# Towards Individuation: A Jungian view on being a body and on being together

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## Abstract

Jungian theory and practice, more properly called analytical psychology, like psycho-analysis (Ogden, 1994, 1996, 1997), has dethroned the notion of a central conscious subject and replaced it with the notion of the centrality of a dialectic between consciousness and the unconscious. This shift away from the notion of a central conscious subject is scribed in the idea of individuation. Indeed analytical psychology is itself centred on the notion of individuation and, as Brooke (1991a, p. 88) has so forthrightly put it: 'Individuation is not "individualism"'. How then does this challenge to individualism find expression in analytical psychology and what are the implications for analytic practice?

With Brooke's assertion in mind I shall first present a thumbnail sketch of analytical psychology and the practice of analysis. I shall then extend the discussion to two particular areas of Jungian analysis (albeit ones not necessarily practiced in quite the way I will outline by all Jungian analysts) in which the challenge to individualism finds expression:

1. Presencing of the unconscious through the body.

2. Analysis as experience and activity in an interpersonal archetypal field.

The practical analytic implications of these will be highlighted by a comparison of two vignettes of analysis interleaved theoretical discussion. The theoretical discussion will be extended to include some alchemical thoughts.

("Presencing" implies bringing forth an experience in this moment rather than thinking about something).

## A Thumbnail Sketch of Analytical Psychology

The theory and practice that lies within the ambit of analytical psychology is huge. It is therefore rather difficult to give more than an outline. We can understand any reference to 'analysis' as referring to dissolving, loosening, from the Greek analusis, 'a dissolving', and luein which means 'to loosen' (Makins, 1991), or untie a knot. If one's psyche is tight, tied in a knot, if one's possibilities of being are tied up then loosening or untying them leads to the freedom to be more completely who one is.

Arguably analytical psychology has its roots in the suspicion, espoused by Goethe, that the natural scientific approach to understanding humanity is too one-sided. Jung was preoccupied with the notion of one-sided psychological development that

he understood to be compensated for by a natural and progressive process. Jung became interested in the habitual attitude of the sense-of-self (or ego) and how this seemed to be compensated for by dream images, symptoms and even psychosis. Consistent with this arose the idea that whilst the ego was the centre of consciousness it was not the centre of the personality. The personality was understood to be the dynamic combination of both ego and unconscious. For Jung the unconscious comprised both a personal unconscious, into which anxiety-generating impulses, affect, images and experience are 'repressed' and a collective unconscious, which has never before been conscious and from which compensating and vitalizing possibilities of being arise to challenge the ego to change and develop, through differentiating, integrating and appropriating them. These possibilities of being mostly find expression in images or root metaphors that are based in 'archetypes'. Archetypes-as-such are living dispositions that structure our experience and behaviour. The continual process of encounter between conscious and unconscious, the challenge this generates, and, hopefully, its transcendence and integration, is called individuation (vide infra). When the capacity for directed 'thinking' of the ego is challenged by the undirected 'thinking' of the unconscious great tension and defendedness may arise. There is, it seems, no way these quite different ways of being can combine with and be appropriated to consciousness. However, they can and Jung understood that there was a capacity, shared by all human beings, to transcend and incorporate something of both the conscious and unconscious. The product of this capacity is the symbol, which we may define as the 'best possible description or formulation of a relatively unknown fact [i.e. a fact that is both conscious and unconscious]' (Jung, CW 6, para: 814).

So far we may see this rather 'metapsychological' explication of Jung's thinking as thoroughly intrapsychic and therefore individualistic (in the pejorative sense of the word). However, in the first instance Jung was profoundly suspicious of the arid individualism that may arise in western culture and he believed that there were great forces of cultural compensation active in history. For instance, he saw the alchemy as a compensation to the predominantly Christian worldview with its 'repression' of matter, evil and the feminine. In the second instance, even though Jung used the imperfect explanatory tool of projection, he saw the psyche as being out-pictured in the body, cultural artefacts and interpersonal relationships. Clinically he was committed to the notion of transference but a transference that out-pictured both the collective unconscious and the personal unconscious. Thus notions such as projection and transference serve to describe the shapes of our originary state of being-together. In other words to be is to be-with-others, that being-together is shaped through root metaphors (archetypes) and as that is an ontological given there is no escape from either the originary being-together nor its shaping.

