Shifts in Focus in Psychotherapy: Jung's 'Problems of Modern Psychotherapy' Revisited

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Abstract

This paper examines the challenge to the psychotherapist of making a shift in focus in psychotherapy. In so doing it revisits the concerns of a seminal paper of Jung's in which he introduced the notion of four foci or phases in psychotherapy: confession, elucidation, education and transformation. In the present paper Jungian theory is dialogued with contemporary psychoanalytic concepts. 'Symbol', in particular, as a core element of analytical psychology, is presented in terms of the contemporary psychoanalytic notion of 'dialectic'. These notions are used to clarify something of the technical considerations entailed in the execution of the shifts or transitions between psychotherapeutic foci. Condensed out of clinical experience and theoretical ruminations in such varied fields as contemporary psychoanalytic thinking, analytical psychology and transpersonal psychology three symbolic/dialectical attitudes are presented: a commitment to perspicacity, an awareness of position and the Promethean-Epimethean attitude.

Case material is presented and filtered through the re-reading of theory and the three symbolic/dialectical attitudes proposed as aids to shifts of focus. An attempt is made to understand the ways in which shifts between the foci are made and the ways in which the decisions to make such shifts are validated.

Introduction

Like all psychotherapists, I am challenged by my work to make shifts in the nature of my engagement with my clients. How active should I be and in what way should I be active? What promotes psychotherapy and what obstructs it? Should I just listen, should I speak, when, how and about what should I speak? These are decisions we all face: how do we gauge when to make a shift and how do we ascertain what the effect of making the shift is.

Traditionally psychoanalysis promotes only one shift: to listen or to speak an interpretation. Loosening of psychoanalytic abstinence is considered a deviation towards supportive work and therefore less psychoanalytic. However,

with the evolution of psychoanalysis from drive theory, to object relations theory, to the intersubjective tradition, there have been reconsiderations of the tenets of psychoanalytic technique. Thus, questions of shifts in focus in analysis assume more legitimacy.

In a 1929 paper entitled 'Problems of Modern Psychotherapy', Jung examined four foci in psychotherapy: confession, elucidation, education and transformation. He addressed the fact that there are these different foci but he tended to see them as more or less following each other, in a somewhat progressive sequence. In consequence he did not explore the nature and conditions of making a shift from one focus to another.

It can be argued that if interest in the sorts of foci in psychotherapy are themselves a 'modern concern' then interest in the processes of the shifting between such foci is a 'postmodern concern'. Postmodernism, when not nihilistic, beckons us to reflect upon our embeddedness in structural systems. In psychoanalysis it is the notion of the dialectic that answers that invitation through the contemporary psychoanalytic concern with 'decentreing' (Atwood and Stolorow: 1984; Ogden: 1997). 'Decentreing' moves us away from the certainty of structure. From within contemporary psychoanalysis such a notion is central to understanding psychological life in general and psychotherapy in particular. If we turn to analytical psychology we see the same concern scribed in Jung's notion of the 'symbol'. The notion of symbol has always been central to analytical psychology and embraces many of the shifts that occur in psychological life.

In this paper it is my intention to present a brief extract from a psychotherapy in which I was challenged to make shifts. Following this, I shall introduce certain basic premises of analytical psychology that converge with aspects of contemporary psychoanalysis. In particular, I will draw on the central nature of symbol (for analytical psychology) and dialectic (for psychoanalysis) in psychological life. I shall try to recruit this position to argue that, from a contemporary perspective, the shifts between foci in psychotherapy are as significant as the foci themselves. Thereafter I shall re-read Jung's 1929 paper on psychotherapy in more contemporary terms. In contrast to his paper I shall try to clarify something of the technical considerations entailed in the execution of a shift between foci by presenting three dialectically informed attitudes: a commitment to perspicacity, an awareness of position and the Promethean-Epimethean attitude.

Brief psychotherapy extract

Julia is an attractive woman in her fifties. She has been in and out of psychotherapy since her late twenties. Julia tells a dramatic story – a mother who was overprotective and superstitious (always warding off the evil eye), marriage (after flirtatiously courting a wealthy man), children, divorce and a good settlement, meaningless sex with emotionally abusive men, loneliness, psychotherapies with caring and reassuring psychotherapists.

