

Keeping New Zealand in the World Values Survey, 1985-2019: A Brief Project History and Selected New Zealand Social Trends from the World's Largest Non-Commercial Social Survey

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Abstract

A brief review of the World Values Survey (WVS) is presented. Seven waves of the survey have occurred since the 1980s, in between 50 and 80 different countries, using a common questionnaire of several hundred items covering a wide range of social and political views. The WVS in New Zealand is then described, having completed six waves between 1985 and the latest survey in 2019. New Zealand social researchers are urged to make use of the WVS data, which is freely available on the WVS website, for all waves. WVS data can be used for cross-national comparisons, examining issues within New Zealand and to consider changes in social views over time. Examples of some the most evident social trends over time in New Zealand are presented. These include increasing environmental concern, social tolerance, support for gender equality, and increasing value placed on the Treaty of Waitangi. Declines can be seen in religiosity, active participation in some types of voluntary organisations, a willingness to fight for the country and the use of traditional media as a source of news. Several illustrative cross-national comparisons are also presented including a dramatic difference in attitudes towards migrants between New Zealand and Australia.

Keywords

World Values Survey, New Zealand Values Survey, social and political attitudes and values, social trends over time, cross-national surveys

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Declining religiosity, increasing social trust and social tolerance, declining active membership in certain types of voluntary groups, and increasing value placed on the Treaty of Waitangi are just some of the long-term social trends evident in New Zealand from successive waves of the World Values Survey. Since the early 1980's, the World Values Survey (WVS) has been recording a wide variety of attitudes, beliefs, and values of people in a large number of countries around the world, including New Zealand.

This unique international social science project has seen representative surveys undertaken roughly every 5 years, using a common and very extensive questionnaire containing hundreds of items, in anywhere from roughly 50 to 80 different countries in any one wave. New Zealand, via Massey University, has been part of this project since 1985, completing the latest wave in late 2019.

The purpose of this article is to provide a brief overview of the project, discuss some social trends that can be seen in the NZ data, and to alert New Zealand social researchers to the existence of the data and its potential contribution to knowledge building.

Overview of The World Values Survey

Figure 1, taken from the WVS website, provides some superlatives about the World Values Survey. There have been 7 waves of the WVS, with New Zealand participating in 6 of them. Data from these surveys are freely available for analysis from the WVS website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), in a variety of formats: SPSS, STATA, R, SAS and an easy-to-use on-line format. Figure 2 lists the time frame of each WVS wave.

Figure 1. Broad WVS Characteristics




Figure 2. The Seven Waves of the World Values Survey Available for Online Analysis

2017-2020	2005-2009	1995-1998	1981-1984
2010-2014	1999-2004	1990-1994	

Figure 3, again taken from the WVS website, provides a global map of WVS coverage. The indicated countries may not be found in every wave but will have been in at least one. Part of the reason for this is that funding normally must be found within each country. The global coverage for at least one wave is generally good, save for Sub-Saharan Africa.



The foremost analytical value of the WVS lies in a large common core of questions across a substantial number of countries, undertaken in approximately the same time period, with representative samples. In addition to analysis in any one country, cross-national comparisons are

easily undertaken, as well as the tracking of changes over time. The 7th wave took place in 2017-2020 measuring some 290+ items, in 79 countries. There are several additional countries currently in progress, finishing off the 7th wave.

Each wave of the survey has seen some variation in the core questions, with items being added and some dropped from each successive wave. Individual countries are allowed to add items unique to their survey, which are not covered in other countries; for example, the past three waves of the New Zealand Survey have had several items about the Treaty of Waitangi, showing that the Treaty has become increasingly valued over time.

Data from the World Values Survey are used by and/or cited by a very large number of published articles, reports, and books, covering a wide range of research topics. Figure 4 shows the results of a recent Google Scholar search, while Figure 5 provides a brief sample of recent publications from the same search, illustrating the diversity of topics supported by WVS data

Figure 4. Illustrating the Breadth of The Use of World Values Survey Data

Google Scholar Search, October 6, 2021, Advanced, “World Values Survey”, “World Values Survey” AND “New Zealand”

<u>Citations</u>	<u>World Values Survey</u>	<u>WVS & NZ</u>
Since 2021	2970	520
Since 2020	6820	1150
Since 2017	16,700	2960
Anytime	40,400	8060

Figure 5. A Few Recent Pieces of Research Illustrating the Diversity of WVS Data Use