Let us attend to some of the elements of theory in more detail and especially insofar as it involves our understanding of individualism and individuation. Individualism may defined, in psychological terms, as the belief that the

personality is centred on the sense-of-self or ego. As we have noted analytical psychology holds that whilst our sense-of-self, or ego, is the centre of our centre consciousness it is not the centre of the psyche. Jung (CW 12) states that the Self is the centre of the personality. (Note: The word 'Self' is not capitalized in the Collected Works but I shall capitalize it here. When I use the word 'self' it refers to the subject, when certain Jungian analysts use the word 'self' it refers to what I am calling the 'Self'. The context of the cited works should make this clear.) Defining the Self is a complicated matter as Jung uses the term in various, sometimes paradoxical, ways. It has been defined as:

> An archetypal image of man's fullest potential and the unity of the personality as a whole. The self as a unifying principle within the human psyche occupies the central position of authority in relation to psychological life and, therefore, the destiny of the individual" (Samuels, Shorter & Plaut, 1986, p. 135).

It may indeed be experienced as the centre of the personality (Brooke, 1991a). The Self is implicated in individuation in that it 'templates', 'sponsors' and 'directs' individuation and is indeed the ultimate Other to whom ego relates. In short the individuating total personality comprises the dynamic manifestation, centred on the Self, of the evolving relationship between sense-of-self and Other (i.e. the intrapsychic other) (Papadopoulos, 1984). The personality is always developing, we are moving towards being who we most truly are by centering on the relationship between conscious and the unconscious. Whilst this may still seem to be an essentially intrapsychic view of things this is not so, for the Other and the other mutually implicate each other.

I need to add that my personal and clinical experience leads me to develop this position further. I have come to believe that paradoxically whilst the Self is the centre of the personality so too is the relationship between sense-of-self and Other/other. I have come to understand that in living from a transcending dialectic between sense-of-self and Other/other (or we might say between ego and archetype) we live with author-ity, authenticity and an autonomy that is also relational.

## The Practice of Jungian Analysis

Both clinically and theoretically these notions call forth two questions: how do conscious and unconscious relate to each other and in what way does this implicate the other? Let me start by asking what it is that Jungian analysts do, what is the practice of Jungian analysis? I will start by saying that the politics that separated Jung from psycho-analysis, and the mutual Freud and Jung bashing which has arisen from it, are very misleading. Jung and the Jungians/post-Jungians are strongly within the broad depth psychology tradition of which psycho-analysis is also part. Jung anticipated many notions that later arose in psycho-analysis of which some of the more significant are: a stress on early object-relations (e.g. Klein), innate psychic structures (e.g. Bowlby), the creative element to the

unconscious (e.g. Winnicot), stress on the clinical use of countertransference (e.g. Little), the importance of regression in analysis (e.g. Balint) and the encounter between personal sense-of-self and the Other/other (e.g. Bion) (Samuels, 1995, p. 10).

I believe that Jungian analysts use their personalities and personal knowledge and abilities to facilitate the individuatory encounter between consciousness and unconscious. Some may do this in a way close to that traditionally espoused by psycho-analysis (working with transference and resistance through the application of abstinence and interpretation), others, more classically, by 'supervising' the out-picturing of the unconscious to consciousness (in dream and active imagination) and yet others by helping the analysand presence and integrate their unappropriated possibilities of being.

Early on Freud answered the question of how conscious and unconscious relate to each other and in what way this implicates the other in his 'definition' of psycho-analysis. The relationship between conscious and unconscious finds form in resistance, and the relationship between self and other first finds form in transference. Freud came to define psychoanalysis as:

> Any line of investigation which recognizes these two facts [the phenomena of transference and resistance] and takes them as the starting point of its work has a right to call itself psycho-analysis (Freud, 1914/2001, p. 16).