Julia goes on and on, I hear her story, I cannot feel it. I tell her this, I ask her to work with me to help me feel her story, help us think and feel what she knows. She tries, we fail, she tries again and again, then I am moved by her and feel tearful: I become as of her in my living reception of something which she knew but could not feel. Her loneliness takes on meaning for us both. So too does her fear of ending the session and so too do her delaying tactics of talking about my cat curled up on a chair, telling me that I live in a pleasant neighbourhood. I tell her that time is up but that we may speak about how horrible it is to end next time. Next time she is angry with me, I try to feel the hurt that drives her anger, at first I cannot, then I can, moved she cries again. Moved, we come to understand her hurt, she comes to understand that I understand and moved by this she cries even more. And then she drifts away from her feelings and so do I and then she speaks again of her dramatic story. I comment on how some part of her seems to use the drama, how its very realness renders feeling unreal and so it takes us away from her feelings. Slowly we go back to her hurt and she is again tearful. We come to talk about how I do not reassure her, how I do not give her plans to deal with her loneliness, how I do speak with her about the ways in which she thinks and feels that I let her down. Trying to prepare Julia for as yet only potential shapes of thought and feeling I also speak about how psychotherapy is not, in my mind, about her getting something that she did not get at some time, but rather sometimes talking about how I was failing to make it up to her now and so telling the same story in a different way. We move in and out of emotional attunement. She again has difficulty ending the session.

Julia comes back for her next session – she says that she felt so lonely after the last session that she cried and cried as she drove home across the city. However, at home something strange and transcendent happened – she 'clicked through', she 'clicked through' that it did not help to complain about her loneliness, she 'clicked through' that she used her complaint as a blanket within which to wrap herself and find comfort, she 'clicked through' that thinking and feeling this was the beginning of something new even though she was still alone. Maybe she also 'clicked through' to the understanding that I thought and felt I had

made her feel lonely and that this meant that she was alone but not lonely, maybe she got it, maybe she did not get it – we will have to see.

Through this story we see shifts, we see Julia's confession and my empathy, her anxiety and our elucidation of it, our mutual education (mine more secret than hers) and transformation. These are Jung's four foci (confession, elucidation, education and transformation) and in this paper I propose to examine something of the shifts between these foci.

A re-vision of some basic premises of analytical psychology

As the arguments that will be presented are essentially those of analytical psychology I should like to outline a re-vision of some of its basic premises in order to grant a foundation and orientation. In order to aid inter-school communication I shall be introducing certain terms from existential phenomenology and from contemporary psychoanalysis as potent analogues of more traditional Jungian terms.

From the classical perspective of analytical psychology the life-task, what Jung called individuation, consists of two 'phases'.

The first of these 'phases' entails the initial development of a viable subject (called the 'ego' by Jung) that possesses the capacity to think, feel and sometimes appropriate 'possibilities of being' (Brooke: 1991). Following an idea of Bollas (1987), I shall call the 'possibilities of being' the 'known'. From the perspective of analytical psychology relatively delineated clusters of possibilities of being are called 'archetypes' (Brooke: 1991). Archetypes shape our being in the world as they influence our behaviour, emotions and interpersonal interactions.

The second of these phases entails the development of a relationship between that subject (or ego) and the as yet unfelt and unthought knowns (or archetypes) that emerge from what Jung called the Self. The notion of the Self is complex and paradoxical. From one perspective the Self is the 'sum' of ego and archetypes making up the personality, from another it is the total ontological ground of the personality, and from yet another the author and the numinous supraordinate centre of the personality. The Self is also an essentially intersubjective notion because ontologically speaking we all emerge from the same ground and epistemologically speaking the Self is fundamentally known in or through the Other. As Papadopoulos puts it: 'The Self therefore, could be understood as the ultimate form of the Other, the highest Anticipated Whole