1. Giving up on God: The Global Decline of Religion, RF Inglehart - Foreign Aff., 2020 - HeinOnline
2. Political freedom, education, and value liberalization and deliberalization: A cross-national analysis of the world values survey, 1981-2014, TH Zhang - The Social Science Journal, 2020 - Taylor & Francis
3. The U-shaped relationship between happiness and age: evidence using world values survey data, EL Beja - Quality & Quantity, 2018 – Springer
4. A quantitative analysis of global environmental protection values based on the world values survey data from 1994 to 2014, Q Li, B Wang, H Deng, C Yu - Environmental monitoring and assessment, 2018 – Springer
5. Muslims, Religiosity, and Attitudes Toward Wife Beating: Analysis of the World Values Survey, DS Chon - International Criminology, 2021 – Springer
6. Beliefs and Economic Growth: Cross-National Evidence Based on the World Values Survey (WVS), J Shuguang, S Tao - China Economist, 2017 - search.proquest.com
7. Who Favors Education? Insights from the World Values Survey, H Feldmann - Comparative Sociology, 2020 - brill.co

The New Zealand Values Survey/The World Values Survey in New Zealand



The New Zealand survey has been undertaken six times: 1985, 1989, 1998, 2004, 2011, and 2019. The last four times have followed a common methodology, involving a self-completed postal questionnaire, with a probability sample drawn from the NZ Electoral Roll. Although there is variability across countries, the desired norm for the WVS is face-to-face interviewing. Given the cost of such a method, and the state of research funding in New Zealand, interviewing has not been a realistic option. Online surveys are also arguably unrealistic, given the very substantial length of the survey, and the difficulty of drawing an online representative probability sample of adult New Zealanders.

Obtaining funding has consistently been the major challenge for the NZ survey. Far more time has always been spent seeking funding than in doing the survey, or indeed analysing the results. For the last NZ survey, three separate Marsden Fund applications, over four years, never got further than the first round. In the end a sum covering just the basic costs of the electoral roll, word-processing, postage, paper, printing, and data entry was obtained from other sources* There was no funding for salaries or research assistants.

The latest NZ wave saw an initial sample of about 3000 drawn from the NZ Electoral Roll. Māori on either the general or Māori roll were identified and oversampled to boost their response rate, as was the case with the three previous NZ surveys. Three postings to this sample were made in 2019: at the end of June, as well as early August and mid-September to non-responders. The first two contained a full questionnaire, cover letter and a postage paid return envelope; the third was just a reminder letter, urging participation. By early November this established process produced a response rate of about 30%, with N=854. To boost the total number of completed surveys an additional sample of 1000 was drawn and sent one mailout. The final N was 1059, with a 28+% response rate.

Figure 6 attempts to list the main areas covered by items in the 2019 World Values Survey in New Zealand. Many of the listed areas cover a substantial number of individual variables. In some instances, items are in the NZ survey, but are not part (or no longer a part) of the WVS core questionnaire. All of the items in the WVS core questionnaire were included in the 2019 NZ Survey,

as well 90 odd additional items. These additional items included unique NZ questions, as well as some items from earlier WVS waves, to allow the measurement of change over time.

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Figure 6. Main Areas of 2019 NZ WVS (around 330+ Variables)

- Importance of broad areas of life (like family, leisure time, work, etc)
- Happiness
- Health
- Qualities Children should have
- Trusting people and sharing
- Degree of Participation in different types of Voluntary Organisations
- L** -Environmental Beliefs and Practices
- Types of People not wanted as neighbours
- Work, including issues of gender and age
- Satisfaction with finances, life as whole, control over life
- Conjugal Status
- No. of Children
- Gender roles
- Important aims for country in next 10 years
- Different Sources of News
- Most Serious Broad Problem in World
- Issues of Science and Technology
- Political Interest and Types of Action
- X** -Questions re. Treaty of Waitangi
- Neoliberal Beliefs
- X** -Government Spending in Many Broad Areas
- X** -Support or Opposition to a Variety of Possible Government Actions
- Views of Immigration and Effects of Immigrants on Society
- Trust of Different kinds of people
- Confidence in a large no. of different institutions
- A variety of views on politics, political leadership, democracy, roles of government & human rights
- Roles of International Organisations
- L** -Degree public opinion can influence government
- X** -Views on Poverty in NZ
- Feelings about safety, security, and crime (largely personal and neighbourhood)
- Broad issues respondents worry about
- Importance of Freedom v. Equality, or v. Security
- Deprivation in last 12 months (like food, medicine, income, shelter)
- Many items on religious beliefs and practices, and feelings about a wide variety of morality issues
- Government surveillance
- X** -Belief in Evolution
- Items on Corruption
- National v. Local identity
- Immigrant or not
- L** -Ethnicity, both Census type definition, and "above all else I am"

L -Political Party preference, 1st & 2nd choice, and ones I would never vote for
-Wide variety of demographic/background characteristics

L = Items much more extensive in the NZ survey and more limited in WVS core questionnaire.