We might understand that the first phase of analytic work (in both psycho-analysis and analytical psychology) is the presencing of the unconscious. I believe that, whilst Freud was disposed to a more passive presencing of the unconscious, Jung was more disposed to an active presencing of it. Freud describes presencing the unconscious as follows:

> [W]hile I am listening to the patient, I, too give myself over to the current of my unconscious thoughts (Freud,1913/2001, pp. 133).

And:

> Experience soon showed that the attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously adopt was to surrender himself to his own unconscious mental activity, in a state of evenly suspended attention, to avoid so far as possible reflection and the construction of conscious expectations, not to try to fix on anything that he heard particularly in his memory, and by these means to catch the drift of the patients unconscious with his own unconscious. It was then found that, except under conditions that were too unfavourable, the patient's associations emerged like allusions, as it were, to one particular theme and it was only necessary for the physician to go a step further in order to guess the material which was concealed from the patient himself and to be able to communicate it to him (Freud, 1923/2001, p.239).

I shall give an example (for which I have the analysand's permission) from my own analytic practice of the kind of analysis I believe Freud might be describing but which is equally 'Jungian' in nature.

## Case Vignette One

Matthew was a single man in his mid-twenties when he first consulted with me. He came three times a week on consecutive days and used the couch. The clinical material is drawn from a session in the second year of the analysis.

Matthew enters my room; he briefly looks about, crosses to the couch and lies down. I experience a settling silence fall over the room. Matthew starts to speak. I listen to his words with evenly suspended attention. My mind is simply drawn along by his words, their rhythm, his silence. His presence evokes my own thoughts and feelings, sensations and intuitions. I surrender to the drift of this material sponsored by my own unconscious. My experienced response forms a wake from the prow of his associations. I register, consider, weigh and try out the experiences presented to me and I am able to allow Matthew's presence to occupy my body-mind. From this I make some interpretation not now recalled.

Matthew says that when he was a child he enjoyed gluing model aeroplanes together. Even so, he was not very good at this and would often get into a mess. He might then ask his father for help. His father would then become engrossed in the task and take it over from Matthew. When finished his father would say something like: 'Didn't we make a nice plane?' Matthew, however, knew that he had not himself made the model. At first I find myself empathizing with Matthew as a child who felt misunderstood and unhelped, then I feel emotionally moved by his account and protective of him. I also find myself feeling as if I were a father and experiencing the difficulty of relating to a child in just the right way.

I wonder if Matthew is making an unconscious communication in which he expresses how my interpretation had interrupted and usurped his 'messy', yet creative, work, in much the same way that his father did with the model aeroplane construction. I wonder, more generally, if he is making an unconscious complaint against a figure who has usurped his creative feeling and left him feeling inadequate, if perhaps he has come to doubt his creative capacity. I wonder if I should speak but decide that there is too little evidence on which to base an interpretation. I also wonder if I should speak if I might not, again, be taking over his work. Is there a way to speak without doing this? Has the time passed to speak, has my silence shown something else? Does he experience my silence as supportive or absent or even punitive? Am I being punitive? Was I countertransferentially stung by in thinking that perhaps he was unconsciously critiquing my making an interpretation and so did I wish to remain punitively silent? My thoughts and feelings, senses and intuitions swirl in the analytic space. So the session continues.

As in psycho-analysis this vignette demonstrates a more passive form of presencing the unconscious (which was described above) and which led Freud to advocate the rule of abstinence. Jung, however, used a more active presence:

> In psychotherapy, even if the doctor is entirely detached from the emotional contents of the patient, the very fact that the patient has emotions has an effect upon him. And it is a great mistake if the doctor thinks he can lift himself out of it. He cannot do more than become conscious of the fact that he is affected. If he does not see that, he is too aloof and then he talks beside the point. It is even his duty to accept the emotions of the patient and to mirror them. That is the reason why I reject the idea of putting the patient upon a sofa and sitting behind him. I put my patients in front of me and I talk to them as one natural human being to another, and I expose myself completely and react with no restriction (Jung, 1935/1986, p.155).

This statement of Jung's brings us to the notion of actively presencing the unconscious through the body, itself one of the many possible ways in which the analytic encounter between consciousness and unconscious may be facilitated.