Other, which at the same time paradoxically represents the most inner core, indeed the centre of the personality' (Papadopoulos: 1984: 80). Whilst being this Other, the Self also authors individuation as the evolving process of the subject conversing dialectically with the unfamiliar Other. Put another way, individuation is the process of growth effected by someone coming to think and feel what was previously known but unfamiliar. For reasons of simplicity I shall hereafter mostly refer to the unthought and unfelt known(s) as 'emergents'. The subject is identified with the structures constituted by the familiar, the already thought and felt known, and this provokes the mechanism of compensation (another notion of analytical psychology) which stimulates the appearance of fresh emergents from out of the Self (Jung: 1916/1957). Compensation drives what psychoanalysis sees as the repetition compulsion (Freud:1920/2001; Milton: 2000). Through this process a state of emotional tension develops between the subject and the emergents. If all goes well this tension induces the subject to differentiate from and transcend current structures of subjectivity and intersubjectivity whilst also accommodating them to the newly integrated emergents. In so doing the subject/ego, and its relationship to the Self, is transformed. In the course of individuation this process of identification, differentiation, transcendence, integration and transformation is repeated again and again (Wilber: 2000).

According to analytical psychology this transition and transformation of the subject (and its relation to the emergents) is effected through the agency of the 'symbol'. The symbol might be defined as the best possible (living and transcendent) image of the mixture of contemporary structures of subjectivity/ intersubjectivity with the emergents of the Self. As such, the symbol functions to differentiate one from, and transcend one's embeddedness in, previously thought and felt knowns. Its presence and action is experienced as numinous, clarifying and freeing. The symbol both acts and is imaged as a creative connection in the dialectical and transformative bringing-together-and-transcendence-of different images, experiences, subjectivities, registers of meaning, etc. It is thus the epitome of the transformative shifting of the dialectic.

Psychotherapy thus becomes several processes (for both client and psychotherapist): the facilitation of the emergence of emergents; the differentiation and transcendence of the unadapted subject and its accommodation to those emergents; and/or the facilitation of the integration of the previously thought and felt knowns to the newly adapted subject.

Psychotherapy occurs in the subject's successful encounter with the Self as the unfamiliar Other. The client is Other to the psychotherapist and the psycho-

therapist is Other to the client. In each Other, client and psychotherapist, come to meet the unfamiliar known and render it familiar. Just as there is a tension between subject and emergents this encounter with the Other generates a field of tension between the participants, a field which Jung (1946) scribed as the 'transference'. Within this field the participants may come to be transformed through the agency of the 'symbol'.

In the process of psychotherapy there are many transitions or shifts. For instance, there are shifts between intersubjective closeness and distance (Balint: 1993), between different phases of counter-transference (Stein: 1984), between literal and metaphoric understanding (Stein: 1991), between inside and outside the analytic frame (Siegalman: 1990), between one register of meaning and another (Kristeva: 1986; Leader: 2000). There are also shifts between the foci of empathy, interpretation, education and transformation.

Ogden (1997) has argued that psychotherapy is a project that is executed in the transitions, the spaces of the 'betweens', which manifest in psychotherapy: between client and psychotherapist, between subject and emergent, between one way of being and another. Hence the resonating space of transition, the living between, the dialectic (Ogden: 1994) becomes the theatre of psychotherapy. The symbol is the original Jungian articulation of what contemporary psychoanalysis scribes in the notion of the dialectic. These notions of symbol and dialectic, which are fundamentals of psychological life and psychotherapy, highlight the argument that the shifts between foci are as significant as the foci themselves.

A re-reading of Jung's four analytic phases

This brings us to Jung's consideration of certain foci in psychotherapy. I shall not precis Jung's 1929 paper 'Problems of Modern Psychotherapy' which is, in many respects, an early attempt to make somewhat phenomenological sense of the conduct of psychotherapy. As mentioned, Jung addressed four aspects of the psychotherapy process, which he called confession, elucidation, education and transformation. In a more contemporary way, I shall attempt to re-read these four aspects. I shall respectively call them empathy, interpretation, education and transformation.