X = Items not in the WVS core questionnaire, but in the NZ survey.

Some Trends Over Time in New Zealand Values Survey Indicators

With six New Zealand surveys since 1985, and hundreds of variables, the potential number of interesting analyses is very large. The time coverage varies with specific items. There are a relatively limited number that go back to the 1985 survey, but quite a substantial number that run from 1998 through 2019.

Figure 7 lists some of the evident trends in the New Zealand data, in broad terms. This is followed by a selected number of items showing more detail, including some trends broken down by age, as an independent variable. There is also an interesting and illustrative international comparison of attitudes toward immigration that shows some very substantial differences between New Zealand and Australia. Finally, a brief international comparison of attitudes toward freedom is presented, contrasting four of the Five Eyes nations with four East Asian countries, illustrating the potential for cross-national comparisons. The intent here is not a comprehensive report, but rather providing a sense of the richness of the data.

Figure 7. Some Broad Trends Over Time from the World Values Survey in New Zealand

1. Strongly Declining Religiosity on many indicators.
2. Increasing Agreement that “Most people can be trusted”.
3. Generally Increasing Support for the Environment and Related Issues.
4. Increasing Social Tolerance
 - a. As neighbours for:
 - Homosexuals
 - People with Aids
 - Emotionally Unstable
 - Maori
 - Pacifica
 - People Speaking a Different Language
 - b. On Morality Issues:
 - Homosexuality
 - Abortion
 - Divorce
 - Suicide
 - Prostitution
 - Pre-marital sex
 - Euthanasia
 - (not for dishonesty issues)
5. Decline in Active Membership in Certain Types of Voluntary Organisations.
6. Increasing Support for Gender Equality.
7. Increasing Value Placed on the Treaty of Waitangi.
8. Confidence in Certain Institutions


<u>Increasing Confidence:</u>	<u>Decreasing Confidence:</u>
The Armed Forces	The Press
Trade Unions	Television
Political Parties	
Parliament	
The Public Service	
Environmental Organisations	
Women’s Organisations	
Community Organisations (Marae, local groups, etc.)	
9. For future society, increasing support for it being a good thing if there was less importance placed on work in our lives.
10. Declines in use of Traditional Sources of News about country and world.
11. A modest leftward shift (on a 10 point left-right scale) politically (with an increasing standard deviation – wider spread).
12. Increase in support for tighter government regulation of big companies and multinationals.
13. Decline in blaming the individual for their poverty.
14. Decline in willingness to fight for your country, in case of war.

Figure 8 provides two examples of diminishing religiosity over time; the percent saying they have no religion and whether they consider themselves a religious person. Both show quite a notable

change. Those who consider themselves to be a religious person, drops from over half in 1998, to a little more than a third in 2019. The graph shows a breakdown by age over time for those having no religion. All age groups show an upward movement in “no religion” since the 1980’s, with the younger ages (under 50) reaching levels above 65% by 2019. Similar trends showing declining religiosity are evident across more than eight different indicators in the NZ survey, including active church membership, attendance at religious services, belief in God and other aspects of belief like sin, heaven, etc. This trend is consistent with evidence from the New Zealand Census and appears to be happening in many countries around the world (Inglehart, 2021).