## Presencing of the unconscious through the body

In Jung's account above the bodily presence of analyst and analysand is seen to be the palette upon which the unconscious is presenced. Whilst Jung's own understanding of the relationship between the psyche and the body can be paradoxical (Samuels, Shorter & Plaut, 1986) we gain the sense that Jung was aware of the way in which body and psyche mutually implicate each other. Near the beginning of his 1935 paper "Principles of Practical Psychotherapy" Jung makes the observation that: "One of the fundamental antinomies is is the statement that psyche depends on the body and body depends on psyche" (CW 16, para: 1). It is important to make a philosophical point about Jung's terminology. Brooke (1991b, 515) has made the argument (both terminological and philosophical) that 'the psyche is not a locality on the hither side of our being-in-the-world' but that '[f]or Jung, the psyche, like the sea in which the fish swims, is the world in which we incarnately and psychologically dwell'. He also argues that:

> Psyche is a 'place' between subject and object, and since in both the idealist and realist traditions the body-subject is abandoned to the world of things, it can be said that psyche moves between mind and body as well, or, better, includes the operations of both those traditionally conceived domains (p. 514).

So, although Jung himself at times terminologically collapses psyche and mind, properly speaking we should not collapse psyche into mind for both mind and body, self and other are 'in' psyche.

As Brooke intimates the linking of mind and body also ushers in the linking of self and other for in analysis (and indeed in everyday life) our bodies become the 'location' at which the mind of the other is registered. Plaut (1956) acknowledged this in his concept of 'incarnation'. Plaut understood that sometimes instead of

interpreting projections made in the transference the analyst may 'incarnate' them, i.e. contain or absorb them. This mostly unconscious process is dangerous in the sense that it can lead to an enactment either in over-identification or in defensive withdrawal. The process of incarnation may, for instance, have elements that are uncomfortable for the analyst (one thinks in particular of something like feeling one has 'fallen in love' with an analysand or even been sexually aroused by them).

Dieckmann (1979) discusses a case in which he felt a strong fascination, not apparently without its bodily counterpart, with a female analysand. With many struggles, Dieckmann came to understand that allowing this to become incarnated in a contained way provided the analysand with a compensatory experience of a certain type of father figure. This permitted her to move into an individuatory process. Samuels (1989) has developed the term 'embodied countertransference' to refer to the response of the analyst in which he/she embodies an emotionally experienced part of the analysand's inner world. Samuels articulates this further:

> 'Embodied' is intended to suggest a physical, actual, material, sensual expression in the analyst of something in the patient's inner world, a drawing together and solidification of this, an incarnation by the analyst of a part of the patient's psyche and . . . a 'clothing' by the analyst of the patient's soul (1989, p. 151).

Samuels takes this further and argues that self and other are implicated when the body registers psychological life:

> Using Corbin's metaphor, the analyst's body becomes less literal, a 'subtle body', a 'being in suspense', a link between soul and corporeality . . . in analysis, the analyst's body is not entirely his or her own and what it says to him or her is not a message for him or her alone (1989, p. 164).

This ambiguity in the 'possession' of the body ushers in our consideration of analysis as experience and activity in an interpersonal archetypal field.

## Analysis as experience and activity in an interpersonal archetypal field

Very early on Jung (McLynn, 1997; Jung, CW 16) recognized that transference is central to the analytic endeavour. By so doing he implicitly acknowledged (as indeed did Freud) that all our theoretical and therapeutic endeavours are inextricably both interpersonal and intrapsychic. The Other within always implicates the other without. The interpersonal relationship is the field in which the unconscious manifests.