Empathy

Julia tries to engage me in the dramatic account of her story, we fail, she tries again and again, then I am moved by her and feel tearful, then she cries, then I become as

of her in my living reception of her unfelt known. Her loneliness takes on meaning for us both.

Empathy may be understood as the living reception of the thought/unthought and felt/unfelt knowns that are concealed and revealed in the manifest shapes of the presence and utterance of the Other. Through this reception empathy is 'a becoming as of the Other' (Kristeva: 1986: 243). It is a rendering into the familiar for the psychotherapist of that which was previously unfamiliar although known. Thus the psychotherapist's empathy is predicated on his or her capacity to come to think and feel the as yet unthought and unfelt knowns of his or her own life. So the psychotherapist is moved.

Interpretation

Julia drifts away from her feelings and so do I and she speaks again of her dramatic story. I comment on how some part of her seems to use the drama, how its very realness renders feeling unreal and so it takes us away from her feelings. Slowly we go back to her hurt and she is again tearful. We come to talk about how I do not reassure her, how I do not give her plans to deal with her loneliness, how I do speak with her about the ways in which she thinks and feels that I let her down.

So, 'becoming as of the Other' means being moved by the Other and thus empathy shifts and gives birth to interpretation, itself an expressive act that constitutes the client's movement by the psychotherapist. Interpretation may be understood as an expressive act that attempts to move the Other whilst it is also an act that springs from being moved by the Other. Such movement is effected by the work of the psychotherapeutic participants when they collaboratively try to condense out of the intersubjective space, in a tolerable way, the best possible, living image of a new mixture of the familiar and the unfamiliar. Interpretation utters an invitation to change. Interpretation is most effective in its action when it emerges from, and refers to, the structuring of both the subject and the emergents that has been immediately and intersubjectively generated in the here-and-now of the analytic encounter, i.e. within the field that is the transference (Jung: 1946; Strachey: 1934/1981). To put it another way, if empathy is an act of reading which writes the reader, then interpretation is an act of writing that emerges from that reading and in turn rewrites the author. Thus, in forming an interpretation, the psychotherapist must first gestate and symbolically metabolize that which is empathically received from the client, the Other, the Self. Thereafter the psychotherapist must prepare and provide a vocabulary with which to give expression to the

potential new shapes of thought and feeling, some of which may already have been thought and felt by the cultural collective and/or the psychotherapist.

Education

Trying to prepare Julia for as yet only potential shapes of thought and feeling I also speak about how psychotherapy is not, in my mind, about her getting something that she did not get at some time, but rather sometimes talking about how I was failing to make it up to her now and so telling the same story in a different way. We move in and out of emotional attunement.

Education is the process whereby the psychotherapist prepares the client to encounter and assimilate emergents. This preparation is effected by the psychotherapist providing the client with shapes of potentially thinkable and feelable knowns. Education can be as simple as the psychotherapist raising an eyebrow or as complex as the provision of information, a plan of action or a conceptual framework. It serves as a means of realizing the invitation to change uttered by the interpretation.

Transformation

Julia comes back for her next session — she says that she felt so lonely after the last session that she cried and cried as she drove home across the city. However, at home something strange and transcendent happened — she 'clicked through', she 'clicked through' that it did not help to complain about her loneliness, she 'clicked through' that she used her complaint as a blanket within which to wrap herself and find comfort, she 'clicked through' that thinking and feeling this was the beginning of something new even though she was still alone.

The previously mentioned potential shapes of thought and feeling, provided by education, generally derive from culture and/or the personal development of the psychotherapist (i.e. the collective consciousness) and therefore they may not authentically represent the unique personality of the client. In contradistinction to the collective quality of education, the possibilities of being, found in the whole Other, are so vast and so novel as to sometimes challenge the usefulness of such collective adaptation. In the light of this what might be called for is less the client's adaptation to collective consciousness and values and more fidelity to his or her own unique personality. This fidelity or authenticity is manifest in the process of transformation. Transformation is the process whereby the emergents of the client's Self challenge the existent structures of subjectivity and intersubjectivity to differentiate from and

transcend their embeddedness in personal or collective consciousness, i.e. from previously thought and felt (personal or collective) knowns. In addition the psychotherapist's own structures of subjectivity and intersubjectivity contribute to such embeddedness and so the psychotherapist is also challenged to encounter the Self and undergo a similar transformation.