Figure 8. Strongly Declining Religiosity on Many Indicators

Examples: <u>What is your religion? % Saying “No Religion”</u>		<u>Independent of Religious Attendance, are you a religious person? % Saying Yes</u>	
1985	21.2%	1998:	52.4%
1989 & 1998:	16.6%	2004:	49.8%
2004:	30.9%	2011:	46.7%
2011:	37.8%	2019:	35.4%
2019:	49.0%		



Despite much contemporary social commentary about increasing social and political divisions and concerns about social cohesion within many societies, including New Zealand, a simple question asking whether most people can be trusted shows quite a consistent upward trend over time in trust, from about 38% in 1989 to nearly 60% in 2019 (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Increasing Agreement that most people can be trusted

<u>Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?</u>	
<u>% Most people can be trusted</u>	
1989:	37.9%
1998:	49.1%
2004:	51.2%
2011:	56.8%
2019:	59.4%

The New Zealand survey (unlike the WVS core questionnaire) has a substantial number of items tapping into environmental attitudes and behaviours. While the trends over time in this area are not quite as dramatic and clear as with declining religiosity, there is a clear pattern overall of increasing environmental concern as well as an increase in behaviours that could be seen as environmentally progressive (like recycling/reuse, willingness to pay higher prices to help the environment). Figure 10 illustrates the results from 2 of about 18 environmental items. A question about prioritising the environment over economic growth shows a reasonably consistent upward trend since 1998, which applies across all age groups. The younger age groups have the highest levels giving priority to the environment over economic growth, touching around 80% in 2019. The second item shows a large jump in the belief that climate change is caused mainly by human activities between 2011 and 2019.


Figure 10. Generally Increasing Support for Environment and Related Issues

Example: Environment should be given priority even if there is slower economic growth and some job loss

1998:	50.4%
2004:	65.0%
2011:	52.5%
2019:	70.6%

Example: Which do you personally believe about climate change:

	<u>2011</u>	<u>2019</u>
Happening now, mainly caused by human activities	57.4%	71.9%
Happening now, mainly caused by natural forces	38.7%	25.8%
Not happening now	3.9%	2.3%



Since the 1998 NZ survey, a series of items have asked how respondents felt about having a wide variety of different types of people as neighbours (some 15 categories in 2019), asking for an indication of those they would not want as neighbours. For some there is a clear increase in social tolerance by this measure (see 4a in Figure 7 above), for some there is a decrease in tolerance (for example, political extremists), and for some there is no clear trend. There is also a very clear

dichotomy among the 15 categories with respect to the relative magnitude of intolerance, with five in 2019 (emotionally unstable, having a criminal record, political extremists, heavy drinkers, drug addicts) ranging from 48 percent to 80 percent not wanted as neighbours, while the other 10 groups are all under 10 percent.

The upper half of Figure 11 illustrates one of the clearest increases in social tolerance, with the percent not wanting homosexuals as neighbours dropping from 22 percent in 1998, to less than 8 percent in 2019. This item is broken down by age. There is generally a clear increase in tolerance over time for most of the age groups, and it is evident that intolerance here is generally higher with greater age.

Another set of items (20 in 2019) asks how justifiable a variety of circumstances are on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 being never justifiable to 10 being always justifiable. These are items that generally could be seen as morality issues. For some there is a clear increase in the average rating of how justifiable they are seen to be (see 4b in Figure 7), for some there is a clear decrease in justifiability and for some there is no clear trend. There is a relatively clear separation into three groups in this list, with 11 items (largely matters of dishonesty or violence) having very low justification averages (2.15 or less in 2019), 5 matters have high justification averages of 6.8 to 7.9 in 2019 (abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, divorce, and premarital sex), and four are in the middle from 3.8 to 5.7 (suicide, death penalty, prostitution, casual sex).

The lower part of Figure 11 illustrates how two of the items (abortion and divorce) with higher justification averages have increased substantially since 1998, and how a dishonesty item (cheating on taxes) has seen its rather low justification average fall from 1998 to 2019 from about 2.3 to 1.8.

Figure 11. Increasing Social Tolerance

Example: Homosexuals, Not wanted as Neighbours:

	<u>Overall</u>	<u>By Age:</u>	<u>18-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60-69</u>	<u>70+</u>	<u>Total</u>
1998:	22.3%		18.8%	17.4%	15.6%	20.1%	30.6%	40.4%	22.3%
2004:	17.3%		5.4%	13.9%	14.9%	15.5%	21.8%	33.9%	17.2%
2011:	14.7%		13.0%	12.7%	10.9%	9.2%	15.4%	26.3%	14.5%
2019:	7.6%		4.7%	2.2%	7.4%	3.4%	6.4%	14.1%	7.6%

Examples: How Justifiable is (1=never; 10=always):

