting of Chinese Gardens."

94   Zhang, *Yuan ye quan shi*, p. 325. Zhang's text gives "woodcutter's singing" instead of "farmer's singing" which I take according to the original Ming printed edition in the collection of the Naikaku Bunko, Tokyo.

95   "We need a corpus, a catalog, the recitation of an empirical logos that, without transcendental reason, would be a gleaned list, random in its order or in its degree of completion." (Nancy, "Corpus," p. 189.)

96   See David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 135-7.

97   Roger T. Ames, "The Meaning of Body in Classical Chinese Philosophy," pp. 169-170.

98   John Rajchman, "What's New in Architecture?" idem, *Philosophical Events: Essays of the '80s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

99   Hsia Chu-joe [Xia Zhujiu], "Yingzao xueshe - Liang Sicheng jianzhushi lunshu gouzao zhi lilun fenxi,"

idem, *Kongjian, lishi yu shehui - lunwen xuan 1987-1992*, Taiwan shehui yenjiu congkan, n. 3 (Taibei, Zhou Yu, 1993), pp. 1-40.

100 Hall & Ames, *Anticipating China* p. 147.

101 Jean-Luc Nancy, "Finite History," idem, *The Birth to Presence* pp. 164-165.

102 Jacques Derrida, *Psyché: Invention de l'autre* (Paris: Galilee, 1987), p. 15, quoted, Rajchman, "What's New in Architecture?" pp. 155ff.

103 Rajchman, "What's New in Architecture?" pp. 157-158.

104 Nancy, "Finite History," p. 151.

105 Nancy, "Finite History," p. 161.

106 We invoke here, all too hastily, Nancy's and Blanchot's comments on Bataille on death and community: Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Inoperative Community," trans. Peter Connor, idem, *The Inoperative Community* ed. Peter Connor, (Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 14ff; Maurice Blanchot, *The Unavowable Community*, trans. Pierre Joris, (Barrytown, New York: Station Hill Press, 1983), pp. 9-11.

107 Nancy, "Finite History," p. 156.