Having presented the four foci we are led to the practical considerations entailed in the judgement and execution of a phase shift or transition in psychotherapy. Action in this theatre is assisted by three symbolically/dialectically informed attitudes: a commitment to perspicacity, an awareness of position and an attitude that is both Promethean and Epimethean.

Commitment to perspicacity

The art of detecting the need to make a shift or transition from one phase of psychotherapy to another is well served by the psychotherapist being perspicacious. By 'perspicacious' is meant that the psychotherapist needs to exercise an attitude of acute discernment. That is, the psychotherapist maintains an attitude through which he/she tries to be hermeneutically alert and focused, actively using the intersubjective symbolic/dialectical processes of moving and being moved by the Other to interact with the client and the emergents of the client's personality. The best support of perspicacity is the symbolic/dialectical attitude of empathic-introspective inquiry (Orange, Atwood and Stolorow: 1997) that actively involves the psychotherapist in the processes of intersubjective closeness and distance. Unfortunately, frequently, through frustration and fatigue, as well as the hope of a 'magical' cure, psychotherapists cease to be perspicacious and surrender, no longer sustaining the symbolic/ dialectical attitude, becoming instead passive participants in the psychotherapy process, participants who are no longer moved by the Other. The pretence of empathy is the great enemy of perspicacity, for the psychotherapist then cannot think, feel and express the client's known but relies instead on formulatory clichés.

Awareness of position

As outlined previously, through individuation the subject comes to adapt to emergents. From a diachronic perspective this means that the subject undergoes a developmental progression, each position of which has certain characteristic subjective and intersubjective qualities. From a synchronic

perspective this means that the subject dwells within the midst of a repertoire of subjective and intersubjective positions between which he/she can dialectically shift. Either way these positions are symbolically/dialectically lost and recovered across the entire life span and are not fixed as in the more traditional early life positions or phases, as once-and-for-all achievements.

As the client symbolically/dialectically shifts between different positions so the psychotherapist faces different challenges. Traditionally, in psychoanalysis, the position-specific anxieties mark the dominant pole of the symbol/dialectic and are therefore used to indicate the point at which an interpretation needs to be made. Psychoanalysis does not, however, give an account that is adequate to the entire life span.

Different psychotherapeutic modalities are more or less apposite to different positions. In the earliest autistic-contiguous position empathy and a certain type of invitational education seem appropriate (Ogden: 1994; Tustin: 1992; Wilber: 1996; 1998; 2000). At the paranoid-schizoid position either empathy or an intensive form of holding interpretation are seen as appropriate (Stolorow: Brandschaft and Atwood: 1987; Kernberg: 1985). Through the depressive position and into the œdipal position the traditional uncovering methods of psychoanalysis become regarded as appropriate — empathy followed by interpretation. For the earlier post oedipal positions psychotherapeutic methods using script analysis and cognitive methods seem more appropriate. Following these a position of existential issues emerges and empathically grounded education seems to best describe the existential psychotherapies. Thereafter traditional psychological methods become less effective and the more spiritual positions are encountered in which essentially transformative spiritual practices are utilized (Wilber: 2000).

All of these position-based therapies lead on to transformation and although Jungian analysis is frequently applied to earlier 'developmental' positions (Wilber: 1996) it can, because of its notions of the symbol and individuation, be generically applied across the entire life span. As the client shifts into different positions and aspects of positions so the psychotherapist can empathically track and perspicaciously judge whether to accent an attitude of empathy, interpretation, education or transformation.

A Promethean-Epimethean attitude

The fluctuations of the subjective-intersubjective field that are known as transference/counter-transference are crucial and implicit to the shapes of

empathy, introspection, perspicacity, awareness of position and the interventions based on that awareness. In essence the ambiguities of transference/counter-transference challenge the psychotherapist to validate his/her psychotherapeutic behaviour. How then to validate or invalidate the transitions between the four foci of empathy, interpretation, education and transformation? The symbolic/dialectical Promethean-Epimethean attitude is one particular means of attempting to validate or invalidate these shifts.