Abortion

1998 Mean:	5.08
2004 Mean:	5.27
2011 Mean:	5.21
2019 Mean:	6.81

Divorce

1998 Mean:	6.29
2004 Mean:	6.66
2011 Mean:	6.64
2019 Mean:	7.79

Cheating on taxes if you have a chance

1998 Mean:	2.31
2004 Mean:	2.15
2011 Mean:	1.88
2019 Mean:	1.79

In the 2019 survey, respondents were asked about their participation in 12 different types of voluntary organisations, indicating whether they were an active member, an inactive member or

not a member. The first part of Figure 12 shows the active membership responses for 3 of the voluntary group types, where there is a clear pattern of substantial decline in active participation over time. For the other types of voluntary organisations, the patterns of change were not as clear and generally very modest in scale. The Sport/Recreation category saw the largest drop, of over 10 points between 1998 and 2019, with Art/Music/Education dropping 6 points and Religious Organisations dropping over 5 points. None of the 12 types showed a substantial increase in active membership; the largest 21 year gain was only +1.1 percentage points for Political Parties.

The 2019 NZ survey contained 10 items asking about gender roles, including issues about jobs, working mothers, income, importance of education and business and political leadership. They all tended to show increasing support over time for gender equality. The second part of Figure 12 shows one example, the percentage that strongly disagreed with the statement that men make better political leaders than women, broken down by age groups. There is a massive increase over 21 years from 17.3% to 43.0% (total disagreement – strongly disagree & disagree - in 2019 was 93.5% compared to 82.2% in 1998). It is also clear that there was a substantial increase in strong disagreement in each age group over time, but that the age differential remains, with the older age groups being substantially less likely to strongly disagree.

Since 2004, two questions about the Treaty of Waitangi were asked, namely how much they knew about the Treaty and what value they gave to the Treaty. The last item in Figure 12 shows the percentage saying that the Treaty is important or very important (rather than unimportant or irrelevant), again broken down by age groups. There is quite a substantial increase in viewing the Treaty as important, rising from about 50% in 2004 to about 72% in 2019. Such substantial increases over time are also evident in each age group, although an age differential is evident throughout, where the older groups are notably less likely to view the Treaty as important.

Figure 12.
Decline in Active Membership in Certain Types of Voluntary Organisations

<u>Percent Active Member:</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>2011</u>	<u>2019</u>
Religious Organisations	21.1%	17.7%	19.0%	15.8%
Sport/Recreation	41.9%	37.7%	38.6%	31.5%
Art, Music, Education	25.1%	25.5%	24.8%	19.1%

Increasing Support for Gender Equality

Percent strongly disagreeing that “men make better political leaders than women do”

	<u>Overall</u>	<u>By Age:</u>	<u>18-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60-69</u>	<u>70+</u>	<u>Total</u>
1998:	17.3%		24.1%	24.5%	22.5%	11.8%	9.4%	5.8%	17.5%
2004:	20.5%		25.0%	25.7%	25.7%	19.8%	10.9%	13.5%	20.5%
2011:	24.1%		28.1%	35.1%	31.3%	26.2%	12.6%	13.0%	24.4%
2019:	43.0%		51.7%	57.1%	58.7%	41.7%	42.3%	28.8%	42.9%

Increasing Value Placed on Treaty of Waitangi

Percent Saying Treaty is important or very important

	<u>Overall</u>	<u>By Age:</u>	<u>18-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60-69</u>	<u>70+</u>	<u>Total</u>
2004:	50.5%		52.4%	60.5%	50.3%	54.7%	45.4%	36.8%	50.7%
2011:	63.1%		64.0%	67.0%	65.8%	68.9%	56.8%	54.2%	62.9%
2019:	71.9%		79.3%	76.9%	75.0%	78.8%	69.0%	66.0%	72.3%

Another area of the NZ survey with considerable potential for examining the social fabric of society involves a set of items where people were asked to indicate how much confidence they had in a long list (25 in 2019) of organisations/institutions. Eight of these go back to 1985, and another seven run from 1998. Number 8 in Figure 7 lists some of the ones with the clearest trends. Figure 13 below, lists two of these broad organisations, Trade Unions and Television. For Trade Unions, those with a great deal or quite a lot of confidence show an increase from 21.5% in 1985 to 33% in 2019. For Television confidence declined from about 44% to about 32% over the 34 year period.