Jung effectively introduced a field concept of the transference in his long essay "The Psychology of the Transference" (CW 16). In this, and in other works drawing on it, we find the notion of the 'cross quaternio' which Jung diagramed in a rectangle with two points of consciousness above and two points of unconscious below. Later writers have subtended this rectangle with a 'deeper' archetypal point. In this diagram we can imagine two 'egos' communicating with each other at the conscious level underpinned by their respective personal complexes and archetypal

images at the unconscious level. From an intrapsychic perspective the process of individuation occurs in the facilitation of the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, between ego and archetype, and hence between ego and Self. But this relationship is always also manifest interpersonally in the cross 'projections' between the analysand's unconscious and the ego of the analyst and also the analyst's unconscious and the ego of the analysand. This arrangement may in turn be visualized as based in an archetypal field built up around the split bi-pole of an archetype – e.g. needy child and depriving mother – which itself underlies and is constellated and made present in and through the analytic relationship. The fixity of this, the way in which the interpersonal archetypal field determines experience, behaviour and affect, is essentially an I-It relationship (Buber, 1923/1970). When there is relationship between ego and Self then this I-It can give way in the analytic work to the I-You (Jacoby, 1984).

Several analysts have utilized the diagram of the cross quaternio as a depiction of an interpersonal archetypal field between analyst and analysand. Notable amongst them are Groesbeck (1975) in his discussion of the archetypal image of the wounded healer, Dieckmann (1979) and Jacoby (1984) in their respective discussions of transference and countertransference and Spiegelman (1996) in his discussion of transference as an interactive field.

Spiegelman, (1991, 1995, 1996), in particular, has discussed the interpersonal archetypal field and the movements of change which occur within this field. As a first step when entering the interpersonal archetypal field analyst and analysand usually experience being:

> embedded in an imaginally perceived whole situation. They experience the unconscious or archetypes both 'around' and 'between' them as well as 'within' them – an encompassing, infusing, and mutually interactive field (Spiegelman, 1996, p. 186).

As a second step this then shifts into the typical analytic relationship in which analyst and analysand perform the usual activities of analysis, typically containment and interpretation. A third shift carries some analytic couples into what Spiegelman calls 'mutual process' which is characterized by each making frequent, and often intense, reference to what is occurring in the analytic relationship between them. This is a relationship characterized by the analyst being in the work as much as the analysand. A fourth and final shift shift involves all the above but also includes bodily experiences, for both analyst and analysand, and synchronistic phenomena.

With comment on the last stage of the analytic encounter as an interpersonal field phenomenon we are brought full circle with a return to presencing of the unconscious in a bodily way.
The presence of the unconscious in the body is a gestural presence and the transference filed is also a gestural field (Romanyshyn, 2007).

These arguments give us a compound theoretical and clinical vertex from which to discuss self and other in analytical psychology: the unconscious as called forth in the interpersonal archetypal field and as presenced in the bodies of the analysand and analyst.
I shall proceed to explore this through the medium of an analytic vignette that is consistent with Jung's style. I shall interleave this with theoretical discussion.

## Case Vignette Two (with interleaved theoretical commentary)

The case material consists of a constructed fictionalized case in which I present a clinical experience that I have had at different times with analysands who have similar psychodynamic functioning and ways of being-in-the-world. I shall call my fictional analysand Claire. The core elements of this analytic encounter have occurred with at least four analysands.
Claire is a 45 year old woman who has had several years of psychotherapy prior to commencing her analysis with me. She came complaining of life being meaningless. At times she experiences depression. She described how she found no occupation or activity particularly interesting, how she had no sense of calling and also how she felt that she lacked imagination. Claire was evidently prone to being self-critical. She presented as a neatly turned out person who dressed in a rather covered up way. A helpful and conscientious person, she stated that she liked keeping her household neat and tidy, that there was a place for everything and that she wished that the family would return objects to these places.
We may note at this point that Claire conforms to what Freud described as an obsessional character type. He says of this type that:

> It is distinguished by the predominance of the super-ego, which is separated from the ego under great tension. People of this type are dominated by fear of their conscience instead of fear of losing love. They exhibit, as it were, an internal instead of external dependence. They develop a high degree of self-reliance; and, from the social standpoint, they are the true, pre-eminently conservative vehicles of civilization (Freud, 1931/2001, p. 218).