Prometheus and Epimetheus (Kerényi: 1951) were brothers and Titans, members of the race of ur-gods who were before the Olympians with whom they came into conflict and by whom they were eventually overcome. Prometheus, Epimetheus (as the husband of the 'infamous' Pandora), Atlas and (in South Africa) Adamastor are probably the best known of the Titans. Prometheus was said to have fashioned humankind out of the earth and he retained a special relationship with humankind. Prometheus and Epimetheus are characterized by their names: Prometheus is the 'forethinker' and Epimetheus is the 'afterthinker' (Jung: 1920: 166).

Prometheus is intimately connected with consciousness, even cunning: he acquired fire for human kind by stealing it from the Olympians. Stealing the fire he secreted it away in a stalk of fennel and brought the glowing ember to humankind. The Olympians punished Prometheus by chaining him to a mountain in the Caucasus, where, in the daytime, an eagle tore out his liver. His torn liver grew back again at night. We see here consciousness imaged in the fire of the Olympians, the sunlight hours and the suffering which consciousness brings. Epimetheus, on the other hand, was characterized by being clumsy and inept in various ways - something of a bumbler. Being Prometheus's brother the Olympians decided to use him as the means whereby they would punish humankind for receiving the stolen fire from Prometheus. They fashioned a beautiful woman, Pandora, and sent her to be Epimetheus's wife. Along with her they sent a box which was full of woes and which she was forbidden to open. Filled with curiosity she opened the box and released the woes and as a consequence humankind has been afflicted ever since. This all seems catastrophic but comfort can be taken from the observation that in fairytales bumblers are often the final inheritors of the treasure, the beautiful maiden and the kingdom.

Prometheus is an archetypal figure of how consciousness may be used to anticipate the effect of a particular action. We use this Promethean capacity in psychotherapy by way of theory and experience driven formulatory devices and trial identifications with our clients (Casement: 1985) when planning some shift of psychotherapeutic focus. The Promethean attitude can guide our empathic reception of the client, our decision to elucidate and interpret, our decision to educate our client or the contribution that we may try to make to transformation through such means as a maieutic presence, metabolism, amplification and active imagination.

In its negative form the Promethean attitude becomes a dreadful and persecutory psychotherapeutic 'superego' whereby a psychotherapist focuses on and demonstrates theoretical and formulatory shortcomings as well as clinical inadequacy and ineptitude. Used in isolation it is also a problematic attitude as it may foster an attempt to conduct psychotherapy using 'memory and desire' (Bion: 1967/1988).

By contrast, Epimetheus is intimately connected with the discovery of truth by consequences. The afterthinker, he is an archetypal figure of consciousness applied to assess the effect of a particular action taken. We use this Epimethean capacity in psychotherapy through our perception and interpretation of the client's response to the shift of focus.

In its worst form the Epimethean attitude becomes a masterful but arid *post hoc* application of the hermeneutic of suspicion to all the events of psychotherapy thus destroying their symbolic density.

Psychotherapeutically we can consider a shift in focus from out of the transitional, symbolic, or dialectical attitude which comprises both (and neither) the Promethean and Epimethean perspectives.

Discussion

I would like to try to filter the case material presented at the beginning of this paper through the notions provided by my re-view of analytical psychology, my re-reading of Jung's 1929 paper and the three symbolic/dialectical attitudes which I have proposed. I shall do this by blending the restated phenomenology of the case material with various of these notions.