Figure 13. Confidence in Certain Institutions

<u>Increasing Confidence</u>		<u>Decreasing Confidence</u>	
% A great deal or quite a lot of Confidence in Trade Unions		% A great deal or quite a lot of Confidence in Television	
1985:	21.5%	1985	44.5%
1998:	22.6%	1998	37.6%
2004:	28.1%	2004	36.4%
2011:	30.5%	2011	37.0%
2019:	33.0%	2019	31.8%

The last two NZ surveys asked about the different sources where people got information about the country and world, and the relative frequency of use (daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly and never). Figure 14 compares 2011 and 2019 for daily use over several kinds of news sources. Traditional sources such as a daily newspaper, TV and radio news show significant declines, while sources from the digital world show an increase, particularly from mobile phones. Rather large age differentials are also apparent. To a substantial degree the younger age groups have abandoned daily use of traditional news sources. Consider the daily use of TV news. It was about 59% in 2011 for 18-29 year olds, while in 2019 it had fallen to about 16%. For those 70+ years TV news remained high dropping only slightly from 94% in 2011 to 91% in 2019.

Figure 14. Declines in Traditional Sources of News about country and world

	<u>2011</u>								<u>2019</u>							
	<u>Overall</u>	<u>18-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60-69</u>	<u>70+</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Overall</u>	<u>18-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60-69</u>	<u>70+</u>	<u>Total</u>
Daily newspaper	54.8%	33.3%	36.4%	47.9%	60.3%	67.2%	76.1%	54.7%	38.7%	9.4%	15.7%	25.0%	32.3%	47.4%	57.9%	38.5%
TV News	82.4%	58.6%	78.0%	82.4%	80.9%	93.0%	93.5%	82.1%	67.4%	15.6%	35.2%	45.8%	67.2%	81.2%	90.7%	67.3%
Radio News	68.6%	48.5%	61.5%	69.0%	75.9%	72.4%	75.2%	68.4%	57.6%	33.3%	45.6%	55.2%	58.5%	63.1%	64.1%	57.7%
Mobile Phone	24.4%	36.4%	22.4%	26.4%	25.2%	20.3%	15.4%	24.2%	56.8%	70.3%	83.3%	72.9%	60.4%	53.3%	35.1%	57.2%
Email	36.0%	35.4%	33.6%	40.4%	44.3%	37.7%	22.8%	36.2%	38.9%	31.3%	38.4%	44.1%	42.3%	41.2%	33.8%	39.1%
Internet	52.9%	69.0%	66.7%	61.7%	51.6%	39.0%	31.4%	53.1%	65.3%	81.3%	78.0%	79.7%	70.1%	62.1%	46.2%	65.3%
Social Media	N.A.								42.8%	71.9%	71.4%	60.1%	45.9%	33.0%	19.5%	42.6%

Since 1985, participants have been asked where they would place their views on political matters, in terms of “the left” and “the right”, on a ten-point scale (1=left, 10=right). In Figure 15, the mean score over time shows a clear, albeit moderate, shift toward the left, from about 6.5 to about 5.5. Note that these averages are still very much in the centre of the spectrum, but the standard deviations are increasing over time. Figure 15 also shows a decline in the willingness to fight for the country, in case of war, between 1998 and 2019, by about 10 percentage points. There is a clear age differential as well, although perhaps not as dramatic as in some of the other age breakdowns above.

Figure 15.

A modest mean leftward shift politically (on a 10-point left-right scale) with an increasing standard deviation

(10-point scale; 1=Left, 10=Right)

	1985	1989	1998	2004	2011	2019
Mean	6.45	5.81	5.79	5.71	5.68	5.47
Std. Deviation	--	1.859	1.863	1.924	2.156	2.310

Decline in willingness to fight for your country, in case of war

Percent willing to fight, In Case of a War

	Overall	By Age:						Total
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+	
1998:	65.0%	54.7%	62.3%	64.4%	68.8%	73.0%	67.0%	64.9%
2004:	62.9%	54.8%	56.5%	63.9%	71.1%	62.1%	63.5%	62.6%
2011:	60.0%	58.7%	55.7%	65.6%	58.9%	57.1%	62.2%	60.2%
2019:	55.4%	48.9%	41.3%	56.4%	60.7%	54.5%	58.6%	55.6%

The remaining three figures attempt to illustrate the value of WVS data for cross-national comparisons. The latest WVS wave had a series of items asking about the impact and effects of immigration on the country. Figure 16 presents the results for a general question about the overall impact of immigrants for several selected countries, while Figure 17 compares several countries on the effects of immigration on four specific areas of life (unemployment, terrorism, social conflict, and crime). The primary purpose here is a comparison of New Zealand and Australia, with the other countries providing some context to the apparent differences. While one might anticipate that Australia and New Zealand would be broadly similar on many attitudinal items, the issue of immigration is one realm with very stark differences. Figure 16 shows that less than 8% of New Zealand gave a negative assessment of the overall impact of immigrants, while the figure for Australia was over 41%. This is substantially higher than for the USA, Great Britain, or Japan.