Claire described her previous psychotherapy with a warm but somewhat abstinent woman therapist who had worked from what was stated to be an eclectic but mostly psychodynamically informed perspective. Claire described how she would anxiously ruminate prior to sessions especially about what she would say. She found little or nothing to say and her therapist's abstinence and interpretive reflections on Claire's few apparent associations did not lead anywhere much. Claire stated that her previous therapist had worked very much in the transference but that for Claire the transference interpretations had seemed meaningless. Claire felt deeply responsible for the failure to make progress in this therapy. Furthermore she felt that she could not come up with appropriate and useful thoughts and insights. She described being mostly emotionally unmoved in her previous therapy. She was very embarrassed. Generally however she had no access to her emotional life.

This also conforms to what Freud had to say about the analysis of obsessional neurotics:

> Obsessional neurotics understand perfectly how to make the technical rule almost useless by applying their over-conscientiousness and doubts to it (Freud, 1917/2001, p. 289).

In analysis with the obsessional analysand this means that associations are mostly a product of the analysand's tendency to compliance. Furthermore, the associations are free of any real emotional valence. This is because the obsessional analysand uses a particular form of unconscious defence which Freud commented on in his seminal 1926 work Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety: the defence of isolation. Isolation amounts to the conscious knowledge of events from which the emotions have been defensively stripped and rendered unconscious. This merges into both the transference and resistance, which Greenson puts very clearly:

> A typical variety [of transference resistance] is the obsessional character who has isolated all his emotions from his everyday life and who lives by thoughts and ideas alone. Such a patient has such a deep-seated resistance to all emotional reactions that he tends to interact with people only to an intellectual plan. All spontaneous emotion is felt to be a danger to be combated. Only control and thinking are reliable and virtuous (1967, p. 344).

We see this restraint in Claire. In the course of the initial sessions, whilst taking something of a history, I realized, through Claire's bodily presence, and my own bodily response to it, that she came into the room very, very anxious. On enquiry she agreed that she was anxious and that she had considerable anticipatory anxiety on the journey to her session with me. Let me describe one of these early experiences further.

I was sitting back in my chair my one hand, characteristically, to the side of my face. In this position I felt far away from her so I shifted in my chair moving forward, putting my elbows on my knees cupping my chin in my hands. Claire was speaking of her mother and her own breathing was tight and constrained. My breathing matched hers. I felt a tightness in my chest. Then I felt, in fact almost saw, a little wave of tearfulness pass across her, as if from her left to her right. I felt some emotion rise in me, something deep down in my body presence. Then she smiled and this drew me away from my own body presencing of emotion. I felt my embodied emotional response to her fade away. She spoke some more, again the tearfulness passed across her. Again the tearfulness touched me, again it faded away. I thought of holding these emotions in my own body, of helping her access these feelings of tearfulness. I waited and the wave of tearfulness came again. I tensed my muscles; sitting still I inwardly leaned further forward.
I was aware of a strange feeling that my whole body was like a living candle, all of it alive from the base where I sat on the chair right to the flickering flame. This candle resonated and caught the still but quiet resonance in Claire. My breathing

changed, I held the tearfulness in my in breath. I set my body firmly, almost stiffly, into holding the wave of tearfulness, caught in the resonating of the candle. The flame danced on the tightly held but resonating candle. Somehow my body managed to hold this feeling. Claire may have been unconscious of her emotions but the musculature of my body, of my breathing, had caught them. I somehow tuned into the feeling of tearfulness, I had caught the tears of the little girl avoided and abandoned by her mother.

We can pause to note at this point that, with respect to the role of breathing, '[i]n treating patients dominated by long-standing inhibitions, a feeling for the spontaneity in the patient is very important . . . The observer immediately "feels" whether a patient breathes freely or not' (Braatøy, 1954, pp.175-176). Braatøy, who was a psycho-analyst, argues that analysts need to cultivate a capacity to register the analysand's psychological life within their own bodies and thus help make emotions available to the analysands. In this way the body is more than a means of registration, it also becomes a vehicle for interpersonal transmission of emotion registered in the countertransference. This describes something of the process I am engaged in with Claire.

I started to speak to Claire. It is important to note that my speaking was not 'a thinking'; it was instead an answering of my being to her presence. In practical terms this meant that I allowed my body to attune to her presence and felt the muscles tightening and holding my own breath, I felt the upwelling of some as yet not quite clear emotion. I experienced this as us resonating together as if we were at the poles of some undulating and shifting interpersonal field imaged in the resonating candles opposite each other: a movement between us but also from base to flame tip – the interpersonal archetypal field.