At the commencement of her psychotherapy Julia presented very dramatically and I attempted empathic attunement with her. With some effort I managed to become attuned to her and she moved me emotionally. With this she was moved in turn and for a while we encountered each other. However, she then returned to her dramatic presentation and I felt my attunement falter. After a while I judged (through an awareness of position) that the focus of the work had shifted

from requiring empathic attunement to the need to elucidate or interpret in order to uncover analytically her unshared loneliness. Using my feeling of her presence I judged that she was in a position of conflict, but one in which metaphoric statements such as interpretations could be received. I therefore proceeded to interpret her dramatic style as a defence against her emotional life, i.e. as an anxiety-driven obstruction to her coming to think and feel what she knew emotionally. Through the interpretation we were able to reencounter each other empathically. After a while there was a change in her presence that I (in the perspicacious dialectic of empathy-introspection) judged to be a non-defensive lightening of the psychotherapeutic encounter. Into this lightened psychotherapeutic space I started to build some educative preparation for as yet unmade comments on our relationship and the emotions that it evoked. At the end of a session these emotions and our relationship came into focus for her and I again made an interpretive statement but this time without any empathic resolution. Julia took the emotional tension away with her and a transformation occurred. In some way, in the dialectic of gratification and non-gratification of her desire to not be lonely, a symbolic resolution seemed to occur. Maybe thereby Julia met new possibilities of being, met an Other that was there and found that she had appropriated the capacity to be alone without feeling lonely. In the next session I was called upon to witness that transformation with empathy.

The period between sessions provided an instance of the symbolic/dialectical Promethean-Epimethean attitude. In the session prior to the break in question, before I shifted to interpretation and education I had attempted to anticipate with perspicacity what the effect of my interpretive and educative statements would be. In order to do this I had used my formulation of her struggle and had tried to make a trial identification from which I concluded that she would be able to use and tolerate the effects of both the educative statements and the interpretations. When she returned for the session after these interventions, I was able to discover (with afterthought) the consequences of my various shifts in focus from efforts to make empathic attunement to interpretation to education back to interpretation. Her account of her experience between the sessions served us to help validate these shifts and had in fact led to a further shift towards transformation.

Before concluding I would like to share some of my reservations about the adequacy of the argument that I have presented. The general descriptions that I have offered (of empathy, interpretation, education and transformation) may not themselves be clinically adequate. There may be different sorts of empathy,

different sorts of interpretation, different sorts of education and different sorts of transformation and 'lumping them together' and then trying to correlate them with psychological positions may have been ill advised. However, maybe the argument will serve as a stimulus to critical discussion and development of the challenges that it poses.

These reservations aside, our attention is drawn to the value of the dialectical/symbolic and a dynamic, intersubjective view of both psychological life and psychotherapy. Focus on transition helps disclose psychological life as a process rather than a collection of semistatic structural or topographic entities.

Conclusion

All psychotherapists are confronted with the challenge of making shifts of focus and intervention in psychotherapy. They are in this way drawn into the tension between a pristine psychoanalytic abstinence and undisciplined, even promiscuous, gratification of the client. Neither traditional psychoanalysis nor traditional analytical psychology have found it easy to provide living answers to this tension. However, analytical psychology has long dwelt on the hermeneutics of bipolar tension and its resolution through the agency of symbol. In a similar way, psychoanalysis has, in some of its contemporary incarnations, recast itself as concerned with the hermeneutics of the dialectic. In this analytical psychology and psychoanalysis converge.

Thus, the theoretical challenge of making shifts in focus and intervention can be examined using the contemporary, and postmodern, psychoanalytic concern with the notion of the dialectical process and the Jungian notion of symbol. Following on from this the practical challenge entailed in the execution of the shifts or transitions between psychotherapeutic foci can also be addressed. Jung spoke of four different foci in psychotherapy but he did not discuss the challenge of making shifts between those foci. This paper has attempted to address that concern. Using clinical experience and theoretical ruminations in such varied fields as contemporary psychoanalytic thinking, analytical psychology and transpersonal psychology three symbolic/dialectical analytic attitudes can be generated: an attitude of commitment to perspicacity, an attitude of awareness of position and anxiety, and what I have called the Promethean-Epimethean attitude. All three of these attitudes serve the living intersubjective encounter that is psychoanalytic psychotherapy rather than the static, often impersonal, precepts of metapsychologically driven technique. They offer ways in which a psychotherapist can professionally, yet humanly, meet the challenge of making shifts between foci in psychotherapy.

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