FIGURE 16. IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY, WVS WAVE 7 % SELECTING




Figure 17. International Comparison of Selected Items About the Effects of Immigration on the Development of the Country, WVS Wave 7, Percent Agreeing That Immigration:

	<u>Increases Unemployment</u>	<u>Increases Risk of Terrorism</u>	<u>Leads to Social Conflict</u>	<u>Increases Crime Rate</u>
New Zealand	20.2%	24.0%	25.0%	13.2%
Australia	35.3%	41.9%	44.3%	34.8%
USA	33.3%	42.0%	40.9%	31.1%
Japan	23.2%	37.3%	23.5%	40.6%

A very substantial difference between New Zealand and Australia is also evident in Figure 17 for four specific effects of immigration. In every instance the degree of negative concern about immigration is substantially higher in Australia than New Zealand, ranging from about 15 percentage points more for increasing unemployment to over 21 percentage points more for increasing crime.

Figure 18 presents a final cross-national comparison with some interesting results for eight countries, on two items in the latest WVS wave. People were asked to choose which is most important between freedom and equality and between freedom and security. The nations in this illustrative comparison are four of the Five Eyes countries and four East Asian countries. In this instance New Zealand and Australia are quite similar. What stands out is the USA valuing freedom at a substantially higher level than any other country, and China valuing freedom at a much lower level than any other country.

Figure 18. International Comparison of Two Items Asking Respondents to Choose Which is Most Important, Freedom or Equality and Freedom or Security, WVS Wave 7, Percent Selecting Each Choice

	<u>Freedom</u>	or	<u>Equality</u>	<u>Freedom</u>	or	<u>Security</u>
Australia	72.7%		26.6%	51.2%		46.5%
New Zealand	67.1%		24.2%	47.3%		42.0%
Canada	63.9%		36.1%	49.1%		50.9%
USA	77.9%		21.3%	69.5%		28.3%
China	34.0%		65.4%	7.1%		92.7%
Taiwan	62.1%		37.0%	13.7%		85.8%
S. Korea	64.9%		35.1%	42.9%		57.1%
Japan	57.1%		34.1%	13.6%		82.1%

Concluding Remarks

The main motivation for the authors in continuing to pursue the WVS in New Zealand, despite considerable challenges (particularly the difficulty of getting funding), has been to keep New Zealand in this most remarkable and long-running of international social science projects; New Zealand can remain a part of many cross-national comparative studies, a wide range of aspects of New Zealand society can be investigated by many researchers, and a good number of social trends over time in New Zealand can continue to be noted and monitored.

This article has only briefly touched on some of the more evident social trends. Declining religiosity is particularly evident, along with increasing environmental concern, increasing social tolerance and support for gender equality, a general increase in trusting other people, as well as increasing value placed on the Treaty of Waitangi. Age differentials are generally evident in these trends, but the direction of movement over time is usually consistent within each age group. Perhaps, this suggests an increasingly progressive course for the nation, although there are many complexities involved here that need to be examined.

Also evident are declines in the degree of active involvement with a variety of voluntary organisations, a decline in willingness to fight for the country (if there is a war) and quite dramatic

(but perhaps not surprising) changes in the source of news for many people. Some observers might see these trends as matters of concern.

We invite social researchers to use the data. The items from the WVS core are generally all freely available on the World Values Survey Website. What is missing are the additional items used in the New Zealand survey that are not part of the WVS core questionnaire. There are around 90 such items in the 2019 NZ survey. These are mostly items from past WVS waves, subsequently dropped from the WVS core, as well as some items unique to New Zealand, like a variety of environmental issues and the items about the Treaty. Figure 6 can provide some sense of what is there.

We are hopeful that a website can be eventually established where all of the items from each of the six NZ surveys can be accessed by social researchers.

References

Inglehart, R. (2021). *Religion's Sudden Decline: What's Causing it, and What Comes Next?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.