My hands shaped something in the space before me, a literal space, but also an interpersonal space, and deep down too an archetypal space. I said to Claire that I wanted us to hold something there. I held the idea in the air between my palms and fingers, my arms were extended somewhat in front of me and I held them steady. I felt the wave of tearfulness move back and forth between us, our two candles resonating more and more.

I told her how I experienced her sitting before me tightly held in the muscles of her chest, so tightly held that she breathed with difficulty. I said I could feel a resonance in my own body to this and how somewhere in this I could feel some emotion was present, and that this emotion came and went but also resonated in her. I said that I thought this might be her as a little girl and that I wanted us to feel this little girl's feelings, I wanted her to be able to speak of how she felt. Then I fell silent. Claire too was silent. Then some sort of exchange occurred, I felt that I could let go of the tearful feelings. I started to relax my fingers, and gently withdrew my arms from the space before me. As this occurred I felt the emotions start to move more in Claire. Her eyes brimmed, first one tear and then another

gathered and slowing slid down her cheeks. These tears brought us both into the presence of the hurt and suffering little girl. Claire's own presence to her emotions built and held. The wave of feeling came and Claire started to sob. Her sobbing rose like feeling undulations running up her body from where she was seated on the chair to her face.

I relaxed my body and then felt my own waves of compassion for this sad and hurt child in front of me. After a long while I asked her what this little girl needed. She settled enough to say, through her tears, that she ached to have had her mother hold her, that was all she had needed, not mother's avoidance, not mother's absence, not mother's fear of having any feelings with and for her. I reflected on how sad it must be for her that her mother could not be with her in this way. We found ourselves in an emotionally attuned and open space. This was an encounter which fulfilled those simple suggestions that all that is needed for therapeutic effect is empathy, congruence and unconditional positive regard, an encounter which was the space of I and You.

In this encounter Claire's soulfulness, which has for so long been obstructed by arid cognition, was expressed in an embodied and interpersonal way. That embodiment was a profound dwelling with herself and a profound state of relationship with me. In my openness to her in relationship, and as an embodied other, she became present to me as an embodied other and to herself as an embodied Other. In this way she started a process of gathering her capacity for passion, that is, for her forms of thinking to become forms of feeling. This can only really happen as an expression of her bodily presence, which was also evoked in my body. We see in this what is effectively a manifestation of deeper levels of the interpersonal archetypal field: we both register her emotional life in our bodies and are able to refer to what is occurring in our bodies and in the analytic relationship. This brings me, in truly Jungian fashion, to alchemical thoughts on the case material and its links to the presencing of the unconscious through the body and the movement from emotional and interpersonal encapsulation to openness.

## Alchemical thoughts

The case material introduces us to the emotional and interpersonal restriction which is so powerfully evident in the obsessional character. This ties in to certain alchemical notions. Alchemy relies on the central notion of the coniunctio, which is the conjunction between different elements within the sealed alchemical vessel. The alchemist Dorn, who Jung cites in his magnum opus Mysterium Coniunctionis (CW 14), describes three different sorts of conjunction. The first of these conjunctions is the 'unio mentalis' in which the spirit and soul combine with each other to form the mind which separates from the body. In the second conjunction the mind recombines with the body, and finally, in the third conjunction the mind/body combines with the world to form the 'unus mundus'. From an archetypal perspective the isolation of affect used by people with obsessional characters removes both their bodily and emotional reaction from the knowing of

their mind and replaces them with intellect and rationality. By this strategy the 'unio mentalis' is very successful but it also truncates the possibility of the reconjunction of the mind and the body and hence of individuation. Jung puts this quite eloquently:

> But the separation of the spiritual and the vital spheres, the subordination of the latter to the rational standpoint, is not satisfactory inasmuch as reason alone cannot do complete or even adequate justice to the irrational facts of the unconscious (CW14, para: 672).

In the Jungian alchemical formulation the mind (with its thoughts but no emotions) fails to conjoin with the body, which both bears and hides emotions. From a phenomenological perspective (strongly informed by analytical psychology) we note that:

> [T]here is a recognizable difference between an understanding which proceeds from mind and an understanding of the human heart. I can, for example, understand your grief at the loss of your friend when I know the circumstances surrounding this loss. But certainly my understanding of your grief is changed when it moves my heart. At that moment I understand you and you yourself feel understood by me (Romanyshyn, 1982, p. 101).

Heart and body are reflective one of the other, for Romanyshyn goes on to say:

> The appearance of psychological life as story suggests therefore that the recovery of the psychological body can begin with the human heart. Indeed it may even be the case that the human heart is pre-eminently the embodiment of psychological life. To be psychological it is perhaps necessary to see life and to live it through the heart (Romanyshyn, 1982, p. 101).

Thus the analytic task is the return of the body and what it carries and hides. And because 'to be' is 'to be in the world together' so my body may serve as a receptor for Claire's hidden emotions. If I can hold onto and maintain contact with these emotions in my body, these emotions that are unconsciously carried and hidden in her body, then they may become consciously available to her. They thus first become available for the conjunction of mind and body in my body and then through our shared participation in the interpersonal archetypal field the conjunction is offered to her and she can live them in her body.

The evocation and reception of Claire's embodied emotions in the interpersonal archetypal field leads to a moment in which I can understand her in and as her emotioned body. She can in turn, in that moment, feel understood by me. This provides a place of opening and reception of her own, until that time unavailable, possibilities of being. Todres (2007, p. 2) argues that the "lived body . . . grounds understanding by intimately participating in a world that can show new horizons and meanings". He goes on to say that "embodied understanding is a form of knowing that evokes its living, bodily relevant textures and meanings". This invites us to consider the third conjunction, or 'unus mundus', in which the mind/body combines with the world. Generally the 'unus mundus' is a spiritual notion that

means the highly developed transpersonal state of non-dual consciousness (Wilber, 2000) but we may also understand it, psychologically, in the context of the obsessional character, as returning the individual to the world, be that the world of nature or the world of others. This is not a regressive restoration of submersion in the collective. It is, however, an experience of compassionate attunement to the world and others. This is surely the antithesis of individualism.

The alchemical metaphor of individuation finds company with several phenomenological thinkers (e.g. Brooke, 1991a; Romanyshyn, 2007 and Todres, 2007) who are sympathetic to analytical psychology. All of these thinkers issue a call back to embodied existence together with others.

Romanyshyn (1984), in a discussion of the metabletics of the West, alerts us to how we live in a world which might be called individualistic, a world in which the individual eye looks on from a distance, a world in which the individual body is a dead mechanical device not the place of life, a world in which individuals may so easily be alienated from others and from themselves. This is the world in which the Western 'soul healer' (i.e. psychotherapist) seeks to return us to what Todres calls embodied understanding, a notion that resonates with the three conjunctions of alchemist Dorn. For in embodied understanding, one is opened to being more than cognitively aware and is involved instead in an embodied and aesthetic experience.

Embodied understanding allows one to 'increasingly experience oneself as "more than" the ways one has been objectified and defined (freedom), and therefore, more fluidly in accord with the human realm (vulnerability)'. Through embodied understanding we are opened spiritually to 'a view of human existence that lies between great freedom and great vulnerability' in a 'spirituality that integrates the personal and the transpersonal' (Todres, 2007, p.3). These words of Todres serve as a poetic articulation of individuation, the capacity to live poised between one's sense-of-self and all that which is other/Other/the other. The openness to live so poised is a freedom towards the world and others that is greater than any offered by individualism.

## Conclusion

The primary aim of this paper was to present a contemporary view of Jungian theory and practice such that it met and challenged the accusation of individualism. First presenting a thumbnail sketch of analytical psychology and the practice of analysis discussion was extended to two areas of Jungian analysis - presencing the unconscious through the body and analysis as experience and activity in an interpersonal archetypal field. This was followed by a fictionalized composite case and interleaved theoretical discussion, which included some alchemical thoughts and their contemporary resonance in phenomenological thinking.

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